durkadurka, you only believe in free will because....(LC)
On the other side, some people define moral responsibility solely based on empirical human behavior. And by that definition, you'd have a very hard time claiming that determinism contradicts responsibility.
Something tells me that most compatibilists define responsibility in such a way that it fits determinism.
Something tells me that most compatibilists define responsibility in such a way that it fits determinism.
Part of the debate is definitely over making more precise what we mean by 'responsible' but all camps agree on what they're working on...the question is whether such a conception of responsibility is compatible with determinism. The incompatibility thesis is really the only area of disagreement that cuts between libertarians and compatibilists.
Well, that depends on your philosophy of language. And while I don't take the pragmatic position per se in terms of metaphysics, I do take a pragmatic position with respect to language. I understand now why you took issue with my raising the question of practical differences - you didn't realize that I was talking about definitions of words.
A word is a tool that facilitates human interactions. It is a container for sets of criteria, that's all it is. If one of the criteria in the "box" is not temporal possibility, then the word doesn't reference temporal possibility. End of story.
I emphatically believe that there is no platonic "meaning" associated with words.
A word is a tool that facilitates human interactions. It is a container for sets of criteria, that's all it is. If one of the criteria in the "box" is not temporal possibility, then the word doesn't reference temporal possibility. End of story.
I emphatically believe that there is no platonic "meaning" associated with words.
Being a pragmatist means being a pragmatist about everything. You can't pick and choose.
An arrangement of information is not a process! (Let me remind you of what you said: "How do you respond to the view that a process is just a particular arrangement of information?")
Do you really believe that going here brings any value to the conversation?
Again...NO!!! This is NOT philosophy. You don't just define terms as you want them to be...if there's an area of debate, you try to start with some agreed upon definitions and go from there. The idea is that compatibilists/libertarians/etc. ALL agree on what "responsibility" means but they disagree over whether the conditions for responsibility are compatible with the determinist thesis.
Part of the debate is definitely over making more precise what we mean by 'responsible' but all camps agree on what they're working on...the question is whether such a conception of responsibility is compatible with determinism. The incompatibility thesis is really the only area of disagreement that cuts between libertarians and compatibilists.
Part of the debate is definitely over making more precise what we mean by 'responsible' but all camps agree on what they're working on...the question is whether such a conception of responsibility is compatible with determinism. The incompatibility thesis is really the only area of disagreement that cuts between libertarians and compatibilists.
Because if they haven't, then by your own definition, what you're doing is not philosophy.
I think there is zero definitional agreement between compatibilists and libertarians, largely because libertarians refuse to give an inch and are supporting an agenda.
But what we're doing isn't that kind of philosophy anyhow. You have claimed that the compatibilists are internally inconsistent in their position. The claim that they're being incosistent is a claim that, according to their own terms, they are wrong. Agreement is no longer necessary.
Some successful physicists don't seem to think so. I think the view that the real world is just information in varying arrangements is coming into vogue. But we aren't talking about whether it's true that everything is information, only whether it is logically possible.
1) His philosophical outlook is self-consistent
2) His philosophical outlook is meaningful (ie, not vacuous)
3) n-tuples are a process.
Um, this is again just a restatement of the claim you're trying to prove.
I respond by pointing out that a process is not a particular arrangement of information BY DEFINITION.
1) A process is one of the following:
process (noun)
1. a systematic series of actions directed to some end: to devise a process for homogenizing milk.
2. a continuous action, operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner: the process of decay.
3. Law .
a. the summons, mandate, or writ by which a defendant or thing is brought before court for litigation.
b. the whole course of the proceedings in an action at law.
4. Photography . photomechanical or photoengraving methods collectively.
5. Biology, Anatomy . a natural outgrowth, projection, or appendage: a process of a bone.
6. the action of going forward or on.
7. the condition of being carried on.
8. course or lapse, as of time.
9. conk4 ( defs. 1, 2 ) .
1. a systematic series of actions directed to some end: to devise a process for homogenizing milk.
2. a continuous action, operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner: the process of decay.
3. Law .
a. the summons, mandate, or writ by which a defendant or thing is brought before court for litigation.
b. the whole course of the proceedings in an action at law.
