So, regardless of derail, can anyone dispute that the Manhattan Project guaranteed an eventual win by the US, and defeat for Germany and Japan?

The key was the weapons grade production of Plutonium, which is harder to make into a bomb but way easier to produce, once you have the right nuclear reactor.


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No, just no. The point is that this was expenditure at the time that outstripped the Manhatten project. What happened to the economy post war is irrelevant.

As for this, an allied victory was guaranteed, especially in the West, whether or not the US developed nuclear weapons. Mainly due to the work done by the Russians.

Hi DoTheMath:

First, thanks for your answer, but let me rephrase the question. If the whole BEF is gone and Germany quickly sends an invasion force to England, which I'm not sure they would have been capable of, would they have been able to quickly knock England out of the war (despite the English Airforce)?

Best wishes,
Mason

The answer to the bolded hypothetical question depends on which facts one assumes away.

If we assume that shortly after Dunkirk the Germans can transport to England without significant losses on the way over an initial wave of roughly 3 infantry divisions, a panzer division and an airborne division, and follow up the next day with another two panzer divisions and one or two infantry divisions, I think there is a good chance they could sustain a beachhead. If they could then maintain supplies and reinforcements moving across the Channel indefinitely, I think they could win the land battle in England.

However, this assumption assumes away

1. the RAF,
2. the RN,
3. the lack of available transport for the German forces,
4. the lack of assembled supplies,
5. the lack of amphibious landing training for the troops involved,
6. the lack of a plan, and
7. the fact that most of the French Army was still fighting the Germans.

We can take care of the last four of these by delaying the invasion to perhaps September or October. Problem 3 probably cannot be solved for the better part of a year and that would mean delaying Barbarossa for a year. And problems 1 and 2 were never solved, even though the Germans tried to address the first of these for a few months.

A successful invasion of England requires the establishment and prolonged maintenance of local air and naval superiority. If the Germans achieved the former there is a chance they could achieve the latter. Without local naval superiority, the invasion forces will take severe losses on the way over, and their supply would be unreliable. Any invasion forces that landed would probably be cordoned off and starved out. The Battle of Britain was the attempt to win local air superiority. It failed, and there is little indication the Germans could have done anything different to win the battle short of significant economic dislocation years in advance that would have included the development of heavy bombers and a significant expansion of trained fighter strength.

Hi Everyone:

I just watched the latest "Nazi Megaweapons" show on PBS and this one was about the jet fighter that the Germans developed. It was far superior than anything else around but came too little too late for it to have any real effect on the war.

But what I didn't know was that the Germans were well on their way to developing a jet engine in 1939, but because of the success of the Luftwaffe it was deemed not necessary and development was slowed down. However, in 1943 with the war now going badly this changed and a massive effort to produce this plane had begun.

So this leads to an obvious question. If development was not slowed in 1939 and this jet was ready to go in let's say 1942 and a lot of them could have been built, could it have changed the outcome of the war.

Best wishes,
Mason

Mason

I believe that it would have an effect on the allied bombing campaign but I'm not sure how much of a difference it would have had on the battlefield, especially on the Eastern front where much of the heavy work was done. I also think if Germany had jet fighters early in the war it would've encouraged the allies to speed up their own work in this area. Frank Whittle had developed a jet engine in the late 30's and Britain had a jet fighter in 1941 but, like the ME262, it never entered service until 1944.

The number might not be exact but the point is the German economy was larger at a certain point in 1941 than the Soviet Union, so to think that had a couple of things gone differently or the Germans had been better prepared that the outcome couldn't have been different is silly.

False. If Italy and southern France are protected from invasion, then the Germans have more resources and flexibility for their campaign in Russia. This is just common sense.

I'm not talking about cancelling the offensive, I'm talking about stopping before the winter sets in. It was partially luck; the winter of 1941 was one of the harshest and coldest of the 20th century.

Peace feelers from both sides when out throughout the war. Stalin sent peace feelers out in Oct. 1941 for example, and Zhukov overheard him talking about it as well. Some feelers apparently went out from Germany in 1943 as well.

Hitler just conquered France and threw Britain off the continent. If he really wanted to drive his tanks to Gibraltar, he had that option.

If you cut off the Mediterranean, Malta becomes irrelevant. Britain has to supply Malta too you know.

Nonsense. This was Raeders suggestion for a reason.

1 more full panzer division, some planes, and some commitment to supply and reinforcement in late 41 would have been more than enough.

It's well known that Hitler was not concerned with Africa and the only reason he sent troops there at all was to save face for Mussolini.

This isn't the relevant point. After the fall of Africa, the British had carte blanche in southern Europe.

No. It does however necessitate not disbanding panzer divisions in fall 1941 because you think you've won the war, equipping your troops with winter clothing, planning for logistics across thousands of miles on a different rail gauge, rationing resources for your population, and speeding up production of proper anti-tank weapons and heavier tanks when you find out about what the Russians have. It also probably would have been a good idea to not declare war on the United States simply to show solidarity with Japan.

This is a myth. German industrial capacity was pretty much full out in 1941. The Wage of Destruction is a good book on this topic.


They lost more men and equipment in the prior 5 months than in December? You don't say. December was their worst month of 1941.

