Quote:
Originally Posted by candybar
So the more I look, the more I'm pretty sure that Tooth made that whole thing up:
https://nymag.com/news/business/58094/
That covers Goldman, Lehman, Bear and Merrill, 4/5 non-commercial bulge brackets at the time. While this isn't conclusive, seems like most investment banks, just as I suspected, took losses on the real bonds, but offset that with gains from CDS. I couldn't find anything that shows that "Wall Street" lost any significant amount on CDS on structured products specifically.
While this is how it played out, as the crisis was unwinding, there were real fears that the CDS weren't going to get paid out and, for a few days, there were 11:59pm fire sales to prop up capital reserves.
That in turn depressed prices, heightened fears that another bank would collapse (more counterparty risk previously uncontemplated), and forced even more fire sales and rapid unwinding. The unwinding and death spiral was spreading beyond MBS before TARP and (more importantly) Fed Reserve stepped in and basically eliminated the counterparty risk of CDS. The losses on bonds/MBS positions were something most of the banks were always prepared to absorb (in that Lehman was an outlier). The counterparty risks (complete collapse of AIG and Lehman) were something nobody was really prepared for.
This is a very simplified but I think fairly accurate description.
PS: people/firms with cash on hand and weren't conflicted out scooped up tons of the MBS products and even the raw mortgages for dimes on the dollar and made out like bandits. Everyone knew the prices were well below fair value.
PS2: It's 100% standard for banks to have CDOs that hedge against the risks of their long positions. It's a big part of what allows them to take on more leverage.
Last edited by grizy; 08-21-2020 at 11:21 PM.