4. Photography . photomechanical or photoengraving methods collectively.
5. Biology, Anatomy . a natural outgrowth, projection, or appendage: a process of a bone.
6. the action of going forward or on.
7. the condition of being carried on.
8. course or lapse, as of time.
9. conk4 ( defs. 1, 2 ) .
That really depends on how deep your refusal to consider any set of assumptions other than your own goes.
(This is also in response to your follow-up) I question whether you really understand what 'pragmatic' means in a philosophical sense. Pragmatism is about truth conditions and truth-aptness of concepts. You can't be a non-pragmatist about metaphysics and yet be a pragmatist about language. That's a contradiction. If you think that it's meaningful to talk about the differences between determinism and indeterminism, then you think that there's a meaningful difference in the words...furthermore, if you think that there's a FACT OF THE MATTER about whether the determinist thesis is true or false, even if it makes no practical difference then you are NOT a pragmatist. It doesn't make sense to not be a pragmatist about metaphysics and yet be a pragmatist about language.
Being a pragmatist means being a pragmatist about everything. You can't pick and choose.
Being a pragmatist means being a pragmatist about everything. You can't pick and choose.
Regardless, this is just a "death by semantics" tactic. There's nothing preventing me from believing that there is a fact of the matter and simultaneously recognizing words as human behavioral tools. And I didn't say that words aren't meaningful, or that there's no meaningful difference between words, but that a particular word does not have a particular philosophical meaning (unless it is a well-defined technical term, in which case the definition is the meaning).
Ummmm... yeah... because if a physicist writes a book asserting that (from the epilogue) "everything in our reality is made up of information" it's *obvious* that
1) His philosophical outlook is self-consistent
2) His philosophical outlook is meaningful (ie, not vacuous)
3) n-tuples are a process.
1) His philosophical outlook is self-consistent
2) His philosophical outlook is meaningful (ie, not vacuous)
3) n-tuples are a process.
"How do you respond to the view that a process is just a particular arrangement of information?"
I respond by pointing out that a process is not a particular arrangement of information BY DEFINITION.
1) A process is one of the following:
2) Therefore, a process in not a particular arrangement of information.
I respond by pointing out that a process is not a particular arrangement of information BY DEFINITION.
1) A process is one of the following:
2) Therefore, a process in not a particular arrangement of information.
You can't claim that a bale of hay isn't an object because "bale of hay" isn't specifically listed under the definition of "object."
You go down all the rabbit holes you want. You're still not making any actual progress in terms of providing a sensible presentation of your position.
Right. So, since you've been using your definitions, show me where compatibilists agreed with them.
Because if they haven't, then by your own definition, what you're doing is not philosophy.
I think there is zero definitional agreement between compatibilists and libertarians, largely because libertarians refuse to give an inch and are supporting an agenda.
But what we're doing isn't that kind of philosophy anyhow. You have claimed that the compatibilists are internally inconsistent in their position. The claim that they're being incosistent is a claim that, according to their own terms, they are wrong. Agreement is no longer necessary.
Because if they haven't, then by your own definition, what you're doing is not philosophy.
I think there is zero definitional agreement between compatibilists and libertarians, largely because libertarians refuse to give an inch and are supporting an agenda.
But what we're doing isn't that kind of philosophy anyhow. You have claimed that the compatibilists are internally inconsistent in their position. The claim that they're being incosistent is a claim that, according to their own terms, they are wrong. Agreement is no longer necessary.
I am a pragmatist about the fact of the matter. We are explicitly not talking about the fact of the matter. We are talking about logical models.
Regardless, this is just a "death by semantics" tactic. There's nothing preventing me from believing that there is a fact of the matter and simultaneously recognizing words as human behavioral tools. And I didn't say that words aren't meaningful, or that there's no meaningful difference between words, but that a particular word does not have a particular philosophical meaning (unless it is a well-defined technical term, in which case the definition is the meaning).
Regardless, this is just a "death by semantics" tactic. There's nothing preventing me from believing that there is a fact of the matter and simultaneously recognizing words as human behavioral tools. And I didn't say that words aren't meaningful, or that there's no meaningful difference between words, but that a particular word does not have a particular philosophical meaning (unless it is a well-defined technical term, in which case the definition is the meaning).