It could have been done which is why he suggested it. He advocated limited engagements instead of grand offensives (which is also the correct strategic option when you are outnumbered, outgunned, and outresourced). Since in general the Soviets suffered far more total losses than the Germans in almost all their engagements until very late in the war, this would have meant actually conserving fuel, manpower, and weaponry and slowly bleeding the bear to death rather than trying to kill it with one, underpowered blow. Hitler was addicted to undermanned sweeping offensives with decisive implications (ala Frederick the Great: he hung a portrait of him in the Fuhrerbunker and other offices) because of the successes of 1939-1941 and continued to be obsessed with them until the very end of the war. After the disaster of 1941, the Germans badly needed to alter their strategy and going after the Soviet oil resources was probably the only move. After the failure of Case Blau, the needed to adapt again and did not, which guaranteed a total loss.

On May 23 the Germans were closer to Dunkirk than the BEF! There was a halt order for some panzer divisions. This is partly because of the British-French counterattack at Arras, partly because of the need for the panzers to not be totally overextended, partially because of paranoia over the changes to the initial invasion plan, and partly because of political reasons.

This is facile. Would the German position be better or worse after having captured 340000 experienced British and French troops? Would Stalin be more or less confident about carrying on the conflict with Germany if there was absolutely no realistic chance of a second Front being opened? Would the campaign in Africa and other smaller theatres have gone better or worse for the Allies?

The number wasn't merely inexact. It was grossly and misleadingly wrong. You can't do good historical interpretation from falsehoods. Nearly every point you have made lacks any actual historical backup. You just make wild claims without any foundation. I'm losing patience with this and will now only make limited replies, mostly to demonstrate some of your more egregious errors.

The German economy may have been larger (and in 1940 the German economy was actually smaller than that of the Soviet Union exclusive of, in both cases, occupied territories), but the Soviet Union produced more war goods than did Germany. The Soviet Union produced more military aircraft, more tanks, many times more artiillery pieces, and more non-AA ammunition that did Germany. There is a difference between size of economy and size of war economy.

You need to think about how Germany could have realistically used a similar part of its economic capacity for war production.

Please list the German formations guarding Italy or the Italian frontier in 1941. Now provide an estimate of the forces necessary to occupy Iberia and Egypt, assuming their successful capture.

You're going to need to explain the difference between cancelling the December offensive and stopping it.

Yes, he did have the option. And the plans were developed. And the result would have been tying down more troops occupying the Iberian Peninsula than would have been saved in the Med, while losing a corps of Spanish volunteers that fought on the eastern front.

This is nonsense. In late 1941, Germany had 2 panzer divisiosn in North Africa. You are suggesting that with three panzer divisions (and some planes and supplies), they could have taken all of North Africa. I don't know where you get that silly idea. Let's look at what the professional army officers thought.

In the fall of 1940, Hitler sent Generalmajor Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma, General of Mobile Troops in the Army High Command, to observe the situation after Marshal Graziani's advance into Egypt had come to a self-imposed halt after a 100km advance with no serious opposition. It was von Thoma's appreciation that 4 panzer divisions would be required to defeat the British Western Desert Force, and would only succeed given the situation then existing:

• The front line is 100km into Egypt.
• The supply dumps established in Egypt and Cyrenaica are intact.
• The Italian truck fleet is intact.
• The British forces are limited to one armoured division and one infantry division in the front lines with two more infantry divisions in reserve.

Furthermore, four panzer divisions could only be kept supplied if all Italian forces other than their logistics units were withdrawn from Egypt and Cyrenaica.

When Rommel arrived in North Africa in early 1941, none of those conditions still held. O'Conner had driven the Italians not only out of Egypt but also out of Cyrenaica. The Axis supply dumps had been captured or destroyed. The Italian truck fleet had been captured or destroyed. GOC Commanding Middle East had access to the equivalent of 6 more divisions which could, in the event of a German offensive, be deployed to North Africa.

So the Gerrman Army's top staff officer for armoured operations said four panzer divisions were required. You say three. Whom should we believe?

Furthermore, 4 panzer divisions was the maximum force that could be supplied given the infrastructure in North Africa, and would only be supplied given a list of conditions the Germans never enjoyed, and never could enjoy. Yet four panzer divisions was the minimum force necessary to defeat a British force as weak as it was in late 1940. After Rommel's initial offensive with 1.5 panzer divisions, the British force was never that weak again.

Von Thoma's supply calculations were repeatedly proven correct at the culmination of each of Rommel's offensives into Egypt.

LOL. It is not well known that the only reason he sent troops there was to save face for Mussolini. Hitler had been offering to send two panzer divisions to Africa for months, but the Italians wouldn't agree until after their disaster in early 1941. So Hitler was offering forces before there was any need to save face. Then when Italy invaded Greece without telling Germany in advance, Hitler was furious, and redesignated the panzer divisions slated for North Africa to other tasks. When Italy got in trouble in North Africa a couple months after their trouble in Greece, Hitler sent Rommel for similar reasons as to why he intervened in Greece, not to save Mussolini's face, but to protect German strategic interests relative to Britain. Those strategic interests did not include the capture of Eqypt. The German force was designated "Blocking Force Africa," and Rommel's orders did not include taking Egypt.

