What is the definition of "random" that is being used here, and which interpretation of probability does it correspond to?

I don't believe that the human mind is able to frame non-deterministic events as anything other than random. Thus I don't believe there's every any use in describing them as anything other than random. Thus, I don't believe that there are any events that are non-deterministic and non-random (though there are events that have elements of both, blowing my narrow definition of determinism out of the water).

Um, except that if your behavior is deterministic you can be held responsible for your actions. And as stated above, it can be formally established that you are responsible for your actions.

But nobody has ever been able to provide any kind of logical reason why you are responsible for freely-willed actions, random or otherwise.

If this were true, then I would believe in libertarian free will. But this is not the definition of libertarian free will. As stated above (and repeated by, for example, Jib and durka) there are many more assumptions included in LFW. For instance, human actions must fall into this category, responsibility must be associated with human actions on the basis of this category, and so on.

If I were to say that "I believe in libertarian free will, but I think human actions are 100% determined," then most people would look at me funny. And yet, that makes perfect sense according to your definition of libertarian free will. So I think your definition is inadequate - it's too far divorced from what most people mean by "free will" to be of any use.

That means we could predict the path in theory, and I believe I defined random as being unpredictable in theory. A coin flip is not random because given enough information we could, in theory, predict the path of the coin. On the other hand, the spin of a particle is random because no amount of information would allow us to predict it (well, unless there exist non-local hidden variables that do determine the spin, I don't think we really know).

But as I've stated before, I view the question of truth as an empirical question. When you discuss the truth of the claim of free will, you are discussing an empirical matter.

None of this follows at all from "if only..." When I have a flush draw on a big pot, I may think "if only I had hit my flush draw." Yet hopefully we can both agree that this is a deterministic case. The river card that was turned over can be expressed as a function of prior events, because the river card was there even before it was turned over.

The fact that I don't think it was possible for the river card to have been a spade doesn't change the fact that I think "if only it had been a spade." I do not require the river card to have had the ability to indeterministically "choose" to be a spade in order to think "if only." Your suggestion that the "if only" form of thinking necessitates all this baggage is simply false. I don't need to think someone other than a spade was possible in order to think "if only it had been a spade," and I don't need to think something other than a particular action was possible in order to think "if only my action had been different."

You haven't related it to the concept of responsibility at all, nor has anyone else.

When I describe myself as a determinist that's exactly what I'm doing, but for the purposes of this thread I'm using a much narrower definition. However, any sense of cause and effect fits my definition to the extent that cause and effect is relevant. Any part of your action that is caused can be, in theory, predicted. If you can take either action A or action B, but it's impossible to predict which action you will take, then neither action is caused. (Although, your taking action A or action B, as opposed to action C, may be caused if it can be predicted.)

First, as in the above post, that's irrelevant.

Second, it's not true. It's so that he could not have chosen any other way GIVEN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO HIS CHOICE, not "period."

What it actually means with respect to the definition of determinism I gave is that changing that choice would also change the past and the future (to correspond with that choice).

As opposed to your view, in which changing the choice would change the future - but not the past.

And of the state of the universe after the decision. If you want to change the future, you must change the present. If you want to change the present, you must change the past. That's all that determinism suggests - not that there are no differing possible worlds, but that each possible world differs from every other possible world in all time frames and not only in some of them.

That's the only distinction.

If red dominoes fall sideways, and black dominoes fall forward, then there is a change in causal efficacy. The effect of a black domino being struck (the domino in front of it is then struck) and the effect of a red domino being struck (the domino next to it is then struck) are differences that imply the color of the domino determines the outcome of the domino system.

Of course, if the color of the domino has no effect on the system and is simply a matter of appearance, then it doesn't have any "special" causal efficacy relative to the black dominos (it still has causal efficacy, of course, and your suggestion that it doesn't is nonsensical) but it's also not analogous. And whether it matters is purely a function of whether the appearance of a domino's color matters (you haven't given any reason why it doesn't).

Of course, the human mind affects outcomes in ways in which nothing else affects outcomes, therefore they have a "special" type of causal efficacy.

But having special causal efficacy isn't the only reason I think awareness matters. That's why it's so relevant, why it imparts responsibility, etc. It matters because it's part of the human condition, because it gives us the ability to find purpose in life and experience enrichment and fulfillment, etc.

