Citations Needed: Links to Interesting Research
06-19-2019
, 06:45 PM
06-19-2019
, 06:51 PM
06-23-2019
, 06:59 PM
06-24-2019
, 11:46 AM
Quote:
Are Cultural and Economic Conservatism Positively Correlated? A Lare-Scale Cross-National Test
This essay (PDF) uses survey data from the World Values Survey (covering 99 countries) to show that holding economic conservative and cultural conservative beliefs are negatively correlated in most nations included in the survey.
This essay (PDF) uses survey data from the World Values Survey (covering 99 countries) to show that holding economic conservative and cultural conservative beliefs are negatively correlated in most nations included in the survey.
Quote:
This article examines the relationship between two preference dimensions that are widely recognized as central to ideological differences between the right and left: the economic dimension, which concerns redistributive social welfare preferences and views about the proper scope of government economic involvement, and the cultural dimension, which concerns views on matters such as sexual morality and immigration.
Within mass publics around the world, do people who hold right-wing cultural attitudes also tend to adopt right-wing economic attitudes? Do left-wing cultural attitudes typically go with left-wing economic attitudes? The established view from political science is that there do not exist psychological constraints that would make this the case for most of the people most of the time. In contrast, an influential research tradition within psychology specifies that cultural and economic conservatism have common psychological origins and thus typically co-occur.
Within mass publics around the world, do people who hold right-wing cultural attitudes also tend to adopt right-wing economic attitudes? Do left-wing cultural attitudes typically go with left-wing economic attitudes? The established view from political science is that there do not exist psychological constraints that would make this the case for most of the people most of the time. In contrast, an influential research tradition within psychology specifies that cultural and economic conservatism have common psychological origins and thus typically co-occur.
The survey data:
Quote:
Right-wing vs. left-wing cultural attitudes. Three cultural attitude indicators were used in the present analyses: sexual morality (a composite of abortion and homosexuality attitudes; mean within-nation-year sample r = 0.41 [SD = 0.15]), immigration (single item) and women’s role in the workforce (single item).
Right-wing vs. left-wing economic attitudes. Two economic attitude indicators were used in the present analyses: social welfare (a composite of attitude regarding income inequality and attitude about government responsibility for providing for people; mean within-nation-year sample r = 0.22 [SD = 0.14]) and preference for private vs. government ownership of business and industry (single item).
Right-wing vs. left-wing economic attitudes. Two economic attitude indicators were used in the present analyses: social welfare (a composite of attitude regarding income inequality and attitude about government responsibility for providing for people; mean within-nation-year sample r = 0.22 [SD = 0.14]) and preference for private vs. government ownership of business and industry (single item).
Quote:
The first question of interest is whether the within- nation associations between right-wing cultural and economic attitudes are more often positive or negative. We initially addressed this question by computing bivariate correlation coefficients for each cultural-economic attitude pair within each nation for which both variables were available, collapsing across the relevant nation-year samples. If right-wing cultural and economic attitudes typically go together, then one would expect more positive than negative correlations.
As displayed in Table 1, for each of the six pairs of cultural and economic attitudes, the mean within-nation correlation was small and negative.
As displayed in Table 1, for each of the six pairs of cultural and economic attitudes, the mean within-nation correlation was small and negative.
Quote:
06-24-2019
, 11:57 AM
Speaking of political ideology and surveys, I ran across this one yesterday: The Perception Gap Quiz
My impression of this is that the survey they created goes pretty far out of its way to try to create the results the authors want, by meticulously crafting how the questions are asked. The goal being to try to promote some form of centrism and an argument that most people are really more centrist than is popularly imagined, and that centrists understand others' political ideologies better than partisans.
So I think the way they've designed the survey probably overstates this effect, but it's still engaging. And I'm a sucker for political quizes :P
Quote:
Do you have a yawning Perception Gap, or are you in sync with the American public? Whether you’re a Republican, Democrat or Independent, our quiz will tell you how your beliefs compare to your side and how well you understand your opponents.
So I think the way they've designed the survey probably overstates this effect, but it's still engaging. And I'm a sucker for political quizes :P
Spoiler:
06-28-2019
, 12:22 PM
Re: identity politics and partisan polarization
The Group Basis of Partisan Affective Polarization (full text here)
The Group Basis of Partisan Affective Polarization (full text here)
Quote:
Abstract
What explains rising partisan animosity in the United States? We argue that mass partisans’ feelings toward the social group coalitions of the parties are an important cause of rising affective polarization. We first leverage evidence from the American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series to show that partisans’ feelings toward the social groups linked to their in-party (out-party) have grown more positive (negative) over time. We then turn to the 1992–96 and 2000–2004 ANES Panel Surveys to disentangle the interrelationship between partisan polarization and social group evaluations. Individuals with more polarized social group evaluations in 1992 or 2000 report substantially more polarized party thermometer ratings and more extreme, and better sorted, partisan identities four years later. Notably, these variables exerted little reciprocal influence on group evaluations. Our study has important implications for understanding affective polarization and the role of social groups in public opinion.
