Roosevelt was aching to get into the war in any way possible.

I'm not going to say that is was absolutely impossible for thr Germand to have defeated the Soviets in 1942, based on somewhat better progress in 1941, but it was very unlikely. There was no chance of a never-ending stalemate given the resource imbalance. The Germans had to win relatively quickly, or never.

There is a whole series of posts in this forum about why this is utter nonsense. It was logistically impossible for the Germans to capture the Suez canal without a naval superiority they didn't have. Capturing Gibraltar would have meant going to war with one of their two fascist allies plus Portugal, which would have meant giving up on Hitler's ultimate war goal: taking out the USSR. Even if the Germans had done the impossible and captured the canal, diverting forces to create a southern Caucasus front would have weakened the attack on the Soviet Union without costing the Soviets much effort. Look at a map!

How?

Germany's best chance of winning the war was in late 1941. If they break off action before their last major offensive, how are their chances of winning improved?

The German forces as a whole didn't have the mobility required to conduct a more elastic defence than what they actually used.

Yes

[QUOTE=DoOrDoNot;52503887]... into a stalemate ...[/QUOE]No. It would just have taken them longer to win.

Really? Like what?

Hitler "letting" them escape is a myth. In the grand scheme of things, the potential manpower losses at Dunkirk were a drop in the bucket. See my post of January 19 in this thread.

Been listening to the History of WWII Podcast lately, and one thing that came up was after Germany and USSR split up Poland, some of the German leaders advocating attacking the Soviets immediately. Do they fare any better if they reverse things like this and try to win on the eastern front quickly before dealing with the west?

There could have been a window for them during the "Sitzkrieg" period (which obviously may have played out much differently if Germany makes this move), but that window is through the dead of winter.

I don't think this works for them. The panzer divisions were absolutely key to the German advance in Russia. At the beginning of September 1939, the Germans had only 5 operational panzer divisons and 4 light divisions. The vast majority of their AFV strength was made up of tankettes and light tanks that had never been intended to see combat as a Main Battle Tank (MBT).* A sixth panzer division was in the process of forming but it was initially held in reserve because it was not ready for operations. By the end of the Polish campaign all these divisions were considerably worn down. The Germans had about 800-1,000 tanks and tankettes knocked out of action (~30-37% of their total force), though about 2/3-3/4 of these were eventually recovered.

I doubt that the Germans would have been able to mount an offensive against Russia any earlier than their attack on France, for a couple of reasons. Their armoured formations needed to refit and reorganise (see more about this below) at least until mid-winter, and the terrain of the eastern frontier was unsuitable for armoured warfare thereafter until the late spring. The actual 1941 attack on Russia didn't start until late June, primarily because of terrain conditions. The weather was worse that year, so the terrain may have supported a May start in 1940.

*German tank strength for the Polish campaign was approx. 1,000 Pz I tankettes, 1,200 Pz II light tanks, 200 seized Czech light tanks serving in a medium tank role, and only about 90 Pz III medium MBTs. In addition to this there were about 200 Pz IVs which were intended primarily as fire support weapons, being armed with a short howitzer rather than an anti-tank gun. In practice, the Pz IVs often became ersatz MBTs due to the extreme shortage of Pz IIIs. Only about 3.3% of their tank force of about 2,700 were actual MBTs. Counting the Czech tanks and the Pz IVs as acting in a medium role, only ~18% of the tank force was designated as an MBT.

When Germany invaded France in 1940, those six panzer and four light divisions had been transformed into ten panzer divisions, mostly by the addition of extra infantry battalions. The number of Pz III and Pz IV tanks, which had been intended to be the warfighting tanks of the Werhmacht, and the number of Czech T38s had been increased from new production, while the numbers of Pz Is and IIs were decreased, but MBTs (either real or notional) were still in a minority. Existing tanks were up-armoured and provided with better vision ports. The retrofits, the influx of new vehicles and infantry battalions, and the absorption of lessons learned in the Polish campaign required a period of retraining.

Total German tank strength for the attack on France was about 2400 - that's less than in Poland. It was comprised of about 600 Pz Is, 850 Pz IIs, 325 light Czech tanks in a medium role, 350 Pz IIIs and 275 Pz IVs. Real MBTs are now up to about 14% of the total tank force, and tanks designated for an MBT role are up to about 40% of total strength.