1. An n-tuple is "a systematic series of actions directed to some end"
2. An n-tuple is "a continuous action, operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner"
3a. An n-tuple is "the summons, mandate, or writ by which a defendant or thing is brought before court for litigation."
3b. An n-tuple is "the whole course of the proceedings in an action at law."
4. An n-tuple is "photomechanical or photoengraving methods collectively."
5. An n-tuple is "a natural outgrowth, projection, or appendage"
6. An n-tuple is "the action of going forward or on."
7. An n-tuple is "the condition of being carried on."
8. An n-tuple is "course or lapse, as of time."
9. An n-tuple is "conk" (a head or a blow to the head)
2. An n-tuple is "a continuous action, operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner"
3a. An n-tuple is "the summons, mandate, or writ by which a defendant or thing is brought before court for litigation."
3b. An n-tuple is "the whole course of the proceedings in an action at law."
4. An n-tuple is "photomechanical or photoengraving methods collectively."
5. An n-tuple is "a natural outgrowth, projection, or appendage"
6. An n-tuple is "the action of going forward or on."
7. An n-tuple is "the condition of being carried on."
8. An n-tuple is "course or lapse, as of time."
9. An n-tuple is "conk" (a head or a blow to the head)
Claim: A bale of a hay is an object.
object (noun)
1. anything that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.
1. anything that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.
Once again, onus is on you. You're the one who claims the position is contradictory.
I've been using YOUR definitions! And, using them, I've provided arguments for why there is no 'choice' in a deterministic system. I've been using your definitions to do that. The internal inconsistency of compatibilism is that reponsibility requires choice and if choice is impossible in a deterministic system (and compatibilists believe in determinism) then there is no responsibility...but the compatibilists believe in responsibility. This is a contradiction. QED.
If your claim is that possibility is a condition of choice, then you aren't using my definition. You're using a definition that includes possibility as a condition, and that is most definitely not mine.
If you're a pragmatist about the matter, then you shouldn't even be ITT at all since you think that it's meaningless. "Words as behavioural tools" is not a position unique to a pragmatist. So, merely because you think this doesn't make you a pragmatist.
You still haven't demonstrated that you understand what it means to be a pragmatist.
Apparently, words you believe in for your own positions. You have taken a vacuous position since words don't hold any particular meaning, and even the meaning that you say they should have from dictionaries don't apply in the most basic settings.
You don't have to be. The pessimist's position is that free will is incoherent regardless of whether determinism is true.
It doesn't have to be ultimate punishment, that's just a way to make the point acute. I think it's ultimately incoherent to say that a person deserves praise or blame for any action he undertakes. Beyond that, I'm personally not that interested in characterizing the nature of responsibility that remains.
Being a pessimist is playing into the libertarian attempt to hijack language. Since when does "responsibility" mean "infinite punishment for finite crimes?" I guess since about the same time that "selection," which is actually defined as "picking the preferred course of action," somehow managed to include the notion that other courses of action are possible.
How about, can a molecule be an object? The definitions of "object" and "molecule" don't sound alike, and when most people think of molecules they don't think of something "visible or tangible."
Is that sufficient proof that molecules cannot be objects?
For example, we can represent the phrase "prime number" as the following classes:
1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers with no more than two distinct divisors
Any number falling into these two categories is a prime number. Now I can define another phrase, "even number higher than two:"
1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers that have 2 as a divisor
3. Numbers that are not 2
Given these definitions and some premises, I can prove that even numbers higher than two are never prime numbers.
How about, can a molecule be an object? The definitions of "object" and "molecule" don't sound alike, and when most people think of molecules they don't think of something "visible or tangible."
Is that sufficient proof that molecules cannot be objects?
Is that sufficient proof that molecules cannot be objects?
But I can keep winning this game the other way, too:
molecule
3. any very small particle.
particle
1. a minute portion, piece, fragment, or amount;
object (noun)
1. anything that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.
3. any very small particle.
particle
1. a minute portion, piece, fragment, or amount;
object (noun)
1. anything that is visible or tangible and is relatively stable in form.
