We have a local community college (2 year) that has an aviation program, pilot license, avionics, A&P, etc. But that's probably not something you're looking for.

Well hey there W0X0F!

Remember me? Haha.

So was reading the latest update on the cause of the 737 Max Ethiopian crash, and it sounds like the Boeing MCAS system kept turning on even though the pilot(s) were correctly turning it off as it was pitching the nose down due to an apparently faulty sensor. So, just considering this from a layman's point of view, that design of MCAS automatically turning itself back on, quite quickly apparently, even though it's been manually shut off, seems bizarre. Obviously it will be addressed by Boeing.

Question: I believe you fly a couple models of Boeing planes, the 757 and -67 if I recall correctly, and I'm curious if there are any systems that automatically adjust the plane's controls? If so, can you shut them off?

Happy flying, and here's to 7 years ago!

Multi Engine is not a Type rating. Type ratings apply to jet powered aircraft and/or aircraft weighing over 12,500 pounds. Any jet you board has a Captain with that particular type rating on his Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate. My first airplane at an airline was the Jetstream 32, with a max tradeoff weight of 16,204 pounds. This was the first type rating I ever got (it appears as BA-3200 on my certificate). I've since added five others.

I should have probably said certificates and ratings. The first certificate, of course, will be the Private Pilot License (PPL). Then you'll add the instrument rating. The next step will be to upgrade to a Commercial certificate and from there you can add the multi-engine rating* and perhaps also get your Flight Instructor certificate (aka CFI, a separate certificate). The CFI is not a requirement to land that first airline job, but it will help you build time (while getting paid) to qualify for that first job.

The next certificate is the ATP, but you need 1500 total time to be eligible. The ATP is also not required for that first job but major airlines like to see it on the resume of applicants.


*You can actually add the multi-engine rating to your PPL. You could also get the Commercial license before the instrument rating. The order is not set in stone. But when I was starting out, the instrument rating required a minimum of 200 total time while the Commercial license required 250 hours. So most people did it on this order and I think still do, though I could be wrong about this. I think the hour requirements might have changed and, if you're curious, you can find the requirements in FAR 61 and 141.

How could I ever forget you? That was quite an achievement. If you get a chance, PM links to the videos you created back then.

Yes, I am rated on the 737, 757 and 767 (the last two are actually one type rating). There are a few systems that provide automatic input to flight controls. The autopilot, when engaged, will automatically change pitch trim as needed. If this malfunctions, we can simply disconnect the autopilot. If we experience a trim runaway (i.e. the trim motor remains engaged and continues to change trim, either up or down) we have a situation that can result in flight control forces that might be difficult or impossible to counteract by the pilots. In this case, we have disconnect switches for the trim motors (we have redundant motors). On the 757/767, when we disconnect the motors, we're stuck with the trim that exists at that moment; there is no way to adjust it. Thus, the pilots will have to use brute force to counter the control forces and get the plane on the ground. The 737 has massive trim wheels located buy the pilots' knees which can be manually adjusted.

The yaw damper is an automatic rudder control system which operates transparently to the pilots. Swept wing aircraft are much more susceptible to ditch roll and the yaw damper fights this tendency with small rudder inputs. We can disconnect the yaw damper if needed and the result is not life threatening but could provide a less comfortable flight.

Lastly, we have automatic mach trim which will add small amounts of nose up trim as the airplane enters the mach speed regime in order to fight a phenomenon known as mach tuck. Airflow over the wing has a local acceleration due to the camber (curve) of the wing which can result in an aft shift of the center of lift as that speed approaches supersonic. This resulted in many fatalities during the early attempts to break the sound barrier. I've never heard of problems with this system, though I suppose if it malfunctioned the easy solution is to reduce speed to fight the tuck tendency.

Here's one of them...

Cool, thanks for the correction.

Crap! I was looking at my response that you quoted and I see that autocorrect has struck again. I meant to type "max takeoff weight" not "max tradeoff weight."

I'm going to have to be more careful in proofing my responses. This has been happening with embarrassing frequency lately.

I have read that as a group, pilots are not easily rattled and rank low on the personality trait of neuroticism. Do you know or have you worked with any pilots who you would describe as uptight/anxious/high-strung? If so, how good are they at piloting?

Interesting question, and something I've never really thought about or noticed. I think I can honestly say I've never flown with someone who exhibits those traits. I suppose it's self-selecting. After all, how would a neurotic person ever manage to actually make it through flight training?

