in an effort to get more people posting in RGT, here is the thread this all started from

Oh come on. It's not like the majority of people from north america aren't theists .... idk why your not admitting it. Why would you talk about Thor and refer to him as "god" and when your talking about Yahweh referring to him as "God?"

Ok Madnak,

What do you think of this in terms of regret of one's choice (not to be confused with outcome)

P1. Free will is the ability to choose otherwise without it being random
P2. In a deterministic world an agent cannot choose otherwise given the same set of variables (unless it is random.)
P3. Agent A is said to have regret if he/she wishes they would have chose otherwise in situation X.
C1 (P2). Agent A does not believe that they have could have chosen differently in situation X if Agent A believes in determinism.
P4. Agent A regrets choice C in situation X
C2 (C1 & P4). Agent A does not believe in determinism.

jib, put it like this:

p1
p2
con1

p3
p4
con2

p5 (con1)
p6 (con2)
con3

or its meaningless

It works, but it's a very technical definition and I don't think most people ever do wish they could "choose otherwise" in the sense you mean.

We got onto this talking about other cultures, and you claimed that the fact they experience regret suggests that they believe in free will. But nobody ever says "I wish I could keep all factors exactly the same, including myself, but that my choice was different." If they did say that, then you'd have a point.

But nothing that people do in fatalistic cultures indicates that they're overly concerned with whether they are the ultimate cause of their actions. In fact, they believe the gods cause everything.

According to your definition, I've never experienced regret in my life and I doubt the ancients ever did either.

Do you not see the contradiction?

That all depends on how you define the words. In particular, what is a "choice"?

I think you're not understanding your own argument, because you don't have an argument. I don't see that you're "refuting" anything at all.

The majority of the people on earth hold some affirmative belief in the supernatural. Therefore, Ryanb9 believes in the supernatural.

I guess that if you were to show that free will was an illusion, I would act exactly the same, but I would not regret anything. I would not hold my deliberation in the same class as my rational actions, but I would still act as if free will existed.

But I think this is my point. If determinism is true then we would have to live ours lives as if free will was true. Which means that how we perceive ourselves would contradict our beliefs.

The way that we act is consistent with free will, not determinism. So why believe that determinism is true? I am not saying that it cannot be, but what evidence is there that would force us to contradict our perceptions?

lol, yeah probably. But I don't see what a mind has to do with it. A mind in a deterministic world is just really sophisticated/complex rock rolling down a hill.

I attempted to in my above (previous to this) post.

I was being a little nitty. I attempted to answer in this post.

i would agree with you if thats what i was saying but it's not. i was saying the majority of people do it so you dont have to be ashamed to admit you do it as well.

There is no contradiction.

You already asked me that, and I already answered. But that is not a valid argument, regardless of definitions. Logic is thankfully not the kind of discipline where you can just slap something together and "see if it works," valid arguments need to have particular structures.

Jib has made a number of arguments in this thread. I've responded to all of them. If you have issues with my responses, you're free to talk about them on an individual basis. I've also made plenty of arguments of my own, I even offered to formalize some of them.

If there are no well-constructed arguments, then your refutation is not well-constructed.

I'm not sure that I've actually asked you to define that word. I did a quick search of the thread for "choice" and I didn't see anything that looks like a definition. Can you repeat it for me?

Actually, arguments are constructed in that way (edit: "constructed" in the sense of "actively being formulated"). You start to build an argument and see if it holds. If not, you alter your assumptions, or alter your argument, and see if it holds after alteration. Repeat until you find something that works, or until you decide to try to argue something else.

The "particular structures" you're talking about are probably the formal rules of propositional logic. But those propositions depend on your definitions, which (unless I missed it) you haven't yet provided.

You need not go any further than the one that I quoted. Your "refutation" regarding "regret" is meaningless. What is the underlying assertion that you've "refuted"?

Speak for yourself. I have always lived as though determinism is true, and will continue to do so in every action and thought. If I were to discover that free will is definitely true, I would still act as if determinism is true, because I would need to do so in order to stay sane.

Nobody has ever been recorded describing themselves as having libertarian free will in the ancient past, and yet they described many things. Including their thoughts and feelings. The fact is that many people do not perceive themselves as having free will.

The way we act is consistent with both determinism and free will, but strongly suggests determinism imo. The only people who "perceive" indeterminism are people who are taught to perceive indeterminism, and ideas like causation, fatalism, and predestination predate the idea of free will.

The fact that you personally perceive free will isn't relevant to the overall question.

In terms of why we should accept determinism, we frankly shouldn't. However, we see deterministic influences every day and in every facet of our lives. So it makes more sense to believe "that's all there is" than it does to make up an idea of something for which there is no logic, no evidence, and nothing. We shouldn't believe in free will for the same reason that we shouldn't believe in pink unicorns - because when we have no evidence for the existence of something, the rational thing to do is disbelieve until proven otherwise.

