Again...NO!!! This is NOT philosophy. You don't just define terms as you want them to be...if there's an area of debate, you try to start with some agreed upon definitions and go from there. The idea is that compatibilists/libertarians/etc. ALL agree on what "responsibility" means but they disagree over whether the conditions for responsibility are compatible with the determinist thesis.

Part of the debate is definitely over making more precise what we mean by 'responsible' but all camps agree on what they're working on...the question is whether such a conception of responsibility is compatible with determinism. The incompatibility thesis is really the only area of disagreement that cuts between libertarians and compatibilists.

(This is also in response to your follow-up) I question whether you really understand what 'pragmatic' means in a philosophical sense. Pragmatism is about truth conditions and truth-aptness of concepts. You can't be a non-pragmatist about metaphysics and yet be a pragmatist about language. That's a contradiction. If you think that it's meaningful to talk about the differences between determinism and indeterminism, then you think that there's a meaningful difference in the words...furthermore, if you think that there's a FACT OF THE MATTER about whether the determinist thesis is true or false, even if it makes no practical difference then you are NOT a pragmatist. It doesn't make sense to not be a pragmatist about metaphysics and yet be a pragmatist about language.

Being a pragmatist means being a pragmatist about everything. You can't pick and choose.

Some successful physicists don't seem to think so. I think the view that the real world is just information in varying arrangements is coming into vogue. But we aren't talking about whether it's true that everything is information, only whether it is logically possible.

Um, this is again just a restatement of the claim you're trying to prove.

That really depends on how deep your refusal to consider any set of assumptions other than your own goes.

Right. So, since you've been using your definitions, show me where compatibilists agreed with them.

Because if they haven't, then by your own definition, what you're doing is not philosophy.

I think there is zero definitional agreement between compatibilists and libertarians, largely because libertarians refuse to give an inch and are supporting an agenda.

But what we're doing isn't that kind of philosophy anyhow. You have claimed that the compatibilists are internally inconsistent in their position. The claim that they're being incosistent is a claim that, according to their own terms, they are wrong. Agreement is no longer necessary.

Ummmm... yeah... because if a physicist writes a book asserting that (from the epilogue) "everything in our reality is made up of information" it's *obvious* that

1) His philosophical outlook is self-consistent
2) His philosophical outlook is meaningful (ie, not vacuous)
3) n-tuples are a process.

"How do you respond to the view that a process is just a particular arrangement of information?"

I respond by pointing out that a process is not a particular arrangement of information BY DEFINITION.

1) A process is one of the following:

2) Therefore, a process in not a particular arrangement of information.

You go down all the rabbit holes you want. You're still not making any actual progress in terms of providing a sensible presentation of your position.

I am a pragmatist about the fact of the matter (at least in your way of thinking). We are explicitly not talking about the fact of the matter. We are talking about logical models.

Regardless, this is just a "death by semantics" tactic. There's nothing preventing me from believing that there is a fact of the matter and simultaneously recognizing words as human behavioral tools. And I didn't say that words aren't meaningful, or that there's no meaningful difference between words, but that a particular word does not have a particular philosophical meaning (unless it is a well-defined technical term, in which case the definition is the meaning).

The onus is on you here. Also, it doesn't matter whether it's vacuous - all that matters is consistency.

This is only true if you can establish that an n-tuple can't fit one of those definitions. For instance, show that the properties that apply to "a systematic series of actions directed to some end" cannot apply to an n-tuple. Or show that an n-tuple can't fulfill the conditions necessary to be "a systematic series of actions directed to some end."

You can't claim that a bale of hay isn't an object because "bale of hay" isn't specifically listed under the definition of "object."

Once again, onus is on you. You're the one who claims the position is contradictory.

I've been using YOUR definitions! And, using them, I've provided arguments for why there is no 'choice' in a deterministic system. I've been using your definitions to do that. The internal inconsistency of compatibilism is that reponsibility requires choice and if choice is impossible in a deterministic system (and compatibilists believe in determinism) then there is no responsibility...but the compatibilists believe in responsibility. This is a contradiction. QED.

If you're a pragmatist about the matter, then you shouldn't even be ITT at all since you think that it's meaningless. "Words as behavioural tools" is not a position unique to a pragmatist. So, merely because you think this doesn't make you a pragmatist. You still haven't demonstrated that you understand what it means to be a pragmatist.

I did that already:

None of these are what an n-tuple is. They're not even close!

Claim: A bale of a hay is an object.

A bale of hay is something that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.

Are we even talking about the same thing anymore? What does a prime have to do with n-tuples being a process?

My definitions of choice has nothing to do with any form of possibility other than epistemic possibility. So you're acknowledging that possibility is not necessary for choice?

If your claim is that possibility is a condition of choice, then you aren't using my definition. You're using a definition that includes possibility as a condition, and that is most definitely not mine.

Yes, which is why all you're doing is semantics.

I don't have to demonstrate that I understand what it means to be a pragmatist. But lol at being in this thread means I'm not a pragmatist. What else aren't pragmatists allowed to do? Truth tables?

Apparently, words you believe in for your own positions. You have taken a vacuous position since words don't hold any particular meaning, and even the meaning that you say they should have from dictionaries don't apply in the most basic settings.

You don't have to be. The pessimist's position is that free will is incoherent regardless of whether determinism is true.

It doesn't have to be ultimate punishment, that's just a way to make the point acute. I think it's ultimately incoherent to say that a person deserves praise or blame for any action he undertakes. Beyond that, I'm personally not that interested in characterizing the nature of responsibility that remains.