I worked with a pilot once who was so high strung it was uncomfortable flying with him. I was flying once while he was doing radios landing in Kabul, which was technically operating as a public international airport so his stress level was up a bit even though we went there regularly. We were told to exit at some taxiway and contact ground so I did but before he could get the ground call I guess I crept up a bit too close to the parallel taxiway and he was like "STOP THE ****ING AIRCRAFT RIGHT NOW. You can't just taxi around wherever you please at an INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT!" and I was like "OK I was just trying to clear the hold short line..." He actually said it in more words and I can't do justice to the intensity of his outrage. Other than that he was a good pilot though.

With the larger airlines I’ve read pilots talk about how they essentially show up at the gate and meet their co-pilot, fly a few legs and may never really see them again.

Setting aside the logistical issues, do you think that crews would be “more effective” if they worked with each other exclusively? Would having “your guy/gal” with you on every flight lead to better teamwork, or possibly lead to developing bad habits?

Definitely seems interesting that on many flights the two pilots were effectively strangers before strapping in...

I pity guys who have to fly as his co-pilot.

How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer

tl;dr: The author asserts that the design changes to the 737 MAX were so significant that it should have required certification as a new aircraft type, or at the very least, the behavior of the MCAS that led to the crashes should have required a Supplemental Type Certificate.

The author of this piece also professes to be a long-time pilot (30 or 40 years flying experience) as well as a software developer/executive. What I find interesting in the article is his explanation/theory as to why Boeing executives made the decision to go with a "cheap software fix" rather than the more traditional avenue of seeking a new type certification. In a word, it was money.

If this guy's theory turns out to be correct, (the "facts" of the current investigation should uncover how the decision was made to go with MCAS), that will amount to a devastating case of aviation malpractice. Assuming this pilot/author is correct, the litigation costs to settle all the forthcoming lawsuits could equal, or possibly exceed, the "hundreds of millions of dollars" it would have cost to seek a new type certification.

What I don't understand is why the [apparent] problem with MCAS wasn't discovered during "routine" airworthiness testing leading up to first deliveries of the new "MAX" design. For this problem to have been discovered prior to delivery to the airlines would probably have meant the death(s) of at least one Boeing test pilot, but that's why test pilots are paid the big bucks. The test pilot's job is to discover/uncover these kind of flaws. Whatever the case, at the very least Boeing would have, should have, known they had a major problem with the MCAS software.

If it turns out they knew MCAS might be flawed but chose to proceed anyway, that decision borders on criminal negligence. If they skimped on testing, to avoid costs and meet an ambitious production schedule, that amounts to willful negligence. This imbroglio also points to problems at the FAA - which the author of this article notes. This may be a case where putting $$$ before safety resulted in the loss of over 300 lives.

Can thank Southwest for that.

We have an LCA just like this. He actually did all 6 days of my IOE and by the second day I thought I was going to bust my ride.

I flew with him like 5 months later on just a normal trip and expected him to be just like a normal line guy. Nope. He can't turn it off. Nice guy outside the cockpit, absolutely miserable in it.

Reminds me of a sports video director I have worked with. Nice fun guy away from the event. In the TV truck, a raving screaming maniac.

Pilot Error?

A friend of mine sent me a link to this article

https://seekingalpha.com/article/425...ity-groundings

and asked for my opinion. Here's my response.

Friend:

Interesting article. As I was reading through it, my initial thought - after reading their conclusion that "pilot error" was the "primary contributing factor" in both accidents - was that folks at Boeing may have "helped" these authors reach their conclusions. In the aviation business, when crashes like this occur, it is a longstanding tradition of the plane manufacturer (and the airline) to blame the pilots - even when the pilots were not at fault. This was clearly the case with the 1994 crash of USAir Flight 427 near Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USAir_Flight_427

I've read a book on the USAir Flight 427 crash. It took quite some
time - and an exhaustive NTSB investigation - before the ultimate cause
was diagnosed and understood. It was not "pilot error" that caused those
rudders to jam, but the pilots were the scapegoats early on. So, given
past history and the USAir 427 precedent, I say it's best to wait for
the full and complete results - by competent air crash investigators -
before jumping to conclusions - and definitely before blaming this on
the pilots.

The previous article I posted on this, (by the experienced pilot and
software development executive), makes an equally strong argument that
fitting the 737 "MAX" with a more powerful engine positioned further
forward on the wings (to avoid the engine scraping the ground) significantly
changed the aircraft's aerodynamics and flight characteristics - in effect
creating an unstable [for flight] aircraft. His argument is that Boeing
was, in effect, creating a new aircraft type which should have gone through
the full FAA type certification process for a new aircraft design. Since
seeking a new type certification would have cost Boeing years of costly
development work - not to mention hundreds-of-millions of dollars in ancillary
costs - Boeing executives decided to try and go with a "cheap" software fix.
(How the decision was made to go with the MCAS "software fix" is now under
Justice Department scrutiny as a grand jury has subpoenaed Boeing for documents related to the decision making process on the 737 MAX.)

