The point is that it doesn't favour anything if it's entirely consistent with all 4 positions. The fact that people may 'feel' or 'think' that they have libertarian free will doesn't necessitate that they actually have it. It may just be an illusion. That sense datum does not support libertarian free will: while we may expect that datum given that libertarianism is true, it is entirely consistent to expect it (even though the prior probability may be lower) given the other 3 positions. Best to just entirely drop that as 'evidence' since it's not in the slightest (sorry).

With that argument, P3 and P2 are entirely consistent with believing in determinism so you don't get the contradiction that you need. An agent can both 'wish' that they could have done otherwise and yet know that they couldn't have done otherwise. There's no contradiction there.

Ok, given that nothing can be presented to contradict either position and that no evidence can favor one over the other, why hold one belief over the other? It seems that you are just saying that belief in either free will or determinism is just arbitrary, is that correct?

Do you hold that your belief in free will is simply an arbitrary distinction that you make to serve some other purpose, like the ability to hold people accountable?

Bingo!


BTW, I think that soft determinism/compatibilism is incoherent. Just because I don't think that it's an empirical question and that no rational argument can be given in support of one position rather than another, there's still lots of philosophical work to be done to investigate the various positions (there is still considerable progress in understanding and refinement of the various positions over the years and is still continuing - a topic that I work on).

I think you hold something generally similar to the position of Thomas Aquinas on this issue, according to whom the denial of free will is among "the oddest philosophical opinions," because it is inconsistent (except by extraordinary mental leaps) with such notions as responsibility, deliberation, exhortation, precept, punishment, praise, and blame, all of which are foundational notions for any moral philosophy. The denial of free will is therefore like the denial of the reality of motion (by those philosophers who followed Parmenides): it carries absurd consequences and destroys entire branches of philosophy, but nevertheless the arguments of one who makes such a denial cannot be directly refuted.

If determinism is true (and AFAIK it is) then the denial of free will is totally coherent...I differ from Aquinas, but I take your point.

Ok, fair enough. Do you think that there could be evidence for either side? If so, do you have any idea of something that if discovered to be true it would lend credence to one side over the other?

I've said many times that I don't think that it's a matter of evidence...it's not an empirical question and the question is structurally underdetermined in the first place. None of the positions is falsifiable or capable of empirical confirmation.

Ok, sorry. I did not know if you were saying currently there is no evidence or that evidence is not possible. Thanks for your replies.

durka,

What would be your response to G Strawson's basic argument - the a priori argument that ultimate moral responsibility is incoherent? Or, if you prefer, can you describe/hypothesize any indeterministic mental process which coheres with libertarian free will? You seem to think that there's some sort intuitive prima facie parity between free will deniers and libertarians, but I don't see it. The pessimistic argument is pretty straightforward and easy to grasp - the libertarian alternatives are (as someone who would like libertarians to be right) disappointing at best. About the only libertarian line I can follow metaphilosophically is analogous to cognitive closure: that humans are not smart enough to understand free will. But that's not really an intuition; that's a gambit.

I'd have to review the argument but I don't really have time (I wrote a summary paper on it last year but it's on my other - dead - computer atm). If you could summarize the argument it may refresh my memory (IIRC my criticism is that it begs the question...shocker).

Wait, I thought you believed in libertarian free will? Or are you saying determinism and free will are compatible and that's what you believe? And why do you think determinism is true?

I haven't been following the thread super closely (reading this as I leave work), so apologies if this has been covered.

Here's the link http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT3

I'll just quote the penultimate paragraph here, but there's a step by step argument in the link.

Read through that post again and see if you understand it the 2nd time through...that's not at all what that post means.

It's coming back to me. The libertarian doesn't require "ultimate" responsibility viz. responsible for 100% of 100% of one's actions. Instead, it merely requires that one could be responsible for at least one "free" act (Kane would call this a self forming action - SFA). While I don't agree with how Kane tries to establish the plausibility of a physicalist libertarianism, he does set out a good sufficient condition for responsibility that is really minimal.

His reply to that is in the last section http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/V014SECT6

I should say that I don't understand why he strains to use ultimate. The distinction between practical responsibility (i.e. identifying an entity with proximate casual influence) and ultimate responsibility (i.e. what we need to have in order to be fairly praised/blamed for our actions) is fine, but it leads to the kind of objection you are raising about what is meant by ultimate. The pessimistic argument works just as well against "at least one free act".

I don't know much about the kinds of libertarians there are, although I have encountered Kane. Do most libertarians think there will be a mechanistic/cognitive account of the faculty of free will eventually?

In a word: yes.

But, as I've indicated, no such confirmation is likely to be possible given my charge of underdetermination.

Durka in your opinion.
How strong is free will?

I opine it is weak.
For the most part we are automatons.

Pretty meaningless question IMO. Bordering on a category mistake.

Libertarian is a political philosophy or party.

level or see wiki

can you restate this quickly or link to post #, sloth consumes me

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarian


clown

Once again, you bring down the IQ of this thread by including your presence and adding nothing.

I leave this as an exercise for the reader...