Now you're just talking about what wiki calls temporal possibility. And claiming that choice requires that (it doesn't). Furthermore, you're not talking about the actual world at all, what you're talking about are possible futures, only one of which is associated with the actual world in determinism.

Choice doesn't require that the options being chosen from are temporally possible.

Have we still not got this down? Your claim is that determinism and choice are incompatible. You seem to be saying that all forms of determinism, from "madnakian special determinism" on up to the most general possible form, are incompatible with choice. You are arguing against all of it.

A look-up table is one possibility, not the only possibility. And none of the exceptions I mentioned above are consistent with this model.

Are you denying that it's possible to represent (or let's say "approximately simulate" to be safe) a human and its functions as a "sub m-tuple?"

Whether or not responsibility requires 'temporal choice' (I haven't looked at the link) is a DIFFERENT question than what we're presently discussing.

I'm trying to get you to understand the difference between libertarianism and compatibilism because we can't even have a discussion about which is better if you don't fully understand the positions.

So far you're begging the question...but we're NOT at that discussion yet. We're still in the premilinaries of getting you to understand the full implications of determinism/compatibilism and libertarianism and the real differences between the positions. You're not there yet. I'm optimistic that you will...though!

No, I'm pretty sure you're just talking about temporal possibility:

The fact that you continually deny that you're saying anything about temporal possibility isn't convincing me, particularly since you haven't bothered reading the link.

Put whatever name on it you want, this is what you're talking about. And it has no relevance to choice, responsibility, or much of anything else.

Says you, but the libertarian thinks that it does.

Do you agree or disagree that this is a (the) central difference between the compatibilist and the libertarian?

So what *IS* general determinism? If it's not the definition you started with, then what am I supposed to be arguing with? Right now, you've got a situation where "determinism" is a collection of incoherent (ie, contradictory) statements. So I don't even think it's possible for me to make an argument of the type you're asking of me.

Edit: I guess I can claim that general determinism is false, given the description of general determinism that you've given. And this implies that general determinism and anything are incompatible.

First, you really need "IS" and not "represent or "approximately simulate" because this is actually what your claim is claiming.

Second, this is irrelevant because it's not answerable in the terms that we are using. It's not an empirical observation, and in a real way this *IS* a claim of determinism. I've never once claimed that determinism is false. I've claimed that I don't believe it's true, but I've also recognized that this is an assumption that I'm bringing to the table.

Third, what does this have to do with anything? You've got yourself set up with this universe of n-tuples and you're trying to ask me about "choice" within that universe. I'm telling you that I don't even know how to recognize it given the universe that you've described!

It's not a "difference." It's a ploy.

"Choose" is a word with an accepted definition. Libertarians commonly try to redefine that word in order to allow for temporal possibility. I agree with that. But it's only a rhetorical tactic and a fairly transparent one.

You're really stretching my ability to consider you an intelligent interlocutor.

We're entirely agreeing on these meanings of possibility. What's the problem? You're merely asserting that one sense doesn't happen to actually exist, but do you deny that IF determinism is FALSE then this sense of possibility is meaningful?

There are no tactics here. Yikes.

I haven't described general determinism. But it doesn't matter. You should be able to prove that any type of determinism, any type at all, is inconsistent with choice. This is a direct implication of your claim. If all deterministic settings are incompatible with choice, then any individual deterministic setting is incompatible with choice.

No, it's not. Your claim is about a logical contradiction between determinism and choice - any logical system that includes both is sufficient to refute your claim. It doesn't need to be reality, it can be a model.

What you've claimed is that it's inconsistent with choice, which is the assertion we're discussing. Whether determinism is true or false has nothing to do with anything.

That's the whole point! If you don't even know how you would recognize choice in such a universe, then why are you so sure it's impossible?

Goalpost move. I'm now playing cricket!

*sigh*

It's up to you now to tell me what "choice" means in your universe. Because apparently, when I'm arguing against determinism, I'm not allowed to use my own definitions of words such as "time" because they aren't "deterministic-time" (whatever that means). So what is "deterministic-choice" in your model?

