Before takeoff the plane isn't flying It's just rolling like any other "average" 150-500 ton vehicle


https://uk.answers.yahoo.com/questio...1123359AA1vyPk

~150 kts (~172 mph).

If you ever "plane spot", it probably doesn't look that fast due to the "scale factor"

Was reading what you were saying on wake turbulence and I just had read about a NYC plane crash right after 9/11 that was the result of wake turbulence. How dangerous is it/have you had bad encounters with it?

Welcome back!


I've flown into Byrd International several times, as both a private pilot and an airline pilot. Chesterfield County airport and Hanover County airports are nearby and I've been into both of those too.


I still look forward to each flight and I love putting the throttles forward for the takeoff roll. The challenge on the descent, approach and landing is to make it all so smooth that passengers don't notice any big changes. I still love it when passengers getting off the plane tell me what a great flight it was. On my last trip, I had someone stop to tell me that of all the flights he's ever had, this was the best. I told him he had a good chance of making Varsity with that attitude. (j/k, but I actually did say he could come back and fly with me anytime)

As for certain airports over others, it's really the approaches that separate one airport from another. Two of my favorite approaches are the Expressway Visual to runway 31 at LGA and the River Visual to runway 19 at DCA. Both approaches offer more opportunity for exercising pilot skill and judgment.

I like JetBlue too. They pretty much pioneered the in-flight entertainment systems in the seat backs that are now almost standard. I have several friends from my days at ACA flying at JetBlue.

If your last question was how fast a jetliner is going when it takes off, that's going to vary by aircraft type and weight. The range is probably between 120 and 175 kts (138 to 200 mph). The lower speed is for a very lightly loaded plane. A typical range on the MD-88 is 145-150 kts.

Wake turbulence is much more serious when the trailing plane is much lighter than the wake-generating plane. A light single-engine plane following too closely behind a 757 can have a fatal encounter, with the plane behind flipped inverted. For airliners, ATC maintains a separation of at least 5 nm in trail.

I've only had modest encounters with wake turbulence. The worst was a roll of about 30°. More common is encountering wake from the previously departing aircraft on climbout. This feels like hitting a pot hole in the sky.

Was on a flight the other day and our destination was going to be experiencing T-Storms. It was a 2 1/2 hour flight on an A319. We had to hold, but only circled twice before going to our alternate. I was really surprised it was such a "short" hold. Did dispatch do the crew a disservice by not putting more fuel on-board or is that up to the PIC to request more fuel?

The dispatcher plans the fuel load for the flight based on forecast weather. The Captain can always ask for more if he wants it and in my experience any such request is always honored. (When I was flying turboprops at ACA under FAR Part 135, pilots always did the fuel planning.) I have not yet exercised my authority in this regard while I've been a Captain.

In the case you cite, it could be a situation where the forecast did not hold up and the planned fuel was for VFR flight conditions with no delays expected. A more common situation is just that the delays are excessive. When ATC issues holding instructions to us, they always give an EFC time (Expect Further Clearance) and we can then judge if we have enough fuel on board to hold that long and then make an approach with adequate fuel reserves. If I know I can only hold for 30 minutes and they issue an EFC for 45 minutes from now, I'll first ask the controller how firm that time is because it's often just a worst case estimate and they can tell us if it looks like we might get in sooner. If the controller says it's firm, or might even be extended, I'll just divert now rather than waste time and fuel circling for no good reason.

I know it was slated for retirement, but does this surprise you? Was there that much damage or is it like a car that's been in an accident...the cost of repairs exceed the value?

http://www.bizjournals.com/twincitie...ard-pinal.html

Also, do they use company pilots for a flight like this or do they sub-contract that type of flying? I'm trying to image what it would be like for the crew on a flight that long with a big empty 747?

https://youtu.be/omz3Z5pbSWI?t=20m40s

It looks like the plane is starting to get off the ground then comes back down, what caused that?

I watched that segment of the video several times and I see what you're talking about. I think it's probable that the right wing, and only the right wing, came up a little due to a strong right crosswind. The normal way to handle a crosswind on takeoff is to have some aileron into the crosswind (i.e. actually turning the control wheel to the right during the takeoff roll) to keep that wing firmly on the ground and counteract the tendency of the crosswind to lift that wing. Either the pilot was holding insufficient aileron to handle the crosswind, or he encountered gusts which tried to lift that wing and then counteracted that force by increasing right aileron. The plane definitely did not actually get airborne and then come back down. In a plane this large, there's a significant delay between rotation (pulling back on the wheel to bring the nose off the ground) and liftoff.

