I haven't been on 2+2 in over a week, so I'm divorced from the flow of the discussion. Eh, it is what it is.

Only 1 "can be chosen" under determinism. It's not "choice" as you define it since you said that there must be a range of options. There aren't. If only one can ever be chosen, it's not a choice.

More unsupported assertions.

Determinists seem to find these concepts meaningful. So maybe they ascribe meaning according to a different standard than you do. But you haven't actually explained your standard for ascribing meaning in the first place. You haven't described what you believe meaning is, how you believe we can evaluate meaning, why you believe that meaning is fundamentally based on indeterminacy, why randomness isn't sufficient to provide meaning (but free will, the "special" form of indeterminacy, is), or how all this logically integrates.

These are the questions you should be able to painstakingly answer as you bear the onus. But you don't seem to think there's any need to do so.

Only one will be chosen. (That's determinism.) This doesn't imply that only one can be chosen. Will and can are two different things.

Again, you're throwing out assertions with no support of any kind and hoping something will stick. You say that only one can be chosen under determinism? Well, prove it!

I just expanded the definitions to help you out. To say that only one option can be chosen means that I only have the means, power, or ability to select one outcome.

The definition of determinism doesn't imply that directly. If you feel that it implies it in some way, then you should be able to show a proof of such.

Show me how the proposition "the state of the universe at any given time can be expressed as a function of the state of the universe at any other time" implies the proposition "when a person makes a choice, that person has the means, power, and ability to select only one outcome."

You really seem to believe this is tautological, but I don't think you'll be able to pull it off without invoking some additional premises. And if you do that, then I think you'll discover that some premise you view as "obvious" (and assume I agree with) is actually more contentious than you had previously imagined. Either that or you'll realize that your position isn't logical in the first place.

No, determinism implies that only one can be chosen. In what sense do you think that more than one option is open to be 'chosen'?

That the state of affairs of the universe in a year from now, including whether you will eat a bagel or toast on June 8 2011, can be known from today. Thus, suppose that you are determined to eat a bagel. You cannot possibly choose to eat toast...therefore, your only actual option is the bagel. How is it that you think that you 'can' choose the toast?

This is just a restatement of the incompatibility thesis. Which you keep doing. Aaron is doing the same thing, stating the incompatibility thesis over and over in different forms.

Well, we get it. You accept the incompatibility thesis. The logical next step is to explain why you accept it.

You yourself have acknowledged that the majority of philosophers reject the incompatibility thesis, so surely you must acknowledge that there are legitimate reasons to reject it. Right?

In technical terms? An option is open to me if the selection of that option relative to some other option can be expressed as a function of the process of choosing the option. In sloppy terms? An option (action) is open to me if my choice (ie my decision-making process) determines whether that action is the action I take.

I can choose the toast. It might be possible for some being existing outside the universe to predict that I will eat a bagel, but that doesn't mean that I can predict that I will eat the bagel. Even if it did, whether my knowledge that I'm going to eat the bagel actually prevents me from choosing is a complicated question that has no pat answer.

How is it that I think that I 'can' choose the toast? Back to the definition of "can," if I have the power, the ability, or the means (any one of the three is enough - and some dictionaries even list "the skill" or "the qualifications") to eat the toast, then I can eat the toast (by definition).

Do I have the power to eat the toast? Of course. If I select the toast, then I'll eat the toast. Nothing is preventing me, nor will anything prevent me, therefore it's within my power.

Do I have the means? I have the hands to pick the toast up, the mouth to chew it, and the mind to direct and coordinate the actions, so clearly I have the means.

Do I have the ability? Sure. The toast is one of the foods that my decision-making process is considering, and I have the power and the means, thus if I want to eat the toast I will eat the toast. I consider that sufficient to establish the ability.

So as far as I can see, I have not only the power, means, or ability, but all three! The fact that I will not eat the toast doesn't imply that I cannot eat the toast.

Now, in what sense can't I choose the toast?

You're not making any sense. This is an induction issue (like mathematical induction).

This implies that everything happening one second from now can be expressed as having been determined by past events plus the events of the next second. But the events of the next second can be expressed as having been determined by the past.