Edit: Alternatively, I can say that choice is actually in contradiction because the vectors don't have it. They cannot be anything other than what they have been prescribed to be. There are no "cognitive processes" involved in the computation of the vectors.

I can't really believe that you're this stubborn or this inept.

Yes, I deny that this type of possibility can ever be meaningful under any natural circumstances.

But that doesn't matter. The point is that this type of possibility has no bearing on choice. Your claim is that choice and responsibility are inconsistent with determinism.

Goalpost move? This has been about you proving choice and determinism incompatible for the majority of this thread.

I've defined it plenty of times. Selection from a range of options through a cognitive mechanism.

This is just LOL. The instructions (now that I understand what you're saying) read as follows:

...

Yeah. It's not there in the vectors.

Right, what you said before. Which was the whole reason I started with the n-tuple stuff. You wanted specified positions instead of unspecified classes of positions.

How do you figure?

So you can at least see the absurdity of your position in this thread, right? When you bring nothing to the table, there's nothing of value to discuss.

How do *YOU* figure? Anything that I'm about to say involving "selection" and "cognitive mechanism" will be subject to your redefinition upon discovering that it doesn't make sense with the usual concepts of the word. So I will add to my characterization of your position:

Wtf does this even mean? And then...why? Without presupposing determinism, how is it that you can take this position?

Bingo: that's the incompatibility thesis. You sound surprised. The incompatibility thesis holds that this type of possibility is necessary for choice and that choice/responsibility are incompatible with determinism.

Please. Plenty of simulations of classical mechanics fit the criteria. Regardless of the absurdity, it's a well-defined position now.

Use the dictionary, then. Just don't add anything the dictionary itself doesn't mention, and keep in mind that if the dictionary says "x, y, or z" that means that any of the three do the job.

Okay...

We will take the special case of n=1, since your definitions should be sensible regardless of the value of n.

So you have now a function f that maps a finite subset of the rational numbers to the rational numbers. And all you require is that this function be computable (that is, an explicit finite-process algorithm).

Dictionary.com definitions

There is no sense in which an rational number in the range of f exhibits any "selection" through a "cognitive" process.

Imagine two worlds.

World 1: It is temporally possible for David to take his degree in either Philosophy or in Accounting. He takes his degree in Philosophy.

World 2: There are no temporal possibilities, save one - David takes his degree in Philosophy.

Care to enlighten me on the difference between the worlds? As far as I can tell, even David has no way of knowing which world he is in. Because the two worlds are exactly the same. He sees the same things. He believes the same things. He expects the same things, cares about the same things, knows the same things. He experiences the same things. He lives the same life, regardless of which world he's in. The two Daves are the same. As are the two worlds.

It makes zero difference.

"Choice" is an English word. You don't get to redefine it based on your philosophical agenda. It is already defined, at least to an extent. And it's not defined based on philosophical technicalities. If you want to talk about philosophical choice, as a technical term, then fine. Depending on how you define the term, I will acknowledge that there is no philosophical choice under determinism.

But normal, everyday choice has nothing to do with temporal possibility. If you don't believe me, grab a dictionary.

I find this sentence humorous in the context of this thread (see "time").

When you're claiming an inconsistency in my position, I get to define the terms. Deal with it.

I've never claimed that all deterministic universes contain choice. You're the one making claims about all deterministic universes, remember? Try again.

I just did. LOL.

Fine. Take n to be whatever finite value you want. My claim is unchanged. I'm doing this to show you that you're still being completely absurd.

Edit: Just so you know, I think we're headed towards "What is a heap?" and "Emergence." Good luck.

You think you can disprove the emergence of cognitive processes?

Sorites is irrelevant here. You don't seem to understand the claim that you're making. If determinism and choice are incompatible, then across every deterministic universe there must not be a single instance of choice.

So it doesn't matter where we draw the line. All that matters is whether any heap, of any size, is "big enough."