I guess there is one other possibility: the pilot started to rotate too early and then realized his mistake. The other, non-flying, pilot calls out the critical speeds during the takeoff. Usually there will be an "80 knots" call, at which time the non-flying pilot will confirm normal engine indication and will vocalize this. The next critical speed is V1, the point at which we are committed to fly. After that comes Vr, rotation speed. On heavy planes, the there can be several knots between those two calls.

If the non-flying mistakenly called "Rotate" too early, perhaps because he mis-set his speed bugs during the departure briefings, and then realized his error and corrected himself, the flying pilot might start to rotate and then bring the nose back down. This seems like an unlikely scenario to me.

This plane was severely damaged, but the question of whether to repair it or not always comes down to the cost. In this case, with some ready spares sitting mothballed in the desert, it was probably an easy call. It's not just the cost to actually get the plane airworthy again (which I'm not even sure was possible with this one), but it's the cost of having a plane out of service for an extended period.

I'm sure it was flown to the desert by company pilots. The airplane is made airworthy for this one ferry flight (cutting corners that wouldn't be acceptable for carrying passengers) and a ferry permit issued. The permit would include any special limitations for the flight. A common limitation would be to restrict the airspeed for cases where we are ferrying the plane with the gear down or perhaps some flaps extended or, as in this case, with some level of damage to the airframe.

If the permit required them to stay low and unpressurized, which seems likely to me, much more fuel would be required and the trip would probably consist of multiple fuel stops.

With all the data analytics and automation in the world today, are pilots presented with reports during training or a review period that's shows your "performance" relative to the automation of the aircraft you are flying? In other words, do they say something like "you are using to much thrust on takeoff" or "you average more fuel on your flights than all our other pilots on MD-88's with the same route"? I guess I'm really asking is your review a simple one, "hey...you got everyone there safely...good job" or are there certain metrics you are measured against?

We are checked against certain standards, but there is no data collection and analysis such as you are alluding to. During our recurrent training, consisting of two days in the simulator, and during our annual line check, performed by a check airman sitting in the jumpseat on a normal, revenue flight, we are graded on a very simple scale for our adherence to company standards.

This includes such things as:

- thoroughness of the briefing to the flight attendants
- proper preflight checks
- handling of maintenance issues
- crew briefings (both departure and arrival)
- adherence to proper flight profiles and techniques (this includes takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, approach and landing)

The scale is a 1 to 4 grade, where 3 is standard. Getting a 1 on anything is a failure, requiring additional training and testing. A 2 can be a not-quite-standard performance on some aspect that can be handled in the debrief. A 4 is rarely given out and would be for a flawless handling of some scenario.

United airlines used to grade applicants using data collection while they flew a Frasca simulator. For example, while the applicant flew an ILS approach, the sim software was counting off points while the pilot was not exactly on centerline. This penalized pilots who were trying to fly very smoothly to intercept the localizer. Word soon got out that if you were going to apply to United, the key was to be very aggressive in hitting precise altitudes and flying a course line (e.g. a VOR radial or a localizer). The same also applied to the glideslope, of course. The result was that you scored well by treating the sim as a video game where finesse counts against you. It's the kind of flying that no one would want to sit through.

Sounds like if there were stats on barf bag usage United would win.

I don't mean to imply that their pilots use those techniques when out flying the real planes, but their screening process certainly didn't help promote smoothness. I don't think they use Frasca sims in their screening process today. That was back during the hiring boom of the mid to late 90s.

Don't know if you fly in and out of SFO very often, but I was there this week and it's seems "different" than most airports. We landed on 28L while another aircraft was landing on 28R, almost simultaneously. I have to admit, being that close to another aircraft while landing was pretty cool! Add the fact that it looks like you are going to touch down on the water and it makes for a pretty unique experience that you just don't seem to get at other airports. When we took off, we used 01L, but according to AeroWeather, we had a 9 mph tailwind. That runway is only 7500 ft, so that seemed odd. It was short route and we weren't full, so I assume being lighter, it wasn't that big a deal for a B737. Do pilots like flying in and out of SFO? I have heard it can be challenging at times.

