So Tsipras should probably start a campaign demonizing Varoufakis and some of the other opponents of the deal right about now before they start rallying the leftwing opposition and destroy the country.

Syriza clearly failed, I had faith in them but its clear the rest of Europe is not negociating with left wing parties. If Podemos wins I expect the outcome to be preety much the same.

Would you negotiate with someone who calls your credit terrorist, blackmail and other stuff?

Yeah because that is the reason they didnt negociate

The problem with Syriza is not rhetoric is the fact that they made the classical leftist mistake of not choosing a clear plan of action. They either play ball within the system and try to renegociate terms with EU with a left of centre platform which would basically be PASOK 2.0 but without its more corrupt elements or they make a solid plan of leaving the euro and present it as such. This we are marxists but we dont want to leave the euro stance was bull****. Now it turns out the greek people would probably been better electing To Potami instead.

Syriza dragged their feet. They caused a shutdown of their banking system in the middle of the tourist season which is their biggest revenue period. Then in the end they got the same deal that was already on the table for several months. According to some people it is a worse deal. I have not seen anyone claiming it is better.

The previous government would at least have prevented the banking shutdown and quite possibly gotten a better deal down the road as the rest of Europe started to trust them to keep their promises.

Its a worse deal. I expect many Syriza MPs to vote against it.

Why not go back to the roots and purge them?
Whatever happened to true socialist values

No they wouldn't have been better by electing an even more populist party.

They made the same mistake as all governments before in that they promised a lot of things that were never going to happen. Such as staying in the euro and getting more money with no strings attached. That's why it shouldnt be too much of a surprise that the latest bailout has so many strings attached.

I almost wrote that having him assassinated, while he can still be a martyr for the cause, and blaming it on the nazi guys would be by far the best option. But I think some people frown upon that kind of thing and it would have some negative consequences too.

I dont really have any idea if he wants to continue in politics either. It just seems like he would have a hard time turning away from the attention. Some of the other Syriza members might be the bigger problem tho.

I think this basically nails it. Leaving the Euro would have made sense and working within the system would have made sense, but trying to have it your own way when you depended on the rest of the Eurozone was catastrophic. The piece has the same point http://www.vox.com/2015/7/13/8949925/greece-syriza

Part of the problem though was that there was no popular mandate for leaving the Euro but plenty of one for confrontation with the creditors.

The fundamental conceit was the idea that austerity and the Euro could be separated.

Opinion in germany

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33517252

Plenty of people say stuff like this, but did anyone actually look at the numbers? Last summer the IMF had it as sustainable with a 3.5% medium term primary surplus and 1% yearly growth. That's tough, but not impossible, and things actually improved from that over last fall.

Obviously the last 6 months, the bank run and 3-4-5% contraction ruins all that, but for a while it looked like it would be okay.

1% yearly growth not much after a 25% contraction.

When that 25 % is all funded on loaned money, it's something :/

Eh?

Exactly. Growth would hopefully have been even better, but 1% would still probably have been enough for the debt to be sustainable if the primary surplus reached 3.50 in a couple of years.

Greece was due to payback 25B this year, it was broke by June 30th. Also Growth of 1% is mostly irrelevant when some of the debt is interest bearing.

The debt might have been notionally sustainable, but not under the payment schedule.


Creditor Due Date Amount Description Rate
IMF June 30, 2015 OVERDUE €1,559,249,629 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

IMF July 13, 2015 OVERDUE €456,365,745 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

Treasury bill holders July 17, 2015 €1,000,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.70%

ECB July 20, 2015 €2,095,880,000 Bonds held by ECB exempted from the 2012 default 3.70%

ECB July 20, 2015 €1,360,500,000 Bonds held by national central banks exempted from the 2012 default 3.70%

EIB July 20, 2015 €25,000,000 Bonds held by the European Investment Bank; exempted from the 2012 default 3.70%

Treasury bill holders August 7, 2015 €1,000,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.75%

Treasury bill holders August 14, 2015 €1,400,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.70%

ECB August 20, 2015 €3,020,300,000 Bonds held by ECB exempted from the 2012 default 6.10%

ECB August 20, 2015 €168,000,000 Bonds held by national central banks exempted from the 2012 default 6.10%

