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Greek debt negotiation Greek debt negotiation

07-16-2015 , 02:49 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by FWWM
Iran? I know who you mean but the situation is not comparable bcos although the overall debt is high they have been granted very low interest rates and most of the repayments are far in the future. Portugal and Italy are still paying more on interest relative to GDP than Greece does.
Meh, broke is broke.

Other country has more harsh terms but is able to pay just shows us how much of a basket case Greece is.
07-16-2015 , 04:58 PM
The banks reopening on Monday is a good sign.
07-16-2015 , 05:01 PM
Still cash controls tho.
07-16-2015 , 11:05 PM
This should be a lesson that agreeing with someone and wishing them well doesn't magically guarantee competence.
07-17-2015 , 10:33 AM
German parliament voted yes with a clear majority.

Next step is debt relief in politically acceptable fashion.


Expect extensions, rebates, some fiscal transfers, lower interest rates, and pretty much everything but nominal haircut.
07-17-2015 , 10:38 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by grizy
German parliament voted yes with a clear majority.

Next step is debt relief in politically acceptable fashion
Amazing the contortions it's gone through to get where it was always almost certainly going.

So hard to tell who has gained and/or lost from all of this. I'm sure it will have been obvious one day.
07-17-2015 , 10:48 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by chezlaw
So hard to tell who has gained and/or lost from all of this. I'm sure it will have been obvious one day.
Everyone lost.
07-17-2015 , 10:56 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by daca
Everyone lost.
I'm not so sure. There's a cost which we are seeing now but it's made clearer that polical solutions are needed which isn't worthless
07-17-2015 , 11:22 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by chezlaw
I'm not so sure. There's a cost which we are seeing now but it's made clearer that polical solutions are needed which isn't worthless
Greece is going through an unnecessary x% contraction which is awful. For that they'll be put on roughly the same payment plan as before resulting in something like planned 3.5% primary surpluses basically forever.

The debt was maybe close to sustainable before but is nowhere near it now. Meaning the creditors will have to pony up another €86bn or so, but can expect even less back than they could before.

Tsipras has ruined his momentum and split his party.

The mainstream opposition in Greece lost the referendum and their leadership in the process.

The negotiations created confrontations and ill will everywhere and nobody came out of them looking great. I think Merkel has even said something about this being Greece's last chance.

Structural reforms and privatisations will have to carry the day for any of it to be turned into a win but that's a lot to ask for from bakery liberalisation and utility privatisation.

Maybe Varoufakis added a zero to his next book deal and Draghi doesnt have to buy his own beers in Athens ever again, but that's about it imo.

Last edited by daca; 07-17-2015 at 11:40 AM.
07-17-2015 , 12:02 PM
I can't consider Greece in isolation. The main game in town is the EU/Eurozone and if they're understanding the problems with the Euro and with Greek debt more realistically and with more political impetus then that can have a huge impact on Greece medium/longer term that could dwarf the short term downside.
07-17-2015 , 12:44 PM
This guy pretty much nails it - he brings up the exact points I brought up, but supports them much better. These sound pretty much exactly like what I'd write if I had the energy to write my thoughts out:

http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/5965.html
http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/6013.html
http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/6069.html

