Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. I learned about this war on my own years ago. As best I can recall this little conflict was never mentioned in any history class I took, high school or college.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Japanese_War

The Russo-Japanese War (8 February 1904 – 5 September 1905) was "the first great war of the 20th century." It grew out of rival imperial ambitions of the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan over Manchuria and Korea. The major theatres of operations were Southern Manchuria, specifically the area around the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden; and the seas around Korea, Japan, and the Yellow Sea.

Russia sought a warm water port on the Pacific Ocean, for their navy as well as for maritime trade. Vladivostok was only operational during the summer season, but Port Arthur would be operational all year. From the end of the First Sino-Japanese War and 1903, negotiations between Russia and Japan had proved impractical. Japan offered to recognize Russian dominance in Manchuria in exchange for recognition of Korea as a Japanese sphere of influence. Russia refused this, so Japan chose war to counter what it described as Russian aggression in Asia. After discussions broke down in 1904, the Japanese Navy attacked the Russian eastern fleet at Port Arthur, a naval base in the Liaotung province leased to Russia by China, which led to war. The Japanese defeated the Russians in a series of battles on land and at sea.

The resulting campaigns, in which the Japanese military attained victory over the Russian forces arrayed against them, were unexpected by world observers. Over time, the consequences of these battles would transform the balance of power in East Asia, resulting in a reassessment of Japan's recent entry onto the world stage.

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I know it's not the kind of conflict you had in mind, but this made me think of the conflict within the United States after we "lost" China. Two results were 1) our Far East experts were systematically hounded out of positions of responsibility by the Republican Party, giving Europeanists the upper hand in internal debate about the importance--or relative unimportance thereof as opposed to fighting communism--of opposing colonialism; and 2) Democrats in power were afraid of "losing" other Far East countries, for example, Korea and Vietnam (although the term "country" should be used advisedly when referring to South Vietnam). Led to a lot of death and suffering.

In 41 if Japan attacks Russia's east cost and doesn't attack the US does this lead to an Axis victory? Would Russia have survived against Germany if they had to fight on 2 fronts? How long would the US have stayed out of the war?

I can't imagine why the Japanese would attack the Russians but leave the Brits, Dutch and Americans untouched. The Russians were not seen as a major strategic threat to Japan. The Americans, and to a lesser extent the Brits were considered the main obstacles to Japan's Imperial goals. The Dutch controlled much of the resources the Japanese needed to compete in the world economy. What would the Japanese have to gain by attacking the Russians?

However, if we accept the premise, I think the answer is Russia still wins WWII, it just takes a year longer in Europe and a couple more years in Manchuria. And if the US doesn't get pulled into the war by a Pearl Harbor event, it might take another year or or two before they send troops to Europe and Africa. A later US entry might mean Russian domination of the whole European continent. If the US delays entering longer than the Russians are slowed down, there might not be any western forces on the ground in France to stop the Red Army from reaching Brittany and the Pyrenees. British and Commonwealth forces might keep Italy and Greece, and Spain would probably come in with them to hold the line.The best the West could reasonably hope for would be a demarcation line on the Rhine instead of the Elbe.

The Russians could afford to give up on their east coast completely, if that is what it took to defend Moscow. There would have been very little net diversion of troops. A victorious Japanese army in eastern Siberia is no threat to western Siberia, let alone Moscow. Essentially the Russians would only fight a one-front war.

How about Grenada. Small conflict that may have slowed down Cuba.

Best wishes,
Mason

Slowed them down doing what? I don't see any evidence of a change in Cuban foreign or domestic policy following Grenada until the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had far-reaching effects on Cuba's economy and foreign policy. Cuba had been losing allies in the Caribbean and among non-aligned nations for years before Grenada, most notably due to negative reaction to its support for Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. As a result Cuba had already slowed its involvement in foreign intervention before the Grenada invasion.