What explains rising partisan animosity in the United States? We argue that mass partisans’ feelings toward the social group coalitions of the parties are an important cause of rising affective polarization. We first leverage evidence from the American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series to show that partisans’ feelings toward the social groups linked to their in-party (out-party) have grown more positive (negative) over time. We then turn to the 1992–96 and 2000–2004 ANES Panel Surveys to disentangle the interrelationship between partisan polarization and social group evaluations. Individuals with more polarized social group evaluations in 1992 or 2000 report substantially more polarized party thermometer ratings and more extreme, and better sorted, partisan identities four years later. Notably, these variables exerted little reciprocal influence on group evaluations. Our study has important implications for understanding affective polarization and the role of social groups in public opinion.
Quote:
A leading explanation for this growing polarization points less to the role of ideology and more to the increasing group distinctiveness of the parties and concomitant identity-based motivations to impugn the other side (Ahler and Sood 2018; Mason 2015, 2016). Broadly, this perspective calls attention to the increasing social homogeneity of the parties due to changes in the voting behavior of racial, geographic, gender, and religious groups (Achen and Bartels 2016; Layman 2001; Zingher 2014). Better-sorted social groups may mean that partisans are less able to see themselves—and their kind of people—in the other side, thereby leading to greater social distance between these group coalitions and ultimately enhanced animosity.
Quote:
We turn to evidence from the American National Election Study (ANES) Time Series to investigate partisans’ evaluations of the parties’ social group coalitions. To do so we fit a confirmatory factor analysis on the social group feeling thermometers contained on each presidential-year ANES survey from 1980 to 2016....
Common Democratic groups included liberals, feminists, unions, environmentalists, and blacks, while common Republican groups included conservatives, big business, Christian fundamentalists, and the military.
Common Democratic groups included liberals, feminists, unions, environmentalists, and blacks, while common Republican groups included conservatives, big business, Christian fundamentalists, and the military.
Quote:
Quote:
We have explored an untested implication of group-based theories of partisan affective polarization and of party conflict more generally: that partisans’ evaluations of the parties’ so- cial group coalitions have polarized over time and that these evaluations are related to subsequent levels of partisan affective polarization. In the former case, we saw evidence that the polarization that has emerged along partisan lines also extends to evaluations of these social group coalitions. In the latter case, we saw consistent evidence that social group polarization is a driving force behind increased partisan affective polarization rather than vice versa. We thus provide novel and substantial evidence in favor of the group interpretation of partisan affective polarization.
07-08-2019
, 11:44 AM
08-23-2019
, 01:26 PM
08-24-2019
, 04:33 PM
An interesting note about median earnings
Quote:
Has the median man made progress economically since 1980? Not really. While male median income rose (in 2017 $) from $35,589 to $40,396, or 13.5 percent, this modest increase masks the fact that the share of men in their peak earnings years has increased, and that earnings at the median within peak earnings years categories have decreased.
Note that population share for 35-64, prime earnings years, rose from 1980 to 2017; earnings fell for every population group between 25 and 54. The median 30 year old is making less than their counterpart from 27 years earlier, as is the median 40 year old, as is the median 50 year old.
Had income within each age category remained constant at 1980 levels, current median income for men could be $40,306, or almost exactly where it us now. On an age adjusted basis, there was no median income growth. But that probably overstates economic well being at the middle--the one category where income has risen rapidly is the 65+ group, which may reflect the fact that 65 year olds no longer feel that they can retire. So when current generations think they are not keeping up with the past, they are on to something.
Note that population share for 35-64, prime earnings years, rose from 1980 to 2017; earnings fell for every population group between 25 and 54. The median 30 year old is making less than their counterpart from 27 years earlier, as is the median 40 year old, as is the median 50 year old.
Had income within each age category remained constant at 1980 levels, current median income for men could be $40,306, or almost exactly where it us now. On an age adjusted basis, there was no median income growth. But that probably overstates economic well being at the middle--the one category where income has risen rapidly is the 65+ group, which may reflect the fact that 65 year olds no longer feel that they can retire. So when current generations think they are not keeping up with the past, they are on to something.
08-24-2019
, 09:41 PM
09-30-2019
, 09:46 AM
10-07-2019
, 10:56 AM
10-18-2019
, 04:38 PM