You can always define "matter" in such a way that none of these things do matter, but you're just playing with words.

This is gobbledegook. If you add to the complexity of a deterministic process, you change that deterministic process. If you change a deterministic process, then you change something. If you change something, then it's not true that you aren't changing anything.

"When x changes, nothing changes" is not much of a point.

This is about as credible as the emo nihilists saying "we don't matter any more than a rock, a rock is made of atoms and we are made of atoms, so it's all the same."

The fact that we have something in common with a rock (we are both composed of matter, we are both affected by causes, whatever) doesn't imply that there's no difference between us and rocks.

To say that two processes are "basically the same thing" because they're both deterministic is no more rational than to say that two objects (say, your wife and a pebble on the ground) are "basically the same thing" because they're both composed of matter. It makes no sense.

Does anyone think free will implies total self control?

By total self control I mean always being able to make rational decisions, not letting emotions get the best of you, etc. Humans obv dont have total self control but do we need to for free will to be true?

Imo answering a question with "free will" or "he/she has free will" is a little short sighted and doesnt really get us anywhere.

You may not believe it, but that's because you cannot do it, and that's because of how you understand "random."

Again, epistemology and empiricism. Because you cannot know the difference by measuring something, you're making an epistemological assertion that it *CANNOT* be known.

I don't think that you've actually done this.

You're obfuscating the main point.

I agree that there are other assumptions, but the current issue is the deterministic thesis.

You failed to use 'in theory' in your original posting. But then when you do this, you conflate the definition of "deterministic" and "random."

This understanding of determinism INCLUDES quantum randomness. But then you say

Which negates the determinsitic thesis. I do not believe your definitions can be resolved.

That's an error on your part unless you can come up with a compelling argument that formal propositional logic is an empirical question. Right now, it looks like you're closing your eyes and sticking your fingers in your ears going "LALALALALALALA" so that you don't have to deal with the reality of the situation.

I never claimed it was a formal proof of anything. In fact, I quite clearly said it's not. But when people say this about themselves, it suggests that they could have done something differently.

There's no "if only *I* had..." in this to assert the ability to influence the outcome. (Notice that here we are in fact calling on the extra assumptions in the libertarian position.)

This paragraph is bordering on nonsense.

(1) Your "other" definition of determinist is empty. To the extent that cause-and-effect happens, your determinist position asserts that there is cause-and-effect. It might be useful to rename yourself as a cause-and-effectist.

(2) You can't seem keep the conversation straight because you've got two notions of "determinism" in your head. This is demonstrated by the fact that the entire initial post that I responded to was based on your "other" determinist position even though I asked you to define "determinism" for the purpose of that post.

(3) Your picture of causality and predictability is just as broken as your definition of random. You can't even reconcile a simple QM experiment as being "predictable" and "caused" at the same time. We can set up a QM experiment and the result will be either spin up or spin down, and we can't predict which. So it's random. But it's "predictable" in the sense of being able to systematically obtain information about the distribution if we were to set up this experiment multiple times. It's "caused" because we set it up to do this, but it's not "caused" because there's no way to predict the outcome.

Determinisim asserts that there is only ONE WAY THE EVENTS COULD HAVE LED UP TO HIS CHOICE. There is only one way PERIOD. If things could have been different, then somewhere along the way, there was something that was not predictable, and this is a negation of determinism.

Determinism asserts that the past is what predicts the future. I have no idea what it means for present tense things to change the past.

Ugh... you're still very backwards on your definition of determinism.

I don't think you're going to see it. So I'm just going to stop (for real).

Well, wishing they just would have done differently doesn't indicate anything more than wishing the river card just would have been a spade. Certainly doesn't indicate that they believe it's possible (in the sense you're talking) that they could have done differently.

An effect is something that results from a cause. That's how cause and effect are ordinarily defined. Since the effect of your choosing A (relative to choosing job B) doesn't actually result from anything that exists (either choice can results from what exists, which implies that what exists doesn't result in one of the two in particular), that means that either that effect does not result from any cause (ie it is uncaused) or that the effect results from a cause that doesn't exist.

I don't know what this "cause that doesn't exist" means or how it makes any sense, but since you're claiming it and calling it "free will" I'm going along with that.