Quote:
You can usually find evidence in support of lots of different narratives. Hypotheses of human affairs are not in general mutually exclusive. Many different stories can in some sense be true. Among those in-some-sense-true narratives, we should choose to emphasize those whose application will lead to better social outcomes over other potentially defensible narratives. That’s why I frequently argue that we should emphasize the role of creditors rather than debtors when lending arrangements go bad. I am not making a claim about God’s view of the subject. Perhaps Hell is a debtors’ prison, and there is truly no greater evil than failing to repay a loan. Perhaps Hell is full of creditors who failed to fit through the eye of a needle. These questions are, I think, beyond the sort of knowledge that should inform policy. What is clear is that unserviceable debt arrangements, when they accumulate, are enormously costly in human and economic terms, and so we need norms and institutions to regulate credit extension. My view, which I think almost anyone with a passing familiarity with the human species would have to concede, is that people under financial stress make decisions with a view to a shorter-term time horizon and with less capacity to be fastidious than people who have already financed their own immediate term. That is why I argue that we should emphasize norms that hold creditors accountable more than norms that hold debtors accountable. Creditors as a class are capable of regulating the initiation of debt arrangements at lower cost and with greater effectiveness that debtors are. If we want societies that yield good outcomes, then, we should impose a heavy regulatory burden on creditors, and we must choose moral narratives consistent with that.
Quote:
I am not criticizing Europe’s handling of Greece because banks deserved to take a hit and were treated too lightly. It is not the absence of pain and blame that troubles me, but its asymmetry. What was required was a Europe-wide solution to a European problem. What occurred, in my opinion, was the quarantining of a scapegoat. I blame Europe’s leaders for not framing the crisis in a different way, for acting as though it was about alms to Southern miscreants rather than explaining its roots in EU-wide regulatory errors and poor credit allocation incentives, Europe-wide problems that threatened many states. Framed this way, solutions would have looked very different. They would have addressed Germany’s problems and France’s problems as well as those of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Cyprus. Framed this way, solutions would have been conducive to “ever closer union” one crisis at a time. Instead, leaders chose to inflame national stereotypes. They pretended that there were villains and angels, and that they (and their own constituents, of course) were the angels.
Quote:
The choice Europe’s leaders faced was to preserve the union or preserve the wealth, prestige, and status of the community of people who were their acquaintances and friends and selves but who are entirely unrepresentative of the European public. They chose themselves. The formal institutions of the EU endure, but European community is now failing fast.

It is difficult to overstate how deeply Europe’s leaders betrayed the ideals of European integration in their handing of the Greek crisis. The first and most fundamental goal of European integration was to blur the lines of national feeling and interest through commerce and interdependence, in order to prevent the fractures along ethnonational lines that made a charnel house of the continent, twice. That is the first thing, the main rule, that anyone who claims to represent the European project must abide: We solve problems as Europeans together, not as nations in conflict. Note that in the tale as told so far, there really was no meaningful national dimension. Regulatory mistakes and agency issues within banks encouraged poor credit decisions. Spanish banks lent into overpriced real estate, and German banks lent to a state they knew to be weak. Current account imbalances within the Eurozone — persistent and unlikely to reverse without policy attention — implied as a matter of arithmetic that there would be loan flows on a scale that might encourage a certain indifference to credit quality. These were European problems, not national problems. But they were European problems that festered while the continent’s leaders gloated and took credit for a phantom prosperity. When the levee broke, instead of acknowledging errors and working to address them as a community, Europe’s elites — its politicians and civil servants, its bankers and financiers — deflected the blame in the worst possible way. They turned a systemic problem of financial architecture into a dispute between European nations. They brought back the very ghosts their predecessors spent half a century trying to dispell. Shame. Shame. Shame. Shame.
Quote:
But don’t the Greeks want to borrow more? Isn’t that what all the fuss is about right now? No. The Greeks need to borrow money now only because old loans are coming due that they have to pay, and they have been trying to come to an agreement about that, rather than raise a middle finger and walk away. The Greek state itself is not trying to expand its borrowing. Greece’s citizens and businesses would like to expand the country’s borrowing indirectly, by withdrawing Euros from Greek banks that the Greek banks won’t be able to come up with unless they are allowed to expand their borrowing from the ECB. That is, Greece’s citizens are in precisely the place France’s citizens and Germany’s citizens were in 2010, at risk that personal savings maintained as bank deposits will not be repaid. Something was worked out for French and German citizens. Other than resorting to the ethnonational stereotypes that European elites have now revived in polite company, what is the justification for a Greek schoolteacher losing her savings that wouldn’t have applied just as strongly to a French schoolteacher five years ago? Because Greeks are responsible, as individuals, for what the governments they elect do? Well, then I deserve to be killed for what my government has done in Iraq and elsewhere. Is that where we want to go?
07-17-2015 , 01:00 PM
^

Quote:
I am not criticizing Europe’s handling of Greece because banks deserved to take a hit and were treated too lightly. It is not the absence of pain and blame that troubles me, but its asymmetry. What was required was a Europe-wide solution to a European problem. What occurred, in my opinion, was the quarantining of a scapegoat. I blame Europe’s leaders for not framing the crisis in a different way, for acting as though it was about alms to Southern miscreants rather than explaining its roots in EU-wide regulatory errors and poor credit allocation incentives, Europe-wide problems that threatened many states. Framed this way, solutions would have looked very different. They would have addressed Germany’s problems and France’s problems as well as those of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Cyprus. Framed this way, solutions would have been conducive to “ever closer union” one crisis at a time. Instead, leaders chose to inflame national stereotypes. They pretended that there were villains and angels, and that they (and their own constituents, of course) were the angels.
That's how I see it too but we shouldn't underestimate the political problems individual countries have and the numbers of people who don't see things as European but as national. Politics is the art of the possible and what we want may simply not yet be possible. My belief and hope is we are moving closer to it being possible but the Europe project can take generations.

