Economic Impact of Coronavirus
If someone makes a point about 2008 crisis that challenges your position you simply resort AGAIN to making FACTUAL positions (as if unassailable) about something you should be stating as your opinion and suddenly the entire 2008/9 crisis was obvious to anyone not dumb. You leave no room for other opinions.
Yes anyone who did not see 2007/8 coming as you clearly did is just laughable. And you must have got very rich as this was so obvious to you and with Wall Street eagerly taking all bets and paying more than a 100:1 for people willing to bet against those securities, there was no better bet for you.
But again this is you. If you think market manipulation by Wall Street does not happen than even Gov't regulating it and Academic studies identifying it are just 'conspiracy stuff'. If you think anyone smart should have seen 2007/8 coming long before, anyone who did not see it just dumb, despite almost all of Wall Street giving great odds to anyone who wanted to bet against.
Yes anyone who did not see 2007/8 coming as you clearly did is just laughable. And you must have got very rich as this was so obvious to you and with Wall Street eagerly taking all bets and paying more than a 100:1 for people willing to bet against those securities, there was no better bet for you.
But again this is you. If you think market manipulation by Wall Street does not happen than even Gov't regulating it and Academic studies identifying it are just 'conspiracy stuff'. If you think anyone smart should have seen 2007/8 coming long before, anyone who did not see it just dumb, despite almost all of Wall Street giving great odds to anyone who wanted to bet against.
It helps to understand the terms. When we talk about "structured products" - it's a vast area, a whole universe of financial instruments backed by all kinds of collateral. Obviously we didn't think - in 2006 - everything blow up and cause a global financial crisis. To you, there was this indisinguishable mess of things called "subprime" that blew up but that's a highly unsophisticated view and no reasonable insider saw things that way.
There's a good explains this a lot better than the lying trash that you write, claiming to be an insider. Here are the facts (from that article):
Inside of three years, credit-default swaps on subprime-mortgage bonds would become a trillion-dollar market and precipitate hundreds of billions of losses inside big Wall Street firms. Yet, when Michael Burry pestered the firms in the beginning of 2005, only Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs had any real interest in continuing the conversation. No one on Wall Street, as far as he could tell, saw what he was seeing.
Against this claim by candybar, we have these facts:
It surprised him that Deutsche Bank didn’t seem to care which bonds he picked to bet against. From their point of view, so far as he could tell, all subprime-mortgage bonds were the same. The price of insurance was driven not by any independent analysis but by the ratings placed on the bond by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. If he wanted to buy insurance on the supposedly riskless triple-A-rated tranche, he might pay 20 basis points (0.20 percent); on the riskier, A-rated tranches, he might pay 50 basis points (0.50 percent); and on the even less safe, triple-B-rated tranches, 200 basis points—that is, 2 percent. (A basis point is one-hundredth of one percentage point.) The triple-B-rated tranches—the ones that would be worth zero if the underlying mortgage pool experienced a loss of just 7 percent—were what he was after. He felt this to be a very conservative bet, which he was able, through analysis, to turn into even more of a sure thing. Anyone who even glanced at the prospectuses could see that there were many critical differences between one triple-B bond and the next—the percentage of interest-only loans contained in their underlying pool of mortgages, for example. He set out to cherry-pick the absolute worst ones and was a bit worried that the investment banks would catch on to just how much he knew about specific mortgage bonds, and adjust their prices.
Once again they shocked and delighted him: Goldman Sachs e-mailed him a great long list of crappy mortgage bonds to choose from. “This was shocking to me, actually,” he says. “They were all priced according to the lowest rating from one of the big-three ratings agencies.” He could pick from the list without alerting them to the depth of his knowledge. It was as if you could buy flood insurance on the house in the valley for the same price as flood insurance on the house on the mountaintop.