There are alternatives to total victory or total defeat in North Africa. The German calculation seems to have been that as long as Axis forces occupied both Tripolitania/Tunisia, and Greece, southern Europe was safe from British Invasion. This calculation is borne out by actual events.

Cite? This seems like another of your preposterous claims. The Germans didn't think they had won the war in fall 1941, and I know of no panzer divisions disbanded for such a reason.

These all seem like reasonable actions. You should think some more about why they didn't happen. You should also think about how they would have affected the timetable and how early the leading decisions would have had to be made.

They did. You seem to underestimate the amount of time it takes to bring new weapons into production.

This is unlikely to have made much practical difference.

The German economy was at very close to full capacity in 1941. That is not at all the same thing as being on a full war footing. Most economists place that at late 1943 or early 1944.

If you read the Wages of Destruction more carefully, you may get some idea why the sort of preparations you think the Germans should have done didn't happen.

That's correct
I'm not sure what you're referring to here.
Please provide documentary evidence to support this, rather than baseless speculation.

The capture/destruction of the entire BEF (had such been possible) would have made no material difference to the possibility of opening a second front. It might have affected timing of that second front and would have affected events in subsidiary theatres that were of limited interest to the Germans.

It probably would have saved the British from their disastrous intervention in Greece. It might have delayed the pushing of Rommel out of Africa, but not the offensive against the Italians.

https://books.google.com.br/books?id...q=coal&f=false

All data for 1942, millions of tons.

------------------ USSR ------- Germany (includes production in occupied territories)
coal supply ----- 48.9 -------- 338.2
coke supply ---- 6.9 ---------- 64.8
brown coal ----- 26.6 -------- 248.9 (Reich only)
steel ingot ----- 8.0 ---------- 31.9
pig iron --------- 4.8 ---------- 24.9
aluminium ------ 52 ---------- 350

You're conflating two totally different economic systems and methodologies of warmaking with each other. The Soviet Union was not concerned with making high quality weapons. They were concerned with making weapons that worked for slightly longer periods than their average battle life. A T-34 entering combat had a lifespan of less than a day (parshall). Engine tolerances were so loose that 2 lbs of metal shavings were found in the oil filters after the first oil change. On the other hand, a Tiger tank took about
100000 man hours to build. There were hundreds of small variations in only about 1500 total tanks produced. A cursory glance at battle losses bears this out.

There were two phases to typhoon. The first encircled the frontier armies guarding the road to Moscow around Briansk (roughly 900000 men). The second happened when this pocket was consolidated and the rasputitsa was over. Hitlers generals wanted to stop before the onset of winter, Hitler demanded they go on.


Rommel had a golden opportunity to take all of Egypt in April-May 1942 but ran out of supplies and was understrength. Had he had a full extra panzer division and committed supplies, he could have easily thrown out the British before they had a chance to fortify their line around El Alamein.



They should have.

The Anglo-Allies invaded Sicily 3 months after they threw the Germans out of Africa

Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, page 853.

"By the beginning of Autumn 1941, Hitler believed that Russia was finished....So planmaessig, as the OKW communiques put it, and so confident was the Nazi dictator that it would continue at an accelerated pace....on July 14, a bare three weeks after the invasion had begun, he issued a directive advising that the strength of the army could be 'considerably reduced in the near future' and that armament production was to be concentrated on naval ships and Luftwaffe places, especially the latter, for the conduct of the war against the last remaining enemy, Britain. By the end of September he instructed High Command to prepare to disband forty infantry divisions so that this additional manpower could be utilized by industry."

You need to think about why they weren't; the hubris and overconfidence that permeated the Wehrmacht had reached fever pitch.

You seem to be unaware that the war was effectively won in most generals (Halder) and Hitlers mind, and they were not planning for a conflict beyond the inevitable fall of Moscow.

Considering the United States still had no reason to go to war with Germany after Pearl Harbor and Roosevelt wanted Germany first, it would have made an enormous difference.

Again, the German industry was preoccupied with making many high quality versions of many different weapons. Most of the efficiency progress they made into 1943 and 1944 had to do with the sheer genius of Albert Speer, rather than any absolute increase in total production ability.


Read a book or two more I guess. It is well sourced that Hitler 1. did not want war with England 2. considered England to be racially equal to German 3. attempted multiple times (pre/post Poland, Post France) to negotiate separate peace with England.

Stalin was sending out peace feelers in Spring 1943 following Mansteins backhand blow precisely because he believed the Second Front was likely not happening in 43 and maybe not in 44 (Zhukov, Bulgarian embassy). How long do you think he would bleed his country white waiting for a second front? Losing 380000 men at Dunkirk would have pushed the invasion of Europe well beyond 1944, making stalemate in the East that much more likely.


All that said, you really act as if you are the expert here and it's up to everyone else to provide sources while providing none yourself and simply discounting every source that is posted if it doesn't agree with your POV. You've been right about a fair number of things in this discussion and your posts are well written but you're also blatantly wrong about some things so please provide sources for your claims as well.

These figures look correct. There is nothing here about imports. The point you made, which I objected to, was that the Soviets were importing 3/4 of their coal. They weren't.