If it can be proven, in a court of law, that Boeing did willfully - and with
prior knowledge, proceed with an aircraft design/modification that they
knew was inherently unsafe; that's a whole new ball game. (This calls
into question the entire rationale for MCAS.) If the larger engine placed
further forward on the wing posed no safety risk - as Boeing is likely to
contend - then why was there any need for a software fix? It seems to me,
admitted non-expert Alan, that Boeing - feeling the need to introduce a
software fix to the redesigned/modified 737 - is an implicit admission that
they knew the modified aircraft was unsafe. This will surely be the
argument presented to a jury by plaintiffs lawyers - if any of these cases
actually go to trial.

Taking all this into consideration and acknowledging that it's too early
to reach any firm conclusions - keep in mind that it took over six years
for NTSB accident investigators to uncover the actual cause of the rudder
malfunction on the USAir Flight 427 crash - I believe (feel) that it's
premature to try and blame these two crashes on pilot error.

On another note, I agree with Rocky's contention that Boeing is probably
not in danger of going bankrupt or having to be "bailed out" by taxpayers
if they are ultimately found to be liable for these accidents. If there
were any real danger of that, Boeing's stock price would be down much more
than is presently the case.

In a nutshell, it's too early to know how this is going to play out.

Sorry to take so long replying to this post. I actually typed out a thorough response, replete with keen insight and witty asides. But I was on my iPad and it froze up on me. My beautiful prose was lost to the bit bucket.

Just back from a four day trip and ready to tackle this one again, but fair warning: this response might be a little mundane

The observation you make in the first paragraph is quite true, though it's not as rare as you might think to see a pilot again. We have somewhere in the neighborhood of 14,000 pilots, but the critical factor is how many are in the same airplane type and same domicile.

We currently have about 200 First Officers on the 737 in New York. I've been on the plane for a year and have probably flown with a couple of dozen of those pilots (note: because of being understaffed for FO's in NY for a good portion of the last year, I often found myself flying with pilots from other bases). I haven't actually counted it up, but even two dozen would put the odds of the next FO being someone I've flown with before at about 8 to 1.

In actuality, I think I've had "repeat" FOs about three times over the past year. I sit at about 135 out of 180 Captains in NY, so I'm probably not going to see the top 20% of FOs very often, as they are able to bid for much better trips than I can hold. [Of course, "better" is subjective. Some pilots bid for weekends off. Others bid for late show times, or trips that are commutable on both ends. Others bid for desirable layovers (e.g. 24 hours at an all-inclusive resort in Cabo San Lucas or Punta Cana)]

Before the days of PBS (Preferential Bidding System), which is very common at airlines today, we used to bid for "lines of flying," i.e. complete monthly schedules. Pilots would get a bid package and select which of the available lines they wanted and they would be awarded in seniority order. Typically, the same lines were available to Captains and FOs and thus two pilots would be awarded the same line and be paired together for the entire month.

With PBS, each pilot puts in his wish list of trip criteria. If the only thing important to me is have specific days off, or having weekends off, I can put that as the first line on my monthly bid and, seniority permitting, I would get that. I might also bid for specific trips or layovers. For example, I routinely bid for layovers in Las Vegas of at least 20 hours (not interested in a 12 hour layover) and I've sometimes gotten as many as four in a month.

PBS then dynamically constructs lines of flying to try to satisfy the desires of the pilots; there are no set lines as in pre-PBS days. Thus, it is typical for me to have a different FO on each trip. In fact, lately, due to the widely differing staffing in the seats, I've had trips with multiple FOs during the same trip. This is a result of differing trip pairings available to Captains and to FOs.

Example: I just had a four day trip with four legs...
Day 1 JFK-LAS 26 hour layover
Day 2 LAS-ATL (red eye; arriving day 3) 24 hour layover (yuck!)
Day 4 ATL-DEN-JFK

I had a different FO on each of the four legs! That's pretty unusual.

As to your question about effectiveness, it's a double-edged sword. It's certainly nice to develop a familiarity and "gel" as a crew, but too much of that can lead to complacency. I remember crew briefs at my previous airline, after flying a month with someone, where the briefing for the approach and landing was distilled down to "That runway, this airplane. Any questions?"

That may sound flippant (and it is), but we were hand flying the J32 and often seeing the same airports two or three times in the same day. An exhaustive, in-depth briefing started to feel redundant.