The market made no sense, but that didn’t stop other Wall Street firms from jumping into it, in part because Mike Burry was pestering them. For weeks he hounded Bank of America until they agreed to sell him $5 million in credit-default swaps. Twenty minutes after they sent their e-mail confirming the trade, they received another back from Burry: “So can we do another?” In a few weeks Mike Burry bought several hundred million dollars in credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks, in chunks of $5 million. None of the sellers appeared to care very much which bonds they were insuring. He found one mortgage pool that was 100 percent floating-rate negative-amortizing mortgages—where the borrowers could choose the option of not paying any interest at all and simply accumulate a bigger and bigger debt until, presumably, they defaulted on it. Goldman Sachs not only sold him insurance on the pool but sent him a little note congratulating him on being the first person, on Wall Street or off, ever to buy insurance on that particular item. “I’m educating the experts here,” Burry crowed in an e-mail.
He wasn’t wasting a lot of time worrying about why these supposedly shrewd investment bankers were willing to sell him insurance so cheaply. He was worried that others would catch on and the opportunity would vanish. “I would play dumb quite a bit,” he said, “making it seem to them like I don’t really know what I’m doing. ‘How do you do this again?’ ‘Oh, where can I find that information?’ or ‘Really?’—when they tell me something really obvious.” It was one of the fringe benefits of living for so many years essentially alienated from the world around him: he could easily believe that he was right and the world was wrong.
The more Wall Street firms jumped into the new business, the easier it became for him to place his bets. For the first few months, he was able to short, at most, $10 million at a time. Then, in late June 2005, he had a call from someone at Goldman Sachs asking him if he’d like to increase his trade size to $100 million a pop. “What needs to be remembered here,” he wrote the next day, after he’d done it, “is that this is $100 million. That’s an insane amount of money. And it just gets thrown around like it’s three digits instead of nine.”
Once again they shocked and delighted him: Goldman Sachs e-mailed him a great long list of crappy mortgage bonds to choose from. “This was shocking to me, actually,” he says. “They were all priced according to the lowest rating from one of the big-three ratings agencies.” He could pick from the list without alerting them to the depth of his knowledge. It was as if you could buy flood insurance on the house in the valley for the same price as flood insurance on the house on the mountaintop.
The market made no sense, but that didn’t stop other Wall Street firms from jumping into it, in part because Mike Burry was pestering them. For weeks he hounded Bank of America until they agreed to sell him $5 million in credit-default swaps. Twenty minutes after they sent their e-mail confirming the trade, they received another back from Burry: “So can we do another?” In a few weeks Mike Burry bought several hundred million dollars in credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks, in chunks of $5 million. None of the sellers appeared to care very much which bonds they were insuring. He found one mortgage pool that was 100 percent floating-rate negative-amortizing mortgages—where the borrowers could choose the option of not paying any interest at all and simply accumulate a bigger and bigger debt until, presumably, they defaulted on it. Goldman Sachs not only sold him insurance on the pool but sent him a little note congratulating him on being the first person, on Wall Street or off, ever to buy insurance on that particular item. “I’m educating the experts here,” Burry crowed in an e-mail.
He wasn’t wasting a lot of time worrying about why these supposedly shrewd investment bankers were willing to sell him insurance so cheaply. He was worried that others would catch on and the opportunity would vanish. “I would play dumb quite a bit,” he said, “making it seem to them like I don’t really know what I’m doing. ‘How do you do this again?’ ‘Oh, where can I find that information?’ or ‘Really?’—when they tell me something really obvious.” It was one of the fringe benefits of living for so many years essentially alienated from the world around him: he could easily believe that he was right and the world was wrong.
The more Wall Street firms jumped into the new business, the easier it became for him to place his bets. For the first few months, he was able to short, at most, $10 million at a time. Then, in late June 2005, he had a call from someone at Goldman Sachs asking him if he’d like to increase his trade size to $100 million a pop. “What needs to be remembered here,” he wrote the next day, after he’d done it, “is that this is $100 million. That’s an insane amount of money. And it just gets thrown around like it’s three digits instead of nine.”
The verdict is that candybar is absolutely full of **** and straight up lying.The ridiculous walk back of his claims in his last post already confirmed that.