I'm not conflating them. If anybody is, you are when you compare GDP or coal production.

And yet, the Soviet tanks were more reliable in winter, had better cross-country mobility in typical Russian terrain, and were better armoured than their German counterparts. The life expectancy in combat wasn't due soley to build or design quality. I somehow doubt that the citation of the metal shavings was typical over the production run.

Yes, he ran out of supplies. That was the whole problem. That was what von Thoma said would happen. The supply problem wasn't primarily one of not enough being fed into the pipe. It was that the pipe was too narrow and there was no practical way to widen it. German supplies were shipped across the Med to Tripoli. When Rommel was at El Alamein, he was about 2,300 km by road from his supply base. That was about seven times the maximum distance called for in German doctrine. When Rommel was in Egypt more than half the fuel sent to him never arrived at the front - mostly because it was used up transporting supply to the front. There was no transport capacity to supply yet another panzer division. The shipping didn't exist. The trucks didn't exist. The road (singular) didn't have the capacity. There was no rail line and coastal shipping was insignificant. Piling up more fuel on the docks in Italy wasn't going to help.

Think about what being seven times the distance from your supply base than the max called for in doctrine means. It means you need more than 7 times as many trucks to keep your supply rate the same. It is more than seven times because not only do you have to deliver the same supplies to the front, but you have to carry seven times as much fuel for the transport trucks and then even more fuel for the extra fuel trucks.

They didn't because the German planners knew from von Thoma's study that capturing Egypt was now impossible.

Yes, exactly. Until they took Tripolitania and Tunisia, they could not - did not - invade southern Europe.

There is nothing here about any panzer divisions being disbanded, or even planned for disbandment. These were infantry division and they never were actually disbanded. Once again you can't get your facts straight.

The reasons are a lot more complex than you imagine. It was not merely a matter of hubris.

You seem to be unaware that the minds of most generals held a much wider range of views than you give them credit for.

Allow me to suggest these two phrases contradict each other.

You said that the halt order for the panzers at Dunkirk was partly for political reasons. I asked you to provide a citation that tied the halt order to political reasons. Nothing you write here is connected to the halt order. There is nothing documented about there being any political reasons for the issuance of the halt order.

As for Hitler's supposed peace offers, I suggest you learn to tell the difference between self-serving proclamations and sincere attempts to negotiate peace. When I Google Hitler Peace Offers I get a lot of hits on Revisionist neo-Nazi sites.

I'm not an expert, but I have worked with some. You are the one making the preposterous claims and getting statements of fact wrong. I have discounted very few sources. Most of the time I have asked you to cite a source it turns out not to have said what you initially claimed (e.g. coal imports, disbanding panzer divisions, political motivation for the panzer halt order at Dunkirk.. If we review the use of sources in our direct conversation, you find I was the first to offera source and did so without being asked. My citations back up what I claimed.

If I am blatantly wrong about some things, please list the worst five.

Thanks. Good post, and a good follow-up debate.

I do as well, although I suspect by now that many who read this thread will have seen it. It was not done in quite the way I expected, but it was very good.

Really? You need to see a cited list showing that the Russians were importing the vast majority of their coal, when you can see from this that they were producing a very small ratio (roughly 7:1) of germanys production? Are you serious? Of course they were importing the vast majority, how else could their economy compete with germanys?


Fuel freezes when it's cold enough no matter what the design type. The Russians of course had retreating infrastructure which is the reason their tanks appeared suited better for the winter. The germans were also totally unprepared to deal with winter conditions, mostly because Hitler didn't think it was necessary---because he thought the war was won.



Fair enough I misspoke but it doesn't matter. 40 divisions is a significant amount and it PROVES that Hitler thought the war was over.

I didn't say hubris was the only reason.



No they don't. After Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt still needs a reason to declare war on Germany. He would have had popular support to escalate tensions with Germany, but until there was an act of war he was hamstrung. Hitler bailed him out on Dec. 11.

You don't need citations to claim that pretty much every decision Hitler made was for political reasons lol. I'm still looking for direct evidence and there might not be any so I might be wrong.

I suggest you not read intention into everything, either way. The objective fact is that Hitler made peace offers, and he also is well sourced saying those other things about Britain as well. He didn't bomb population centers during the BOB also because of these reasons, and I know there are sources for that.



There really aren't any preposterous claims in my posts and you are largely arguing with the experts. Russian tank production and war effort facts in my posts come from Alexander, Parshall, Glantz, and Citino. African claims come from Rommel and Hitler themselves as well as Raeder and Doenitz. You're arguing with them, not me.

Another thing: the Germans weren't stopped by the British or run out of supply. They had no intention to take Africa at all. Rommels corps was under the command of the Italian head general and he was ordered to defend a line at Sirte. Rommel had to resort to subterfuge in order to carry out offensives at first, against the orders of OKH and Hitler.

When you think about how Rommels force was intended to be defensive, there's not really a question why he couldn't take Egypt. Of course he couldn't. The fact that he did what he did with the amount of supply given for defensive operations is amazing and to imagine what he could have done with more commitment from the top is not difficult.