Again you're making statements without anything to back them up at all. A mind in a deterministic world is just a sophisticated rock? Number one, what on earth does that mean? Number two, assuming it means anything at all, how can you justify that claim?

Show me where how you're not assuming he is a theist based on geographical location.

Hey durka, do you think not believing in responsibility is a justifiable position? And does it make a difference if we switch Ryan's unicorn with Russell's teapot?

I just wanted to isolate this because it makes me happy

I thought that it was pretty accurate as to what people are doing when they regret, I will explain below.

Sure they do, that is exactly what you are doing when you regret a choice. Not that you wish the outcome was the same, but that you chose differently. For example, when I chose to take my current job (job A) I had another job (job B) offered to me that I turned down. After about 3 months or so I began to regret my decision. I did not wish that the variables leading up to me choosing job A were different, but that I chose job B.

I think that we would have to look at specific cultures to be able to go any further. Islam for instance believes that Allah wills everything that happens. But I would guess that if we polled various Muslims if they had any regret (as in they wish they would have made different choices) they would in fact have regrets.

I am not saying that it is not possible no never regret, but that those people are in the minority, lending credence to my prima facie claim.

You have never wished that you made a different choice the one you made?

You've made claims like this in the past, and I have never seen any evidence for this claim. I've always suspected you of playing a silly word game (perhaps the phrase "libertarian free will" weren't specifically used) or that you're just making this up.

So...
(1) I would like to see you describe what it would take for someone to "describe themselves as having libertarian free will" (to verify that this isn't a silly word game)
(2) Show me some reliable historical source that implies that such a thing has never been recorded.

How is that a contradiction?

It wasn't you, turns out it was durka.

"It means my conscious mind constructed the action. Or that the action is a result of my cognitive processes. Or that the action was selected from a range of possible actions by my mental processes. Take your pick, I think they all resolve into the same thing and I can work with any of them.

The fact that my conscious mind caused me to take an action, (instead of solely factors external to my conscious mind), is the relevant criterion."

I mean "constructed" in the sense of "being expressed." As in, I don't think most supporters of free will have any logic to back them up at all, and I think they believe in free will for reasons that are irrational (and certainly not for logical reasons), and I think they try to construct post-hoc arguments to defend the belief rather than believing on the basis of what logically follows from their premises.

Some sets of propositions may be valid arguments or not depending on definitions. Other sets of propositions simply do not (regardless of definitions) represent valid arguments.

I'm not refuting assertions, I'm refuting arguments. Assertions are just propositions. It's the process of inference that I'm targeting.

Please explain to me how I can prove this. I mean, obviously I can't prove a negative, it's possible that in some ancient Assyrian manuscript there's a mention. But I've read a lot, and I've never seen one. I've also spoken to many people who are very well-read, and none of them have been able to produce one.

The claim I'm making should be easy to refute. "Nobody in the ancient world ever wrote about libertarian free will" is a claim I've thrown around for years, and yet nobody has ever been able to produce a single counterexample. If libertarianism is such a universal part of the human condition, then why is this? Why does every culture write about awareness, but not one touches on this?

Sure, I just mean exactly what people like Jib are doing right here in this forum. Where are people describing that human actions could be different even if all factors (God, self, and universe) had been exactly the same, but that there is nothing of randomness or chance involved and that this (the actions that can have been different even with identical causes) is the source of responsibility.

Huh? Again, you'll need to explain what this looks like. What "historical source" is reliable enough to prove a negative? Here's a Google result of a history of free will.

A refutation is an argument. If you think otherwise, then tell me what a refutation is.

With your definitions, you're right because the premises do not refer to the assumptions. But this is not necessarily the case, depending on how one understands the words.

A1 - My actions are determined by past events
C1 - My actions are not determined by me
C2 - I cannot make choices

If "me" is not a "past event" and "make choices" necessarily involves actions, then this can be a sensible argument.

I think that this is how most people construct their understanding of the world. The basis is a collection of experiences, from which one attempts to formulate a coherent understanding. That the current understanding is actually internally AND externally coherent is irrelevant (and probably false).

You will have a hard time using "logic" to back up determinism as well. At least, you have yet to produce a "logical" argument in favor of determinism. (See your refutations.)

Huh?

(1) To refute an assertion, you provide evidence against that assertion. You're saying that you're not doing this, which I'll accept, but I'll also add that this is how it reads to me.

(2) To refute an argument, you show that the argument is flawed. Apparently, this is what you think you're doing. Rephrase the argument in your own words, and then tell me how your refutation refutes that.

At the time that I posted that I did not fully understand what you were saying, hence the use of "might"

Even though you did not do exactly what I hoped, you did technically do exactly what I asked, so felt you still deserved what I promised.

And it was well worth it, this has turned out to be a great thread.

What are you talking about? (Don't actually respond to this. This is just me expressing my reaction to what you've written.)

In other words, you're playing a silly word game by completely reframing the "free will" question to be a matter of purely of the nature of "randomness." (edit: randomness as the source of "responsibility")

The existence of moral responsibility implies that you could have done something different in the identical circumstance. Do you disagree with that?