So. according to the fraudclown candybar, the ultimate Wall Street insider kindly teaching up poor plebs, it was broad knowledge on Wall Street years before the financial crisis that these were going to crash. They also knew which were likely to do poorly (better than some uninformed schmuck like the people in this thread who aren't Wall Street insiders like candy).
The best of Wall Street were calling Burry, trying to sell him the insurance that moved more than 2000% against them when the 100% predictably crashed. They also ended up holding the bag on this trash. In other words, the vast majority of Wall Street had no clue what was coming, and were in fact so clueless they were selling guaranteed -2000% positions.
The verdict is that candybar is absolutely full of **** and straight up lying.The ridiculous walk back of his claims in his last post already confirmed that.
The verdict is that candybar is absolutely full of **** and straight up lying.The ridiculous walk back of his claims in his last post already confirmed that.
Nice logic you have going there.
You also seem to have no idea how these things work. During normal times, Wall Street is always willing to sell you anything. It doesn't matter what it is. And it's also a certainty that none of these firms lost money on the trades in 2005 - what those dealers took on in 2005 have absolutely no bearing on what the book looked like when **** hit the fan. These were liquid instruments and they were happy to sell because they effectively take a cut on every trade. Also, I don't think you understand the relationship between CDS and structured products - they are not traded by the same people. They are happy to sell CDS in any liquid market, since they can sell synthetics on the other hand at a higher price. It's quite likely that Wall Street made money here - they wouldn't sell CDS to Burry otherwise.
Edit:
From your own ****ing article:
Goldman Sachs made it clear that the ultimate seller wasn’t Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs was simply standing between insurance buyer and insurance seller and taking a cut.
We have two disputes neither of which should be a dispute if you were anything resembling a normal reasonable person.
I believe, and have represented it as my opinion only, that the GDP considerations are not properly priced in and the markets have taken a more 'optimistic' view' than i would in many areas. i have explained why. That is not a controversial view and even if you want to call it an outlier view, so what. Outliers will always exist and rightfully so.
But since it disagrees with your position there is simply no way you will agree to disagree which I have said all thru is reasonable. Nope it must be wrong and you must be right. You just are so smart there is no room for error in your view.
And when it comes to 2007/8 and the potential of any market manipulation in the system you dismiss it out right. Anyone who thinks there was ANY TRACE, is in your view is in crazy conspiracy land.
And how did you inform your view. You admit it has nothing to do with any readings you have done. You admit you learned nothing from any analysis pre or post.
Instead you had discussion with your smart Wall Street friends and formed your opinion on that and you do not need to read any analysis to challenge that as your view is formed and in your mind, nothing can counter that.
Anyone else who did not see the crash coming was simply the naive outlier, and you and your smart friends were the norm.
I would bet that if we look into any of your 'trade' analysis you would always be the guy who never got caught and always knew exactly the right trade after the fact.
If you actually have Wall Street friends, which i doubt, they would tell you that ANYONE who always acts like everything was obvious to them after the fact and anyone else who did not see it was just dumb, is never to be taken seriously. That person, if he exists should be rolling in his billions of dollars.
Take your great insights to the blog sphere and just post some of them in ADVANCE, and when you prove right with most of the rest of the world being wrong (as most of Wall Street was in the lead up to 2007/8) everyone will know you are a gold mine and King Maker and any fund you set up will be oversubscribed.
Until you do that do not expect any to take your e-bravado and e-bragging and e-hindsight wisdom, seriously as you are clearly a joke.
candybar,
At this point you're outing yourself as a liar. Your walkbacks screwed you. You, a random dude on Internet, are claiming to have friends who were the very few people who were "experts in this field" and knew that this was going down in 2006 (they were "certain") in 2006. You're like that fraud in OOT who claimed to work in the modeling industry - a combination of lots of "inside info" and insulting those not on the inside and claiming that those on the inside - which includes you of course - are the ones that get and they are beyond reproach. It's the classic shtick of an internet fraud.