And contrary to US ass-covering propaganda of the time, since repudiated, the Point Salines Airport was not a Russo-Cuban plot to militarize the Caribbean. It was a British-conceived and backed, Canadian-designed infrastructure project designed to boost the economy through greater tourism.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 (not that small and not forgotten but vastly important to later consequences):

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/...nco-German-War


The Franco-German War had far-reaching consequences. It established both the German Empire and the French Third Republic. With Napoleon III no longer in power to protect them, the Papal States were annexed by Italy (Sept. 20, 1870), thereby completing that nation’s unification. The Germans’ crushing victory over France in the war consolidated their faith in Prussian militarism, which would remain a dominant force in German society until 1945. (Additionally, the Prussian system of conscript armies controlled by a highly trained general staff was soon adopted by the other great powers.) Most importantly, Germany’s annexation of Alsace-Lorraine aroused a deep longing for revenge in the French people. The years from 1871 to 1914 were marked by an extremely unstable peace, since France’s determination to recover Alsace-Lorraine and Germany’s mounting imperialist ambitions kept the two nations constantly poised for conflict. Their mutual animosity proved to be the driving force behind the prolonged slaughter on the Western Front in World War I.

Corinth-Corcyra War, 435-431 BC


http://www.historyofwar.org/articles...h_corcyra.html


Part of a series of smaller conflicts (which includes the above):

http://www.wwnorton.com/college/poli...pw_prelude.htm

From above link:

The Prelude to War

Thucydides reveals that despite direct tensions between the two superpowers, Athens and Sparta came to the precipice of war in 431 due to a series of disputes involving minor and middle-rank powers. In this sense, war was precipitated indirectly through conflicts between lesser city-states. Thucydides points to three specific incidents involving Epidamnus, Corcyra, and Potidaea as a prelude to the war.

The Dispute over Epidamnus

The prelude to the great Peloponnesian War began with the outbreak of a small civil conflict in the coastal city-state of Epidamnus. Social conflict within Epidamnus had been brewing for years and this finally led to a democratic faction rising within the broader population. This faction successfully overthrew the aristocratic class, who, in an attempt to regain control, joined with outside nomadic forces and laid siege on their own city. Epidamnus had originally been settled by colonists of Corcyra, an important neutral city-state with a large navy of 120 triremes. Based on this ancestral connection, the people of Epidamnus sent ambassadors to Corcyra requesting help. When it became clear that no help would be forthcoming from Corcyra, the ambassadors continued on to Corinth, the most important ally of Sparta, which had been the city-state that founded Corcyra. Thus, Corinth was indirectly connected to the Epidamnian population through Corcyra. The Corinthians agreed to help and sent a garrison to protect the besieged people of Epidamnus.

This action infuriated Corcyra, which felt that Corinth was interfering with its colony. Tension had existed between Corcyra and Corinth for some time. The Corinthians believed that Corcyra, although a rich and powerful city-state in its own right, still owed it the respect that colonies should always pay their founding state. The Corinthian decision to support Epidamnus's people, therefore, had less to do with sympathy for the democratic faction in Epidamnus than with teaching Corcyra the importance of respect and honor in Greek city-state relations. The Corcyraeans understood the Corinthian action in the context of a power-play and felt that if they allowed Corinth to interfere in this case, Corinth might continue to pressure them. The Corcyraeans concluded that to remain out of the dispute over Epidamnus would invite more Corinthian interference in Corcyraean affairs in the future. Corinth and Corcyra each brought significant support to the Epidamnian side they favored and a major naval battle ensued involving over one hundred ships in which Corcyra scored a convincing victory.

The Dispute over Corcyra

The naval victory, however, did not increase Corcyra's sense of security, but rather required the city-state to re-think its status since, as a neutral state, it lacked reliable allies. Corinth was allied to Sparta, the greatest land power in all of Greece. The Corcyraeans quickly determined that Corinth would not take their recent defeat lightly and would return with the support of the Peloponnesian League. Corcyra realized that while its neutrality had allowed it to flourish as an open trading state, without committed allies it was vulnerable to greater powers in times of conflict. Corcyra sent ambassadors to Athens, the other great power in the Greek world, and presented their case for a new alliance. The Corcyraeans made four key points in their speech to the Assembly:

1.Athens would gain the respect of many city-states if it agreed to an alliance, because Athens would be seen as coming to the aid of a city-state in trouble. Athens would enhance its reputation as a reliable partner upon which other states could rest their security.