Had there been actual commitment to take the Suez, it's pretty clear they could have if they really wanted to. Tripoli is not the only base for supply, you also have Benghazi and Tobruk along the way to Alexandria.

This is not strictly true.
The germans weren't prepared for winter conditions because, in the planning, the Generals and Hitler expected a short war that would be over before winter.

You only need to kick in the front door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down - Adolf Hitler

By the time winter clothing was needed, logistical constraints meant that fuel and ammunition had to be prioritised over food and clothing.


The policies of 'Arsenal of Freedom ' and 'Neutrality Patrol' were already pitting the US Navy against the Kriegsmarine.

Sept 4 1941 - USS Greer fired upon by U-652, which resulted in the US Navy and Air Force being authorised to attack any Axis warship in waters deemed 'necessary for the defence of the United States'

Oct 16/17 1941 - USS Kearny and 3 other US destroyers were in action to protect a British convoy off Iceland. In this action, the USS Kearny was torpedoed by U-568 with the loss of 11 lives.

Oct 31 1941 - USS Reuben James was sunk by U-522 while escorting convoy HX-156. 115 of her crew were killed.

In the atmosphere after Pearl Harbour, I believe it would have been possible to use these incidents to convince Congress and Senate to support a declaration of war on Germany.

In fact, these incidents are explicitly referenced in Germany's declaration of war on the US.

Which is exactly what I claimed and that the war would have gone better had the germans planned for a long war dealt with their logistical problems sooner. DoTheMath claims that this was not the case, nor was it possible to do so (which is a bizarre thing to claim). I don't really know why he is so argumentative over obvious facts; perhaps he does not like being challenged here.



You might be right about that, we will never know, but it is definitely true that Hitler did Roosevelts dirty work for him on Dec. 11.



On June 22, 1942, when Rommel was promoted to Field Marshal after the fall of Tobruk, he wrote to his wife:

"I would much rather he had given me one more division."

This proves that even Rommel himself believed it was possible to consolidate his gains in 42 and move further into Egypt had he had the forces required, despite DotheMaths claim that supply was impossible w/r Thoma

I think it's fairly certain that had the Germans landed on the continent of Africa totally prepared for an aggressive war with the goal of capturing the Suez canal in early 1941, they could have done so fairly easily and rapidly. This would have changed the entire strategic situation prior to Barbarossa. With control of the mediterranean, the Italian fleet would have been free to support German/Italian operations into southwestern Africa (Dakar), the middle east, and potentially the Caucasus region from the south. This scenario was one that Doenitz/Raeder themselves thought necessary and sufficient for winning the war vs. the UK and Russia, and is described in detail in the book by Bevin Alexander.

https://www.bevinalexander.com/excer...der-hitler.htm

I'm not interested in assisting you in some point scoring contest with DTM.

I was simply pointing out that the provision of winter clothing wasn't because Hitler believed the war was won - as you stated - but because the war he got with the Soviets wasn't the one he expected and planned for.

Saying it would be different if he planned differently is to ignore the mindset of the Nazi leadership and the reality of life within the Nazi Germany.

--------------

The problem with alternate history is that too many realities have to be ignored or changed for the outcome to be different.

To crudely summarise this thread

1 - Could Nazi Germany have won WW2 ? No
2 - Could Germany have won WW2 ? Yes

However, no2 is predicated on Germany rejecting Adolf Hitler and the Nazis and being led by a more rational government.
But if you change that reality then WW2 possibly doesn't happen.

Nor did I request that.

If you go back and read my posts I say precisely this

I agree but that's what speculation is all about. They broke all the rules of warfare when they didn't plan for a long war with Russia, and that was partially because of their hubris.


Hmmm I disagree with the latter part of this as I believe Nazi Germany was highly rational and highly sophisticated in some ways. It was a totally different time. World War 2 was largely a continuation of the previous colonial world war.

After all, Hitler was the main reason why the Germans went from Versailles to master of Europe in 7 years, even militarily. A lot of luck had to do with the win vs. France, but it was Hitlers decision to use the Manstein Plan, which won them the war. It was also Hitlers decision to 'hold fast' to their positions in Russia during the winter counterattack, which undoubtedly prevented (luck again) a total collapse in December 1941. He made a ton of mistakes, but he also made a ton of brilliant political moves that were crucial to their early success.

Looking at the figures for 1940 and 1941 might give you some perspective.

You are drawing incorrect conclusions from correct data because you are making unfounded assumptions. Yes I need either a cited list for imports or cited lists for consumption and stockpiles to draw a valid conclusion from a production list that imports were as large as you claimed. I don't just assume imports or consumption figures. What you are doing is looking at the production numbers and assuming that because the Russians seemed competitive they must have been consuming a similar amount of coal and importing a fair amount of the difference in production to be competitive. That's not what happened. What happened is that the Germans had a much higher standard of living and far less resource-efficient production of war goods. The Germans produced vastly more consumer goods than the Russians, so the Russians didn't need nearly as high raw materials production in order to be competitive. You cited how much labour it took to build a Tiger. That's on the order of ten times the labour it took to produce a KV1. It also took more raw materials. Russian tanks were smaller. They did things like assign tank crews from the shortest men available. Not only was a smaller tank a harder target to hit, if also saved on materials needed to build it. Russian tanks were simpler As the war went on the Russians simplified production even more, drastically reducing the production costs, labour and material inputs. The Russians didn't have to import coal to compete with the Germans. They just used their much smaller resources more effectively. If you follow Parshall on tank production more carefully, you'll understand how.