That's not the logic. Burry started buying in 2005 and kept buying for a long time as the market got larger and larger with Wall Street a good chunk of the sellers. They got more and more willing to sell them as time went on, not less. Wall Street was collectively so clueless that they were happy to sell him these swaps with absolutely no differentiation from them in the quality of the underlying securities that deviated from ratings. That says that they had no clue, as it is the fact that they ended up holding giant bags of crap.
You either know this is the logic and are deliberately lying about above my position, OR you don't and have you no clue what you're talking about or how to read. Which is it?
I know exactly how this all works. It's been the subject of numerous books, papers and movies.
Another line that absolutely destroys your credibility and proves you have no idea what you're talking about. Most of Wall Street lost tens to hundreds of billions on toxic CDS assets that they owned. So they did indeed lose money, and your assertion that they wouldn't sell unless they made money is insane. They accumulated these over time and then held a giant bag of toxic debt they didn't see coming. Your clown argument seems to be "well they made fees on them when they sold them so them selling toxic trash that they held the bag on means nothing". Weird argument bro.
Almost everyone was oblivious. A few people caught on. In the end, the people that ended up holding the bag on the wrong side of the trade tells you everything you need to know about who saw this coming.
You, an Internet random, claim to have known the very very few people who were "certain"t his would blow in 2006 - although you contradicted yourself when challenged and walked back that claim. I'm calling bullshit.
And as far as it goes in this thread, why would you even mention this? It clearly was NOT widely known in Wall Street or else they wouldn't have ended up with all this toxic trash on the books. Did they want to go bankrupt? So why did you mention your friends then, in a general discussion of what Wall Street knew, if not to do the classic fraud thing of trying to appear the ultimate insider? If only your expert friends knew it's irrelevant to the discussing.
At this point you're outing yourself as a liar. Your walkbacks screwed you. You, a random dude on Internet, are claiming to have friends who were the very few people who were "experts in this field" and knew that this was going down in 2006 (they were "certain") in 2006. You're like that fraud in OOT who claimed to work in the modeling industry - a combination of lots of "inside info" and insulting those not on the inside and claiming that those on the inside - which includes you of course - are the ones that get and they are beyond reproach. It's the classic shtick of an internet fraud.
You either know this is the logic and are deliberately lying about above my position, OR you don't and have you no clue what you're talking about or how to read. Which is it?
You also seem to have no idea how these things work.
During normal times, Wall Street is always willing to sell you anything. It doesn't matter what it is. And it's also a certainty that none of these firms lost money on the trades in 2005 - what those dealers took on in 2005 have absolutely no bearing on what the book looked like when **** hit the fan. These were liquid instruments and they were happy to sell because they effectively take a cut on every trade. Also, I don't think you understand the relationship between CDS and structured products - they are not traded by the same people. They are happy to sell CDS in any liquid market, since they can sell synthetics on the other hand at a higher price. It's quite likely that Wall Street made money here - they wouldn't sell CDS to Burry otherwise.
Also the article goes on to describe how "Wall Street" caught on to what he was doing in late 2005 and were trying buy insurance and how Wall Street Journal reported on loan performance issues in November 2005. Yup, clearly my friends couldn't possibly have been worried about anything in 2006.
You, an Internet random, claim to have known the very very few people who were "certain"t his would blow in 2006 - although you contradicted yourself when challenged and walked back that claim. I'm calling bullshit.
And as far as it goes in this thread, why would you even mention this? It clearly was NOT widely known in Wall Street or else they wouldn't have ended up with all this toxic trash on the books. Did they want to go bankrupt? So why did you mention your friends then, in a general discussion of what Wall Street knew, if not to do the classic fraud thing of trying to appear the ultimate insider? If only your expert friends knew it's irrelevant to the discussing.
Tooth being skeptical of other people's claims, I guess is not surprising, given the glass house. Btw, you still seem to have no idea what you're talking about - that's just not how that industry works - but since you seem so sure, how about this? If I can demonstrate to a neutral mod (I don't know, Larry Legend?) that I have contacts in this field that would qualify as experts, you (and all your sockpuppets, etc) get permabanned. If I cannot demonstrate this to their satisfaction, then I get permabanned. How does that sound Tooth? Since you're so sure, this should be easy right? Quite frankly I'm not even sure if I have enough evidence to convince a third party - this was all so long ago - so you should probably take this bet, you may win even if you're wrong.