No, "information" has nothing to do with it. An imaginary person outside the universe, knowing all the information about the universe, could predict that you will make decision Y. But that is separate and related to the prediction question. Decision Y is determined by things like who you are, if you want to view that as information go ahead, I don't view it as such. I'd say it's determined by reality, not by information.

In terms of "led to the decision," if who you are admits either path A or path B, then it hasn't led you down either path. If it led you down one path, then by definition it would exclude the other path. If it leads to path A, then it can't also lead to path B. At best it can lead to the fork in the road.

According to your claims, the "information" (the factors - who you are and so on) didn't lead to either decision. Which raises the question, in my mind, of what did lead to the decision.

That is, what was the reason you chose A instead of B? If there was such a reason, then by definition it has to lock out B - otherwise it's not the reason you chose A instead of B, it's just the reason you chose A or B. There must be a reason why A happened and B did not happen. OR, there is no reason why you chose A.

Take your pick. Either way, I don't think it looks good for free will. If there was a reason for choosing A and not choosing B, then given that reason, A was the only possible choice. Therefore B wasn't possible at all, in the sense of possible you're discussing. And if there was no reason, then you chose A for no reason. And that's what free will means, that we choose things for no reason. Which is a fair definition of free will, I can accept that maybe we do choose things for no reason.

But something tells me you won't like that interpretation much.

"In the mood" means I feel like eating McDonald's. I'm craving it, I'm hungry for it. There exists in me a sensation that McDonald's is appealing, and that healthy food is less appealing. That's not the only thing influencing my actions, of course. I may have a desire to lose weight, and if my desire to lose weight is stronger than my sensation that McDonald's is appealing, then I will choose to eat healthy instead of eating McDonald's because my desire to eat low-calorie food outweighs my desire to eat yummy food.

Of course, there are probably thousands of factors involved in many choices, particularly the intuitive choices. Maybe the health food place is quiet and McDonald's is noisy, and I'm feeling stressed and I know that eating in a quiet place will help me feel less stressed, while eating in a noisy place will just make me feel more stressed. Stress is an unpleasant sensation that I'd like to get rid of, and I also know that I have dinner with my girlfriend tonight and that will go better if I'm not stressed, so I want to eat at the less stressful place.

On the other hand I know my friends are eating at McDonald's, and I would have some fun eating with them. That might help my stress even more than the quiet environment at the other place.

I will continue to weigh these factors, either slowly (if I want to carefully deliberate) or quickly (if I want to make a snap decision), and one set of factors (either the one supporting eating healthy or the one supporting eating at McDonald's) will end up outweighing the other, and that will determine where I eat. This is always true, after weighing the factors I always make the choice that has the "heavier" support. Normally there are more than two options, of course, but often the decision is relatively simple because one factor outweighs all others (for instance, I might go where the food tastes best, because I don't care about anything else as much as I care about taste). So it can be more complicated than in this example, or it can be simpler. Usually the simpler it is, the less time I spend deliberating, but sometimes it's the opposite - if there are 20 movies I want to see, I may just close my eyes and pick one because it's too exhausting trying to consciously weigh all the choices. But often I'll still be aware of many of the determinants - maybe I pick the one on the top of the shelf because it seems cheerier up there, or the one right in front of me because that's just easiest, or the one on the bottom because it seems out of the way and I like the idea of finding a hidden gem.

I wish that I was smarter all the time. I think most people do. In fact, "I wish I hadn't been such an idiot" or "how could I be so dumb," or "why, why, why did I do such a stupid thing" are some of the most common expressions of regret that I hear. So I'm not for an instant believing that most people experience regret the way that you do.

I think they would wish that they had the willpower to resist the ice cream, or that they would have simply wished to have gotten the different flavor, never to have had everything exactly the same except they changed their mind at the last minute. I think very few people actually wish for reversals.

And I'm confident that most people know which kind of ice cream they're going to buy before they actually buy it - even if only a split second before. So since I know that I'm going to buy vanilla before I buy it, that knowledge is a prior cause. In order for all prior causes to be the same, I would need to know I'm going to buy vanilla, and yet buy chocolate instead. That is weird, I don't think most people imagine it like that. Even if they aren't aware of what they're imagining, I think most people imagine that the prior cause ("knowing" they were going to buy vanilla) was different (and that they had "known" they were going to buy chocolate instead).

