Hi, I have just working on that, but I don't know who is Hero for you. SB shoves with 2/3 of his range ranked versus the BB flop starting range (for simplicity I suppose), that range described on page 124.
And the SB will call when he has the equity necessary, that is every hand with 33.3% equity. The EDVis application from the editor's page can help you with that, but for these things I'm very happy using Pokercruncher, it has a heat map that allows you to export a list of the hands and copy it in an excel where you can rank the combos very fast by their equity.

I would say you are right. In the third paragraph on p.57 is almost everything you've said.

Hi man im going to do the same exercise tomorow and i think best tool would be Will Tiptons EDVis (equity distribution visualizer). You can get it on books website.

Using EDVis, I noticed you have to consider those hands that are ahead of at least 33% of Villain's range. Quite obvious if you think about it.

Anyone bought Tiptons videos as well? Love the book so far, how good are the videos?

Hi man i bought but havent finished watching them. Watched only videos about gambit, decision trees and non auto profit calculation and i did realy enjoy them. Anyways i understood that im too dumb to continue so i decided to reread volume 1 and do all the exercises with no exceptions. But anyways i dont regret buying and 100% will buy 2nd pack also

in the raise shove game solution provided, 13BB deep 87s is not a Raise. In the nash chart 87s is a shove.
Therefore, am I right in concluding that 87s 13BB is ALWAYS an open Shove as we can't fold it (acc to nash S > f) and minRaising it is exploitable (acc to raise shove solutions)??

(If we ignore limping obv)

If EDVis shows the equity distribution, is there a way to visualize the range without having to plug in every hand individually into Equilab, PokerStove or whatever?

Hi im doing the exercise on page 130. And in my example BB range is little too strong so he can bet 100% of hands and SB can't jam all in over his c bet 2/3 of the time (as equilibrium suggests).

How can we than calculate SB jaming frequency? BB was before calling with hands with 32% equity what he still does but as SB jaming range gets stronger, BB's 32% equity calling range changes as well (consists of stronger hands than before)

id like to know if in this thread has been previously posted the entire process to get to equations reported on pg. 250-251 (reference 7.3.2 - SB bet or check on the river) and pg. 258-259 (bet sizing).

thanks

Hey, i would like to know 1 thing about river SB bet or check game. We have betting structures on page 268 for both BB and SB. Im interested if it holds true for both cases - when SB double barels the turn (should BB donk bet river with range showed in his betting structure?) and when turn goes check/check.

Hey Mark,

Glad to hear things are going well for you.

Well, the goal always to make as much money as possible, of course. It's just not always easy to know what decision will let us do that. I don't think it makes much sense to say we should play exploitatively before knowing any of Villain's tendencies we can exploit. I think I had a good discussion with QTip earlier in this thread about GTO vs exploitative play. As far as practical benefits -- a lot of them come from developing your facility with EV calculations and also understanding your ranges and how decisions affect your ranges and make you exploitable so that you can watch out of whether you're being exploited and better recognize when/how Villain is exploitable. (sorry for the run-on )

Well, unfortunately all of that is easier said than done. We know that we can't even store a complete strategy for playing a game as large as NLHE given the memory limitations of modern computers. So... you have a pretty big problem right from the beginning with any process that tries to "learn" a strategy to play the game. The way in which a method solves this and other problems will have a big effect on its success.

If by "in real play" you mean "against really exploitable opponents", then yea raise-folding at 7bb could be ok. Almost anything could be OK against the right opponent. If you're asking about GTO play of the full game at 7bb, yea that's a volume 2 topic, but the short answer is that sb shouldn't be raise-folding there either.

Yea, interesting question. So, the only real reason we do anything at equilibrium is because it has at least as high an EV as our other options, and it's hard to see an easy way to show the difference in EV of two bet sizing options that comes from forcing Villain to have other bet sizing options. I mean -- I guess the real question is something like, in a real raise-or-fold situation, where our bet size choices aren't artificially fixed, should we ever use a sizing other than minraise? And the answer to that is almost certainly yes.