After the fall of France, the Germans prepared for the invasion of Russia by doubling their number of panzer divisions, using the simple expedient of taking half the tank units out of the existing panzer divisions and allocating them to existing infantry divisions - usually the relatively rare motorized infantry divisions. Total tank strength was brought up to about 3,500, by returning to service the Pz Is and Pz IIs that had been withdrawn from service before the invasion of France, and by adding even more new t38s, Pz IIs, IIIs and IVs. The Pz III's were upgunned from a 3.7cm gun to a 5 cm gun. The need for 20 panzer divisions (actually, they needed more than 20, but had no immediate way of producing them) was dictated more by the size of the territory of operations than by the strength of the Red Army.

If the Germans had attacked Russia in 1940, instead of 1941, they would have done so with half the panzer divisions, 20% fewer tanks, (which on average would have been considerably weaker tanks), while facing an increasingly -prepared enemy in France. Not only would their armoured forces be half the number, but they'd have to hold back a considerable portion of their infantry to defend the western border from French/British attack. The Red Army was weaker in 1940 than in 1941, but not so much so that the reduced German force available in 1940 would have made as much gain as they made with a later start in 1941.

Germany has always been justly terrified of fighting a two-front war. In both WWI and WWII the plan was always to gain a quick victory on one front before concentrating on the other. In WWII, a quick victory over Russia, given the large space for operations, was not a realistic proposition. Striking France first made a lot more sense. They just failed to work out how to knock the British Empire out of the war as well.

Hi DoTheMath:

I thought this had something to do with the Italians getting bogged down in Greece and Hitler having to go into Greece to rescue them. Thus, this is what delayed the start of the Russian invasion until late June 1941. Do I have this wrong?

Best wishes,
Mason

The Balkan campaign and the invasion of Greece indeed took place before the invasion of the Soviet Union, but I don't think that it is correct to say that the former actually delayed the latter.

Planning for the invasion of Greece began in November 1940, and the operation was authorised in December with a March start date envisioned. This was all before planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union was completed. The plans for Barbarossa originally contemplated a mid-May start, and the operations against Greece were intended to be complete by about mid-April. So it is not accurate to say that the Greek invasion delayed the Russian one from a planning point of view.

The dates for the Greek operations slipped a couple of weeks, with the invasion starting in early April and mainland Greece coming under complete Axis control before the end of April. Since the ground conditions on the eastern front caused a five-week delay, the two week delay in Greek operations didn't really delay the Russian operation.

The operation against Crete had not been part of the original plan for the invasion of Greece. It was added to planning in March and authorised in April for a May execution. The start date was delayed, again by about two weeks, but this again was not a problem for Barbarossa because the terrain conditions were known by then to be pushing the start of Barbarossa into June.

If the floods hadn't delayed the start by over five weeks, it is doubtful that Barbarossa could have gotten under way in mid-May. There were a number of delays in logistics arrangements that were not complete until early June.

A few historians have claimed that the Balkan and Greek operations delayed Barbarossa, but their analysis doesn't seem to go any deeper than the Balkan operations happened and Barbarossa was delayed five weeks. They provide no chain of cause and effect. Certainly contemporary German sources cite the coincidence of Balkan/Greek operations with the delay in Barbarossa, but again I can see no citation of cause and effect.

I think that the most one could say is that the way the Balkan and Greek operations actually went, it would not have been possible to launch Barbarossa on its original timetable. Since other factors also prevented Barbarossa from kicking off in May, the Greek invasion didn't actually have any effect on Barbarossa's timing.

The most direct impact the Balkan/Greek operations had on Barbarossa was that one of the panzer divisions involved lost most of its tanks and vehicles when the ships transporting them back to Austria after the operation was over were sunk by air attacks. The division had to be removed from the plans of the initial attack.

Hi DoTheMath:

My understanding was that Italy invaded Greece, got in trouble with their invasion, and that Germany had to go in and rescue them and that delayed Barbarossa. You don't mention Italy and their problems. So is idea off?

Best wishes,
Mason

Disagree. The Soviet Union was importing about 75% of its needed coal for example. A stalemate would have been contingent on better success in the Atlantic/Africa or the loss of a million or more soviet soldiers, but it was totally possible. Also it's important to remember that even if the Germans were incapable of totally destroying the Soviet Union, they could still have won a limited victory.

Sure, just get Franco to agree to let you traverse overland. Hitler actually attempted this, but Franco said no. Regardless, the Germans didn't even need to take Gibraltar to close off the Med. They could have easily taken Suez, and then established total air superiority with clean supply lines to northern africa, effectively sealing it off anyway.


Planned for a long conflict instead of a 6 month one including necessary winter gear, done better planning to improve the logistics network, consolidated gains in Africa before invading and then doing so with help from the Italians, and so on.

Their last offensive of the year started in early October. The Bryansk-Vyazma pocket resulted in the capture or killing or a further million soviet men, but shortly after the rasputitsa came and miraculously saved Stalin from having to evacuate Moscow. Had the Germans stopped THEN, instead of pushing on into the winter months when many generals were begging Hitler to stop, they wouldn't have had the absolute disaster that happened in Dec. 1941.