And if we keep going back (I don't think we need to, I think most people just wish they had bought a chocolate cone instead of a vanilla cone and don't analyze it beyond that, but let's go back) then we eventually run into something that wasn't a choice. For example, I only knew that I wanted vanilla because I decided that I wanted vanilla. But I decided that I wanted vanilla because when I looked at the flavors, the vanilla looked really tasty to me and the chocolate didn't look so good - I didn't choose for the vanilla to look tasty, the reason I looked into the flavor compartment was because I wanted information on how I felt about the flavors, and I wasn't choosing which flavor to like and which to dislike. I looked at the vanilla, it looked good, and that's why I chose it. In order to have chosen differently, I would have had to look at the vanilla, see that it looked good, look at the chocolate, see that it looked bad, and then choose the (bad-looking) chocolate instead of the (good-looking) vanilla, even though I had no reason to do so.

If I chose to eat something healthy instead of the ice cream, I would have chosen because I was on a diet, or because I wanted to eat something good for me instead of something bad for me, or because of some other prior factor. Even the process of weighing that is a process that occurs over time - you've already said that the choice is instantaneous, so when I say "hmm, I shouldn't eat this, I ought to go with something healthier instead" I am not making the decision, on the contrary I'm articulating the factor (my preference for healthy food) that determines the decision. The decision, that instantaneous thing that comes after my little monologue, that's different.

I would bet your preference to keep your job is stronger than your preference to tell your boss off. But if I'm wrong, and you don't have a prior reason to avoid telling your boss off (such as your knowledge that doing so would have negative consequences), then I don't envy you not doing it. If I have no prior reason not to yell at someone (ie no knowledge that there will be negative consequences, nothing rational and deterministic like that), and I feel like yelling at that person, I will do it for sure.

I've already discussed this with you in another thread that this is a really big issue that I have yet to address (and I don't know whether anyone else in the literature has looked into it either).

As a first approximation I mean an event that can take a set of possible paths of action that are equiprobable.

This post appears to be REALLY bad form, sir. You clearly quote me at one point and then appear to start using other people's posts and passing them off as my own. What's going on?

He was just using that one post to show the definition that has been put forward ITT.

That's false. Determinism says there is only one way the events could have led up to his choice, GIVEN that the state of the entire universe at the time of his choice had a particular value (or that the state of the universe was identical at some other time index). Saying p(x | y) = 1 is not necessarily the same as saying p(x) = 1. Pretty sure that's a fact.

I thought you were using my original definition. I like that one best, but fine, if you want it one way it can be one way. Regardless, being able to express the present as a function of the past and being able to express the past as a function of the present are the same idea, so if you aren't getting the latter then you aren't getting the former, either.

Imagine a hypothetical universe in which the state of reality can be described by a single value. Now imagine that at time t=1s, that value is 4. And at t=5s, that value is 8. And at t=1d, that value is 86,403. That at any time t (in seconds), v=t + 3.

Now, if I look at the universe and see that its current value is 1400, then I can predict that in 3 seconds that value will be 1403. I can predict the future given the present. But, I can also predict that 3 seconds ago, the value was 1397. I can also predict the past give the present. And if I know that five seconds ago v=1395, I can predict on that basis that at present v=1400.

Past, present, and future don't matter in terms of expressing outcomes. You can follow the causal chain forward and say "x cause must have resulted in y effect," or you can follow it backward and say "y effect must have been the result of x cause." Either way you can move from one "frame" to any other "frame." That's the hardest definition of determinism.



Considering that I defined determinism as being able to express any state of the universe as a function of any other state, and that above you said you thought I was only talking about future states as functions of past states, it's pretty lol for you to be claiming that I'm having trouble with my definition of determinism.

Oh, yes. Thank you. I had forgotten about that conversation. If you ever do come across someone in the literature who has considered this, then I would be interested in reading about it.

That's clearly not because of how I understand "random," if there really does exist some experiential state that fundamentally implies libertarian free will (which is the only actual reason to believe in lfw that anyone has so far suggested).

My epistemology is pretty well-developed.

Not quite, but I've come very close. Do you think "responsibility depends on a person's choice," "a person's choices are a deterministic effect," "therefore responsibility depends on a deterministic effect" is invalid? Or do you disagree with the premises and definitions?

