Not in the sense that we've been using it. Choice is being used in the sense of "being able to do otherwise in the same situation." It would be impossible for this program NOT to have picked the stocks that it did given the same market data.

(You haven't read the whole exchange? What's wrong with you? )

Okay, but so what?
Then you just define choice in a way that it's impossible to choose in a determinitic universe... per definition.
But the way my program chooses stocks or deep blue chooses to accept Kasparov's draw offer or I choose to eat toast is just as good.

Choice is being used in the context of libertarian free will vs. determinism, as in the distinguishing characteristic between the two conceptualizations of the universe.

Edit: And the challenge for the determinists is to come up with a meaningful concept of choice within their deterministic universe that isn't somehow a butchering of the basic concept of choosing (as in concepts that lead to rocks "choosing" to fall).

Then I'm with madnak (I guess)... seems like you define choice just so everybody has to agree that we don't have choice per your definition and then you equivocate and say: "See, no choice under determinism!"

See my late edit. I haven't been following the discussion between madnak and durka very closely, so what I said represents the conversation between me and Brian. The conversation between me and madnak is something quite a bit different. He's currently trying to convince me that a sequence of fractions is choice and cognition (not that which generates the sequence, but the sequence itself).

This is frustrating. A compatibilist believes that free will is compatible with determinism. An imcompatibilist believes that free will is not compatible with determinism. If compatibilists and incompatibilists don't have at least some common features in their definition of "free will," then there is not in fact any disagreement. Just like if I say the light is red (and I mean the color red) and you say the light is not red (and you mean the color is pretty), then there is no disagreement.

Thus, if you want to have a philosophical discussion of compatibilism, you must first come up with a mutually agreed upon definition of free will. I think madnak wants to use a pragmatic definition of free will, but since this is a debate about metaphysics, I doubt that will actually capture the disagreement between the two views.

What's so bad about this result? So you don't 'choose' as we commonly understand it...so what?!

His move to pragmatism was VERY late in the debate...I don't think that he's actually a pragmatist. He may have felt desperate and needed the 'out' that pragmatism offers.

I've been using his definition of 'choice' the entire time and been arguing that 'choice' in that sense doesn't exist in a deterministic system. My arguments on this topic have been entirely conceptual: analyzing what it means to "select from a range of options." I have argued that it's only really a 'range' when you could, in the actual world, choose either of the disjuncts. But, in a deterministic system you can't do that: you could only ever choose one of them. Thus, it's not selecting from a 'range' since it was only the selection of the one you were determined to select. I don't think that this is 'choice' as defined by Madnak...QED.

Obviously hard determinism and temporal possibility (the possibility to do otherwise given the same laws of nature, the same prior conditions, etc) are inconsistent. I highly doubt that any serious compatibilist has claimed otherwise.

Show me a compatibilist who accepts a definition of "choice" that includes temporal possibility, and I'll shut up.

But I think the compatibilists are using a definition of choice that doesn't require the possibility (in some cases, not even the counterfactual possibility) of doing otherwise.

The compatibilists are saying that choice (picking one course of action REGARDLESS of whether other courses of action are possible) is compatible with determinism. And durka is claiming that they are being incoherent and illogical because choice (picking one of multiple temporally possible courses of action) is inconsistent with determinism. His whole argument is to equivocate on the meaning of the terms, and then criticize the compatibilists because his definition of the term (not theirs) is incompatible with determinism.

Most of the other compatibilists have probably left this thread by now, but I'd be willing to bet a lot that their definitions of choice are much closer to the former than to the latter. Using the same definition of choice that compatibilists use, durka's arguments do not hold. It is only by applying a different definition of choice that durka can make his claim. And since his claim is that the compatibilist position is internally contradictory, that is a wholly disingenuous approach.

The compatibilists do not claim that temporal possibility is consistent with non-random determinism. Yet this is the position the libertarians are arguing against. So if they aren't playing language games, then what they are doing is picking at straw men.

Except that in this case, the person defining God as the ground of all being is the one redefining the term. The dictionary defines choice as selection, and selection as picking out a course of action. It shouldn't be necessary to say that the definition "picking out a course of action" applies regardless of whether the other courses of action are temporally possible; if a definition doesn't include a particular stipulation, then that stipulation is generally considered not to apply to the definition. The libertarians here are trying to insert an additional stipulation (that alternative courses of action were temporally possible) to the actual definition of the term. And it took hundreds of posts of wrangling for them to even admit that.