I'm not claiming that all n-tuples are processes. Hell, I'm not even claiming anything about n-tuples, though I'll go ahead and claim now that they can be processes.

How about, can a molecule be an object? The definitions of "object" and "molecule" don't sound alike, and when most people think of molecules they don't think of something "visible or tangible."

Is that sufficient proof that molecules cannot be objects?

Words don't have any particular philosophical meaning. That doesn't imply that they don't have meaning. A word definition in logic, for example, can be viewed as a set of classes. Anything falling into all of these classes fits the definition of the word. It's not hard. You do it in math all the time.

For example, we can represent the phrase "prime number" as the following classes:

1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers with no more than two distinct divisors

Any number falling into these two categories is a prime number. Now I can define another phrase, "even number higher than two:"

1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers that have 2 as a divisor
3. Numbers that are not 2

Given these definitions and some premises, I can prove that even numbers higher than two are never prime numbers.

I'm at a loss as to how to explain how far up your butt your head has gone.

I believe some polymers are long enough that they can be seen with the human eye (because they're wrapped around themselves enough). Furthermore, single atoms are visible through the use of an electron microscope.

But I can keep winning this game the other way, too:

A very small fragment can be visible or tangible and be relatively stable in form.

I'm done with this game now. If you want to keep arguing with the dictionary, have fun.

Wow... how desperate are you?

This is not vacuous. You should look up the word vacuous to make sure you know what it means.

While the dictionary definition may not, the CONCEPT of choice does. This is what conceptual analysis is. Welcome to philosophy and not philology.

I'm using your definition "Choice = df, Selecting from a range of options." I'm using that and providing arguments why "selecting from a range of options" as a concept implies possibility; moreover, that it implies a special kind of possibility.

It's funny that you think this is an insult to a philosopher. Semantics = MEANING.

A pragmatist would say: there's no fact of the matter and it makes no practical difference whether libertarianism or compatibilism is the case (if there were a fact of the matter), so it's a meaningless question/debate... /thread (for the pragmatist).

Well, it seems to lead to problems in terms of "choice" and "free will." But you know, you're right. I should just call myself a pessimist and be done with it. I don't need to be a compatibilist in order to avoid libertarian semantics, and the term "free will" is hopeless anyhow. If it all comes down to language, I may as well just call myself a pessimist.

But I don't think that Hume, Schopenhauer, and Dennett are incoherent or inconsistent.

I think the sense of "deserve" that you're talking about is arbitrary at a minimum. But the terms "deserve" and "responsibility" have plenty of value imo. The discussion of whether a criminal is responsible for his actions, for example, is necessary. Well, not necessary, we could just explicitly talk about whether recidivism is likely, etc. But that ain't going to happen.

Great, so my standard of proof (the same standard that you are using) is wrong. It doesn't prove anything. The fact that the definition of "molecule" doesn't have any apparent connection to the definition of "object" doesn't imply that molecules can't be objects. Nor does the fact that some molecules are not objects imply that molecules can't be objects.

Similarly, the fact that the definition of "n-tuple" doesn't have any apparent connection to the definition of "process" doesn't imply that n-tuples can't be processes. Nor does the fact that some n-tuples are not processes imply that n-tuples can't be processes.

It means, among other things, that an axiom in a logical system is false.

You are claiming an inconsistency in the system, the falsehood of the axioms is irrelevant.

Could you quote your argument for this, please (or restate it)?
Would you argue that Deep Blue doesn't choose its next move according to the compatibilist definition of choosing?

Dictionary FAIL.

You don't get to analyze your concept of free will and then apply that analysis to my concept of free will. That is just the same as redefining the term, actually it's just another way of saying it.

My definition is considered as a whole - you can't just define "selecting," "range," and "options" in arbitrary ways and claim that you're using my definition just because the original sentence has the same structure. Only if you are using my definitions of "selecting," "range," and "options" are you actually using my definition of choice.

That's a figure of speech. (Definition 3) "Semantics" used in this sense usually references discussions over what the meaning of a word "is." As I think meanings are assigned arbitrarily (from a philosophical perspective), and that there is no "the" meaning of a word, this is an exercise in dicking around. In this case we're talking about a term that is well-defined, so here it just means "nittery."

Point being, you originally used the word to describe my position on why temporal possibility is not a relevant or meaningful inclusion into any definition.

That would only be true if said pragmatist naively assumed that if there's no fact of the matter and it makes no practical difference whether libertarianism or compatibilism is the case, then it's a meaningless question/debate/thread.

Let's say I offer a pragmatist $1M to post in this thread for a week. Think he'll still exit stage left?

I prefer to use Wiki for terminology. The dictionary is mainly for common language.

I've given it multiple times and also responded to your IBM question.

Choice = df, Selecting from a range of options.

I have argued that there is only a 'range' of options when one could select either of the disjuncts (the "options"). If the options are toast or a bagel for breakfast next week, then I can only be said to 'choose' the bagel if I could have also chosen the toast ceteris paribus. This is important.

It's important because I take 'choice' as defined in this way to require that the 'selection of the option' was not determined. If it were determined, then the other 'options' weren't actually options: they never could have been chosen.

Here are two options: I could choose to eat a burger for dinner, or I could fly to mars and eat a sandwich. If those are the only options, clearly it isn't a 'choice' since I can't possibly select the latter 'option' of going to mars. If all but one disjunct is closed off as impossible for selection (due to being determined) then they aren't actually options and therefore the 'selection' isn't from a 'range of options' and therefore it isn't a CHOICE.

Thus, choice is impossible in a deterministic system.

So, no...properly speaking Big Blue isn't making any choices if it's movements are determined.