2.Corcyra would be indebted to Athens and thus extremely loyal. Although they had been neutral, the Corcyraeans insisted that they could be trusted as new partners.


3.An alliance would not break the Thirty Years Peace Treaty, since Corcyra was a neutral city-state and thus had the right to join an alliance of its choice.


4.War was inevitable between Athens and Sparta and so Athens should do everything it could to increase its power and show its strength. Corcyra's navy, which was second in size only to that of Athens, would be a great asset. They asserted that defying Corinth would send a strong message to the Peloponnesian League.

The Corcyraeans ended their speech by emphasizing that Athens should look out for itself and avoid showing weakness to its enemies. They stated, "When one makes concessions to one's enemies one regrets it afterwards and the fewer concessions one makes the safer one is likely to be" (Thucydides, I.34; Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin Classics, 1985, p. 56).

Corinth was aware of the Corcyraean delegation and sent its own ambassadors to Athens to counter the Corcyraean argument. The Corinthians were invited to speak against the idea of an Athens-Corcyra alliance and they delivered a speech with four key rebuttal points:

1.Although perhaps not a technical violation of the Thirty Years Peace Treaty, an alliance certainly would violate the spirit of the treaty, which rested on a desire to avoid interference in the relations of other states and sought to de-escalate, rather than escalate, points of conflict.


2.Athens should be wary of alliances that could drag it into conflicts in which it has no stake. While allies might bring material resources, they also bring political baggage.


3.Corinth and Athens have had decent relations in the past and should not act as if they are outright enemies.


4.War is never inevitable but is caused by conscious decisions and thus can be consciously avoided.

The Corinthians summed up their argument by suggesting that Athens could find greater security in behaving justly, rather than hastily and out of a perceived sense of necessity: "The power that deals fairly with its equals finds a truer security than one which is hurried into snatching some apparent, but dangerous advantage" (Thucydides, I.42; [] Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Translated by Rex Warner. New York: Penguin Classics, 1985, p. 61).

Two Athenian assemblies had to be held to decide the question of alliance. After much debate on both sides, the Athenians voted in favor of what might have been regarded at first as a compromise. Athens offered Corcyra a defensive alliance under which Athens would lend aid only if Corcyra was attacked. Since, however, the most likely conflict would be initiated by Corinth against Corcyra, the Corinthian delegation left displeased. From their perspective, Athens had rejected the opportunity to avoid interference and potential conflict in favor of increasing its power. The Athenians had decided that if war with Sparta was necessary, it was better to have Corcyra's navy than allow it to fall into the hands of the Peloponnesian League.

Shortly after their alliance with Corcyra had been extended, Athens sent ten ships to Corcyra under the expressed orders to involve themselves in battle only if Corcyra itself was in danger of an enemy landing. Athens wanted to avoid a breach of the nonaggression treaty and thus told its generals to avoid direct combat with Corinthian forces unless Corcyraean defeat looked likely. A naval battle followed, involving over two hundred Corinthian and Corcyraean warships. At one point in the battle the Corcyraean left flank began to collapse, and the Athenian triremes engaged in combat to protect its new ally. The battle ended indecisively with each side losing a flank, however twenty additional Athenian ships arrived to reinforce the Corcyraeans. The next day the Athenian-Corcyraean fleet agreed that the Corinthian fleet could sail home without further conflict. However, if the Corinthians wished to advance, all of the Athenian vessels would engage them. The Corinthians withdrew.

The Dispute over Potidaea

Athens realized that its decision and the ensuing naval engagement were additional blows to Corinth, whose prestige had already suffered from the earlier naval defeat against Corcyra. Athens suspected that Corinth would plot revenge.