Actually different fuels freeze at different temperatures. More importantly, different lubricating oils freeze at different temperatures. The Russians equipped their tanks with lubricating oils of the correct viscosity for the weather. In 1941, the Germans didn't. The same applies to anti-freeze. Cold weather reduces the power of batteries used to start engines. The Russians equipped their tanks with compressed air starters so they didn't rely on battery power to get the engine turning over. And, most importantly, remember those loose tolerances you were complaining about in Russian tanks? Tighter tolerances mean that the engine parts are more likely to seize up in excessively cold weather.

First of all the order was to prepare for disbanding those divisions, not to disband them. It means Hitler thought he was going to win the Russian campaign, not that he had already won the war. Furthermore he ordered preparations for a shift in military production to aircraft and u-boats. This means he didn't think the war was over but that he would return to focus on Britain. He didn't need vast hordes of infantry to conquer a small island. Notice he didn't order the preparation of disbandment of panzer units.

Hitler didn't make this decision. The panzer halt order wasn't conceived, drafted or issued by Hitler. Nor was its issuance delayed to obtain Hitler's approval.

No, in fact, I am arguing in common with the experts against conclusions drawn by you and other non-experts. It seems you don't have enough knowledge to even recognize a preposterous claim.

Alexander? I thought some of your claptrap sounded familiar. If the "Alexander" you refer to is Bevin Alexander, then that explains why your ideas are so preposterous. You need to re-assess who constitutes an expert. The man is not an expert and not even a good historian. I suggest you read through the thread in this forum titled "Hitler's mistakes", and look for the conversation between myself and Oski about the North African campaign, starting with this post by Oski. It will save me considerable re-typing. That fact that you would even cite Alexander as an expert, and the fact that you place him first in a list that isn't in alphabetical order with those other names, shows how little you know about the valid practice of history.

I was not familiar with the work of any Parshall on the subject, so I looked him up. Jonathan Parshall does not appear to be a qualified historian. His training was in business administration and his career has been as a business administrator. That doesn't seem to have stopped him from writing and presenting on historical topics, though much of his his meagre output is on the Pacific naval actions. His claim to authority on armoured warfare matters seems limited to his business training, which may make him qualified to discuss tank production systems, but not the operational employment of tanks. You may find his presentation starting at minute 26 of the video on this page interesting. I don't think I have taken any positions in contradiction of what Parshall says about tank production.

I don't think anything I have said is at odds with these gentlemen.

Ah yes, Raeder and Doenitz those renowned experts on armoured warfare and land force logistics. And it seems to me that you were arguing that Hitler knew less about tank strategy than his tank generals. Which leaves Rommel - the man who ran out of supply four (or was that five?) times. Yes, these are definitely experts on the subject of logistic capabilities in North Africa. </sarcasm>

Against these vaunted experts all I've got is somebody you may never have heard of - the Knight of Thoma. Who was he? He was the General Staff's designated expert on armoured warfare. Unlike the other "experts" you listed, he actually was a subject matter expert, and again unlike the others, he actually undertook a formal study of force requirements and logistics limitations of the North African situation.

The North African campaign is a classic case in the study of logistics, because it is so straightforward. It has been taught in war colleges around the world for the past seventy years. Nobody of any consequence has found fault with von Thoma's overall conclusions.

I have personally had the opportunity to discuss the matter with the senior logistics staff officer of my local territorial formation (a brigade group position). Same conclusion.

So, on my side of the argument, I have the appointed expert who actually studied the case, war colleges around the world, and trained professional logistics officers. You have Bevin Alexander <scoff> - a retired non-academic college administrator, not a real historian - and his misinterpretations of several Germans who were not experts in the particular field. Yet you say I'm the one arguing against the experts?!?

Not all port facilities are created equal and not all sea routes are equally safe,. The Germans and Italians used, or attempted to use, Benghazi and Tobruk to bring in supply by sea, and cut the road distance by 45%. If you consult the figures for goods actually unloaded at each port, you'll see they were a drop in the bucket compared to Tripoli.

The preposterous claim here is that the Soviets massively outproduced the Germans in war material, while being 7-1 deficient in most natural resources, without importing natural resources.

No argument here. Remember our conversation about how the Germans didn't prepare for a long or winter war and some of the general staff incl. Hitler believed the war would be/was over in Autumn 1941, and how you disagreed with me?

Not specifically here no. The point is, which you argued as impossible, that the Germans would have fared better in their Russian campaign and been more likely to win had they been better prepared/prepared for a long campaign.


Let's get this thoroughly straight. Are you still arguing that had the Germans not been full of hubris, and been better prepared for a long campaign vs. the Soviets, that they had absolutely no chance of winning the war? They did have a chance, and the Soviet Union was for moments on its knees in 1941, and most actual historians agree had the Germans just done a couple things differently, they had a good chance at winning outright. Later in the war, they still had a chance at a limited victory.