When I'm paired with someone new, part of my initial crew brief mentions the threat of a lack of familiarity with each other. (Part of all of our briefings is to identify threat areas and how we are going to mitigate the threat.) Mitigation for this lack of familiarity is easy: fly the way we are trained, using standard procedures and good checklist discipline. If we're on a three day trip, I usually say that we'll probably achieve maximum crew effectiveness as we taxi in on the last leg of the trip. (<--- this is what passes for Captain humor. The FO is obliged to at least chuckle. A well-placed "good one sir!" is always appreciated.)

The main effectiveness of the crew comes from just getting along and having a pleasant cockpit. I remember a Captain I flew with at ACA who told me that flying with him was like a day off with pay. And it kind of was. I always enjoyed our trips together. I try to emulate that.

The worst thing a Captain can do, imo, is to be overbearing. I've seen guys who play flight instructor with the FO, constantly questioning their technique and creating a nearly hostile cockpit. This results in the FO simple "shutting down." I know because I remember those kind of Captains. I reverted to strictly complying with standard operating procedures and nothing but required calls and checklist responses. To do more was to invite the second guessing. So, in effect, the Captain in this situation loses an important asset. It's really pretty dumb. I always want my FOs to feel free to speak up. I'm a firm believer in the crew concept.

Almost feel bad for making you type all of that up (twice no less) but there is a ton of great stuff in there. Thank you for the response.

I initially was thinking that of course you’d be better flying with the same person but your point about approach briefing is a good one. Going on “autopilot” (har!) seems bad.

Not sure how I’d feel about having different coworkers every day but I guess you need to be pretty self sufficient to do that job.

Glad you’re in the air again!

I have a good time with most of the pilots I fly with, but it is disappointing to me when I find someone I really click with and then realize there is a real chance I'll never fly with that pilot again. In fact, I might not ever see that person again!


btw, today was my last day on the 737. I flew JFK to Santo Domingo and back.

This Wednesday, I'll be in Scottsdale, AZ for my niece's wedding (and four days of golf with my brothers and cousins), then I start 757/767 transition training on May 7th, finishing on June 6th.

I enjoyed flying the 737 for a year, and I'll miss the HUD, but I know I'll also enjoy flying the 757/767 again.

More Evidence 737 Max Crashes Were Not Due To "Pilot Error"

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...cked-key-alert

The most interesting takeaway from this article is that after the first Lion Air crash back in October, (according to Wall Street Journal reporting), mid-level FAA officials were discussing grounding the MAX. If this reporting is correct, it's a clear indication of a safety concern that was either ignored (or dismissed) by higher level FAA managers. After the second crash, the concern(s) of the "lower level" regulators could no longer be dismissed or ignored ...

This latest report is another indication that pilot error was not the "primary contributing factor" in these accidents. It's also an indication that a lot of CYA is going on as the various parties involved are attempting to shift the blame - and potential liability - away from themselves and on to Boeing. The litigation arising from these crashes will probably drag on for a decade. That was the case with the engine that fell off a United Airlines jet [on takeoff] in Chicago back in 1979.

There's a thread about the Boeing planes. This isn't it.

First time ever to experience an aborted takeoff. Plane hitting the brakes pretty hard due to a door giving a warning light. Now they are keeping us on the plane until a module on the door is replaced which could take 90 minutes or more. Hate airlines that think it is easier to control you while on the plane. Wonder what happens if that same warning start while we are right between Sydney and Dallas.

I would abort for a door open light if we are below 80 knots, although it's not really critical for plug-type doors. The reason I would abort is because an abort below 80 knots is very docile and the only downside is the inconvenience of dealing with the issue and getting back in line for takeoff. On the turboprops I used to fly, we had doors that were not plug-type and in this case an abort would be mandatory. You don't want a door flying open after takeoff.

Above 80 kts, we only abort for four things:

(1) Fire (engine or cargo)
(2) Engine failure
(3) Windshear
(4) anything that makes you think the plane is incapable of flight

We often summarize this, when listing reasons for abort, as "FIRE, FAILURE, SHEAR OR FEAR."

The fourth category is the one depending on pilot judgment. What kind of thing would cause a fear that the plane can't fly and an abort should be initiated? I can't answer that. It's just a catchall to give us latitude to deal with the unexpected.

As for leaving passengers on the plane, that can be a tough call. For a 90 minute delay, I'd probably deplane. But if it looks like a delay of 45 minutes or less, it makes sense to keep people on for the most expeditious departure. Otherwise it can be like herding kittens to get them back on and get going.