Good insights. Something I've tried to do to is estimate my actual chances of winning when I have a hand I'd normally 'expect' to win with. Also, I find I do better when I limit my sessions so that the probability of taking a series of beats that tilts me is decreased.

I have considered tilt in the manner that the author defined it. I find that when I am making poor decisions when I am not emotionally upset - I still consider myself on tilt. Guarding against that is not all that easy. Recognizing it does go a long way toward avoiding tilt.

(as Ed Miller told me in a blog response - I think you tilt easily)

I think that it is important to state a couple of things here regarding this article's applicability to the player.

First off, this type of logical analysis of tilt is easier done from an objective frame of reference, like when you are reading an article in a coffee shop enjoying a latte. That's fine, you have to understand the mechanism in the first place. However, as with many of the things taught in books, knowledge is not power without training and reinforcement.

While playing cards it is harder to remember the tenants of Prospect Theory and take consolation from that. Handling tilt beyond an intellectual understanding of it is much more difficult. Since the behaviors mentioned in the article are what people are prone to do, it needs to be emphasized that it is extraordinarily difficult, on average, for people to resist these decisions. Poker profits often come from player's tilt and other contexts of bad decision making.

The article introduces a few concepts towards tilt control, but they really need to be expanded upon, and may make great material for a follow on article. What would be useful is a set of heuristics to guide the player already in tilt or in near tilt!

Very interesting read. It reminds me how important it is in poker to make plays that are profitable in the long run. I think if you always remember this then you will do well.

Guru's Tiltaholics Anonymous thread.

Some interesting NLHE tactics seem to come out of understanding the S-curve in the Science of Tilt article.

One is that most players who have won a considerable amount in a given session (say 2 or 3 buy-ins) will be more willing to fold good but not great hands when faced with large bets and raises from opponents who have them covered. This player, especially if he tends to be weak tight in general, is a better target for turn semi-bluffs and river bluffs.

And two, is that most players who have lost a considerable amount in a given session (say 2 or 3 buy-ins) will be more willing to either semi-bluff too much, or call on draws or with marginal hands for too much. This player is now a better target for larger value bets on the turn and river with made hands, and one against whom you should take free cards in position with draws that you can bet for value if they come in rather than semi-bluffing.

The appanrent emotional state of the player is probably less relevant than the fact that he is significantly "up" or "down" for the session and is therefore unknowingly at one end or the other of the S-curve. In a sense, the "winning" player is experiencing a kind of risk-aversion tilt that can be exploited just like the risk-seeking tilt of the "losing" player.

Another interesting observation is that both the big winner as well as the big loser will willingly call off a small portion of thier stack even if they are likely an underdog because the perceived utility of the small win or loss is about equal since he is near the flat edge of the S-curve. So, using position bluffs and semi-bluffs to play "small ball" with big winners and big losers is usually going to be -EV since these guys are both more likely to call with marginal holdings than a tight guy near his initial buy-in to whom a small win or a small loss still has a significant perceived utility. Meanwhile the small-ball bluffs vs the guy near his initial buy-in will often be more effective. Conversely, vs. the same opponents, you can value bet some more marginal hands in position on the river, especially vs the winning player, since they will both frequently call with worse hands that "might" be good, whereas the guy near the middle of the S-curve might only call with hands that beat you. Of course if the "losing" player might raise-bluff on the river over a small value bet, then a more typical check with modest holdings on the river might be better vs. that player.

I think this is a terrific article, and the S-curve will open up tactical changes in NL hands to maximize EV when playing with opponents near a flat edge of the S-curve (up or down) vs near the steep edge of the S-curve (up or down). In fact, when posting "reads" in strategy forums, it might be useful to note whether a guy is near the center of the S-curve, or whether he is near one of the extremes on the S-curve for a given session. Vs on-line, multi-tabling opponents, however, one "session" would be accross multiple tables, so figuring out where a guy is on the S-curve would be much more difficult than in live play.

Yes yes yes -- good insight.

Similarly, a form of tilt may be simply playing fewer hands simply because the player has booked a win and wants to keep it that way. I know I'm often guily of this.

The "winning player's tilt" would be true near the upper bend in the S-curve - where each chip won gains significantly less utility in the mind of the player than each chip lost would lose in perceived utility.

This bend in the S-curve at the upper and lower ends are critical points to identify in yourself, but probably even more important to identify in others. These are points of vulnerability where players will make decisions in which their sense of expected value will be skewed by the great difference in perceived utility between chips lost and chips won.