The city-state of Potidaea was a tribute-paying member of the Athenian empire, but a colony of Corinth. Strategically important, Potidaea could affect the control of Thrace, a northern region that was dominated by Athens. In anticipation of some Corinthian plan, Athens ordered Potidaea to remove one of its defensive walls, send hostages to Athens, and dismiss the Corinthian administrators who helped govern the city. In this way, Athens hoped to remove the opportunity for Potidaea to revolt if Corinth encouraged it to do so. The Potidaeans were alarmed by the Athenian demands, which essentially would have turned them into a vassal state. However, the Potidaeans were also aware that defiance of Athens would likely lead to an Athenian military assault. The Potidaeans needed to choose between willingly surrendering their freedom or risking it through resistance. After receiving assurances of support from the Peloponnesian League, the Potidaeans rejected the Athenian demands and openly revolted. The Athenians sent ships and over three thousand hoplites (heavily armed Greek foot soldiers) to lay siege to Potidaea and the surrounding region.

Corinth saw this as outright Athenian aggression against its colony. Athens saw it as Corinthian interference with a tribute-paying ally.

Not sure if people count it as "little," but the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s was fought almost entirely on a relatively small border, yet had huge consequences for world history.

Most notably, the clash of two of the largest oil producers ruined OPEC's solidarity and the cartel essentially collapsed, leading to a glut of cheap oil and energy for net oil importers (like the United States), and a disastrous fall in prices for oil exporters dependent on this commodity for a large portion of their wealth (like the USSR), while other countries increased oil production to become major regional players (like Saudi Arabia). This may have seriously contributed to the economic crisis that eventually collapsed the Soviet Union, bringing to an end the most ambitious modernizing project of the 20th century.

If the US didn't enter the war, or waited a year or two, they probably wouldn't have created the atomic bomb as soon, Germany might have first, and all bets are off on the historical results of the war. Also, the US contributed to Germany's problems in Africa, and then Italy and France, which diverted Germany's resources. Finally, its doubtful Russia would have totally ignored its east coast and some of its resources would have been diverted, and it would have taken a while to move armies from there to the west even if Russia chose to do so. Without the bomb, Russia might have eventually won anyway, but in retrospect, Japan's attack of the US was just in time to assure the US had the bomb first, something no one could have known at the time.

Wasn't Cuba sending troops and military advisers to places in South America and Africa. I think most of that stopped after this.

Best wishes,
Mason

Troop deployments to one country in Africa, yes. None in South America that I am aware of unless you consider Che Guevera himself "troops". The deployment in Africa lasted until 8 years after Grenada, but its end coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union.

I'm not sure I understand what the problem is with sending military advisers to friendly countries. Do you consider the US military advisers in Canada a threat to world peace? The US probably has more military advisers around the world than any other country.

The people Cuba mostly sent to other countries were doctors, teachers, aid workers, artists, scientists, and construction workers.

Regards,
DTM

HI DTM:

I grew up in Miami, so perhaps my opinion is a little biased on this topic. But I have trouble even understanding your logic, less agreeing with it.

But one thing for sure. Grenada was a very small conflict and may not even qualify as a war in any sense. However, I believe that the Grenada action and Ronald Reagan made the Castro government think twice about any future adventures.

If you think that the United States having military advisers in Canada and the Castro Government sending people to another country is in any way similar, then your world view is so far different from mine that it won't make sense for us to discuss this point.

Let me put it another way. If Canada had warmer winters, I'm sure it's a place worth moving to (and yes I dislike cold winters). Do you feel the same about Cuba? and they do have warm winters.

Best wishes,
Mason

Roosevelt approved the Manhattan project two months before Pearl Harbor. The Manhattan project wasn't a US project. It was a British project that became an ABC project (America/Britain/Canada). Most of the key scientists came from none of these countries. Most had been assembled by the British. The Pacific war wasn't the original impetus for the project - the European war was. Given all the above, I'm not sure I see why the project would be significantly delayed without Pearl Harbor.

Germany had already shelved its atomic research program in favour of more practical research to support the war effort. There is no reason to believe that a Japanese attack on Russia would spur the Germans to restart their atomic program. The biggest incentive they could have had was the entry of the US into the war, and that wasn't enough. They had already lost most of their key scientists in the field. If any other country was going to produce an atomic bomb, it would be the Soviet Union, which did have an ongoing project, but was several years behind.