Why did Manstein suggest it then?

[quote]Yes

Up to that point the Russians were dangerously short of manpower, so much so they were recruiting women and the 15 year old cohort for fresh troops. This is found in the Soviet archives. It was not as far a run thing as you seem to imply. A couple more decisive victories and Stalin would be chomping for an armistice.

Release of the baltics, finland and bessarabia/buchovina and total control of poland at minimum, perhaps some land in ukraine and belarus.

There's some evidence that Hitler offered peace to england during the 3 day delay at Dunkirk. Manpower isn't the only thing, these were already experienced troops and officers that would require months and years and many battles to replace. It would have put England in an even more precarious position than they were in, which is slightly irrelevant because the Wehrmacht couldn't mount a major invasion anyway (something they knew, which is why they settled for a small one in their plans).

Mason hopefully this answers your question

According to Zapantis:

The levels in the rivers then decreased slowly. It'd be nice to find out why they chose June 22, instead of earlier June. Most likely more Hitlerian superpreparation/paranoia similar to Kursk.

Germany should have followed the Roman model of conscripting captured enemies and the Jews into their army and let them do most of the front-line fighting.

They could have sent them to the Russian front instead of Auschwitz. Perhaps it would have been dangerous though to give their internal enemies guns which is something the Romans did not have to face.

And Hitler, et. al. were too consumed with Aryan superiority to even consider other "bloods" to aid their efforts. The Romans were much more capitalistic.

Roman Empire lasted 1,500 years. The German Empire lasted 6 years. The Germans wanted world domination too quickly. If they truly had a 1,000 year strategy, they would have acted much differently.

The Waffen-SS recruited over 350,000 foreign volunteers from 20 countries to fight in various theatres of war.

The Nazis viewed the Jews as the primary enemy.
In their world view the Jews were the driving force behind communism and were intent on world domination and the destruction of Germany.

The idea that they would/could have recruited Jews is tragically laughable.

That's pretty much what defined them as Nazis.

They should have been able to conscript 20 million people.

Not that they could have recruited Jews. They should have forced them to fight and/or build resources for the war effort. And if they wanted them dead, it may have been more effective shepherding them to Russia than to concentration/death camps.

They should not have allowed the Jewish scientists to emigrate. Instead they should have captured and incentivized them to help build rockets and the atomic bomb.

Yes, the Aryan superiority theology was much too strong to allow any Jews to help them win the war. The Nazis came to power preaching to the populace that all Jews were enemies of the state.

You are right that the Italians invaded Greece (without telling Germany), that the Italians immediately got into trouble, and that the German intervened in Greece as a result.

It is less clear that the motivation for the German intervention was to rescue the Italians. Rather it seems that the Germans did not want an active war front on their southern flank as they prepared to go to war with the Soviet Union. They were particularly concerned about the British using Greek territory for airbases. Greece had been strictly neutral until Italy invaded Greece from Albania in late October 1940. The Italians were immediately stopped by the Greek army, which then launched their own offensive into Albania. So Greece changed from a Neutral, whose territory could not be used against the Axis, to a de facto member of the Allies. By the time Germany started planning, in November, for their own invasion of Greece, Britain had based the equivalent of four squadrons of aircraft in Greece, These included medium bombers, light bombers, fighters and night fighters. These aircraft were used to support the Greek counter-offensive against the Italians. The Germans were worried that the British could also use them against German forces and possessions. Royal Air Force strength stationed in Greece at the start of the German invasion had risen to about 8 squadrons.

The Germans were also worried that the British would send ground forces to Greece, and thus open a second front against Germany. While this had not yet occurred when Hitler gave the go-ahead in December, British forces did indeed begin arriving in Greece before the German attack got underway.

You are wrong that the German intervention in Greece actually delayed Barbarossa, although several people have claimed it did after the fact, including Adolf Hitler. That's what I went over in my previous post.

I was aware of this quote but deliberately chose not to use it because the work in which it appears is unreliable as a source. Guderian was known to massage what he wrote after the war in order to please his Western Allied captors, especially B. H. Liddell Hart, who not so coincidentally wrote the forward to the English language edition.

However, there are numerous reliable contemporary sources that well document the extreme spring weather of 1941 in eastern Europe, and its effects on rivers and ground.