Instead of personally insulting me, who is not a historian, maybe you would care to actually dismantle his arguments instead of posting your usual claptrap.



Didn't address a single point I brought up about the Afrika Korps, not surprisingly. You should take a deep breath, I know you're more capable than this response shows.

Was this study by him done before or after he was sent to Africa in September 1942?

Considering the KV was nowhere near comparable to a Tiger, this is not surprising. The comparison is silly.

Lol. Russian tanks often had a lower profile, but most of them were bigger and heavier than their german counterparts. They certainly weren't, in general, smaller.

Compare:

Light:

German Pz2:
Weight 8.9 t (8.8 long tons)
Length 4.81 m (15 ft 9 in)
Width 2.22 m (7 ft 3 in)
Height 1.99 m (6 ft 6 in)
Crew 3 (commander/gunner, driver, loader)

Soviet BT7: Weight 13.9 tonnes (13.7 long tons; 15.3 short tons)
Length 5.66 m (18 ft 7 in)
Width 2.29 m (7 ft 6 in)
Height 2.42 m (7 ft 11 in)
Crew 3 (commander, loader, driver)

Medium:

German Pz3: Weight 23.0 tonnes (25.4 short tons)
Length 5.56 m (18 ft 3 in)
Width 2.90 m (9 ft 6 in)
Height 2.5 m (8 ft 2 in)
Crew 5 (commander, gunner, loader, driver, radio operator/bow machine-gunner)

Soviet T34
Weight 26.5 tonnes (29.2 short tons; 26.1 long tons)
Length 6.68 m (21 ft 11 in)
Width 3.00 m (9 ft 10 in)
Height 2.45 m (8 ft 0 in)
Crew 4 (T-34)
5 (T-34-85)

Heavy:

German Panther:
Weight 44.8 tonnes (44.1 long tons; 49.4 short tons)[2]
Length 6.87 m (22 ft 6 in)
8.66 metres (28 ft 5 in) gun forward[2]
Width 3.27 m (10 ft 9 in)[2]
3.42 m (11 ft 3 in) with skirts
Height 2.99 m (9 ft 10 in)
Crew 5 (driver, radio-operator/hull machine gunner, commander, gunner, loader)

Soviet IS1
Weight 46 tonnes (51 short tons; 45 long tons)
Length 9.90 m (32 ft 6 in)
Width 3.09 m (10 ft 2 in)
Height 2.73 m (8 ft 11 in)
Crew 4



This I can all agree with. Material inputs, however, are largely fixed.

It depends what you mean by resources. The Soviets lost on order of about 100 000 tanks throughout the war.

Soviet tank losses [12] Received Total stock Losses % of Total
stock loss
Tanks 86,100 108,700 83,500 76.8
Heavy 10,000 10,500 5,200 49.5
Medium 55,000 55,900 44,900 80.3
Light 21,100 42,300 33,400 79.1
SP Guns 23,100 23,100 13,000 56.3
Heavy 5,000 5,000 2,300 46.0
Medium 4,000 4,000 2.100 52.5

Comparative figures [13] 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Soviet Tank strength(¹)22,600 7,700 20,600 21,100 25,400
German Tank strength(¹)5,262 4,896 5,648 5,266 6,284
Soviet Tank Production 6,274 24,639 19,959 16,975 4,384
German Tank Production 3,256 4,278 5,966 9,161 1,098
Production Ratio 1:2 1:5.6 1:3.3 1:1.85 1:4
Soviet Tank losses 20,500 15,000 22,400 16,900 8,700
German Tank losses 2,758 2,648 6,362 6,434 7,382
Tank exchange ratio(²)
(German:Soviet) 1:7 1:6 1:4 1:4 1:1.2

We see from these tables that the Soviets lost 4.4 tanks for every 1 the germans lost over the course of the war. In 1941-43 however, they lose tanks at a ratio of almost 6-1! They lose 57000 tanks in three years! (granted a good portion of the ones lost in 41 were old ****ty models). Of the 5 years from 41-42, the Soviets produced more tanks than they lost in only two years, and in 44 it was only by 75. At the end of the war, they had lost some 11000 more tanks than they produced since the beginning of it!!!!

Of course as the war went on and the Soviet Union recaptured their coal producing regions and some of Germanys, they had less of a deficit in coal that they did in 41-42-43

The relevant point though, is not whether or not the Soviets imported coal. It's really difficult to find documentary evidence on this subject, but it's not unreasonable to assume that a. they did and b. they couldn't have continued the war for very long without doing so with as much of their country in german hands in 1942. Maybe they just squeaked by without importing, it's possible. But they couldn't have carried on the war for long the way they were in late 41-late 42, which was the entire point I was trying to make.

You seem to believe that the Germans had absolutely no chance of defeating the Soviet Union. All you need to do is look at the Soviet losses in 1941, 42, and 43 to see that no country could take that kind of pounding forever. Their system was bound to break down eventually if losses continued the way they did. The Germans could have done a couple things differently and the war goes on for far longer than it did. They undo a a half a dozen critical mistakes and the war goes completely the other way, or ends in an armistice.

Parshall directly addresses this in the video I provided a link to. I didn't say they didn't import resources. I said they didn't import resources on the scale you claimed. Any importation of coal would have been one or two decimal orders of magnitude smaller than your claim.