There are other ways to resolve the dictionary definition of choice (by looking up the definitions of the definitions), but all of them resolve to a general definition that includes no stipulation about temporal possibility (and often no stipulation about possibility at all). The stipulation simply doesn't exist in any accepted definition of choice. It is a stipulation that has been arbitrarily added to the definition by the libertarians.

However, since the argument is that the compatibilist position is internally inconsistent, we should be using the compatibilist definition of choice regardless of the fact that it's the accepted general definition.

Not about metaphysics, there isn't. That's why this is, in fact, a debate about language.

That's purely a function of the definitions of "select," "range," and "option." Which are components of the definition of choice.

You aren't using my definition of choice unless you're using my definitions of "select" and "option." I already defined "option" for Matt R., I can't find the exact post but it was something like "a course of action that has been considered." I also broke down the definition of "option" for you, to the extent of further breaking down the definition of "can" including in the definition of option, and demonstrating that there is no mention of possibility in either of them. Even when I was arguing with Jib, I claimed that when ordinary people use the word "choice," they are referencing COUNTERFACTUAL possibility and not any kind of "possibility in the actual world" - you can see that all the way toward the beginning of the thread, look for the ice cream discussion. You never actually asked about my definition of "select," you just inserted your own temporally-loaded version of the term into it.

Funny how no dictionary I can locate mentions anything of the kind in any definition of "range!" It mentions "possible" in the general sense, and that's the end of it. But you are only pushing the problem back anyhow - it's the definition of "range" used by me, NOT the definition fabricated by you, that is relevant to your claim. And at no time in my life have I ever used the term in a way that includes possibilities of any kind other than the counterfactual and the epistemic. (The latter is what I consider relevant in choices, and I've acknowledged that even a computer chess program makes choices if it "knows" which moves are legal. Since I'm explicitly using a definition that applies to computer programs on personal computers, HOW did you figure that I was using a definition that included your wonky notions of possibility?)

Where does it deny my concept of process? Nothing in any of those definitions is mutually exclusive with an n-tuple. Or even a single rational number, for that matter. I'll grant inconsistent with the number 1, mind. A process at least requires multiple elements and a relation of interaction among those elements, so you'd need more than a single digit for that. But some huge prime divided by some other, even larger prime is a different story.

Then why don't you just stipulate whatever meanings you want and declare victory? What's the point of arguing about language?

In my view, the important claim for the imcompatibilist is not that there are no possible definitions (even common or dominant definitions) of "free will" that are compatible with determinism, but that all such definitions will not be able to ground moral responsibility and thus most moral claims. That would seem to be a debate about concepts.

Ahaha, you think you can back up your definition of "choose" as the one people commonly understand? Even in secular countries?

I'm absolutely NOT equivocating. Stop that. Stop setting up straw men. I'm taking YOUR definition of 'choice' and attempting to argue that what it means to 'select from a range of options' is inconsistent with a deterministic system. No equivocation has taken place.

1) that's an empirical question.

2) it's a descriptive question and we're doing normative metaphysics and philosophy of language. Leave the former for the linguists and anthropologists and we're doing the latter: philosophy.

3) yes, I think that I can...but who cares? This is about how people should use language and not how they actually do.

Fair enough. I don't want you to go over the same material again and this thread is too long for me to read, so I won't make you go over everything again. I'll just note that I'm confused about your methodology. I'm not really sure what it matters for a philosophical discussion what the "real" definition of a word is. It seems to me that we can define our terms however we please. The only limits on these definitions are their usefulness to the conclusions we are trying to draw.

Whether there's a 'mention of possibility in either term' in a dictionary is completely irrelevant! We're dong normative philosophy of language: what is implied in the meaning of a word/concept? I'm arguing that the concept of 'selecting from a range of options' = 'choice' implies a certain kind of possibility (which you're calling 'temporal').

That's not equivocating and philosophy of language is NOT done by just looking at dictionaries or how 'normal' people use pre-theoretic language.

Except that an n-tuple does not actually conform to any of those definitions of process. We can even try it directly:

1. An n-tuple is "a systematic series of actions directed to some end"
2. An n-tuple is "a continuous action, operation, or series of changes taking place in a definite manner"
3a. An n-tuple is "the summons, mandate, or writ by which a defendant or thing is brought before court for litigation."
3b. An n-tuple is "the whole course of the proceedings in an action at law."
4. An n-tuple is "photomechanical or photoengraving methods collectively."
5. An n-tuple is "a natural outgrowth, projection, or appendage"
6. An n-tuple is "the action of going forward or on."
7. An n-tuple is "the condition of being carried on."
8. An n-tuple is "course or lapse, as of time."
9. An n-tuple is "conk" (a head or a blow to the head)

None of these definitions actually put the concept of "n-tuple" in a meaningful juxtaposition with "process."