I find candybar is writing out most of the things I am thinking but do not have time to write. so yes, I agree with pretty much everything hes saying and disagree with cuepee that "big banks" are artificially manipulating the broader stock market.
Sources? I highly doubt this. Outside of AIG (not Wall Street) and similar companies, I don't think any major US financial firms had heavy net exposure to CDS. I could be wrong here - I'm not super familiar with the market (well probably more than you though by a fair amount) but Wall Street firms (investment banks) don't take on naked risk like this, they sell CDS primarily to make markets and sell synthetics. If you're quoting losses at that level, you're almost certainly mixing in unrelated products or not netting out offsetting gains. If I had to guess, they were probably net buyers of CDS, since they necessarily had a lot of credit exposure due to having to hold on to collateral and bonds during the securitization process. For banks like Citi, Deutsche and JP Morgan, it's also important to separate out the investment banking arms (Wall Street"), most of which aims to be neutral and the commercial side, which has a lot of capital it needs to invest.
candybar,
At this point you're outing yourself as a liar. Your walkbacks screwed you. You, a random dude on Internet, are claiming to have friends who were the very few people who were "experts in this field" and knew that this was going down in 2006 (they were "certain") in 2006. You're like that fraud in OOT who claimed to work in the modeling industry - a combination of lots of "inside info" and insulting those not on the inside and claiming that those on the inside - which includes you of course - are the ones that get and they are beyond reproach. It's the classic shtick of an internet fraud.
That's not the logic. Burry started buying in 2005 and kept buying for a long time as the market got larger and larger with Wall Street a good chunk of the sellers. They got more and more willing to sell them as time went on, not less. Wall Street was collectively so clueless that they were happy to sell him these swaps with absolutely no differentiation from them in the quality of the underlying securities that deviated from ratings. That says that they had no clue, as it is the fact that they ended up holding giant bags of crap.
You either know this is the logic and are deliberately lying about above my position, OR you don't and have you no clue what you're talking about or how to read. Which is it?
I know exactly how this all works. It's been the subject of numerous books, papers and movies.
Another line that absolutely destroys your credibility and proves you have no idea what you're talking about. Most of Wall Street lost tens to hundreds of billions on toxic CDS assets that they owned. So they did indeed lose money, and your assertion that they wouldn't sell unless they made money is insane. They accumulated these over time and then held a giant bag of toxic debt they didn't see coming. Your clown argument seems to be "well they made fees on them when they sold them so them selling toxic trash that they held the bag on means nothing". Weird argument bro.
Almost everyone was oblivious. A few people caught on. In the end, the people that ended up holding the bag on the wrong side of the trade tells you everything you need to know about who saw this coming.
You, an Internet random, claim to have known the very very few people who were "certain"t his would blow in 2006 - although you contradicted yourself when challenged and walked back that claim. I'm calling bullshit.
And as far as it goes in this thread, why would you even mention this? It clearly was NOT widely known in Wall Street or else they wouldn't have ended up with all this toxic trash on the books. Did they want to go bankrupt? So why did you mention your friends then, in a general discussion of what Wall Street knew, if not to do the classic fraud thing of trying to appear the ultimate insider? If only your expert friends knew it's irrelevant to the discussing.
At this point you're outing yourself as a liar. Your walkbacks screwed you. You, a random dude on Internet, are claiming to have friends who were the very few people who were "experts in this field" and knew that this was going down in 2006 (they were "certain") in 2006. You're like that fraud in OOT who claimed to work in the modeling industry - a combination of lots of "inside info" and insulting those not on the inside and claiming that those on the inside - which includes you of course - are the ones that get and they are beyond reproach. It's the classic shtick of an internet fraud.