The number of forces the US contributed in Africa was less than the number of Indian and Australian forces that would have been freed up by a diversion of Japanese war effort exclusively against China and Russia. I see no reason to think that the Allied victories in North Africa and Sicily would be any later than they were historically. In fact, the US forces in Tunisia were so inept, Indians and Australians replacing them would probably have shortened the campaign. With no war against Japan, even more landing craft would have been available in the Med. The number of German forces diverted from the Eastern front by the American landings in Africa was negligible. The same amount would have been diverted if the Americans were replaced by Indians and Australians, for no net effect on the eastern front..

Lack of US troops would probably have delayed progress in Italy however. OTOH, without Mack Clark gallivanting to Rome for personal glory rather than following orders, but his Australian replacement actually cutting off the Germans as instructed, perhaps the Italian campaign would have been over sooner under a unified British command.

Without US troops, the Normandy campaign would not have been possible. That's one thing which delays Russian victory a year.

They would not have totally ignored it at first, which is the other reason why I suggested it would delay Russian victory in Europe by a year. They'd have fewer eastern troops to conduct their later western offensives.

There would be no diversion of forces from the west to the east. What happened historically is that Russia had an army in the east and actually did transfer much of it west when needed to protect Moscow. If it came to a choice between protecting Moscow or protecting Vladivostok, the Russians would make the obvious choice. A Japanese attack would merely make disengagement more difficult.

Miami probably has the least objective view of Cuba of any place in the world.

I have trouble understanding Republican thinking (don't mean to imply I'm a Democrat) but I still think it can be worthwhile to try. Perhaps most of my difficulty in understanding stems from failing to be aware of unstated premises. The rest probably involves failing to understand how stated premises could possibly be accepted.

My logic on this is pretty simple, really.

You asserted that the US invasion of Grenada had a negative effect on Cuba (or Castro in particular) sending troops and military advisors to African and South American countries. I think that a historian would only accept this proposition if there was evidence that there had been a planned deployment of troops or military advisers that was cancelled, delayed or reduced, soon after the Grenada invasion and preferably with evidence that the reason for the change in plan was stated by the decision maker to be because of the Grenada invasion. Possible evidence counter to the proposition would be a troop deployment that occurred shortly after the Grenada invasion or the existence of a record of a different reason being given by the decision-maker for a cancellation, reduction or delay in a deployment. The absence of any further deployment is not by itself evidence that the absence was caused by the Grenada invasion.

So what evidence do we have? We have no evidence that I am aware of that any planned deployment was cancelled, reduced or delayed. We have the very clear evidence that Cuban deployment of military forces to Angola continued until 1991, 8 years after Grenada. It ceased in conjunction with the fall of the Soviet Union. And the Cuban deployment to Angola, was, AFAIK, the only deployment of Cuban troops at the unit level or higher, outside Cuba, ever. Therefore there is no evidence to support your assertion but there is evidence that contradicts your assertion.

"Both countries have military advisers, and send them to other countries." Semantic analysis of that sentence shows an overt similarity and no implied differences. So for there to be a dissimilarity, there must be some difference either between the countries themselves or the advisers they actually send. Since you seem to think that the difference is obvious, you should be able to articulate what it is. I'm all ears. I hope it will be more substantial than US=Good and Cuba=Bad. If you tell me what you think the significant differences are, I'l tell you what I think the differences are.

I don't know why we'd compare Cuba with Canada.

I can tell you I'd rather move to Cuba than Haiti, the Dominican Republic or Jamaica, which I believe are the three most comparable countries to Cuba. And even then, it is not a fair comparison, because only Cuba has been subject to a US economic embargo since the 1950s. In essence, your question is like: "I'm shooting a machinegun at the house on the left. Would you rather live in the house on the left or the house on the right?" The decision isn't going to be driven by the natures of the respective houses, but rather by outside influences.

I'd probably prefer to live in Miami than Cuba now, but I'm not sure. If the US had accepted the Cuban Revolution and treated Cuba benignly ever since, I might prefer to live in the Cuba-that-would-have-been than in the Miami-that-is. OTOH, if the US had done that, it would be a different place than it is today, so I might prefer to live in the Miami-that-could-have-been than in the Cuba-that-would-have-been.