Also, when taking off on a runway that's parallel to arriving traffic, why does ATC give out wake turbulence cautions? Does the wake extend out that far from the wings? Plus, I thought all wake ceased when the wheels hit the ground?

Approaching Logan (Boston) from the east you have the same view. You see nothing but water below you until you get to the runway.

A little W0X0F pr0n:

The risk here is if there is a crosswind, the wake can drift to the other runway. There is no specific requirement to say "caution wake turbulence" in this scenario, but the controllers' job order says, "issue cautionary information to any aircraft if in your opinion, wake turbulence may have an adverse effect on it," and then notes wake turbulence's unpredictability. There's not much to lose by throwing out a "caution wake turbulence" in these arrival/departure operations.

FWIW, an aircraft departing behind a heavy jet (or 757) on a parallel runway less than 2,500 feet away needs a wake turbulence delay as if the two aircraft were departing the same runway.

Last time I took off out of SFO there was another plane taking off on the parallel runway. That was super cool. It's the closest I'll ever get to launching from an aircraft carrier simultaneously with another aircraft, a boyhood dream from watching "Top Gun."

I haven't seen SFO since leaving the 757. In the MD-88, the farthest west I've been so far has been Denver. The configuration you describe for SFO is common: landing on the 28s and departing on 01L. I can't speak for other airlines, but we can accept up to a 10 knot tailwind for takeoff and landing if the performance data supports it. That number is actually one of our few "memory item" limitations which we get asked in every recurrent training.

SFO is just fine to fly in and out of. I've never had a problem with operating there and I like our layover hotel (Club Quarters) downtown near the Trans America building.

As for the wake turbulence, sopoRific's answer was spot on. Just to clear up a misconception in your question, wake turbulence does not cease when the wheels hit the ground. Wake is generated whenever the wings are producing lift. So on the takeoff roll, there is "dirty air" behind the plane as it accelerates and the worst of it is right at the point of rotation. This is why GA planes departing after a large plane are wise to note the point of rotation and make sure they are airborne before that point (easy to do in a light plane).

When airborne, the wake of a plane normally descends at about 500'/minute, but obviously the ground stops it from descending, so it actually moves out laterally from the plane's path. If there are just the right crosswind conditions, the upwind vortex can linger over the runway for several minutes; it is good to be aware of surface winds when landing behind a heavy. If the winds are strong enough that wake can become a factor for a plane on a parallel runway.

I'm in Atlanta right now for recurrent training. I was in the box this morning for a B session, 10:50 am to 2:50 pm. Tomorrow I have an A session: 6:30 am to 10:30 am. This morning we actually did a wake turbulence upset with a scenario much like you mention. The instructor cleared us for takeoff and cautioned us for wake turbulence from a departing 777 off the parallel runway. Once airborne, and below 1000', we got into an unusual attitude (maybe 50° bank and pitch attitude increasing beyond 30° nose up. The whole point of the exercise was unusual attitude recovery and, let's face it, we know it's coming from the scenario set up.

Other fun things we did this morning: engine failure at V1; windshear on takeoff and again on approach; loss of pressurization requiring an emergency descent to 10,000' (and the use of, ugh!, the oxygen masks); engine fire on landing leading to an evacuation; double flameout with engine re-light; single-engine approach to a missed approach; single-engine approach to landing; CAT II autoland with missed approach due to failure of the autoland to go into ALIGN mode at low altitude (it has to do this no later than 100' above the ground); CAT II autoland to completion; LDA to runway 19 at DCA (a very demanding approach with a low level turn to line up with the runway); CFIT (controlled flight into terrain) avoidance scenario, where we are vectored to high terrain (depicted on our Nav display) and allowed to progress until we get the "TERRAIN! PULL UP!" aural.

Going to recurrent training is like going to the dentist. No one looks forward to it, but it is nice having that minty fresh feeling when you leave.

Here's another cool scenario, which I've experienced only a handful of times: three planes on parallel approaches at Atlanta. I think I've had it happen twice where, just by random chance, we were lined up practically three abreast coming in to 08L, 09R and 10 (all of which have a 095° alignment). It's not exactly fingertip formation, but it's a nice view.