That's not the logic. Burry started buying in 2005 and kept buying for a long time as the market got larger and larger with Wall Street a good chunk of the sellers. They got more and more willing to sell them as time went on, not less. Wall Street was collectively so clueless that they were happy to sell him these swaps with absolutely no differentiation from them in the quality of the underlying securities that deviated from ratings. That says that they had no clue, as it is the fact that they ended up holding giant bags of crap.
You either know this is the logic and are deliberately lying about above my position, OR you don't and have you no clue what you're talking about or how to read. Which is it?
I know exactly how this all works. It's been the subject of numerous books, papers and movies.
Another line that absolutely destroys your credibility and proves you have no idea what you're talking about. Most of Wall Street lost tens to hundreds of billions on toxic CDS assets that they owned. So they did indeed lose money, and your assertion that they wouldn't sell unless they made money is insane. They accumulated these over time and then held a giant bag of toxic debt they didn't see coming. Your clown argument seems to be "well they made fees on them when they sold them so them selling toxic trash that they held the bag on means nothing". Weird argument bro.
Almost everyone was oblivious. A few people caught on. In the end, the people that ended up holding the bag on the wrong side of the trade tells you everything you need to know about who saw this coming.
You, an Internet random, claim to have known the very very few people who were "certain"t his would blow in 2006 - although you contradicted yourself when challenged and walked back that claim. I'm calling bullshit.
And as far as it goes in this thread, why would you even mention this? It clearly was NOT widely known in Wall Street or else they wouldn't have ended up with all this toxic trash on the books. Did they want to go bankrupt? So why did you mention your friends then, in a general discussion of what Wall Street knew, if not to do the classic fraud thing of trying to appear the ultimate insider? If only your expert friends knew it's irrelevant to the discussing.
Sources? I highly doubt this. Outside of AIG (not Wall Street) and similar companies, I don't think any major US financial firms had heavy net exposure to CDS. I could be wrong here - I'm not super familiar with the market (well probably more than you though by a fair amount) but Wall Street firms (investment banks) don't take on naked risk like this, they sell CDS primarily to make markets and sell synthetics. If you're quoting losses at that level, you're almost certainly mixing in unrelated products or not netting out offsetting gains. If I had to guess, they were probably net buyers of CDS, since they necessarily had a lot of credit exposure due to having to hold on to collateral and bonds during the securitization process. For banks like Citi, Deutsche and JP Morgan, it's also important to separate out the investment banking arms (Wall Street"), most of which aims to be neutral and the commercial side, which has a lot of capital it needs to invest.
https://covid-19.mitpress.mit.edu/pu...ction=107da4e3
The risk of Lehman’s collapse was significantly mitigated by (1) the positive positioning of Lehman’s derivatives portfolio, with assets exceeding liabilities—Lehman was in the money (their counterparties owed them money)— and (2) the frequency with which Lehman’s derivatives contracts were collateralized, could be netted, and were centrally cleared (interest rate contracts). Central clearing mutualized the losses on Lehman contracts to all members of the clearinghouse, rather than imposing it just on Lehman counterparties. The value of central clearing in risk reduction played a significant role in the requirements for central clearing imposed by the Dodd–Frank Act. By contrast, AIG had a negatively positioned and noncentrally cleared portfolio of CDS, thereby potentially exposing counterparties to greater losses. The remainder of this subsection discusses the Lehman and AIG OTC derivatives portfolios in turn.
If you tip into the 'it is conspiracy stuff to believe markets can be or have been artificially manipulated by Wall Street' as Candybar came out swinging and said instead of just having a different view of things, that is when lines are crossed.
It is a way people trying to make their opinion have more weight than should improperly appeal to facts or authorities they do not have.
And again that is not speaking to any thing regarding who is right or wrong in their belief, just the argumentative tactic being employed.
