This is where I remind people that indeterminate =/= random. The pessimistic position depends on that conflation. Unfortuantely, it's a natural response to some actual arguments based on attempting to seat libertarian free will in things like quantum indeterminacy but (for reasons stated) is a bad idea...so I don't do that. It has to be the right 'kind' of indeterminacy. We still want there to be an important sense of 'control' without being ourselves forced. Whether that necessarily requires a dualism I'm not sure...but that's the basic idea.

Yeah, I was mindful of your distinction so I did try to hedge my comments in spots to jb9. But to the substance - let's say the definition of determinism is: every event or state of affairs is necessarily caused/brought about by some prior event or state of affairs. Indeterminism is then: at least one/some/all event or state of affairs is not necessarily caused/brought about by some prior event or state of affairs (you're welcome to correct/improve these definitions but I think my point will endure through emendation). I can grant that this abstract definition of indeterminism doesn't have anything directly to do with QM randomness, however (a) I can't really think of a good example other than physical randomness that exemplifies indeterminism in the world and (b) whatever alternative in (a) is, how it helps libertarians construct a defense of free will. It seems to me that your objection to pessimism doesn't stand because pessimists aren't really equivocating indeterminism/randomness, they probably deny that there's any alternative to equivocate about.

There is still a point to it all if hard determinism is right. You still get to live your life, make choices, fall in love, etc.

If you are reading this post because of your preferences, what you read earlier in this post and a million other things, does it make it any more or less enjoyable? (peanut gallery comments expected)

I agree that it would be horrible if hard determinism were true and you had perfect knowledge of the future. There would be no more point to anything than there is to watching an average movie for a second time.

In hard determinism, you do matter because you do have effect on everything. You are 100% an actor in the world. If you were removed (though that would be impossible), the world would be a different place. Therefore your actions do matter.

I have very good reasons to be a hard determinist. Unfortunately, I can't prove I am right. In essence, I think that a better understanding of the concept of consciousness will lead to free will being placed in a smaller and smaller box, much like the gods have been placed. I predict that eventually, the free will discussions will be auto-moved to RGT.

The Mississippi River and Weird Al are pretty close in probability in the grand scheme of things. How about a particular drop of water that hit you in the head the last time it rained?

I disagree. If hard determinism is right, human existence is just a rock falling down a hill. There is no point to that.

In fact, everyone might as well just stay in bed tomorrow morning or start zoning out on some fun drugs, because if you are doing it, you had to do it, and you were going to do it no matter what, so there is no point in not doing it, because if you weren't going to do it, you wouldn't be able to do it, and so on...

A rock falling down the hill has an effect on the things it hits along the way. Doesn't mean it has any significance.

Likewise, but different.

Let's see this better concept of consciousness before we decide which post types will be auto-moved to RGT.

The laws of physics (and chemistry and geology and meteorology, etc.) perfectly explain rivers and drops of rain. When the laws of physics are ready to explain Weird Al, let me know (but I think this goes back to the question of consciousness).

That is one of the best posts I have seen from you.

Are you implying that the arguments for and against the existence of free will are weak, given the lack of evidence, and that it is more or less a personal decision which one to base your personal philosophy on? (other than compatibilists, who are clearly goofy in there thinking)

I don't see how dualism would not be necessary for free will to exist if, for the most part, stuff causes other stuff to happen (i.e. gravity, etc.).

I include in my definition of the determinist thesis that there may be things like quantum indeterminacy or randomness...

Here's a good example of indeterminacy: free will DUCY? It's not an empirical question...if there WAS a decisive and good example then this debate would be over (or in a very different place).

The pessimists ARE equivocating...they may be able to deny a 3rd alternative but they have yet to do so. But, on what grounds would they deny the possibility?

To Brian: free will qua metaphysics clearly belongs in SMP.

Alright, but you'd agree to distinguish an event which was caused necessarily and one which wasn't? At any rate, probably not an important side point?

I don't think I'm treating it as an empirical question. The question is what would it mean even hypothetically for an event to not be determined. Although I might use QM randomness as an example of indeterminism from physics, the issue is that randomness seems to be the only conceivable mode of indeterminism a priori.

As I said, I don't think they're equivocating because they don't think there are conceivable alternatives. Now, I did suggest that cognitive closure might be a decent analogy for libertarians to use against the 'no conceivable alternatives' point, but that's anticlimactic if anything.

Agreed, but only in the very strictest sense. For average Joe, metaphysics = religion +/-some god.

I agree that a prime cause of randomness doesn't work as free will. "I randomly do stuff" is more "I do not understand myself" than free will.

Obviously, the arguments against free will, given determinism are pretty easy: Hard determinism: Everything comes from something, therefore no free will. stfu. QED. I like the great razor, obviously. Just got the beginning of the universe to figure out...

