I think attempting to take the terms of my definition, such as "range of possibilities," and tautologically define them as requiring actual possibility as essentially the same tactic.

His claim is that my position doesn't hold water, and he can only do that if he can work from premises and definitions that I accept. He can't just take his own premises and definitions and thrust them into the mix arbitrarily.

Sure, but the same conditions apply to defining "responsibility" as to defining "choice." He has claimed an internal inconsistency in my position, so he is the one who has to demonstrate the incompatibility between "choice" and moral responsibility according to my conceptions of choice and responsibility, not his own. For example, he can't just toss in the premise that responsibility requires actual possibility, as that premise is not part of my conception of responsibility.

That is correct. I don't think durka and myself will ever agree on a definition of "choice," as it appears that he won't accept any definition that doesn't (at some level) include some direct reference to actual possibility. And my conception of choice doesn't include any such reference at any level. It's possible (no pun intended - I'm talking epistemically) that my conception of choice does imply actual possibility - but it doesn't do so directly, anywhere down the chain.

If he wants to establish that, based on some chain of inference, my premises imply actual possibility, then he must do so on the basis of my premises, that is, any premise he uses in constructing the argument must be a premise he has cleared with me beforehand. It is not valid for him to use premises I don't accept as a way to show that my position is internally inconsistent; when he uses premises extraneous to my position his conclusions can't be relevant to my position at all.

[QUOTE=madnak;19681288] I think this is a use/mention confusion. If you define all your terms in an argument, and then define all the terms in your definitions ad infinitum your argument becomes vacuous. As I understand it, durka is not so much defining "range of options" as using it in his argument. He might be wrong about the implications of this concept, but then his argument fails because it is invalid--it equivocates between two different meanings of a word (this is not a matter of definition or tautology). If the meaning of "range of options" is not clear enough for him to use it without equivocating, then I would say your definition itself is ambiguous and you need to either use an entirely different definition or make it clear exactly why this definition doesn't have this implication.

If he can show that this premise follows from your conception of choice he can. Alternatively, if he can show that it is required for your conception of responsibility his inconsistency claim holds. You are of course right that he cannot just assume that responsibility requires actual possibility.

Obviously whether or not durka accepts your definition of choice is irrelevant to his claim. His view is that there is an inconsistency in your own view, so he has to use your understanding of "choice" to demonstrate this. I think his intention has been to show your concept of choice does imply actual possibility (I'm not sure what you mean by "directly" here--all logical implication is direct).

All he really has to clear with you is what your understanding of the concepts of choice, responsibility, freedom, determinism, possibility, and the other relevant concepts is. Once he has that he can construct whatever premises he wishes. If you think one of his premises is false, you have to show it is false. If you think one of his premises uses equivocal language and so his argument is not valid you have to show that as well. It is not usually enough to just claim that a particular implication doesn't follow from your conception--it is best if you give a counterexample illustrating this.

My respect for Original Position grows...

Then make the case. Don't equivocate. Don't change the definitions of anything. Don't confuse yourself by adding extra ideas that are irrelevant to the point.

An n-tuple is a list of numbers. In the context of your universe, it encodes the state of the universe at a particular moment in time. To obtain the n-tuples that correspond to other moments in time, you require the use of a Turing machine whose input is the given n-tuple (and a time parameter telling you what time you need to compute to). You require that time values are discrete and that your n-tuple can only contain rational numbers.

A process is something that matches the definition of process given earlier.

I've tried both to no avail. But he hasn't given any concrete reason why the definition would imply such a thing in the first place, which makes the latter strategy difficult. How would I go about demonstrating that a particular definition doesn't have a particular implication?

Either way, I don't think the original definition is specific enough for there to be any conceptual common ground. But durka obviously finds my updated definition unacceptable.

Sure, if he can accomplish either of those things. As far as I can tell, he hasn't even attempted to do so.

I mean "accept for the purpose of argument." He needs to argue from my conception of choice, not from his own. And by "directly" I just mean "tautologically."