Much easier not to have done such a bad job of the Euro in the first place but people are reluctant to properly consider what can go wrong. Maybe that wasn't possible either.
07-17-2015 , 01:39 PM
Quote:
It is difficult to overstate how deeply Europe’s leaders betrayed the ideals of European integration in their handing of the Greek crisis. The first and most fundamental goal of European integration was to blur the lines of national feeling and interest through commerce and interdependence, in order to prevent the fractures along ethnonational lines that made a charnel house of the continent, twice. That is the first thing, the main rule, that anyone who claims to represent the European project must abide: We solve problems as Europeans together, not as nations in conflict.
The fundamental goal of the EU project is to establish in an orderly way German (and to a lesser extent French) domination over their natural sphere of influence. Greece is a troublesome province of the empire that needs to be brought back into the fold.
07-17-2015 , 02:12 PM
Waldman is such a great writer, I can imagine this entire screed spilling out onto his computer screen in one fell swoop, DVaut-style.

Quote:
If it were 2009, I might have been persuaded that the corporate bankruptcy analogy is poor, that Europe’s interest in the development and cohesiveness of its empire would substitute for narrow economic incentives (which should in any case be blunted, since they are the incentives of 27 different fiscs). If the past five years had not happened, I might be open to the argument made here (ht platypus) that, having extended the maturity of a large quantity of debt far into the future, creditors’ position is more like equity, since the fraction of face value creditors eventually recover is dependent upon Greece’s long-term growth.

But we have had five years to observe creditors’ tender ministrations, under governments that complied with creditors’ every demand. This has been the result:


Euroelite apologists cite the small upturn at the very end of the graph to say,
“See! Things were going swimmingly until the five-month old Syriza government screwed it all up. They just had to stick with the program! It was working!
The darkest hour comes before the dawn!” These people, they are sophisticated highly educated people. You can trust them. Check out this track record:



The fact of the matter is no country, not Germany, not France, would voluntarily put up with the sort of “adjustment” that has been forced on Greece, for the good reason that gratuitous great depressions are not actually helpful to an economy. Creditors have had five years to mismanage Greece and they’ve done a startlingly effective job. Syriza has had five months to object. However much you may dislike their negotiating style, however little you think of their competence, Greece’s catastrophe was not Syriza’s work. If creditors respond to Syriza’s “intransigence” with maneuvers that cause yet more devastation, that will be on the creditors. Blaming victims for having insufficiently perfect leaders is standard fare for apologists of predation. Unfortunately, understanding this may be of little comfort to the disemboweled prey.

Europe’s creditors are behaving exactly as one might naively predict private creditors would behave, seeking to get as much blood from the stone as quickly as possible, indifferent to the cost in longer-term growth. And that, in fact, is a puzzle! Greece’s creditors are not nervous lenders panicked over their own financial situation, but public sector institutions representing primarily governments that are in no financial distress at all. They really shouldn’t be behaving like this.

I think the explanation is quite simple, though. Having recast a crisis caused by a combustible mix of regulatory failure and elite venality into a morality play about profligate Greeks who must be punished, Eurocrats are now engaged in what might be described as “loan-shark theater”. They are putting on a show for the electorates they inflamed in order to preserve their own prestige. The show must go on.

Last edited by Double Eagle; 07-17-2015 at 02:17 PM.
07-17-2015 , 02:36 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by bobman0330
The fundamental goal of the EU project is to establish in an orderly way German (and to a lesser extent French) domination over their natural sphere of influence. Greece is a troublesome province of the empire that needs to be brought back into the fold.

The EU project was intended to put to rest the possibility of a 3rd homicidal intra-European war. So they wanted to pull as many countries in as possible, on the theory that nations economically united would never go to war.
07-17-2015 , 02:39 PM
The problem is, it's gone way beyone economically united.
07-17-2015 , 04:34 PM
Article nearly nails it but fails ultimately due to one oversight.