Therefore, the events one second from now can be expressed as having been determined by the past. And in a very real sense, it has already been determined (since the events which determine it are in the past).

*Yawn*

This is all nonsense.

Dude...just wow. Your argument that you can choose the toast is that some super being can predict that you will necessarily choose the bagel but you still maintain that because you're ignorant of your future that you have a genuine choice of toast. Wat?

This really is nonsense. Determinism directly implies this 'script' which you deny. Furthermore, the future is already determined and 'already' is certainly meaningful. One could perfectly predict all of the universe's states of affairs of any point in the future right now...that's what 'already' means and that's meaningful.

If not, I'm afraid that you're breaking the rules of language.

Here's the difference between determinism and predestination:

Predistination is an intelligently determined future (such as God determining all future states of affairs).

Determinism is an unintelligent determined future.

All future states are equally determined, it's merely a difference concerning the source (intelligent vs not intelligent).

"Already" doesn't apply in this way if it's an induction issue. Nobody would ever say "you can't prove x, because if what you're saying is true then x was already proved on page 3, so your proof is wrong." That type of reasoning would be instantly recognized as ludicrous in mathematics - the fact that x could be derived from the information presented on page 3 doesn't somehow invalidate the explicit proof of x on page 53 - yet you've made it your whole argument itt.

That's the "everyday terms" scaffolding designed to help those who are struggling to understand the actual definition. The reason I lead with the technical definition is exactly because this type of equivocation is possible in the common-language version. If you want to get into a technical discussion then use the actual technical definitions I gave and not the tldr cliff notes.

I don't mean anything metaphysical when I say "has been determined," which you would know if you read the actual definition I presented. You continue to include the assumption that determinism is time-dependent in your posts, and determinism is very explicitly not time-dependent.

You clearly have no clue about philosophy in general or the philosophy of determinism in particular.

The general form of predestination is fatalism, not determinism. You're just confused about this one. (Either that or you believe that determinism implies fatalism, so you've never bothered making the distinction - regardless, a "deterministic" universe is not necessarily the same as a "determined" universe. See the point about time-dependence again.)

Um, I took definitions from the dictionary and gave step-by-step logical explanations of why the situation fit each of the criteria.

And you completely missed the point of the first paragraph - which is that prediction is completely irrelevant. It didn't really need to be said, since all I have to do is show that choice is possible (ie show that deterministic events fit the definition of choice, which I've done). But since viewing prediction as somehow relevant to determinism is a common error, I thought I'd get into it.

I'm not confused at all. Determinism directly implies fatalism. It doesn't for compatibilists but this is one of the reasons that I think that their position is incoherent.

Determinism =/= fatalism

But, If Determinism then fatalism

And yes, deterministic = determined. Deterministic implies determined but not the other way around (since a predetermined universe is also determined but not deterministic...see above post making this distinction).

More unsupported assertions. If my definition really does imply that, then you should be able to formally prove such. Go go go.

No, "already" implies that there is some time at which my decision comes into being, and that time is in the past.

There is no such time, TIME HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH MY CHOICE. So "already" is a category error.

This is a basic function of

I'm not sure that you understand what a 'proof' entails. You start with definitions/axioms (which will include some logic) and derive a conclusion and show that the conclusion really follows from true premises.

I can do that. But, you're asking me to prove definitions. You can't do that. You're making a category mistake.

As I suspected, you're breaking the rules of language.

Wow! This is a wallbanger.

Whoa. Not only are you calling a position that you yourself claim the majority of experts in philosophy accept incoherent, without even thinking you need to back it up (you also seem to think you can merely implicitly assume their position is incorrect when debating the subject), but you also act as if the onus is on them when all they are doing is denying your claims.

And your claims are specifically about logical contradictions (claiming that compatibilism is logically contradictory) and logical implications (claiming that determinism implies fatalism, among other things!).

Yet you haven't even begun to attempt to express your point in logical terms.

I'll give you points for hubris, certainly. I honestly don't think you're capable of being logical here.

Precisely, I'm calling the position that most professional philosophers adopt incoherent (fwiw, this "most" to which you refer is a huge class who've never thought about the issue very much).

