fyp

If determinism is true, then how you respond isn't up to you...it's up to the universe...geebus.

Why would the truth of determinism render moot our understanding of proximate causes and regularities? If determinism is true, it would be abstractly true that it's up to the universe as to how one responds, but we have far more specific proximate explanations about what causes stuff to happen.

Yes, but that is irrelevant, because I am part of the universe. I effect future events (in part), and I realize that and like it. Prior events effect me perfectly (in sum), and I am ok with that (I like me - the prior events have been kind). The only real effect that free will would add is that prior events effect me less than perfectly, and I would effect future events less perfectly.

At any point in time, I am not sitting here thinking, "wow, the big bang, therefore I will eat a cookie." I am not perceiving the big bang. I am not even perceiving the vast majority of the things that led up to me being who I am. What I am perceiving is a feeling of hunger and the sight of a cookie.

Obviously, with things more important than cookies, my feelings of involvement and importance increase. I struggle with decisions. Knowing that some imagined fast forward button would get me to the action does not make a difference. I don't have the fast forward button.

Is there some great meaning to my life? Only to the extent that if I was missing, the world would be different. This is the same as if free will existed. Or if there were a god.

Because the 'proximate' cause is only arbitrary circle drawing. The only 'cause' is really the ultimate cause. At least, 'proximal causality' in determinism is not sufficient for responsibility.

But everything you ever did, will do, and could do is already determined well before your existence.

No, you don't, not really.

No, there's no such thing as what you're describing; it's nonsense. You're not the source of anything.

So? This establishes nothing. If determinism is true then we could expect things to happen this way. Just because you aren't perceiving the truth doesn't mean that it's not out there doing all the work. This is the 'illusion' claim.

If an atom were 1 micrometer in a different direction than it is then the universe would be different...so what?

Agreed.

As part of the sequence of events, I do. Remove me, and some number of events don't occur and some number of other events do occur.

I never claimed to be the source of anything. I am just part of a complicated sequence of events that inevitably lead forward. This is enough of a reason for me to make (inevitable) efforts instead of just becoming a lump of inaction. I happen to care (due to past events) about the outcome. Taking prime cause out of humanity does nothing other than destroying a number of philosophers' livelihoods.

Yes, we would expect things to happen as they have. We agree.

My eventual choices are due to the past and present conditions, but my effort exists. There is no "truth" doing all of the work. There is only me and the rest of the universe. Since, for instance, I don't know what the conclusion will be, I am clearly working out what words to type here (burning some number of calories). There is no humonculus driving the conversation, only the laws of nature. The wonderful thing is that I didn't know how you would respond to my argument. Despite the fact that this conversation will end in some predetermined conclusion, I cannot see the end clearly. This is enough of a reason for me to be motivated to continue.

Again, it would only matter to me as much as it effected me and the things I care about.

(by the way, this is enjoyable. you are making me think things through, which is awesome.)

I'm not trying to sneak responsibility in (I think I've been clear in taking a strong incompatibilist position), but I don't think determinism is incompatible with knowledge, truth, even counterfactual reasoning. Just because the ultimate cause of the BP oil spill is the big bang does not mean that the proximate cause was not deepwater drilling. Just because the ultimate cause of my hatred of celery is the big bang does not mean that the proximate cause is not in my brain. That's not really abstract circle drawning, you draw the same circles if you're a libertarian when you discuss deterministic events.

I'm fine with that list except "reasoning"

In what sense, do you need freedom to reason?

the bible is not a proponent of free will. it's a proponent of a dichotomy, either god's will or satan's. so door one or door two. you're not free to not go through a door, or go through a different door.

The problem with disproving that unicorns exist is that even if we set up a huge system of satellites that covered every inch of the earth, the believers in unicorns would then claim that the unicorns lived underground.

I'd stick to saying that we don't need the hypothesis and leave it at that.

This is meaningless. It's essentially saying that since you could do only either X or not-X, you don't have free will.

What the bible does for free will is provide a way out of physicalism.

IMO, intentional talk requires freedom...as does 'reasoning' We don't say that a bug reasons.

How did libertarian free will evolve?

What do you mean by intentional talk?

Don't care. Ask Dennett for some bad just-so-story.

Meaning, thoughts that have 'aboutness' to them, etc.

Wouldn't you agree that libertarian free will is in big trouble without a just-so-story (at least a bad one)?