Yup, the top 20.6% of hands, ranked by equity vs ATC, is 55+,A3s+,K8s+,QTs+,A7o+,K9o+,QJo (less a few combos of K9o), and A2o has ~39.5% equity vs it.

Thanks for helping mmowgli!

Your expected profit wouldn't be 0 in any particular hand -- generally you'll lose some in the BB and win some in the SB -- but that will cancel out on average if you play the same number of hands in both positions at the same stack sizes...

Yea, the guarantee that Villain can only lose money (and thus we can only win it) when he deviates from GTO play comes directly from the definition of equilibrium.

Technically, there are some deviations from equilibrium that Villain could make such that our GTO strategy would still be maximally exploitative, but in general, yea, we'd have to adjust away from equilibrium to exploit him.

Yea, EDVis doesn't make it particularly easy to answer questions of the form "Give me the top X% of this range against this other range" or "Give me all hands in one range with at least Y% equity vs this other range". You can get a list of currently-selected hands from the Edit button, but we'd really like to edit the range according to their equities before we do this.

I could have sworn ProPokerTools had a page on their website that answered these sorts of questions, but I can't find it now. I haven't used any other publicly-available software that does this, but it sounds like that Pokercruncher app might be a good lead.

When the indifference breaks down in that way, BB bets 100% of hands, then SB jams whatever hands are more profitably jammed than folded (< 2/3 of his range), and then BB calls whatever hands are more profitably called than folded.

So, as you've said, SB jamming depends on BB calling, and BB calling depends on SB jamming. So we still have to find the equilibrium in this subgame, given that BB starts by betting 100%. Indifference relationships aren't very easy to use here (like in the shove/fold preflop-only game).

Easiest way that I see to approximate the subgame equilibrium here by hand is to just go back to first principles -- both players try to play as profitably as possible. So, start out with a good guess at SB's jamming range, then find BB's calling range, and see if that makes SB want to add or remove a few borderline combos, etc. Repeat until you find SB's jamming range that doesn't want to adjust given that BB is max exploiting it.

I don't remember that being discussed in this thread, but it's explained in the surrounding text in the book. If that explanation isn't clear... maybe you have a more specific question?

Well, it's important to keep in mind the assumptions that went into creating the figures on pgs 267-8. First, those aren't for the SB bet-or-check game -- they're for the two bets behind river game. Then there are a few assumptions that separate those results from real life:

- The two bets behind decision tree (Fig 7.15) is sometimes appropriate and sometimes not.
- The [0,1] models all neglect chopping and card removal effects.
- The structures drawn there are for the symmetric distributions case.

It's the third point here that really gets us as far as practical applicability goes. The locations of the cutoffs and the structures themselves can change if starting distributions change -- whole regions can easily disappear. For example, when SB double barrels the turn (and the board runout isn't particularly interesting), the distributions are usually going to look a lot more PvBC or PvBC-plus-traps, and we know that in that case, BB doesn't have a river leading range at all...

Tnx man a lot. As always really appreciate the answers

Thanks for your helping Will! I sneak a quick look at Preflop Chapter in Vol. 2 and I'll get there soon. (I'm also in love with Vol.2!!)

Chapter 7.3.2 and the discussion surrounding figure 7.12

You refer to the symmetric case where P = B = S and state that the BB's calling freq is 55.6%. Did you not mean 44.4%? With P = B = S, Hc =5/9 on the Y axis, so the BB is calling with all hands better than that, i.e 4/9 hands.

Sorry I couldn't give page numbers, I am currently using the ebook version.

dam i think u are right. On page 251 where Will showed those cutoff hands for symetric case he also told that Hc=5/9 and the BB is calling with 4/9 of his hands. Anyways not a big deal but i think u are right about that number.

Also, I would just like to ask about using EDVIS. If I set the ranges and board so that that the turn is only dealt, does this give me the distributions averaged out over all possible rivers? Is this a good way of planning ahead from the turn?

Well i havent yet started 2nd book coz im just about to finish volume 1 but yea you get all the equities vs villains range considering any river card can come.
I can imagine we are going to use those distributions to plan ahead from the turn.