Here's another:
https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/rese...digest-summary
https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/rese...digest-summary
Despite the media storm surrounding the CDS market, the CDS market actually worked quite well during much of the financial crisis. As evidence, the author points to the orderly process of the Lehman Brothers default in which CDS written on Lehman were settled with relative ease. To understand the disparity between why the CDS market worked during the financial crisis and its reputation as a dangerous product, the author points out that regulators permitted financial institutions to hold less regulatory capital if they held loan securitizations with CDS protection on their balance sheets rather than on the underlying loans. When the subprime CDS market began to experience losses, observers were quick to blame the CDS contracts. It was not the CDS contracts themselves that caused the losses, however, but the increase in defaults on the underlying subprime mortgages and the disappearance of liquidity for these securitizations. Furthermore, CDS were not the cause of failure for Lehman and Bear Stearns. Although both firms were dealers in CDS, their books were fairly balanced with trades on both sides and collateral agreements were generally in place. AIG was different. Its books were not balanced because it mostly sold protection. Additionally, AIG was heavily leveraged when it purchased a portfolio of subprime securitizations. In fact, the losses on its portfolio of mortgage-related securities exceeded the losses on its credit default swaps.
So the more I look, the more I'm pretty sure that Tooth made that whole thing up:
https://nymag.com/news/business/58094/
That covers Goldman, Lehman, Bear and Merrill, 4/5 non-commercial bulge brackets at the time. While this isn't conclusive, seems like most investment banks, just as I suspected, took losses on the real bonds, but offset that with gains from CDS. I couldn't find anything that shows that "Wall Street" lost any significant amount on CDS on structured products specifically.
https://nymag.com/news/business/58094/
Of the $52 billion paid to AIG’s counterparties, Goldman Sachs was the biggest recipient: $13 billion, the entire balance of its claim. The amount was surprising: Banks like Merrill Lynch that had bought credit-default swaps from failed insurers other than AIG were paid 13 cents on the dollar in deals moderated by New York’s insurance regulator. Eric Dinallo, the former New York State insurance commissioner, who was at the AIG meetings, characterizes the decision this way: AIG’s counterparties, Goldman being the most prominent, “got to collect on an insurance policy without having the loss.”
This is like saying that Amazon comingling products is evidence of Amazon being clueless. It really doesn't matter to them as long as people accept the practice. Likewise, as long as the market is willing to trade without looking at the collateral for the most part, there's no reason for Goldman to care, I'm sure AIG or whoever was perfectly fine taking the other side of that trade.
Sources? I highly doubt this. Outside of AIG (not Wall Street) and similar companies, I don't think any major US financial firms had heavy net exposure to CDS. I could be wrong here - I'm not super familiar with the market (well probably more than you though by a fair amount) but Wall Street firms (investment banks) don't take on naked risk like this, they sell CDS primarily to make markets and sell synthetics.
They had no ****ing clue what they were dealing with at any level of the organization, from the traders through to their bosses through to risk management who job it is to see the risk in these naked sales. And the incredible thing is, it was simple to see the exact trajectory of these products by simply reading the prospectuses. That's what Burry did to buy these CDS and know which ones to buy; you didn't even need a finance degree, just a little common sense.
I have two problems with your shtick here. The first is the absurd notion that "Wall Street are far smarter than you and have priced everything in". Everything you write revolves around that thesis, and it's comically wrong and intellectually lazy on a level that shames even Cuepee. Wall Street (with close to zero exceptions) failed to even reach a smart high schooler level of sophistication and diligence on CDS for example, and ended up holding the bag on them. Similarly with corona - Wall Street with almost no exceptions (Ackman being one) completely failed to see any of it coming, despite it being 90+% certain to happen and result in a market crash. Similarly with Enron, Valeant etc. Ackman proved how much money was on the table if you made that bet correctly. It's important to understand this blindness/stupidity/incompetence on Wall Street; idiots (such as yourself) who failed to realize Wall Street's blind spots missed 10-20 baggers betting on corona, because the market acted like it was nothing even when it was 90+% certain to happen.
That view (that Wall Street are geniuses and we're all dummies who can't see any angle they don't) would be ok by itself, but the compounding trouble is that you're a straight up liar, who makes **** up to support his position. For example, you lied about the traders you know in 2006 knew it was "certain" that CDS would fail, to make it seem like people "in the know" - you and your insiders - had it all covered and maintain your lie of Wall Street competence/infallability. You contradicted that by walking it back strongly when challenged, proving the lie.
