Pilot Error?
A friend of mine sent me a link to this article
https://seekingalpha.com/article/425...ity-groundings
and asked for my opinion. Here's my response.
Friend:
Interesting article. As I was reading through it, my initial thought - after reading their conclusion that "pilot error" was the "primary contributing factor" in both accidents - was that folks at Boeing may have "helped" these authors reach their conclusions. In the aviation business, when crashes like this occur, it is a longstanding tradition of the plane manufacturer (and the airline) to blame the pilots - even when the pilots were not at fault. This was clearly the case with the 1994 crash of USAir Flight 427 near Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USAir_Flight_427
I've read a book on the USAir Flight 427 crash. It took quite some
time - and an exhaustive NTSB investigation - before the ultimate cause
was diagnosed and understood. It was not "pilot error" that caused those
rudders to jam, but the pilots were the scapegoats early on. So, given
past history and the USAir 427 precedent, I say it's best to wait for
the full and complete results - by competent air crash investigators -
before jumping to conclusions - and definitely before blaming this on
the pilots.
The previous article I posted on this, (by the experienced pilot and
software development executive), makes an equally strong argument that
fitting the 737 "MAX" with a more powerful engine positioned further
forward on the wings (to avoid the engine scraping the ground) significantly
changed the aircraft's aerodynamics and flight characteristics - in effect
creating an unstable [for flight] aircraft. His argument is that Boeing
was, in effect, creating a new aircraft type which should have gone through
the full FAA type certification process for a new aircraft design. Since
seeking a new type certification would have cost Boeing years of costly
development work - not to mention hundreds-of-millions of dollars in ancillary
costs - Boeing executives decided to try and go with a "cheap" software fix.
(How the decision was made to go with the MCAS "software fix" is now under
Justice Department scrutiny as a grand jury has subpoenaed Boeing for documents related to the decision making process on the 737 MAX.)
If it can be proven, in a court of law, that Boeing did willfully - and with
prior knowledge, proceed with an aircraft design/modification that they
knew was inherently unsafe; that's a whole new ball game. (This calls
into question the entire rationale for MCAS.) If the larger engine placed
further forward on the wing posed no safety risk - as Boeing is likely to
contend - then why was there any need for a software fix? It seems to me,
admitted non-expert Alan, that Boeing - feeling the need to introduce a
software fix to the redesigned/modified 737 - is an implicit admission that
they knew the modified aircraft was unsafe. This will surely be the
argument presented to a jury by plaintiffs lawyers - if any of these cases
actually go to trial.
Taking all this into consideration and acknowledging that it's too early
to reach any firm conclusions - keep in mind that it took over six years
for NTSB accident investigators to uncover the actual cause of the rudder
malfunction on the USAir Flight 427 crash - I believe (feel) that it's
premature to try and blame these two crashes on pilot error.
On another note, I agree with Rocky's contention that Boeing is probably
not in danger of going bankrupt or having to be "bailed out" by taxpayers
if they are ultimately found to be liable for these accidents. If there
were any real danger of that, Boeing's stock price would be down much more
than is presently the case.
In a nutshell, it's too early to know how this is going to play out.
Last edited by Former DJ; 04-24-2019 at 07:34 PM.
Reason: Tidying Up ...