Counsel,
I'm not surprised you disagree. It was either you or your partner, Mr. [x], who fumbled around for 15 minutes misrepresenting trade secret law to the magistrate, and you have apparently not taken the opportunity to review the relevant cases and materials in the interim, to the extent that you have disobeyed a court order.
I'm not sure your contempt of court is willful; it may just be that you are not sufficiently concerned with standards of professional conduct that they guide your actions. That would explain why your firm initially filed the complaint on a plainly unenforceable, even illegal, contract in a venue that lacked jurisdiction even after having been informed that jurisdiction was lacking. I've never had a complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, or even a motion filed on such basis, but I'm not in the habit of using law as a vehicle for abuse rather than a system for rule-based dispute resolution.
From your initial 8-page overbroad, uninformed, and borderline abusive "cease and desist" letter that appeared to be cut and pasted from a guide for how to use officious legalese to threaten the uninitiated, little of what has happened in this case has appeared to reflect a concern for either the law or truth.
This is not simply an issue of fair play or personal ethics; it has the force of law. Rule 11 of the FRCP requires that:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.
I realize the universities in Utah are not known for their quality, but the internet, to say nothing of printing generally, has lead to the widespread availability of cases and treatises with information about the law of trade secrets and standards of professional conduct. Such materials often note that disgruntled former employers, particularly those with more money than sense, have a tendency to file trade secret cases against former employees, regardless of their merit, particularly when the employer lacks the managerial skill or competence to effectively run the business without the former employee. The predominance of such experience is why courts have carefully circumscribed trade secret actions to limit their abuse. In fact, such experience, which appears to be exemplified by the present case, is why the magistrate ordered your client to divulge its actual trade secret(s) instead of simply general categories of businessy-sounding information.