Quote:
Originally Posted by JMark821
I hear you on this. My hypothesis is that there is at least one tech working with Mike that has access to the pokerGFX server. There has been too many instances of his RFID glitches/ cards changing to cover up his plays. There must be some correlation between when Mike Postle has hole-card access and when a tech is working.
If Mike Postle doesn't have the ability to remote into the pokerGFX server to see the cards in real-time, a tech that does have access must send him this information, possibly via text or SMS. In this scenario, the tech might as well just give Mike Postle access.
If Mike Postle has the ability to remote into the pokerGFX server, a tech must make sure the server is available to Mike Postle via configurations and by letting him know which network and credentials to use. Also, remote access is generally not anonymous. Logs are created and it is usually evident, in most cases, when someone is remoted in because they have access to the mouse. A tech must be there to make sure that no outsiders see the unauthorized logins.
But, if there are no guards or locks in the pokerGFX server is Mike Postle could very well be a one man show but I'm just not sure how capable he is of this. I feel like there must be insiders for him to have got away with it for so long.
I'm with you completely. I am almost sure he had help, and this person needed to physically be on-site when the cheating happened. I guess I'm saying that I'm no longer sure we can say who it was so easily, even with system access to audit.
Whoever did this will have the convenient excuse that anyone could have been in that room at the time, since there were no locks, people came in and out regularly, no CCTV to confirm who was there, etc. (assuming all of that is true). Just imagine if people shared user ID's and passwords on occasion to help facilitate changes faster, etc. Who knows what else.
Just to be super sneaky, if I were the villain in the control room, I would make sure I had approval to share my ID and password with someone at least once, for whatever reason. "Hey, I'm out of the office for the next couple of hours and they need to modify something for the broadcast tonight, can I let XXX log onto my account now to make the change?" Once that is approved, there is a history of sharing passwords and log ins within the operation, so game over (not saying this happened, I'm must saying it would be a great way to cover my ass).
But whatever. Once you tell me anyone could go into that server/control room, well.... That's just a complete game changer. At that point it clicked that we are no longer discussing a secure environment.