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Originally Posted by harkin
That was an interesting video. The audio of the exchange between the controller and the crew was frustrating at times. Was this controller the only person in the tower at 2 am? Maybe so. But it seemed odd that she kept working all frequencies (Approach/Departure; Local control; Ground control). When an aircraft declares an emergency, they usually get the undivided attention of one controller and often on a discrete frequency. I will say that the controller kept her cool. When some guy on Ground control frequency commented that he hadn't gotten a response on that frequency, she pointed out that she had been a little busy.
Running checklists is important and normally the loss of an engine would be a "time available" emergency (as opposed to a fire on board or smoke filling the cockpit), so it's understandable that the crew accepted the vector away from Oahu to run the checklist (eliminates the worry about terrain avoidance, since you only have to remain above sea level). But when the other engine developed issues, they were quite a distance from the airport and couldn't make it back.
I was glad to hear that the YouTuber immediately corrected himself when he used the word "crash" and caught himself and said "ditch." A ditching is a controlled "landing" on the water vs. a crash which describes impact while not under control.
The reference to the other divert field that was
slightly closer to them was kind of interesting. That field used to be a Navy P-3 base when I lived in Hawaii (1987-1989) and was known as Barbers Point NAS. It is now a civilian field and I did touch and goes there as recently as two years ago. But as the controller noted, it has pilot controlled lighting which was certainly a distraction this crew didn't need and that's why it wouldn't have been visibile to them at 2 am. I'm sure the runway lights were extinguished when they were discussing it. Honolulu, on the other hand, was completely lit up and had complete fire and rescue services available. Of course, if it had turned out that they could have made it to that other field to land, it would have been great and the controller is there to offer options to the pilots.
I'm interested to hear what the findings are in this case. For two engines to fail on the same flight, and so shortly after takeoff, makes me immediately consider fuel contamination as a potential problem. Next on my list would be some maintenance error. But for two healthy engines to both experience independent failure like this is almost inconceivable. The JT8D engines are very reliable. I had experience with that engine on both the 727 and the MD-88. From
Wikipedia:
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More than 14,000 JT8D engines have been produced, totaling more than one-half billion hours of service with more than 350 operators making it the most popular of all low-bypass turbofan engines ever produced.
Based solely on what we could hear in the audio, I'd have to give both the pilots and controller high marks. They were both professional and fairly efficient. The controller's distraction with other aircraft was perhaps unavoidable (if she was alone in the tower) and she did seem to focus 100% on the emergency aircraft once they announced the problem with the second engine.
And, as I said above, running checklists is important. But you have to keep in mind situational awareness with respect to checklists. Often in the simulator when faced with emergencies down low (in the approach or departure phases of flights, but close to the airport), my direction to the first officer would be something like "You have the airplane and the radios. I've got the checklists. Get us setup on a straight-in approach to runway XX and let me know when we're inside 10 miles." My thinking is that we are both capable of flying the aircraft, but it's my job to manage and make decisions. By handling the checklists, I can make the moment-to-moment decisions on prioritizing the items in the checklist and what to tell flight attendants (not a concern on this particular flight). Then, once we're established and ready to land, I can dispense with the QRH and do the descent/landing checklist items needed for a safe landing.
And I'm not second guessing this crew. They might have done exactly that. Plus, they had the added consideration of a ditching. Yes, we practice ditching checklists and procedures in the cockpit, but the ditching checklist would be an excellent thing to pull out and review in this situation. It might include things like closing the outflow valve prior to ditching, to prolong the time the fuselage might stay above water. As low as they were, and concentrating on the engine out checklists, they might not have had any time to look at the ditching checklist. A landing on water at 2 am would certainly be a sphincter-tightening thing to consider.