IMF Sept. 4, 2015 €304,243,830 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

Treasury bill holders Sept. 4, 2015 €1,400,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.97%

Treasury bill holders Sept. 11, 2015 €1,600,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.70%

IMF Sept. 14, 2015 €342,274,309 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

IMF Sept. 16, 2015 €570,457,181 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

Treasury bill holders Sept. 18, 2015 €1,600,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.70%

IMF Sept. 21, 2015 €342,274,309 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

Treasury bill holders Oct. 9, 2015 €1,400,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.97%

IMF Oct. 13, 2015 €456,365,745 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

Treasury bill holders Nov. 6, 2015 €1,400,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.97%

IMF Dec. 7, 2015 €304,243,830 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

Treasury bill holders Dec. 11, 2015 €2,000,000,000 Short-term treasury bills 2.97%

IMF Dec. 16, 2015 €570,457,181 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

IMF Dec. 21, 2015 €342,274,309 Loan under the IMF's first bailout program for Greece, in 2010.*

dude, obviously interest rates are part of these calculations too. Together with growth, inflation and the primary balance. It's not hard stuff.

You're just making stuff up now. The target was a 3% primary surplus in 2015 and the rest of the financing needs would be provided by the 2nd bailout. It fits with the 14bn, or whatev, cache that never got paid.

The payment schedule obviously matches up with the fiscal targets (and being able to return to the open market should take care of the rest). Had things continued in the direction they were heading then Greece would probably have been alright.

The Greeks may still exit the Euro and not give their creditors everything they want.

The gun is still holstered. And Tsipras had no choice at this moment.

I still have faith in them. They tried a bluff and it failed. But ironically they are still getting bailed out. So now they know these are the best terms they are able to get.

This is really laughable. Greece had kept their promises. And they got a severe austerity package offer in the face of insolvency. Everybody knew and knows that the Greek debt is unsustainable. Merkel knew it in 2011. The IMF knew it as of last year and even tried to make an impact this year.

What Syriza got by shutting down their banking system and causing their GDP to fall is knowledge. They now know that Germany will not allow a true bailout of the proportions historically necessary to get Greece back on their feet (which is roughly a 40% haircut).

Should Greece exit the Euro with all of their debt owed and move to a new currency at the time of their own choosing it will create a very interesting situation. Will the EU be willing to go to war over money? Or will the EU be forced to negotiate without any real leverage. Because yes, the Greek people will suffer a lot more than they have now, but the EU banks will also be forced to face huge losses. In the end, the ability to trade with the EU will be the only bargaining chip the EU will have. And it won't be enough to avoid forgiving a large % of the current debt.

Greece had not kept their promises. Several reforms had been reversed when it looked like Syriza might get into power. Several more were not implemented on schedule when Syriza got into power. The only thing Syriza achieved is showing the rest of Europe that they were bluffing and don't want to exit as they didn't get any additional consessions.

The money owed to Greece is now all owed by governments so why would the EU want to go to war. They basically already have written it all off. What they want is for Greece to play by the European budget rules or to exit and Greece clearly doesn't want to exit. Not writing of the principal is just leverage. I actually expect the deal not to be ratified by the northern European countries and that Greece will exit anyway.

No thoughts on the latest IMF table pounding for haircuts?

Great timing.

For the rest of the Eurozone it's probably pretty annoying politically if it has to happen right now, especially if the amount is so big that they cant just extend the loans again to bring down the value.

Hopefully it can be a political victory for Tsipras and can be used constructively, but it probably doesnt change the economic situation much for Greece because the fiscal targets will stay the same.

Feels like the kind of stuff they should have talked about in all those negotiations, but the Greeks were trying to push the IMF out and Germany wanted to keep them in, so maybe they didnt.

Legarde and the IMF work for the Eurozone and other IMF members. It's not some independent private entity.

It operates like one, but push comes to shove, IMF will do what Germany/US/France/UK want (4 out of top 5 IMF voting shares, add rest of Eurozone and Japan and we got close to 50% of IMF votes).

Eurozone will most likely extend the loans some more, give more rebates and refunds, and maybe even take some nominal haircuts or, more likely, agree to some mechanism for haircut if Greece doesn't recover despite meeting its obligations.