He can construct whatever premises he wishes on the basis of that understanding. He can't just pull an arbitrary premise out of a hat. He can't just say "you think choice involves action - well clearly action requires actual possibilities, so I win!" I can't prove a negative. The only ways I know of demonstrating that action doesn't require actual possibilities is to look at the definition of "action" and show that it contains no mention of actual possibility. (And of course, he can then take one of the words of that definition and claim that it requires actual possibility, repeat ad nauseum as per his tactic in this thread). The other way is like you said, to bring up counterexamples - like the counterexample of the chess computer that I've repeatedly raised, which is sufficient to address everything.

Wouldn't you require an oracle machine that can compute the halting function? Or, at least have a turing maching 'outside' of the system?

And I already have.
Reality is information.
The representation of that information is irrelevant, only the informational content is relevant.
The arrangement of information that defines a process in the real world can be encoded within n-tuple time frames without altering that arrangement.
Ergo, if a process can exist in the real world, then it can exist within n-tuples.
A process can exist in the real world.

Which of these do you have a problem with? The latter is the only one that is relevant to definitions. The are really just a more detailed statement of the "everything is information" view.

It's already defined as being outside the system. It's just Laplace's demon. Aaron wanted me to put it in math terms, so I did my best and "Turing machine" seemed like the best equivalent to "Laplace's demon."

Nope.

When you say "exist within n-tuples" you are changing from singular to plural. This is critical because it means your process does not "exist within" an "n-tuple"

Your process "exists within" the n-fold product of rational numbers. This is a larger set that exists outside of your universe (since your universe *IS* an n-tuple -- and not merely encoded in an n-tuple). Your process is now no longer "within" your universe, but it's somewhere else.

This also fails to show that an n-tuple *IS* a process. (Hint: The state of the universe is not a process.)

I never asked you to put it in math terms. I would have been content just talking about things as long as you could at least be clear and consistent with your definitions. But when you started down the path of math terms, I went with it because I felt that staying there would at least help you to stop changing the definitions around at will, and help you to realize how much you're flailing about trying to defend this position that has become so obfuscated that you really aren't saying anything at all anymore.

So far, it hasn't worked.

What? You just said that the universe was the set of n-tuples? Now you're going back to the universe itself being an n-tuple?

Pick one.

Regardless, all this implies that a process can exist as an n-tuple, within an n-tuple, or within multiple n-tuples. It only depends on how the information is encoded (which is explicitly irrelevant).

Well, at least we agree on something...

I was trying to indicate that *EITHER WAY* you're screwed.

Since when does "exist as" and "exist within" mean the same thing? The encoding matters because you're screwing around with your conception of "universe" when you do that.

Your problem is ultimately equivocation. Because the words you're using don't seem to have an actual meaning inside your head, you're allowing yourself to switch from one definition to the next, and you're not even realizing that you're doing it.

You want to say that the universe is ultimately information. I think it's crazy, but I can accept that as an assumption.

You are taking this to mean that at any moment in time, there exists an n-tuple that is the universe. Just for concreteness, we'll call it T_1.

But this n-tuple T_1 is not enough to make a process. You actually need multiple n-tuples to encode a process. So you really need a set of n-tuples, {T_1, T_2, ..., T_k}. That's fine.

But now, what is this set of n-tuples? If you said that the universe is a single n-tuple, then you're stuck with this thing that is multiple universes (ie, multiple n-tuples) lumped together in a collection. This can't possibly be saying that "an n-tuple is a process."

But if you go back and redefine your universe to be the collection of all the n-tuples that correspond to specific moments in time, you can still say that the process "exists within" in the universe, but you still can't say that "an n-tuple is a process." The "process" is something that lies outside of the state of the universe at a given moment in time.

I think it's far more sensible to recognize that the "process" is encoded into the Turing machine, which is something that exists outside of the universe (it's not an n-tuple nor a collection of n-tuples), and I believe that this is what durka was driving towards.

But there is just no way that you can make sense of the idea that "a process is an n-tuple" in the setup that you've given.