Whoa whoa whoa - libertarianism is wishing that you had chosen job B for no pre-existing reason. That's very different from wishing you had chosen job B for a good reason, or wishing you had chosen job B regardless of the reason. Both of those are consistent with determinism.

And I don't do that. If I choose job A and the work environment sucks, I will think "I wish I had been more aware of the work environment here before I took the job." Because if I had been more aware of the work environment I would have known that it wasn't right for me, and because of that I would have chosen job B instead. Or I wish that I had preferred job B, because I chose the job I preferred and if I had preferred job B I would have chosen that job.

Sometimes I just wish that I had ended up in job B - either because I was more aware of job conditions, or because I spent a longer time considering, or even for no reason if that had been how it came out. No consideration of randomness or controlling factors or anything like that - a pure desire to go where the grass is greener without a philosophical context.

But I have never wished that I preferred job A but chose job B anyhow due to my free will. That sounds horrifying to me. And it sounds like overthinking it. But if I could go back and change history so that I actually paid more attention while looking for jobs, and chose job B for that reason, or if I could go back and choose to leave everything exactly the same except that in that one moment where I chose I chose job B instead of job A, I would vastly prefer the former.

I mean, would you rather have raised that pot because you recognized that it was the right play, or would you rather have raised the pot even though you didn't recognize that it was a good play, because your free will "kicked in" during that moment and caused you to make the choice you thought was wrong? Again, I take the former. I don't want to luck out on a free will toss! By the time I make my decision, I want to know my EV and I want to make my decision PURELY based on what I think the EV is. Not based on free will, but based on which action I think is best.

The same goes for all the other choices I make. I'd rather choose chocolate ice cream because I'm in the mood for chocolate ice cream than because I'm in the mood for vanilla but my free will chooses chocolate anyway.

Again, we'd have to say "do you wish that you had chosen differently with no prior cause - or would you prefer to have chosen differently because you were smart and knew the right choice?"

I think when most people think of "choosing differently" they thing of it in the deterministic way. If I was in the mood for vanilla ice cream, and I chose to eat vanilla ice cream, but I later regretted that choice... Then if I envision "choosing differently" I envision having been in the mood for chocolate from the start - not having been in the mood for vanilla and having chosen chocolate in spite of that.

I have wished that I made a different choice BECAUSE prior factors were different. I have never wished that I had chosen chocolate even though I wanted vanilla (despite having no reason to choose chocolate). I have wished that I was in the mood for chocolate instead of vanilla. But my mood is a deterministic prior factor. And my desires and preferences are also prior factors, and so on.

I would never want to do something outside of my preferences. I never want to 100% prefer vanilla, and to choose chocolate. That would distress me, I think I would seriously have trouble dealing with that. Every single time I have ever gone into an ice cream parlor, I have always chosen the ice cream that I prefer. The prior factor of my ice cream preference has always determined the type of ice cream I buy. If I'm in the mood for vanilla, I buy vanilla. If I'm in the mood for chocolate, I buy chocolate. Or maybe I'm with a girl and she likes strawberry, and I want to share that with her so I order strawberry.

But there's always at least one prior factor determining the action. Always always always. Sometimes I can't figure it out, like recently I was very rude to my ex-girlfriend and I didn't know why, I didn't mean to be but I was anyway. And it disturbed me. And then I figured out that I still wasn't over her, and that I was feeling some resentment over her new boyfriend - and I felt much, much better after that. There was a prior cause for my rudeness, so I could sleep easily. I don't mean to be a teenager here, but it's the only example I can think of where I didn't know the cause of my action while I was taking that action.

Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe it wasn't resentment. Maybe I freely willed the rudeness, and there was no reason for it. But that is a disturbing prospect, and I really really hope that it's not true.

Oh, I get it. You're using a completely different sense of "libertarianism."

I think you're missing the point. I never claimed that my refutations were well-formed. I'm not contradicting myself because I imply something negative about myself.

The conclusion can follow from the definitions alone, if we go far enough. But this is not a complete argument. The conclusion is following from the definitions more than the premises here, you're hiding the inferences and assuming they're implied. Most any non-sequitur (and really most any fallacy at all) can be made "valid" in this sense.

All cars are red.
John is red, therefore John is a car.

Is this a fallacy, or is it a tautology? Because if we define "red" to mean "the state of being a car," then it's perfectly valid according to your standards.

I don't think that's a legitimate basis for making serious decisions. But I think Jib is claiming here that he has a rational basis for believing in libertarian free will (and for believing that determinism and choice are incompatible).

I don't even accept determinism, as I noted above. I am here to refute the claim that determinism is incompatible with choice, not to support determinism.

"my actions are determined by past events, therefore my actions aren't determined by me, therefore I can't make choices"

The conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. My refutation refutes this by pointing out that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises.

I already got Jib to acknowledge that all prior factors must be identical in another thread.