Source? I find this extremely unlikely. In 1941, the USSR produced about 125 million metric tonnes of black coal. If they consumed 500Mmt, they would have had to import an amount of coal greater than the entire output of the US, the world's largest producer, and would have had the world's largest consumption of coal. Even in 1942, when production fell to about 50Mmt, it's lowest level in the war, the US and British Empire together could not have shipped 150Mmt of coal to the Soviet Union, given their own production and consumption figures. [sources: Harrison, Mark., Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment and the Defense Burden, 1940-1945, 1996; Statistical Abstract of the United States]

Results in Africa were irrelevant to the conduct of the war in the eastern front. Lend-lease shipments to the USSR in 1941/42 were too small for even their total loss be decisive.

How were the Germans going to kill/capture yet another million Red Army soldiers, especially if you cancel the German's final 1941 offensive?

Yeah, right. Under what realistic circumstances can the Germans achieve a limited victory? Stalin can't afford to give the one. Annihilation of one side or the other is pretty much inevitable.

LOL! Franco had very good reasons to say "No". There is no realistic possibility of him agreeing.

First they would have had to take Malta, which their own planners thought was not possible at an acceptable cost.

Failing to take Gibralter means their is nothing stopping the RN from operating in the western Med. You need to take Alexandria, interdict the Suez Canal and take Malta to eventually stop the RN from operating in the eastern Med. For the short term the RN could base out of Haifa.

You didn't read what has been written here about that, did you? Even with Malta taken, and nearly all the supplies sent from Italy actually arriving in Tripoli, the Germans could not supply enough forces to defeat the number of forces the British could keep supplied in Egypt. This has been studied to death by war colleges.

The Med was already effectively sealed off as a transport route between Britain and Persia/India/Australia.

<sigh> This requires at least an 11 month postponement of Barbarossa. In those 11 months, the Soviets would have been ramping up faster than the Germans, meaning as much progress as the Germans made historically in 1941 would have been unlikely in 1942. So what you really want to say is that in order to win, Germany would have needed to put their economy on a total war footing in 1938, instead of waiting til 1943 like they really did. That was almost certainly politically impossible. Such flights of fancy are beyond the scope of this thread (go back and read my OP).

The Germans lost more men and equipment before December than they did in December. The real loss was two offensive phases earlier.

Because it would have been the right thing to do, if it could have been done.

There is? Please provide it.

And what 3 day delay are we talking about? Read the German war diary. There was no pause in fighting.

If the Germans couldn't mount an invasion, then the Brits were not in a precarious position.

It seems that Germany was trying to do too many things. All these multiple campaigns occurring while at the same time trying to deal with the "Jewish Problem" had them greatly over-extended.

But being methodical would be dangerous too since it would allow the United States to build up slower.

Hi Everyone:

I just saw the movie Dunkirk (which I highly recommend) and of course the obvious question related to this thread is how would the result of WWII be impacted if the German tanks hadn't stopped and the complete British Expeditionary Force been destroyed or captured on the Dunkirk Beach?

Best wishes,
Mason

They already were doing this. Visited the Mercedes-Benz Museum in Stuttgart recently and even they admitted that by the end of the war, half their workforce was forced labor.

I already addressed that in a longer post earlier in this thread. I'll quote the relevant parts again.

So, I assume that the Manhattan project, costing way more than any other country could have afforded, and being the only scientists even close to achieving a working bomb, has already been discussed.

What was the tinfoil theory that we would not have made it first, by years, and used it against Germany as well as Japan?

As for conventional warfare, we had Patton.

And MacArthur, Nimitz, Eisenhower, Sherman, Bradley, etc.....


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Germany spent more developing the V2 programme than the US spent on the Manhatten project.

Well we spent it all, plus extra, was the German GDP more than ours?

We had all the silver in Fort Knox shipped to Oak Ridge Tennessee, to make the refiners more efficient.

What Hitler wasted on his pet projects does not compare.

All in to win, no way we lose and no way we allow Hitler to hold onto Europe either.




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Sorry but this is a little incoherent so I'm not sure what you're getting at. Are you saying Germany didn't spend more on the V2 programme than the US spent on the Manhatten project? If so, what figures do you have?

Ah, yes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forced...g_World_War_II

Might be as high as 15 million people. And it seems, as expected, the working conditions were horrible and many people died. I am sure the Nazis didn't care either way really.

I guess what I am saying is that currency during WWII has to have some perspective.

It is hard to put the German currency into perspective since Germany lost the war.

If Germany loses, it knows it does not have to pay back anything. Its like National bankruptcy. The US knows it will have to pay back the war bonds either way.

Or, since the silver that backed the US dollar was worth more as literal silver in Oak Ridge than as currency, that needs perspective also.

Quite possibly, all the potatoes Hitler wasted on V2 fuel was worth more to a hungry army than all the silver in Fort Knox.


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