What happens in a world where creditors are more accountable?

Spoiler:
Higher interest rates


Now to be clear, im not saying thats a bad thing, its probably a very good thing prior to 2008.

However the political class has a massive interest in driving interest rates down, more so than the financial class.

Which brings us onto another issue, do the "debtors" actually suffer?

Yes the "people" suffer, a lot.

But the people did not take out the loans.

At least in terms of sovereign debt, those that put pen to paper on the loans probably did not suffer that much if at all, maybe there pensions were not quite so good, at most.

So in taking on loads of debt you actually have a situation where the down side for the actual agents in the process is fairly limited, both creditor and debtor.

Yes the debtor can be put out of office, but this is just a bump in the road for political elites.

But some bankers did actually lose jobs, take haircuts etc.

So actual procedural debtors do have at most a marginal downside but the people have a massive downside.

However, lets say we try and fix this now, make the creditors more accountable.

BOOOOOOOM! Nothing ****s the "recovery" like higher interest rates, because debt is so high.

Central banks have dropped interest rates to near 0 for a reason.

Creditors say FU we own this game.

The solution of making creditors more responsible creates an effect absolutely in contradiction to the effect sought by the monetary policy of CBs in response to the crises.

So blaming debtors or creditors is ultimately a false dichotomy.

The system that defines such is ultimately at fault.

Ultimately a money supply predicated on debt is the problem.

http://positivemoney.org/

Last edited by O.A.F.K.1.1; 07-17-2015 at 04:52 PM.
07-17-2015 , 05:36 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by chezlaw
I'm not so sure. There's a cost which we are seeing now but it's made clearer that polical solutions are needed which isn't worthless
The real cost will transpire when this bailout will fail as much as those before because of Greek inability to reform as much as needed to be on the same track with the rest of the Eurozone
07-17-2015 , 05:41 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by FWWM
The real cost will transpire when this bailout will fail as much as those before because of Greek inability to reform as much as needed to be on the same track with the rest of the Eurozone
It's possible, either way the short term cost quite likely wont determine how this is judged in the future.
07-17-2015 , 05:57 PM
At this point no amount of reform could lead to a situation where liabilities could be met, that ship sailed a long time ago.
07-17-2015 , 06:06 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by O.A.F.K.1.1
At this point no amount of reform could lead to a situation where liabilities could be met, that ship sailed a long time ago.
Well, theoretically it could, because what Greece has to pay is not actually that much and much less than they had to pay for their debt prior to the Euro. But in practical terms you're absolutely right, there is no way this will actually happen. Just looking at the news of today Tsipras is likely to be calling for another general election in autumn, it's not hard to imagine what that will mean for the economy.
07-17-2015 , 06:12 PM
The Greek election will be very interesting.

I wonder if the left will do that well if they seek another mandate to renegotiate. I would have though the Greek people now believe that they can't have both and will vote for something more constructive or for a 'Grexit' party.
07-17-2015 , 09:45 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by O.A.F.K.1.1
What was that country that had harsh economic sanctions passed on it regarding debt repayments that lead to some pretty rightwing guys coming to power?
The Greeks can elect all the Nazis they want, but they're not organized enough to do a blitzkrieg.
07-17-2015 , 10:36 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by O.A.F.K.1.1
Article nearly nails it but fails ultimately due to one oversight.

What happens in a world where creditors are more accountable?
[/URL]
Higher rates and underserved populations (a lot of people aren't worth underwriting if you need to actually research their credit worthiness before making a loan, like a mortgage).

Quote:
Originally Posted by O.A.F.K.1.1
Ultimately a money supply predicated on debt is the problem.

http://positivemoney.org/
This is gold bug level idiocy. Debt based money supply is one of the killer apps of modern economy. It's one of the main mechanisms that allows capital to flow to where it's most productive (one that doesn't work too well with super low near zero rates).
07-18-2015 , 03:24 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by grizy



This is gold bug level idiocy. Debt based money supply is one of the killer apps of modern economy. It's one of the main mechanisms that allows capital to flow to where it's most productive (one that doesn't work too well with super low near zero rates).
Noting to do with goldbugs.

So you are saying its works really well accepting for the inevitable outcome of such a system, e.g. interest rates near zero.

      
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