Chapter 1 - Definitions of Religion
Work and travel has put me behind on blogging, but not on reading, so I'm well ahead of myself now, but carrying on.
The interesting thing about this chapter is that the definitions of religion which Durkheim wants to contest are still quite relevant, at least in popular consciousness. And Durkheim's criticisms are also still relevant because of that.
So, this chapter begins by first criticizing two ways of defining religion -- as concern for the supernatural, or as concern with divinities -- and then Durkheim offers his own preliminary definition, based around the idea of dividing the world into the categories of "sacred" and "profane".
Religion as Belief in the Supernatural
In a nutshell, the problem with this definition is that it presupposes a very modern, western way of thinking about religion that is quite foreign to the self-understanding of the older religions Durkheim is interested in making sense of. As he puts it, in reference to the members of the tribes he wishes to study:
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For him, there is nothing strange in using one's voice or gestures to command the elements, to halt or advance the progress of the stars, to make the rain fall or not, and so on. The rites he uses to ensure the fertility of the soil or the fecundity of animal species that provide him with food are no more irrational, in his view, than the technical procedures our agronomists use for the same purpose.
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Moreover, the idea of the supernatural, as we understand it, is of recent vintage: it presupposes its opposite, which it negates and which is not at all primitive. In order to call certain phenomena supernatural, one must already have a sense that there is a natural order of things, in other words, that the phenomena of the universe are connected to one another according to certain necessary relationships called laws. Once this principle is established, anything that pertains to these laws necessarily appears to be beyond nature, and so beyond reason...
The point being that this view of
nature is relatively late and thus can't provide a conceptual basis for a definition of religion that will make sense of ancient religions.
Religion as concern with linking man and some divinity
Just as the definition of religion as "belief in the supernatural" is clearly tied to modern understandings, this definition is too centered around the theistic, Abrahamic religions to serve as a universal definition.
The first problem Durkheim points out is just the existence of religions where divinities are not central at all, like the oldest forms of Buddhism and Jainism. This is a well known criticism, I think.
The second point he makes is more interesting in connection to his own definition:
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Even in deistic religions, we find a great number of rites that are entirely independent of any idea of gods or spiritual beings. First of all, there are a multitude of prohibitions. The Bible, for example, commands women to live in isolation for a specified period each month, and requires the same sort of isolation during childbirth. It forbids yoking together the ox and the ass, or wearing a clothing in which wool is mixed with linen, though it is impossible to see what role the belief in Yahweh can have played in these prohibitions. He is absent from all the prohibited relations....
In every cult there are practices that act by themselves, through a virtue of their own, without any god mediating between the individual who executes the rite and the goal pursued...
In Durkheim's view, since there are foundational elements of religious practice which appear independent from belief in deities, as well as non-theistic religions, that belief cannot be enough to establish a universal definition of religion.
Durkheim's definition -- the sacred and the profane
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Religious phenomena fall quite naturally into two basic categories: beliefs and rites. The first are states of opinion and consist of representations; the second are fixed modes of actions. These two classes of phenomena differ as much as thought differs from action....
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present a common quality: they presuppose a classification of things -- the real or ideal things that men represent for themselves -- into two classes, two opposite kinds, generally designated by two distinct terms effectively translated by the words profane and sacred.
The division of the world into two comprehensive domains, one sacred, the other profane, is the hallmark of religious thought. Beliefs, myths, gnomic spirits, and legends are either representations or systems of representation that express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers attributed to them, their history, their relations with each other and with profane things. But sacred things should be taken to mean simply those personal beings we call gods or spirits. A rock, a tree, a spring, a stone, a piece of wood, a house, in other words anything all, can be sacred. A rite can have this sacred character as well; in fact, no rite exists that does not have it to some degree. There are words, speeches, and formulas that can be spoken only by consecrated persons; there are gestures and movements that cannot be executed by everyone. If, according to mythology, Vedic sacrifice was not just a way of winning favour with the gods but actually created them, that is because it possessed a virtue comparable to those of the most sacred beings.
The circle of sacred objects, then, cannot be fixed once and for all; its scope varies endlessly from one religion to another. Buddhism is a religion because, in the absence of gods, it accepts the existence of sacred things, namely the Four Noble Truths and the practices that derive from them.
Durkheim goes on to try to qualify the nature of the difference between sacred and profane things in a general way, but I'll pass over it because I think it might make more sense when we get to his later definition of religion which builds on this distinction between the sacred and profane, which is more intended just as starting place.
The last part of the chapter is concerned with drawing a distinction between religion and magic, which again foreshadows the larger goal of Durkheim's system building:
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Magic also consists of beliefs and rites. Like religion, it has its myths and its dogmas... Magic also has its ceremonies, sacrifices, purification rituals, prayers, chants, and dances. The beings invoked by the magician, the forces he puts into play, are not only similar in nature to the forces and beings addressed by religion but often identical.
So, how then are the two different? The difference, for Durkheim, is that religion is an inherently collective and social phenomena in a way that is distinct from magic.
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Religious beliefs proper are always held by a defined collectivity that professes them and practices the rites that go with them. These beliefs are not only embraced by all the members of this collectivity as individuals, they belong to the group and unite it....
When it comes to magic, the situation is quite different. It is probably true that magical beliefs are always in vogue. They are often widespread among large sectors of the population, and there are even people who believe in magic as much as they do in religion proper. But magic does not bind its followers to one another and unite them in a single group living the same life. A church of magic does not exist.
This distinction between individual practice and collective practice will come up again later.