The arguments for, seem to be much more difficult. Is there a good read that makes an argument for free will that doesn't work backward from "well, we need free will to prop up personal responsibility" or "well, the Bible implies it."? I can afford a book or two. Maybe 5 if they are not in hardback.

Thers no free will.

Thanks for clearing that up

I don't share this opinion. It seems self-evident to me that you and I and many, many other human beings live our lives everyday in a world where we experience the perfect illusion of freedom of action and thought to some significant degree. And where we witness and can track how our behavior appears to have personal and social consequences (try playfully slapping a police officer.)

How much should it matter to me that I am ultimately a cog in the deterministic unfolding of the universe -- modulo quantum randomness -- if my life utterly feels like and appears to function as though my self or ego play some controlling role therein? That is to say, if for all practical intents and purposes I can't tell or experience myself being determined causally by a long chain of prior universes, even if philosophical arguments suggest this is so -- if in fact I cannot help psychologically sensing myself and my existence in a manner contradicting such arguments -- then why should the truth of determinism be such a vexing concern for me?

This sounds off to me. If everyone did this, there would be problematic consequences. Various kinds of culturally-understood 'harms' would befall society, family life, individual enrichment and progress. So there's no "you might as well" about it. Offer this recommendation about zoning out on drugs to (say) the father of a 1-year-old child, because you think determinism negates all purpose and value, and I can easily imagine him conceding the philosophical argument while refusing to inflict neglect and distress on his child by abandoning her.

I think your notion of how significance can come about is too restrictive and dependent upon ultimate foundations. Or rather, it would be for me. You're perfectly free (lol) to demand that "significance" be built out of such supreme material, but I think there are humbler yet nonetheless workable ways of seeing the significance of human existence even under determinism.

Disproving the existance of anything is impossible, ducy? (sorry for the fake quote, durka, but this has been an ongoing ignored argument in this thread*)

*you can't prove free will doesn't exist

You realize that there's a whole lot more to metaphysics than just topics like free will...right?

For "normal" people, they equate "metaphysical" with the "occult."

+1 except that I would have used WAY less words and used WAY more asterisks. Plus, I wouldn't have taken it nearly as personally that someone disagreed with my personal philosophy. I would have also not used nearly as much random insertion of Latin. Personal determined preferences, I guess. Plus, I would have been drunk when writing so wouldn't have spelled things as well.

We should do a separate thread on what it means personally/societally if free will is impossible given any conceivable metaphysics. Actually I'll start one right now.

I didn't take jb9's views that personally at all! And less personally than your disparagement of my addiction to Latin and wordiness!

I do realize that re:your first sentence. For the second sentence, I equate it with beyond physics, which, combined with my hard determinism = lack of knowledge (metaphyisics shrinking like god due to science). Admitted that this is personal belief with only the obvious historical evidence as momentum toward the implied conclusion, but some very serious doubts, or I would just enjoy the ride and profit.

I would have not used even one explanation point

Your reply (about taking jb's* views as not being bothersome) put you in the same view as mine about the world.

*I don't have to put the "9" in, because I am that cool.

It should be 4 seperate threads...

...no thread needed: the answer is 'nothing' and it's why the pragmatists thought the issue was a non-issue.

Sweet, I have this 2 page thread that I've just deleted.

I guess we can do it here: how could it possibly be a non-issue if the pessimist's case is correct? You (or the pragmatists) don't think society or many individuals will change profoundly if the pessimist's case were the received view? It has definitely changed me.

If I may preempt an objection - if indeterminism is true and the future is open, then it's meaningful for me to think about what I would have been like had I not been interested in philosophy, or particularly interested in the free will problem, as my interest in philosophy could be the result of a random event.

Basically everyone behaves as if libertarianism is the case...so learning that it's true would change nothing. If determinism is the case then learning that determinism is the case would only change something because it was already determined to change (prior to 'learning' the information). Makes no difference either way.

If libertarianism is thought to be the case and then it is learned that libertarnianism is not the case, there will be no change? I don't see how that's possible unless conscious awareness of the principle is so drastically ineffectual that one's psychology will be unaffected. But surely that's not right - if one used to think he/she had ultimate moral responsibility and then learned that he/she is an epiphenomenal sideshow...

I didn't say there wouldn't be a change...but there's nothing we can do to prevent an already determined course of events. So policy decisions can't be other than what they already would have been regardless of our actions. We're one of many dominoes and while it may be appropriate to say that one dominoe 'causes' the next to fall over...that's not the real story: it couldn't have done anything other than it did and it didn't really 'do' anything that it wasn't already determined to do well before it did it.

If determinism is true and it's learned, then if there's a change (and there may be) it would have been determined to happen well before the acquisition of the knowledge and no policy changes could have been implemented to avoid this (other than ones already done or determined to happen, of course).