No, I'm asking you to prove the assertion that the definition of determinism implies that some "script" exists somewhere in the past detailing all future actions.

My definition mentions no such script, and therefore if my definition implies a script then there exists some direct process of inference leading from my definition (as a premise) to the existence of this script (as a conclusion).

The "proof" would be an enumeration of this process of inference.

If there is no such process of inference, then my definition cannot logically imply the script.

...Along with virtually every top-level philosopher who has approached the subject, from Schopenhauer to Dennet.

And you're calling their position both incoherent and inconsistent, making heavy metaphysical claims as truth (some of which you don't even bother to make explicit but seem to think it's kosher to include as hidden assumptions even when you know how many people disagree with you), and all without one shred of actual reasoning to back you up - you seem to feel that in spite of all this the onus is on them. Even though proving that determinism and free will are compatible is akin to proving a negative, and you are apparently the super genius who has actually identified a contradiction between the two premises (though you naturally can't show anybody that contradiction even when we explicitly define our terms, I guess it's top secret).

LOL. Silly word game. I'm not going to play this one with you.

So you want me to use this one?

And you want to say that this is a "non-time-dependent" definition? Then when you say that every state of the universe can be expressed as a function of every other state, are you allowing reverse-time implications and that sort of thing as well? If so, this is most assuredly *NOT* what determinism means.

And if not... then it's time-dependent.

As best as I can tell, this is the distinction that you're making:

The capacity to calculate is not the same as having calculated.

That's fine. But this distinction is not relevant to the conversation. Determinism does not require that one *HAS* calculated anything (in other words the "script" need not have been "written" somewhere). Determinism is a statement about the possibility of calculating the future state of the universe (edit: that it is always possible from any state to calculate the next state).

And what you are calling "predestination" sounds more like "a supreme being that HAS calculated the future state of the universe" (which isn't really predestination at all).

You're asking me to prove some definition with a process of inference when no such thing is possible. I told you to stop breaking the rules of language. I've provided reason to suspect that determinism indeed directly implies fatalism and provided reasons against your reasons. You've provided no such reasons: you keep demanding a proof which is in principle impossible and commits an egregious category mistake.

That's the substance of your only single logical argument in this thread - "because your choice can be expressed as a function of the past, it cannot exist in the present."

It's absurd. I can't even refute it because there's no logic to it in the first place.

That one's ideal, the other one is also acceptable, the summary is inappropriate.

I already said this. It's not the definition or the function that's not time-dependent, it's the resolution of outcomes or what I'm going to call the "determination" of events.

It seems based on your inclusion of this assumption into virtually everything you've said that in your worldview, there exists some particular time at which reality "solidifies" from possibility. Like, at time t_a my eating toast is a "possible future," and then at time t_c my eating a bagel is a past event (and my eating toast is no longer possible at all). And at some point there is a transition - a time t_b at which my eating toast goes from being a future possibility to being a past impossibility (and which is, at exactly t_b, a present choice).

In other words, the reality of my choice is "open" at all times prior to t_b (when reality is open, it doesn't include my eating toast or my eating a bagel) and reality has been "determined" at all times subsequent (in this "determined" reality, I ate the bagel). And the moment t_b is the determining moment, the moment at which my choice (of toast or bagel) is defined.

In other words, determination in this worldview is time-dependent. Time is not simply a spatial dimension, the passage of time actively creates (determines) reality. Time is like a "zipper," with the present moment "zipping together" the range of possibilities into a single reality (the past). Thus, the past, present, and future are all fundamentally different and they all work in different ways.

And because there is some moment at which a choice actually is actually determined (at which the wave function collapses, if you will), determination is time-dependent in this worldview. It is tied in a metaphysical way to time and the passage thereof. "This moment" is special in that it's the moment in which possibilities resolve, and the particular time at which the possibilities resolve is a property of the event itself. This even seems to creep into your modalities (it's not even clear to me that you include other types of world in your space of "possible worlds," which might explain why you see alternate courses of action within determinism as "impossible" - you are looking at "possible worlds" in a time-dependent way and not in a time-independent way).

So, assuming I'm right and this is (more or less) your worldview. It is a critical component of this debate that this is not how the determinist worldview (or at least the one we're discussing) works.