If I lived in Miami, I'd move at the drop of a hat to Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria, and probably to Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. And its not that I like to be cold. Miami vs France, the UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand, or Costa Rica would be hard choices.

I'm sure you believe it. I just don't understand on what evidence you base your belief.

Regards,

DTM

Ever wonder why Bolivia has no sea coast land?


War of the Pacific, Spanish Guerra del Pacífico, (1879–83), conflict involving Chile, Bolivia, and Peru, which resulted in Chilean annexation of valuable disputed territory on the Pacific coast. It grew out of a dispute between Chile and Bolivia over control of a part of the Atacama Desert that lies between the 23rd and 26th parallels on the Pacific coast of South America. The territory contained valuable mineral resources, particularly sodium nitrate.

Full article linked below:

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/...of-the-Pacific



This conflict is still unresolved; see recent BBC article from April, 2013 that gives a good synopsis.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-22287222

From above link:

Each year, on 23 March, Bolivians celebrate the Day of the Sea. It is a bizarre spectacle: thousands of people march through the streets of La Paz carrying model ships and pictures of the ocean. The Bolivian navy, which has no sea on which to sail, turns out in full uniform.

For now, that navy and the Bolivian people can only dream of coastal sovereignty. But they hope that with the help of The Hague, that dream can become reality.

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It would have been significantly delayed because the US wouldn't have put the same resources into the project they had if the US wasn't involved in the war. That includes the relatively safe places to work on it. And the Manhattan Project was largely an American effort by the time it became the "Manhattan Project." Without the large American involvement the bomb probably is delayed a couple of years or more--especially if the UK loses the war.

If Hitler was aware that Japan was going to invade Russia in the East (in other than Mongolia), he might have held off invading Russia until she diverted more resources there. As it was, Germany made much progress there anyway before being pushed back. Also, if Russia was dealing more with Japan, it might have been less aggressive in Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, near the Balkans, etc and Germany might have taken more territory itself, providing it with more of the resources needed for its war effort--Russia being more willing to appease Germany, more than it did, to avoid confrontation. Japan's timing of invading America just 6 months after Hitler invaded Russia probably made Stalin think Japan would not be a major problem in its east.

It's not just the nuclear, but also their V-2 program that was an issue. The war lasting another year or two and the UK would have been under continuous bombing from the rockets, and the RAF would have been mostly powerless to stop it. The evasion of France and the advance of the allies pushed back the launching sites out of range of the UK. Without that, or if delayed a year or two, the UK might have been forced to sue for peace.

Germany might have continued it's atomic research (it restarted it again for over a year during the war) if it had more breathing room had it invaded Russia later and if the US was not involved in the war. Also, with more time, Germany might have discovered the allies were working on atomic research more than they realized and decided that they needed to do so also.

If the US had not entered the war, and Russia defeated Germany as you suggest, then Russia might very well have gotten the bomb before the US, as the US would have been less motivated, and Russia would've confiscated the German atomic research instead of the Americans.

It's not just the American's presence in Africa that matters, but its troops were mostly green and the Africa campaign provided it the experience needed to make it's troops more effective later in the war. The evasion happening a year or two later might be long enough for the UK to have to sue for peace.

If Stalin appeases Hitler and is satisfied that Germany won't invade Russia (they did have the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) then Stalin might very well divert forces east.

If by "significantly delayed" you mean about a year, then I might not disagree. But what is a one year delay if the Japanese attack on the US is delayed by one year and the Russian victory over the Germans is delayed by a year? In relative terms, it is no delay at all.

But I am going to suggest that you have no good reason to suggest a much longer delay. The US was not originally motivated to get the bomb by the war with Japan. It started the program to acquire the bomb before that war began. Rather they were motivated by wanting to get the bomb before anybody else did, and they knew the British and Canadians would get the bomb eventually, (probably between 1947 and 1949), they suspected the Russians were working on a project, and they were worried that the Germans would develop one too. So research was going to proceed whether the US was at war or not, and at a pace necessary to be first by a comfortable margin.