Semi-grunching: I read 2 pages, skimmed the 3rd and 4th after it became clear there (not surprisingly) hasn't been very much progress. If I missed something important, I trust someone will let me know.

durkadurka33, your accurate and informed first post represents precisely what I have always found maddening about contemporary analytic philosophy: the assumption that the best way to begin addressing any given question (regardless of how difficult or complex the question is) is just to lay out a supposed range of possible positions and then dive right into arguments for and against positions.

I know that a conversation you would have with other analytic philosophers would occur at a higher level and with greater clarity about the meaning of terms, but I take it that there's no fundamental difference between the way you have approached the issue here and how you would do so with a more informed set of interlocutors. (And I mean no offense to participants in the thread. Madnak in particular has been articulate and as clear about his position as the character of a forum-based conversation will allow.)

In my view, we can distinguish between conversation about (A) the general intuition that a person may or may not have that he is "free" (i.e., that in given circumstances he really could have chosen differently, that one's choices are not absolutely determined by anything not itself within one's ultimate control, or that while deliberating it's up to him to end his deliberations and settle on a choice, etc.), (B) the complex philosophical and psychological account of exactly what free choice is, what it is about the structure of intentional human acts that allows for freedom, etc., and (C) the philosophical question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with the denial of freedom.

As I read things here, it seems that madnak and Jib have focused on (A) and (C), with nods at (B) whenever they reached intractable disputes about whether people generally experience (A). durkadurka33 has set aside (A) as irrelevant and wanted to focus almost exclusively on (C). Aaron W. has asked for clarifications that would push the conversation in the direction of (B), but not much progress has occurred. Does this seem like a fair overview?

With regard to (A), madnak is absolutely correct that this general intuition of freedom has not been expressed in any obvious or articulate way by the vast majority of ancient cultures. Despite his suggestion earlier in the thread, however, this is not unique to the notion of freedom: "person," "self," "self-consciousness," "self-confidence," and "niceness" are all terms very familiar to us for which there are not any universally attested obvious correlates in ancient writings. There are those who have made exactly the same argument about "self" that madnak is making about "libertarian free will" here: that it's just a Western construct. Given that madnak's own definition of choice involves reference to oneself as the proximate (but determined) cause of chosen actions, I assume he wouldn't agree with such an argument about "self."

In any event, my response to madnak's argument about (A) is this: the vast majority of people, in the ancient world and today, live pre-philosophical (or non-philosophical) lives in which the language they use rarely expresses anything newly insightful about the human condition. I include myself to a certain degree in this: I study philosophy, but I know I'm not particularly original or insightful. One of the basic difference between pre-philosophical experience and philosophy is that philosophy tries to express the things most taken for granted by non-philosophers. That those with philosophically-disposed minds employ novel terms does not mean that they are inventing the notion from nothing. For this reason, the absence of historical usage of terms for "free will" doesn't necessarily mean very much about whether or not human beings are actually free or even whether the average person has some intuition about freedom.

As for (A) itself, I would agree that most people live their lives in such a way that they have no intuitive sense about the truth or falsity of determinism with regard to their own choices. People for the most part live unreflective lives in which they don't articulate for themselves anything about these sorts of difficult issues.

That being said, I think the average reasonably educated person in America is such that, in a conversation about these issues, they will have an intuition in favor of what has been articulated by durkadurka33 as libertarianism and against determinism and compatibilism. That is, I think most people will usually think that "the ability to do / have done otherwise" is necessary for moral responsibility. With durkadurka33, I share this intuition. EDIT: I'm aware of the limited character of my claim (today and in America) and I'm not presenting this as evidence by itself in favor of libertarian free will. Just making an observation.

Thanks for clarifying intentional talk.

You also added in "IMO" because we are in muddy waters, correct?

I agree that will is necessary, but it does not have to be free for intentional talk and reasoning to happen.

I wouldn't call it 'big trouble' but it could be an issue. However, the issue is empirically hopelessly underdetermined. It's a category mistake to ask me for evidence or some physical mechanism that would allow for libertarian free will...what could such evidence possibly look like? How could such an observation count only towards libertarianism and not be equally consistent with determinism?

Actually, the dominant position is compatibilism.

What is this based on? Your students' responses?

Pretty epic post BTirish...though...nihan.

I think that B is related to C, but I definitely think that C is the most important question (and then, to the degree that we need to answer B in order to answer C). A is basically philosophically irrelevant.

Observations...that's all. I'm making a descriptive claim.