There is no sense in which an n-tuple is "selection" through a "cognitive" "process."

LOL primes. Because primes have everything to do with this entire conversation.

Among most people (many of whom at least apparently accept my definition of choice), there's no conflict at all. But among some people, there is significant conflict. Many people who accept a fundamentally indeterministic conception of choice make claims on the basis of that conception, and take action on the basis of those claims.

The claims that I see justified on the basis of this indeterministic choice include "medication is pointless, kids with behavior problems only behave that way because they choose to," "there's no such thing as rehabilitating criminals, they only do what they do because that's what they choose, and you can't change what a person's going to choose," "we shouldn't study environmental effects on human action because human action is a matter of free will, not science," and "you freely chose not to believe in Christ, so it's just for you to go to hell," among others.

That makes it sound political, but in reality it's more personal. Suffice it to say, I tend to get angry about certain things relating to the free will debate, and what I perceive as the attempt to hijack language is one of them.

And there is a political component. The term "free will" is so bogged down by metaphysical detritus now that it's not worth fighting for. But "choice" is different - it's still a clean, functional term. Libertarians are free to believe that choice is associated with particular forms of possibility without trying to redefine the term in such a way. The term "choice" has plenty of room to be broad enough to encompass both determinist and indeterminist metaphysics, and the libertarians want to narrow it in order to shut out those who would rather not have to reference indeterminism every time they use the word "choice."

Right now, when I use the term "free will" people (libertarian or otherwise) assume I'm talking about indeterminism. But when I use the term "choice," people don't make that assumption. And the libertarians are pushing to change that.

That would just depend on the definitions of what constitutes "moral responsibility."

Some Christian theologians define moral responsibility on the basis of God's judgment of the indeterministic elements of our actions (this is basically the position of Jibninjas) - by that definition, determinism does contradict moral responsibility.

On the other side, some people define moral responsibility solely based on empirical human behavior. And by that definition, you'd have a very hard time claiming that determinism contradicts responsibility.

Something tells me that most compatibilists define responsibility in such a way that it fits determinism.

Let's stick to this one. Why do you think an n-tuple can't be a systematic series of actions directed to some end?

What puts an n-tuple in a meaningful juxtaposition with "process" is an arrangement of information corresponding to "a systematic series of actions directed to some end."

There's nothing about an n-tuple that implies such an arrangement of information, but there's nothing about an n-tuple that prevents it, either.

I'm using primes because the goal is to have a lot of information stored in the number. Large prime over large prime is a good way to ensure that a rational number contains lots of information - any large number will work so long as there is no common factor (simplifying the fraction and reducing the information content), but the easiest way I know to avoid common factors is to use primes.

I guess we can just say "long non-repeating decimal sequence" or even plain old "a rational number with a large information content" if you don't like primes.

Well, that depends on your philosophy of language. And while I don't take the pragmatic position per se in terms of metaphysics, I do take a pragmatic position with respect to language. I understand now why you took issue with my raising the question of practical differences - you didn't realize that I was talking about definitions of words.

A word is a tool that facilitates human interactions. It is a container for sets of criteria, that's all it is. If one of the criteria in the "box" is not temporal possibility, then the word doesn't reference temporal possibility. End of story.

I emphatically believe that there is no platonic "meaning" associated with words.

To elaborate on my above post, the only sense in which I believe norms apply to language is in the moral sense. That is, as a utilitarian, I believe a word should be used in the manner that has the greatest utility (that results in the maximum happiness).

But discussing which use of the word yields maximum happiness would take us far afield, and my opinion should be clear based on my response to Original Position. Regardless, that's clearly not how you look at language.

Well, I think words have usefulness that goes beyond the conclusions we are trying to draw. How we use words influences us at a personal level and at a societal level.

But philosophically, I agree. On the other hand, durka maintains that compatibilists are contradicting themselves, and I have a problem with that philosophical claim.

Please don't tell me you want to redefine an n-tuple of rational numbers now, too. Why can't you simply admit that this setup that you're trying to use is simply nonsense?

An arrangement of information is not a process! (Let me remind you of what you said: "How do you respond to the view that a process is just a particular arrangement of information?")

Do you really believe that going here brings any value to the conversation?