Quote:
Originally Posted by Gioco
Not to be smart, but, neither of the above.
The wording of the regulation is not "plain", it is painfully distorted. It does not say what your post suggests it says. The property rights it discusses are difficult to understand but the estate is the genuine owner (though manager might be more technically correct, as the executor or personal representative through his/her letters of authority or administration is actually better described as the manager of the decedent's property and property rights which so long as they remain in the estate remain technically titled in the name of the decedent) of the victim's claim and of the underlying property right that forms the basis of the claim. Regardless of whether they remain in the estate or have been distributed to a devisee or legatee, the person holding the right of claim is in ownership of it.
The statute governs the regulation. To the extent the regulation, directly or inadvertently, contravenes the statute, the regulation is inoperative.
The DOJ has always recognized claims filed by the estates of deceased bona fide victim claimants. The statute requires it. A refusal to recognize a valid claim by the estate of a deceased bona fide victim would result in a civil action on a number of grounds including denial of equal protection of the law. To my knowledge, that has never happened because no estate pursuing the valid claim of a deceased bona fide victim has ever been denied because it is an estate.
Charles Dickens exasperation with the legal system is sometimes justified but the legal system does not deny the rights of widows and orphans because of an untimely death.
First, I apologize to all for this long winded rebuttal. I would suggest if you are not interested in a rather dry debate over the law you just skip it. It really doesn't have much to do with anything important in this case.
You would be 100% correct, if the estate was making a "claim" for the forfeited funds as an "owner" with the court of jurisdiction. But, for purposes of this particular case FTP customers were not "owners" of the forfeited funds and therefore could make no claim against the forfeited funds. At least one of the FTP customers made such a claim of ownership (Webb) but his claim failed due to lack of standing as an owner. Every victim of FTP's fraud also has the right to file their own lawsuit seeking restitution and/or damages from the perpetrators of the fraud. Nobody in this case had to wait for remissions. The problem was that the government seized and/or caused forfeited all of FTPs assets. Consequently what good would a successful lawsuit have done a victim? This scenario is precisely the reason the government "invented" remissions. Remissions is the way the government legally transfers what are now government funds to crime victims.
Your position seemingly relies on the notion that a petition for remission is the same as a claim for property. It is not. A decedent's estate is the Real and Personal Property (and the rights to that property) that an individual owns upon his or her death. I will suggest to you that the possible potential opportunity to file a petition for remission, at some date in the future that may or mat not ever come to be, with the DOJ, is not real or personal property. There exists no guarantee anywhere in the law that any victim of any crime, anywhere or at anytime, will ever have an opportunity to file a petition for remission with the DOJ. That "act of grace", as described by one apeelate court, is granted at the sole discretion of the DOJ.
However, in the case at discussion a victim of the FTP fraud DOES have a legal right to file a lawsuit seeking restitution and/or damages against the "person(s)" responsible for the fraud. This is a right that survives the decedent and passes to the estate who can then initiate a lawsuit by subrogating the decedent estate and/or its executor in place of the decedent. Why do you suppose the regulation at TITLE 28 CHAPTER I
PART 9 § 9.2 (v) contains the following if not but to limit who or what is a victim?:
(v) The term victim means a person who has incurred a pecuniary loss as a direct result of the commission of the offense underlying a forfeiture. A drug user is not considered a victim of a drug trafficking offense under this definition. A victim does not include one who acquires a right to sue the perpetrator of the criminal offense for any loss by assignment, subrogation inheritance, or otherwise form the actual victim, unless that person has acquired an actual ownership interest in the forfeited property.
What is the "statute" you claim "requires the DOJ to recognize claims filed by the estates of deceased bona fide victim claimants". Where can I find this "statute"? What court has jurisdiction over the DOJ (AG) with respect to executive decisions made with respect to remission?
Contrary to your assertion otherwise, there have been many, many lawsuits attempting to challenge the DOJ remission policy, including lawsuits brought by persons, corporations, estates, heirs (and I'm sure some widows and orphans too) denied status as a victim. But not even one has ever been successful. Since the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946 (Title 5 of the United States Code, beginning at Section 500) the courts have continued to hold that the exercise of discretion by the Secretary of the Treasury or of the Attorney General in denying a petition for remission or forfeiture, is not reviewable. Associates Investment Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 885 (C.A.5, 1955); United States v. Gramling, 180 F.2d 498 (C.A.5, 1950); United States v. One 1957 Buick Roadmaster, supra; United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 108 F.Supp. 286 (W.D.Pa.1952); United States v. One 1946 Plymouth Sedan, 73 F.Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y.1946).
Judicial control of the Attorney General's remission and mitigation function has been exercised only when administrative officials have refused to entertain a mitigation claim on the erroneous belief that they had no statutory authority to do so, Cotonificio Bustese, S. A. v. Morgenthau, 74 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 121 F.2d 884 (1941), and
the extent of judicial control has been merely to require the officials to exercise jurisdiction over the claim, not to review the official decision of the merits.
In the case UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ONE 1961 CADILLAC et al., Defendants, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. 337 F.2d 730 (1964) The court found the following:
"The purpose of the remission statutes was to grant executive power to relieve against the harshness of forfeitures. The exercise of the power, however, was committed to the discretion of the executive so that he could temper justice with mercy or leniency. Remitting the forfeiture, however, constituted an act of grace. The courts have not been granted jurisdiction to control the action of the executive, even where it is alleged, as here, in general conclusory language, that discretion has been abused.
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 75 S.Ct. 591, 99 L.Ed. 868 (1955), relied on by G.M.A.C., is not apposite. The Court there stated that the legislative history of the 1952 Immigration Act and the Administrative Procedure Act indicated Congressional approval for a full review of deportation orders. This is not true of orders denying petitions for remission, which have never been regarded as subject to review by the courts.
G.M.A.C. argues that the courts have been liberal in construing the Administrative Procedure Act and in extending its scope. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503 (1958); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 75 S.Ct. 790, 99 L.Ed. 1129 (1955); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (C.A.D.C.1964); Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690 (C.A.5, 1961); Obrenovic v. Pilliod, 282 F.2d 874 (C.A.7, 1960); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (C.A.9, 1958); Homovich v. Chapman, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 150, 191 F.2d 761 (1951). It urges that we should construe the Administrative Procedure Act so as to furnish reviews of orders of the Attorney General denying remission of forfeiture. The trouble here is that the Administrative Procedure Act expressly exempted matters committed to the discretion of an agency. We have no right to disregard this plain language.
The District Court was correct in ruling that it was without authority to review the action of the Attorney General in denying remission."