Furthermore, you seem to think that the formal beginning of a state of war acted like a giant off/on switch for the project: without war nothing much would happen; with war everything would happen at the fastest possible pace. That's not quite accurate. America was already deeply involved in the European war, short of providing ground troops. Their involvement in the bomb project began before they formally entered the war. Once they did enter the war the priority of the project was not formally increased until July of 1944, and even then it wasn't given the highest priority ranking.

Hitler committed to an attack on Russian in fall of 1940. So if he were to delay Barbarossa, he would have had to have known more than a year before Pearl Harbor that Pearl Harbor wasn't going to happen but that a Japanese attack on Russia was going take place in - what, late summer 1941 or spring of 1942? At that point not even the Japanese knew they were going to attack the US and not Russia. (well they probably knew they were not going to attack Russia, but the scenario we are discussing assumes they do attack.)

If the Japanese do attack, they almost certainly won't do so in late fall, winter, or early spring. So any attack that is an alternative to attacking the US and Britain would probably come no sooner than May 1942. If you suggest that the Germans would wait until after Russia had diverted resources away from the west to deal with the Japanese attack, you're really talking about a German delay until May 1943. I can't see that happening. Hitler needed Russian resources to make up for what the British blockade was denying him.

Russia finished being aggressive in Poland in October 1939, in Finland in March 1940, and the Baltic States in June 1940. To have any effect on these events the Japanese would have had to attack the Soviet Union in force two and a half years before Pearl Harbor. Not going to happen... because they had already tried and failed. There was an undeclared border war between Japan and Russia on the Manchurian frontier between 1932 and 1939, ending in a decisive Soviet victory in 1939 at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol in September of 1939 (now there's a topic for this thread!). After that, the only realistic possibility for a Japanese attack on the SU would be after an attack by Germany. So an attack on the SU instead of the US is a possibility, but only after the German attack in spring of 1941.

We've already covered that. A Japanese attack coming after the German attack would not have diverted enough forces to allow the Germans to take Moscow. There was no opportunity in fall 1941 for the Germans to take "more of the resources". Russia had no need to appease the Germans more because they had already defeated the Japanese threat. One might even conclude that the victory over the Japanese in 1939 encouraged them to move against Finland and the Baltic states. (It came too late to have influenced the decision on Poland.)

You are having an Hitlerian fantasy. The V-2 would not have forced peace on Britain. However, it might have meant that the first atom bomb would have been used on Berlin in 1946 rather than Hiroshima in 1945.

Germany would never have developed the Bomb as fast as Britain and Canada acting without the US. Germany was hamstrung by a lack of access to vital materials and to key scientists. Britain had access to the largest amount of Uranium in the world and could produce ample supplies of heavy water. Canada was the second country in the world to bring a nuclear reactor online, doing so in 1945. What the British and Canadians lacked was the industrial infrastructure for refining the uranium to weapons grade as fast as the Americans managed, and that is what would have caused the 2-4 years delay in acquiring a deployable bomb if they had to go without a US project.

The Russians did confiscate German research and German scientists, but by then the Allies already had the Bomb. While the US might have been a bit slower if they hadn't been actually at war, once they realized in 1941 the problem and the possibility of a race , they always intended to be first.

Agreed that the African and Italian campaigns provided much needed experience. In a delayed entry, the US would have started out in Italy, or perhaps the Balkans, which would have been a more active theatre for the West if Overlord was delayed due to a later US arrival.

No way the UK was going to sue for peace. They had no need to. They were winning the battle of the Atlantic and survived the blitz. Worst case for them is that delayed US entry allowed the Germans to make a better showing of developing the Type XXI U-boat. In that case, the supply situation might start to get hairy until the Soviets win.

They had no need to divert forces east. They already had a large enough army in Mongolia and eastern Siberia that had already defeated the Japanese. This is what they diverted west. A Japanese attack in summer 1941 would have delayed the westward transfer of some of these troops, but only enough to limit the Soviet winter counteroffensive.

Given the economic realities of 1940/1941 a Japanese attack on Russia is a fantasy.
The US oil embargo enacted in August 1941 meant they needed to secure an alternative oil supply or surrender to US demands to withdraw from China and South East Asia.