What would this procedure be? I'm assuming you've still got one good engine. Take off, compensate for the lost engine, immediate return?

Would think take off with one engine would be a little sticky but can't say I know much about such things.

V1 is that magic speed, also sometimes called "decision speed", at which point we are committed to flying. If we have an engine failure prior to V1, we abort the takeoff and bring the plane to a stop on the runway, a procedure that will likely include max braking.

When I'm flying and hear the other pilot say "Vee one," my hand comes off of the throttles and goes to the yoke, and I wait for him to say "Rotate." In the MD-88, there is usually about 7-10 knots between V1 and rotation speed.

So here's how a V1 cut goes. I apply takeoff power and call for autothrottles. The PM (pilot monitoring) engages the autothrottles and calls out the annunciation on the FMA (flight mode annunciator): "Flex 50" for example.

At about 60 knots the throttles in the 88 go into clamp mode and the PM calls out the change on the FMA: "Clamp." The power should be at takeoff power and clamp mode gives me control of the throttles.

At 80 knots, the PM scans the engine instruments and calls out "80 knots, thrust normal." If it's not normal we would abort the takeoff. I have one hand on the yoke, one hand on the throttles in case I need to abort.

The next call from the PM is "Vee one." In our scenario, the instructor will fail one of the engines and the plane will yaw towards the dead engine. I will visually apply enough rudder to keep the nose on centerline and wait for the "rotation" call. I will also expect to have to apply a little more rudder once I lift the nosewheel off the ground because I won't have the assist of ground friction.

At Vr, the PM calls "rotate" and I smoothly pull back on the yoke to rotate the nose to 12.5° rather than the usual 18-20° nose up. While climbing, I can reach over to the center console and crank in some rudder trim to help me with the pressure I'm holding on the rudder pedal.

We don't do a thing until 400' agl and this can be a minute if we're heavy on a hot day. Once at 400' agl, I'll ask the PM to declare an emergency and request runway heading if possible. Note: at some airports this is not possible and we still have to comply with an obstacle avoidance climb procedure. Our company pubs have special procedures for critical terrain airports.

At 1000' agl, I'll ask for "altitude hold, bug Vee two plus twenty" and I'll level the plane off here to accelerate. When the plane reaches V2+20, which is a good maneuvering speed with flaps extended, I'll then say "IAS, MCT, EPR limit, re-bug V2+20, bank angle 25, After Takeoff checklist, Engine Failure checklist, autopilot engage"

To break this down, I'm asking for IAS, which is a climb mode at a specific speed. I'm asking for MCT, which is Maximum Continuous Thrust, and is a button the PM pushes on the power mode control panel. Lastly, I ask for "EPR limit" (pronounce "E-purr") so that the autothrottles drive the power right up the index set by selecting MCT. I ask for V2+ 20 again, because when IAS is selected, it's going to lock onto whatever speed I'm currently at and I may be a few knots off of V2+20. I have him select bank angle 25 on the mode control panel, so that I can now use more than 15° of bank. When we were below maneuvering speed (V2+20), we keep the bank angle shallower for a higher margin above stall. I then ask for two checklists: the normal after takeoff checklist and then the engine failure checklist, which the PM will find in the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook). If the failure was due to an engine fire, we would first perform two memory items: autothrottles off and affected thrust lever (confirm) to idle. We don't move it until both pilots confirm that it's the right one. It is typical for the flying pilot to assume the radios while flying on autopilot, so that the PM can give full attention to the abnormal checklist.

At this point, with the engine failure checklist done, we'll probably return for landing or, if the weather is below minimums, we'll fly to our takeoff alternate. We'll also do the customary "two in, two out" duties. This means talking to the flight attendants and passengers (two inside the plane), as well as ATC and our dispatcher (two outside the plane). When talking to the flight attendants, we'll explain the type of emergency, time remaining to land (so that they can plan their preparation), any special instructions (e.g. don't use rear cabin exit if there's an engine fire on that side), and then have the FA repeat it all back to me so I can be sure there was good communications.

I hope this was a procedure adopted with foresight and not one that was learned from someone's mistake.

There has been more than one case where, in the heat of the moment, a pilot has shut down the one good, working engine. Things get very quiet.