See, you're basically holding the position that responsibility can't be defined (and conveniently, neither can libertarian free will or any of the other concepts you're looking to defend), so of course I can't formally establish that your conception of responsibility is compatible with determinism. Much less that it depends on determinism. Ultimately I think progress can be made on this front, but only when both sides are willing to accept a definition.

The current issue is the premise of libertarian free will. The deterministic thesis isn't especially important.

Eh, not worth digging up. But yeah, the mix does present problems with regard to my definition of determinism. I think it's a fairly simple extension, but that doesn't necessarily make it so. Regardless, my definition of determinism is irrelevant here.

Only if quantum "randomness" is determined by hidden non-local variables. Which I specified as an exception in the other post.

If you want to start another solipsism thread, we can go there. Better yet, just refute Kant's idealism. But this is off the topic.

I disagree.

So you're saying that "if only x" is compatible with impossible events, but "if only I had x" suggests that the event in question must have been possible? That's totally arbitrary. The fact is, people wish for impossible things all the time. You've given no reason why wishes about personal actions are an exception.

Cause and effect implies predictability, given an understanding of which effects result from which causes under which circumstances.

I think you're confusing the implications of my determinism with a "different kind" of determinism. Either that or you're confusing my attacks on libertarian free will with my defense of determinism.

I made my meaning of "predictable" with respect to determinism fairly clear: that we can know exactly the positions and states of every particle (and everything else in the universe) based only on the prior information.

Narrowing that down to this experiment is pretty simple - it means we can predict the spin of each individual particle exactly based solely on prior information. We can't do this.

Furthermore, the general results of the experiment are "caused," however the spin of a particular electron is not caused.

The spins of electrons are neither predictable nor caused. (The fact that we can use probability to roughly predict the distribution of spins in aggregate is a result of those spins being uncaused and unpredictable, ie entirely random.)

Will do...I'm interested too.

Madnak's rhetorical strategy is to just overwhelm his opponent with text...

Grunching. Durka, I hope you have a strong secondary concentration because I don't think most departments are looking for philosophers with an expertise in free will (action theory?). I studied philosophy for 8 years and always ran the other way when someone mentioned free will (I did phil of science/cog sci). This is intended as a serious piece of advice. (Sad to say, you should probably pick up an expertise in business ethics for marketability).

This is maybe my 3rd...it's an area of competence, not specialization. I do epistemology (1) and decision theory (2)...metaphysics/free will is a strong area of competence.

That's definitely my position (that libertarianism implies uncaused action), but there's too much room for them to just say "no wai that's not what a causal connection is at all."

It depends entirely on what you mean by 'uncaused' because libertarians still think that our actions aren't entirely uncaused. It's just that they're not entirely determined (or merely random or QM-style indeterminate).

Think of it like a kayaker in a really strong river. They're being rushed down the river by the force of the water (they can't go backwards or even hold their position) but they do have SOME influence, though not total, over their side-to-side movement. So, they can influence their direction without having 'ultimate' causal responsibility; furthermore, they only have some control over their direction (they may be restricted by eddies or rocks blocking certain paths = choices).

What allows the slight influence to be called 'uncaused' in some sense is that it originates without being determined or random/QM-style indeterminacy, but it's still not ultimately uncaused (we're born, have influences, etc.).

You've defined libertarian free will in a certain way, and I've not seen an alternate definition. The definition provided is not in conflict with the definition of determinism that madnak presented (of which you approved).

The only reason I put 'durka' in there was to acknowledge that I wasn't quoting madnak in presenting that particular definition. I did forget to "quote back" to madnak after quoting you for that one time for the definition.

I hope that the context of the conversation provides sufficient clarity.

...it didn't...which is why I thought you were attributing the following discussion to me.

My apologies. The only quote that was from you is labeled as being from you, and everything else was from madnak's post.

I don't share this opinion.

Honestly, it strikes me as absurd to argue "we have no free will but since we generally ignore that fact it doesn't matter".

Really sounds more like religion to me at this point.

How can anyone *do* anything in a deterministic universe?

If you become a drug addict, you had no choice. It's the big bang's fault. No effort you make matters. What will be will be and what you will do you will do.

That's sort of the problem with it.

It's like one of those physics theories that seems really beautiful and elegant and then you say "what happens in this scenario" and when you check your equations you have division by zero or some strange infinities.

It doesn't mean that your theory has lost its beauty and elegance; just that it isn't true.