You're exactly like that OOT model guy - I was one of the few to spot his fraud as well when he said something about beautiful women that was pure bullshit (having dated very smart beautiful women and hung around their friends, it was obvious baloney). He combined "insider knowledge" with orthodox thinking and backhanded status-based insults to those who weren't in his world. Which is what you do here, you're almost exactly like him. Normal successful people don't that, sir. They're more straight up. Like ahnuld.
I appreciate you taking the time to discuss the orthodoxy of Wall Street thinking (you're basically a mouthpiece for freshman Wall Street thinking), but lose the straight up lying and overstating. It shows a lack of intellectual curiosity at the very least and makes it very hard to take the other things you claim to know seriously. You say you're a teacher and perhaps that's where it comes from: people who don't know their **** from experience cover it with certainty and authority, and status-demeaning those who disagree.
People here find some value in your posts - and there a couple of ideas you've put forward that have subtly shifted my thinking - so I'm not going to take the bet that even you think you'd lose (proving you knew these people). "Hey do you want to bet me but I might lose anyway even if what I say is true" is a weird bet offer. Relax bro. Stop the lying and exaggerating and the insecure status-bound defense of your unfounded belief that there's no edge to be found over Wall Street who are smarter and more aware (seriously, I get a chuckle out of that especially after February/March).
Again, this is kind of the point of structured products. Why do you think they structure these deals and create credit tranches in the first place? So that under normal circumstances, they can trade fungibly as bonds. Each deal is unique, but there's enough of them collectively and most people that aren't specialists have enough trust in the deal and the rating such that collectively this creates enough liquidity. This is how anything works in finance - bonds are sold to all kinds of unsophisticated investors who just need market yield and often considered fungible within the same product category and rating. If you had to be an expert on the collateral, there would be no point in creating these bonds with ratings.
This is like saying that Amazon comingling products is evidence of Amazon being clueless. It really doesn't matter to them as long as people accept the practice. Likewise, as long as the market is willing to trade without looking at the collateral for the most part, there's no reason for Goldman to care, I'm sure AIG or whoever was perfectly fine taking the other side of that trade.
This is like saying that Amazon comingling products is evidence of Amazon being clueless. It really doesn't matter to them as long as people accept the practice. Likewise, as long as the market is willing to trade without looking at the collateral for the most part, there's no reason for Goldman to care, I'm sure AIG or whoever was perfectly fine taking the other side of that trade.
The reality is that orthodox thinking (such as yours) is just fine until something goes wrong. And the big money is in figuring out when you should think in an orthodox way and when not. You don't even see the "not", you're pure orthodox. Which works fine 90% of the time and gives you index-level returns, and misses the big edges.
the Atlanta Fed is now predicting 26.2% annualized growth in Q3, almost makes up for Q2
I know it seems to (26 is close to 32, right?), but (100-32)*1.26 = only 85% of what you started with
Still getting your info from sensationalist mainstream media? You are a dunce.
The CPI ticking up (after ticking lower Feb - May) isn't the same as your hyper inflation end of the world nonsense.
The CPI ticking up (after ticking lower Feb - May) isn't the same as your hyper inflation end of the world nonsense.
good point, so we need back to back +26% quarters for it to be very impressive
So I was told it's annualized in both cases, divide by 4.
(100 - 32/4)*(1+ 0.262/4) = 98.0%
ergo down ~2% from a year ago
Pent-up demand exhausted and lays offs starting for real.
No need to panic. TSLA will make us all rich.
No need to panic. TSLA will make us all rich.
+26.2% annualized is about +6% for the quarter. -32.9% annualized is down about -9.5% for quarter.
Together we're down about 4.1% over two quarters if the advanced estimates are accurate.
Together we're down about 4.1% over two quarters if the advanced estimates are accurate.
grizy did the math correctly here
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