Quote:
Originally Posted by durkadurka33
The point is that your brand of "possibility" is empty. It's not sufficient for responsibility: that's the very position that's up for debate.
How does this have any bearing on responsibility at all?
Quote:
Turning to possible worlds will not save you here: it's the wrong move. A Libertarian holds that in the actual world it's an open question whether you'll choose the bagel or the toast. But, for a compatibilist, soft determinist, or hard determinist, it is not: the answer is that you will not choose the toast. We're not talking about possibility in terms of counterfactuals and possible worlds.
Why is that? What reason do we have to talk about anything other than possible worlds? And since you claim to be talking about metaphysical possibility, if you aren't talking about possible worlds then what are you talking about? Can you provide a reference to a philosopher or a system of modal logic that uses "your version" of metaphysical possibility?
Quote:
You need to understand that "metaphysical possibility" =/= "counterfactual possibility." That's only one interpretation and thanks to David Lewis, the debate has moved on PAST that description of possibility. This sort of appeal to authority of (LOL) wiki and (less LOL) SEP indicates that you don't know the debate well enough to know that this has happened: interpreting possibility in terms of possible worlds or counterfactuals has been rejected.
You're right that I don't know David Lewis and I'm not aware of many developments in the last 60 years or so. But I'm not about to take it on faith that there is a consensus against the "possible worlds" view of possibility. Particularly since a quick Google search yielded
this as well as many other contemporary articles that references the view as common (admittedly many are critical).
Quote:
Furthermore, it is not interpreted in terms of epistemic possibility. Given full knowledge of the states (and microstates) of the universe and the laws of nature, no one denies that one would know the future given determinism. Epistemic possibility requires that the agent not have full knowledge of the states and/or laws and/or the computational power to make the prediction. But, that is not what is at issue here: it's largely irrelevant.
Agreed.
Quote:
This is precisely the point: for determinism, it is necessarily false in the actual world that you will eat the toast. Furthermore, it is necessarily true in the actual world that you will eat the bagel next week.
To me "necessarily false" means "false in all possible worlds." So again, this statement reads as nonsensical to me. How do you define "necessarily false" without reference to possible worlds?
Quote:
Do you agree or disagree?
I disagree. I don't see how "actual world" possibility is relevant in the slightest, nor do I see how two things can be possible in the "actual world" in the first place. It seems to me that there is only one reality in the "actual world" - the reality that will actually happen. Outside of a multiverse, two mutually exclusive options can't both actually happen, only
one will actually happen. Either I will actually eat the toast, or I will actually eat the bagel, not both. And the only option that is part of
reality is the one that I will
actually choose. If the future is viewed as "not existing yet," then I would say that
neither option is possible in this reality, as neither option will be part of reality until the choice is made. If the future is viewed as existent, then one of the options is already defined despite being indeterministic - and in that case the choice is what it is, even though we can't know it yet. Either way, only one course is possible
in actual reality, and I don't see how indeterminism can possibly change that.
But even if I did agree that multiple options can be possible in actual reality, I would still say that it's completely irrelevant whether they're possible in actual reality or in a counterfactual reality. Responsibility is the same either way, choice is the same either way, our experience of the world is the same either way, in fact, I can't see how anything is different depending on whether the possibility is an "actual" or a counterfactual possibility. Seems like an empty distinction to me.