There is no time t_b at which an event is determined! In fact, the event isn't "determined" at all, because "determination" never happens! The fact that the event can be expressed as a function of prior events (or of future events) is incidental - it doesn't mean that the past has some kind of bearing on the present. You and durka have both used a domino analogy. There are many problems with that analogy. For one thing, there "is" a state in which all the dominoes are standing, and another in which all the dominoes have fallen. In determinism, there is only one state of the universe, and time gives us a "slice" of that state. But more importantly, the domino effect has an "arrow."

Domino 1 falls, which causes domino 2 to fall, which causes domino 3 to fall, and so on. In a sense, domino 1 causes domino 3 to fall. However, in no sense does domino 3 cause domino 1 to fall. THIS IS NOT HOW DETERMINISM WORKS. In determinism, ALL states of the universe can be expressed as functions of ALL other states. Yes, domino 1 causes domino 3 to fall, but in determinism DOMINO 3 ALSO CAUSES DOMINO 1 TO FALL. This is SUPER-IMPORTANT, and yet you seem to have missed it. Even if we assume a linear relationship (event 1 relates to event 2, which relates to event 3 - but event 3 doesn't relate to event 1 except through event 2 - the events stand in a line, and not in a "web" for example), and I don't think this is necessarily a reasonable assumption, even then the "arrow" goes in both directions! The future causes the past just as much as the past causes the future, and the present is merely an arbitrary token. The reason we normally think about the past causing the future and not the reverse is because we are aware of the past but unaware of the future (meaning we can predict the future based on the past to some degree, but we can't really predict the past based on the future). Thus, the past causing the future is more intuitive to us than the Benjamin Button turnaround. BUT IT IS NO MORE TRUE.

Really, every moment is caused by every other moment, it's a fully-interlocking web and not a linear "path" that is "traveled."

You have a tendency to look for a "moment of determination," and for whatever reason it seems that you express this tendency by viewing the "moment of determination" in determinism as the very beginning (the big bang, presumably). That makes no more sense than assuming the END OF TIME is the "determining moment." And the truth is, there is no such thing. Time is only a spatial dimension, there's nothing special about "this moment." You can view the universe as a three-dimensional universe moving "with the moment," but you can also view the universe as a four-dimensional object outside of time (and this four-dimensional view is arguably far more accurate). It changes nothing. Time is not significant in the way it is in your worldview. You can't use argument that rely on "when" the "moment of determination" is, because there is no moment of determination in the first place. Nor can you associate a particular time period with determination.

In fact, if instead of arguing that choice is insignificant in determinism, you had argued that time is insignificant in determinism, I might have been inclined to agree with you. But the reason for this wall of text, which nobody may even bother reading, is because all the libertarians here seem to be COMPLETELY MISSING how hugely different time is in the two different views, whereas most of the determinists seem to get it. (Weirdly, the pessimists seem to miss it, which almost makes me think that one's view of time is a primary determinant - no pun intended - in whether one is a compatibilist or not.)

Technically it may be correct to say that "my actions were determined in the past." BUT only in the sense that it is correct to say that "my actions will be determined in the future." My actions can be expressed as a function of the future just as easily as they can be expressed as a function of the past.

What you can't say is that since my actions have already been determined, and thus they can't be determined in the present. That assumes that there exists some time at which the "determination" happens, and that is explicitly false under determinism. Either my actions are determined in the past, present, and future, or they are determined in neither the past, nor the present, nor the future. But this determination is time-independent.

Remember, you're suggesting a contradiction in the compatibilist deterministic worldview. In order to establish such a contradiction, you have to work within the framework of that worldview. You can't insert premises from your worldview in order to show a contradiction in my worldview, all of your premises must be premises taken from my worldview or you aren't showing that my worldview is contradictory at all, what you're doing is saying that it disagrees with your worldview (which is pretty meaningless since even I don't agree with "my" worldview, I only believe that it is coherent and internally consistent).

In summary, YOU DON'T GET TO USE YOUR VIEW OF TIME IN CRITIQUING DETERMINISM, BECAUSE THE DETERMINIST VIEW OF TIME IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM YOUR OWN.