Your position might be even more confused because you sound like you're wanting to say that information *IS* the process, as opposed to something like information is the *RESULT* of a process.

You're the one switching terms, and I'm going along with you every time you do it. It doesn't matter, because all of the scenarios apply. We are talking about the forms in which it is possible for a process to exist - all of the encoding forms qualify.

"Exist as" and "exist within" mean the same thing in terms of n-tuples based on your statement that an n-tuple is a series of numbers. If a series of numbers can exist within another series of numbers, then that series of numbers can also exist independently. And if a series of numbers can be expressed independently, it can be inserted into another series of numbers.

Huh? No. That's my model of the universe, it's not part of the claim that the universe is information. That the nature of a particular thing lies in the information content of that thing and has nothing to do with how that information is stored.

The storage medium is irrelevant. What's relevant is the information content itself. It doesn't matter whether it's contained in an n-tuple, distributed throughout multiple n-tuples, written in a book, stored on a hard disk, or written into the laws of physics.

This comic expresses the concept concisely. It doesn't matter that it's just a bunch of rocks - we experience it as a universe because it contains the information content of a universe. ANYTHING that has the information content of a universe, rocks, n-tuples, mooing cows, computer memory, anything, will be experienced as a universe.

And the process of, for example, capillary action, occurs within those rocks in the comic. Because capillary action exists within the simulated universe, and the simulated universe exists within the arrangements of rocks over time, so capillary action exists within the arrangements of rocks over time. It's really a fairly common concept, I'm surprised that you find it so alien. Do you read any pulp science fiction or watch mind-**** animes?

I have never said an n-tuple "is" a process. I've said it can be a process, depending on its information content.

So it's good that I'm not trying to make sense of that idea.

EVERYTHING IS INFORMATION AND INFORMATION IS EVERYTHING.

That is the whole. Effing. Point.

Words like 'choice' and 'control', as used in any context except for a misguided philosophical discussion, are understood by reference to an experience -- in this case, the experience of "making a choice". In the sense that the word is commonly used, a five year old understands it as well as we do, because they know what it feels like to make a choice. I see little benefit in pursuing any further reductionism here. Perhaps you'll take issue with this unsophisticated approach, but it is clear that many people use the word choice without embedding anything about indeterminism into it, and I see little reason to interpret the experience we associate with 'choosing' any differently under a deterministic framework.

It's probably not the only condition, but being able to 'choose' is certainly one of the conditions for moral responsibility. In response to your last question, this framework obviously precludes trees and waves from being considered responsible.

Edit: Apologies for the grunch, my curiosity was piqued by this thread's peculiar popularity .

You do know that if (1, 2) is the a particular n-tuple, then you can't have (1, 2, 3) as another n-tuple IN THE SAME SENSE, right? So "exist as" and "exist within" cannot possibly mean the same thing. Welcome to equivocation-land.

Except that we're talking about a particular claim involving n-tuples. You can claim "EVERYTHING IS INFORMATION AND INFORMATION IS EVERYTHING" and set up this equivalence between the two categories. But unfortunately, it says absolutely nothing about the claim at hand.

The claim:

I don't know how you think you're able to divorce this claim from what an n-tuple is.

I'm not even going to bother reading or responding to the rest of this. You clearly can't keep simple concepts straight.

For the record:

Everything is information and information is everything?

Do you know how stupid that sounds?

You've basically said that x is something if and only if it is information. So, you're giving information the same ontology as a rock?

If (1, 2) is a process, then an n-tuple is a process, and a process exists within the n-tuple (1, 2, 3). So if (1, 2) is a process, then it is possible for an n-tuple to be a process and it is likely possible for a process to exist within an n-tuple.

What's problematic about that?

If everything that exists in reality is a finite arrangement of information, and a process exists in reality, then a process is a finite arrangement of information. If an n-tuple can store any finite arrangement of information, and a process is a finite arrangement of information, then an n-tuple can store a process.

Also, interested in an IQ test? There's probably a significant potential for gain if the guy is honest.

No, the rock is an illusion. Only information exists. What we call a "rock" is a particular type of arrangement of information.