For example, if a player puts player X on a range of hands against which he has 25% equity (3:1), and he has to call an all-in getting 3.5:1 pot odds, then a player at the center of the S-curve would think, then call. Players at both extremes of the S-curve would call. But players on the bends would have very different reactions.

The player on the losing side at the bend on the left would call because the chips potentially lost would have less "negative utility" than the chips potentially won would have "positive utility." In fact, the player at the left bend would probably call if the pot odds were only 3:1 or even 2:1.

The player on the winning side at the bend on the right would fold because the chips potentialy lost would have more "negative utility" than the chips potentially won would have "positive utility." In fact, the player at the right bend might fold if the pot odds were as high as 4:1 or maybe even 5:1.

Another interesing note about the S-curve is that it helps explain why people often try to go up limits to "win back" big losses. If a player loses multiple buy-ins, but still has some bankroll available, he might reach a mental state near the flat end of the left side of the S-curve. At that point, 1 buy-in either way still doesn't alter his perceived utility per chip. However, if she doubles or triples the stakes, now a potential loss still results in the same negative perceived utility per chip as when she started the hand, but a potential win at higher stakes would catapult her past the lower bend in the cure to where the perceived utility of each potential chip won is worth significantly more than the perceived utility of each chip lost. The chance of quickly getting back onto the steep slope of that utility curve becomes quite compelling to somebody on the flat left corner of the curve.

Expected value calculations, "EV," assumes a linear relationship in which every chip won or lost at any amount at any moment has an equal utility. For example, the 100,000th chip won is identical in EV calculations as the 1st. But most people don't think about their chips that way. The S-curve makes more sense for how people behave during the course of a session, and even over the course of several sessions if they are on a streak (up or down). And understanding how people behave along that curve gives, especially at the inflection points, gives you an edge over people unaware of their shifting sense of utility per chip.

agreed

From the article:
"Tilt is when a gambler who wants to make the most money he can over the course of a gambling situation employs a wagering strategy other than the highest expected-value pattern of wagering he generally has the ability to adopt for that situation."

This can't be right! Well, it sure SEEMS a poor definition of Tilt, to me anyway. Being on Tilt is a feeling - a very emotional feeling, and it leads to poor play. They are in fact distinct. For example, something happens at the table, and I go on tilt. I suddenly have the urge to call with a hand I normally wouldn't, then dig real real deep, and make my usual fold. Then I go for a walk, knowing I'm on tilt, and knowing I need to calm down before playing again. This is what I do.

So no bad hands played. Was I on tilt?

No, you weren't. You almost went on tilt, but avoided it by digging "real deep" then leaving the table.

You'd have been on tilt if you'd called, rebought, and stayed playing differently than you usually would to maximize your EV in that game.

Tilt to me is when emotion clouds - and thus harms - your game. Emotion can also be beneficial to poker, but only in rare, specific ways (I say specific simply because it's so difficult to maintain absolute control over your emotions; it's like walking on a knife's edge).

So, by the above definition:
100% lack of tilt = complete emotional control

This is why I think almost every poker player is almost always on tilt, just to varying degrees. I would guess that many pros experience tilt just as often but to a lesser degree than fish. The best pros go on tilt practically never, since they have filtered out nearly all emotion from their game.


Maybe Hellmuth (the other 98% of the time) can maintain such complete emotional control and make the right decisions, that he has to have a release valve and blow up and look silly the other 2%... :P

What do you guys think of my view of tilt?

His response to the situation (leaving) could be viewed as tilt because he gave up the expected value he would have enjoyed had he been able to stay and play his normal game.

Good point. So, after "digging deep," and avoiding tilt in his last hand by playing correctly, his subsequent leaving the table would constitute a form of tilt because chosing not to play at that point "employs a wagering strategy [in this case, the strategy employed is to refrain from wagering] other than the highest expected-value pattern of wagering he generally has the ability to adopt for that situation [which would otherwise be to play in a +EV game]."

So, again, nice point.

And I like the article's definition.

I think you guys avoided my point, albeit nicely. I conceed that leaving the table and not playing would fall under the author's definition of tilt. But, for the hand I played, and folded correctly, was I on tilt? To me, there is no question at all, I was. According to the article, I wasn't. So which is it? Tilt is clearly an emotional state. Playing badly, or whatever, is a RESULT of tilt. Is the author really saying something different than that?