Back to the OP
It's remarkable that the lessons available from the Japanese actions at Port Arthur and Mukden were completely misinterpreted by the military observers of the time.
The Japanese army conducted infantry attacks against entrenched Russian positions that were supported by artillery and machine guns. Despite the massive casualty lists that resulted, international military observers went away agreeing that the offensive could still succeed providing attacks were pressed home with sufficient courage and disregard for losses. WWI was to disprove these optimistic views.

1939 May>Sep the Nomonhan Incident or Battles of Khalkhin Gol

In 1939 Japan there were 2 competing groups within the military.
The Northern Strike Group (Army) which favoured attacking the Soviet Union and seizing Siberia as far as Lake Baikal and the Southern Strike Group (Navy) which favoured seizing SE Asia and the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia)

In 1939 May>Sept the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, initiated a series of border incidents with Mongolia and the Soviet Union with the intent of seizing disputed border areas.
The Kwantung Army generals launched these attacks without authorisation from Tokyo .

In August the Japanese were defeated by a Soviet attack led by General Zhukov that shattered the 23rd Infantry division. A peace accord was duly signed in September 1939.

The combination of launching a war without authorisation and defeat in that war, served to discredit the plans of the Northern Strike Group. After this date, the Southern Strike Group gained the political advantage and the stage was set for Japanese advances into SE Asia and an eventual war with the US.

I'm not sure if Grenada slowed down Cuba or not, but it had to let them know that communist expansion in the western hemisphere wasn't going to happen.

The bigger impact was probably that it provided a much needed US victory and boosted confidence in the military after Vietnam and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, even it was a small and easy win. I remember watching some news footage of it, I think in a documentary or something, and the news people were surprised that there was no major snafu or screwup of some sort. It probably helped provide support for Reagan's military buildup which eventually helped win the cold war.

Yeah. They probably didn't get the message in 1954, 1961, 1962, 1973 or 1981. But I am sure it stopped all that Cuban military intervention in the Americas that never happened and was never going to happen. There is a reason that Cuba's one and only foreign military expedition happened in Africa. Granada is not that reason. How many foreign military interventions has the US had since 1959?

Yup. And I'm sure that justifies what such traditional enemies of the US as the UK and Canada called the criminal violation of another country's sovereignty and the killing of hundreds of innocent people.

Significant reforms in the US military were undertaken as a result of
SNAFUs in the operation that were mostly kept out of the well-managed press coverage. It did help the forces become much more professional.

Pity Putin didn't get the memo.

The Cuban troops in Angola succeeded, so they were not slowed down by Grenada. South Africa's invasion of Angola was defeated with Cuban/Soviet assistance. This war is said to be significant in the fall of apartheid, though I'm unfamiliar with the logic/evidence. IIRC Cuban troops stay until around the fall of apartheid. Cuba continued encouraging revolution in Latin America, including the successful one in El Salvador. But I'm not aware that there was significant Cuban arms flow to ES.

Here's an obscure conflict with big ramifications: Napoleon's failed invasion of Haiti. He sought to reenslave the island and return it to being the hub of a sugar empire in the Caribbean. The ex-slaves defeated him. As a result, France no longer needs Louisiana to feed the planned sugar empire. Hence, fire sale to Jefferson of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.

While this is repeated a lot, I never been persuaded Reagan's arms buildup had much to do with the collapse of the USSR. Belief in the revolution had been wiped away by cynicism, repression, and stagnation, long before. Gorbachev's perestroika is what really opened the floodgates. I think the arms race throughout did a lot to maintain the USSR because it shifted the conflict to the one thing the Soviet economy could do well: weaponize. Their command economy was really bad at consumer goods, but the people could be distracted and the satellites disciplined by using the military threat from the west.

Its really a shame how the great ideas of the peace-loving communists DTM is so fond of are now in the trash bin of history, thanks to the evil murdering imperialists. Its strange but people I know from Poland and Romania who lived under communism don't feel the same way.

He never said anything like that. Argue with what people actually write, not a caricature.