I was the one who posted on it in twoplustwo elsewhere (your article is better than the one I posted). It was in a discussion on quantum mechanics. Basically, the point of this new research is that quantum mechanics methodology works for large objects. Theoretically, quantum mechanics should not be size dependent. Practically, however, this has shown to be difficult. There can be a quantum elephant, but we don't have the methods of producing one, goes the theory.

It is super-de-duper relevant. If quantum mechanics is correct. Wait, bad wording... If quantum mechanics is an accurate description of how the universe works, as opposed to being only a probablistic method of predicting the universe, then this is very problematic for determinism.

I happen to believe Einstein in that "I think that a particle must have a separate reality independent of the measurements. That is an electron has spin, location and so forth even when it is not being measured. I like to think that the moon is there even if I am not looking at it."*

Please note the concept of choice in the second to last paragraph of the article you cited. Specifically the choice is made due to observance by an outsider to the quantum entanglement. This, I think, creates some huge problems for free will. The choice being caused by something (observance from outside the entanglement) other than the choser is not exactly free. Right?

**

Science can shrink or constrain free willness. It probably can't entirely disprove it.****

As we progress (in science), we show the world to be more and more determinable. There is always some amount of error though. The error of prediction of human predicion = +/- where the concept of free will resides.***

*Appeal to authority fallacy noted.

**At this point in writing, I heard beeping upstairs. I went up to see what it was. My oven was on fire. It was VERY on fire. I got so absorbed in this that I forgot that I had put some food under the broiler. I discovered something new: my oven has a fire alarm built in. I am not happy to have discovered this feature.

***Gettin all up in your face with philosophy of science 101.

****Not exactly the same, but I believe this is similar to durka's "god's existence is underdetermined" concept. You can rule out certain gods as being silly (due to empirical study and simple logic), but you cannot altogether rule out the existence of all possible gods if you set the definition of god super loosely.*****

*****Durka, we need to discuss this at greater length, since I think it would be fun.******

******If we do, I am claiming that you take place in the conversation because you must. /thread

It has nothing to do with compatiblism at all. I think we have established that they (compatibilists) are either lying or silly. OR that they accidentally have some truth or can't explain it.

Popper's demon has everything to do with my line of thinking though. Sort of. Kind of. In a way.

There is no chance this can make sense, in the end. Either you make choices because of nothing (free will) or you do because of something (determinism) It is a wobbly non-existant philosophical bridge between our line of thoughts though. I notice a change in your consideration of position here, and right or wrong in your positional change, I am proud to know you.

You don't even know what an n-tuple is, do you? You really don't see the gigantic and blatantly obvious error you are committing here? A 2-tuple does not "exist as" a 3-tuple, and you can't say that a 2-tuple "exists within" a 3-tuple and make it meaningful (otherwise you destroy your 3-tuple and simply turn it into a multi-set, which is not the same thing).

Are you really going to hang your hat on "exists as" and "exists within" are really the exact same relationship? You simply cannot say that "X exists as Y" and "X exists within Y" with the same X and Y used in the same sense, and have this be meaningful. You will always need to alter one or the other.

"madnak exists as an SMP poster."
"madnak exists within an SMP poster."

They are NOT the same.

According to you "EVERYTHING IS INFORMATION AND INFORMATION IS EVERYTHING." What is this "arrangement" of information? Is the arrangement included in everything? If so, then why not just call it information? Do you really not see the equivocation going on? Let's restate what you just said, but replace "arrangement of information" with information.

Did we consent that "an n-tuple can store any information"? Not unless you let n tend to infinity. But that would be a butchering of what an n-tuple is. But you don't know this because you don't seem to know what an n-tuple is.

This is not the position of determinism. Determinism should not be confused with cause-and-effect. Cause-and-effect still exists in a libertarian universe. Free will is not "caused by nothing." But whatever it is caused by (perhaps "agency") is not encoded within the universe. It's "somewhere else" (whatever that means). That is, the state of the universe does not contain complete information regarding "agency."