I'm done with this game now. If you want to keep arguing with the dictionary, have fun.
Apparently, words you believe in for your own positions. You have taken a vacuous position since words don't hold any particular meaning, and even the meaning that you say they should have from dictionaries don't apply in the most basic settings.
It's not hard. You do it in math all the time.
For example, we can represent the phrase "prime number" as the following classes:
1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers with no more than two distinct divisors
Any number falling into these two categories is a prime number. Now I can define another phrase, "even number higher than two:"
1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers that have 2 as a divisor
3. Numbers that are not 2
Given these definitions and some premises, I can prove that even numbers higher than two are never prime numbers.
For example, we can represent the phrase "prime number" as the following classes:
1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers with no more than two distinct divisors
Any number falling into these two categories is a prime number. Now I can define another phrase, "even number higher than two:"
1. Natural numbers
2. Numbers that have 2 as a divisor
3. Numbers that are not 2
Given these definitions and some premises, I can prove that even numbers higher than two are never prime numbers.
If your claim is that possibility is a condition of choice, then you aren't using my definition. You're using a definition that includes possibility as a condition, and that is most definitely not mine.
Yes, which is why all you're doing is semantics.
I don't have to demonstrate that I understand what it means to be a pragmatist. But lol at being in this thread means I'm not a pragmatist. What else aren't pragmatists allowed to do? Truth tables?
But I don't think that Hume, Schopenhauer, and Dennett are incoherent or inconsistent.
It doesn't have to be ultimate punishment, that's just a way to make the point acute. I think it's ultimately incoherent to say that a person deserves praise or blame for any action he undertakes. Beyond that, I'm personally not that interested in characterizing the nature of responsibility that remains.
Similarly, the fact that the definition of "n-tuple" doesn't have any apparent connection to the definition of "process" doesn't imply that n-tuples can't be processes. Nor does the fact that some n-tuples are not processes imply that n-tuples can't be processes.
You are claiming an inconsistency in the system, the falsehood of the axioms is irrelevant.
I've been using YOUR definitions! And, using them, I've provided arguments for why there is no 'choice' in a deterministic system. I've been using your definitions to do that. The internal inconsistency of compatibilism is that reponsibility requires choice and if choice is impossible in a deterministic system (and compatibilists believe in determinism) then there is no responsibility...but the compatibilists believe in responsibility. This is a contradiction. QED.
Would you argue that Deep Blue doesn't choose its next move according to the compatibilist definition of choosing?
Dictionary FAIL.
I'm using your definition "Choice = df, Selecting from a range of options." I'm using that and providing arguments why "selecting from a range of options" as a concept implies possibility; moreover, that it implies a special kind of possibility.
It's funny that you think this is an insult to a philosopher. Semantics = MEANING.
Point being, you originally used the word to describe my position on why temporal possibility is not a relevant or meaningful inclusion into any definition.
A pragmatist would say: there's no fact of the matter and it makes no practical difference whether libertarianism or compatibilism is the case (if there were a fact of the matter), so it's a meaningless question/debate... /thread (for the pragmatist).
Let's say I offer a pragmatist $1M to post in this thread for a week. Think he'll still exit stage left?
Choice = df, Selecting from a range of options.
I have argued that there is only a 'range' of options when one could select either of the disjuncts (the "options"). If the options are toast or a bagel for breakfast next week, then I can only be said to 'choose' the bagel if I could have also chosen the toast ceteris paribus. This is important.
It's important because I take 'choice' as defined in this way to require that the 'selection of the option' was not determined. If it were determined, then the other 'options' weren't actually options: they never could have been chosen.
Here are two options: I could choose to eat a burger for dinner, or I could fly to mars and eat a sandwich. If those are the only options, clearly it isn't a 'choice' since I can't possibly select the latter 'option' of going to mars. If all but one disjunct is closed off as impossible for selection (due to being determined) then they aren't actually options and therefore the 'selection' isn't from a 'range of options' and therefore it isn't a CHOICE.
Thus, choice is impossible in a deterministic system.
So, no...properly speaking Big Blue isn't making any choices if it's movements are determined.
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