You were not on tilt in the hand you mentioned. You almost tilted, but you didn't.

As defined by the article, tilt is not an emotional state. It is a manner of play. And I think the article's definition is more useful than any other that I've seen.

If your emotional state did not change your manner of play from one in which you maximize your expectation to some other less optimal way, then you may have been "sad" or "mad" or "angry" or "upset," but you were not on tilt.

In fact, if I loved to gamble when I'm feeling good, but I played a more solid game when I was mad about some big loss that I'd just incurred while gambling, then I'd be on tilt when I was feeling good because I'd be -EV gambling, but I'd be playing to maximize my EV when I was mad or upset in order to grind my money back. Now, most people do not respond like that. Most people regard the utility of the chips/money they win in a poker game a long an S-curve like the one in the article. As a result, when they lose a lot, they get to a point where they feel losing another big pot has much has less perceived negative utility than winning a big pot would have in terms of positive utility, even though the absolute dollar value of the win/loss would be the same. In practice, that will mean that they become much more willing to try to double up on a 36% flush draw for their stack on a flop despite the fact that they would otherwise know to fold when the pot odds do not justify that risk.

Tilt, as definined by the article, is a manner of behavior not a feeling. And treating it as a manner of behavior is much more valuable. As I mentioned earlier in the thread, the S-curve indicates a "winners" tilt in which deep stack "winners" might make -EV calls for "just one buy-in" when they are way ahead for a session because the total utility of another buy-in win or loss is about equivalent when some people are at the extreme right side of the S-curve. This makes very, very deep stack, multi-buy-in winners bad targets for bluffing.

In your case, you didn't "tilt" until you left the table, assuming that the table was otherwise +EV except for your feelings causing you to give up additional hands during that session.

If you were miserably depressed at the table, but made the same decisions that you would otherwise make, then you are not on tilt. The point of the article that "tilt" if not a feeling, is a manner of play that often result from emotions.

Albert said:

I don't quite agree.

Sparks said:

What I got from article was that though emotion may be a sufficient condition for identifying tilt, it is not necessary. If you rely on monitoring your emotional state to identify tilt, you may at times be on tilt without realizing it.

The definition of tilt used in the article is useful because it allows for better recognition and avoidance. That means I can limit its impact on my bankroll. If at times that means leaving the table, that's fine.

Yes, I was on tilt. But, I avoided making bad decisions because of my awareness of my emotional state.

According to McCauley's definition I was not on tilt. I'm just a card player without any citable credentials on the subject (other than my experience in casinos) but I will nevertheless, respectfully, disagree with McCauley.

He writes: "Tilt is when a gambler who wants to make the most money he can over the course of a gambling situation employs a wagering strategy other than the highest expected-value pattern of wagering he generally has the ability to adopt for that situation."

This is simply wrong. Tilt IS an emotional state. That is its definition in principle and it is very usefull to know that; likely more useful than the definition McCauley provides and certainly not "dangerous," as he posits.

I don't disagree with the S-curve, or Prospect Theory at all. They both seem reasonable and are likely an integral part of why people make certain questionable plays in poker. But what of the players who make those plays in the normal course of their session? Are they on tilt? Are bad players permanently on tilt? Of course not, and that is why the McCauley article misses.

Tilt should, and does, have a definition: and that definition is essentially an emotionally charged state a player comes under (which is NOT his normal condition), following some perceived injustice or equivalent.

The reason emotion HAS to be fundamental to the definition of tilt is because without emotion, you simply have bad play. What McCauley has gone through pains to define, is essentially just a description of why some people play bad, and no more. Players who make bad decisions, chasing long shots, perceiving one play as acceptable based on recent events, are simply bad players. Bad play based on Prospect Theory is nothing more than bad play. But a player playing badly on tilt, is something that is VERY important to recognize, and useful.

I believe McCauley got it just about 180 degrees wrong when attempting to remove emotion from the definition of tilt.

Upon review, this is pretty tortured logic cleary seeking to shoehorn my actions into the McCauley definiton of tilt. I WAS on tilt, and specifically because I recognized tilt as an emotional state, I was able to avoid potential bad play. I will be so bold as to say that the McCauley definition is in fact itself, somewhat dangerous. He should have taken the word tilt out of the entire article, and kept it to a discussion of Prospect Theory and how it relates to poker, which is pretty interesting actually.