I didn't disagree about them not having prepared for a long or winter war. I disagreed with your handwaving their way out of the problem by just planning better. Proper planning would have identified a requirement for a much earlier ramp-up in military production, which would have required an earlier move to centralized economic control. And, of course, for proper planning to have occurred would have required identification of the need for proper planning, or the recognition of how the planning they did perform was not proper.

I never argued that the Germans couldn't have fared better if they had been better prepared. I argued that it would have been difficult for them to be significantly better prepared. This goes to the economic adjustments that better preparedness would have required, and their ability to recognize the need for better preparations.

I never argued this, so I can't be still arguing it. Expat seemed to understand what I was saying. Why don't you?

I don't know why you would think this.

I already dismantled his arguments, and provided a link to that dismantling.

You didn't read the conversation with Oski that I linked to, did you? I think it shows you what I am capable of and I think it adequately addresses what you raised about Afrika Korps.

He was sent to Africa in Oct/Nov 1940 to do the study, while he was staff general of mobile troops. Sometime after this but before Barabarossa, he was moved from the staff to command of a panzer division.

And you called my comparison silly!.

The Panther is a medium tank and the IS series are super-heavy tanks, so your comparison there is off by two classes. The BT-7 is armed with a real tank gun (45mm L/46), while the PzKw II has a 2cm quick firing cannon. The Pz III was too small to mount a gun bigger than 50mm. None of your comparisons makes sense.

The apt comparisons are
IS series to Tiger II
KV series to Tiger
T34/85 to Panther
T34 to Pzkw IV Ausf G-J

I'm not sure there were reasonable comparisons for the Pz I, Pz II, Pz III or BT-7, Perhaps the Pz III Ausf A-C is reasonably comparable with the T-26.

I mean raw materials and labour.

From the OP, with bolding added to help you get the point:

Where do you get these strange ideas? It honestly sounds like you get this stuff from a video game. Any classification scheme are based on the weight/size/gun caliber. The Panther and the IS-1 are almost exactly the same size and weight. This is probably because the IS was specifically designed to compete against Panthers and Tigers!

This is all total nonsense. We're not talking about gun caliber here. You said Russian tanks were smaller. They weren't. The Panzer IIIN had a 75mm gun, so you're wrong about that too.



I'm not even going to respond. All of these comparisons are pulled out of your ass to try and be right when you've been proven wrong. It's clear you don't know much about tanks.







The longer I talk with you the more I don't think you have the ability to find a position contrary to your own that you would consider reasonable. You quite literally make things up as you go to get out of being wrong lol. I'm done with this discussion.

The ideas are not strange. They are reflective of the consensus in the field of study. I get them from too many places to list, but for example, on the Panther being a medium tank:

• the Wikipedia article on the Panther begins with this phrase:
  Quote:

  The Panther was a German medium tank deployed during World War II
• The description of the Panther at The Tank Museum's (UK) website opens with this sentence:
  Quote:

  The Panzerkampfwagen V or Panther was the best German tank of World War II and possibly the best medium tank fielded by any of the combatants in World War II.
• The description of the Panther at the (US) Armed Forces History Museum begins:
  Quote:

  The Panther was a medium German tank that went into service the middle of 1943.
• The Panther is listed as a medium tank, among other places, at
  
  • The WW 2 Database (ww2db.com)
  • militaryfactory.com
  • thoughtco.com
  • the revolvy.com List of armoured fighting vehicles of World War II
  • the wikipedia category "World War II medium tanks"‎
  • https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...Medium_tanks_2

I don't recall ever seeing the Panther classified as a heavy tank (as opposed to being described as heavy) by a reputable source. If you can provide some instances, I'd be most grateful.

Perhaps most persuasive regarding the Pz III being light, the Pz IV and Pz V being medium and the Pz VI being heavy is the fact that the German forces organized tanks into light, medium and heavy companies. PZKw VI tanks were always assigned to heavy tank companies. These were usually grouped in independent heavy tank battalions, but for a while, (some?) SS panzer divisions included a single heavy tank company in their panzer regiment. Panzer V tanks were always assigned to medium tank companies, as were Pz IV tanks. The Panzer V was intended to replace the Pz IV as the MBT in the German forces, but production was never high enough to allow it to replace more than about half of the Pz IV spots in the organizational charts. In the idealized 1939 and 1940 unit organizations (never achieved due to shortages of Pz III tanks) the Pz III tanks were assigned to light tank companies. Sources: too many to list, but for example,

• Military History Visualized's video on panzer division organization
• http://www.achtungpanzer.com/divis.htm
• http://www.wwiivehicles.com/germany/organization.asp
• http://www.wwiidaybyday.com/kstn/kstn11771nov43.htm
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German...tank_battalion

Please note that some sources refer to the medium companies in early organizations as "mixed" instead of "medium", which seems strange, because the light companies were in fact as mixed as the medium companies, and also note that the medium companies of 1944 tank battalions are sometimes referred to by the name of the MBT Type (Pz IV or Panther) assigned to the battalion. The Pz III is often classified as a medium tank because of its role as an MBT and because Germany had two lighter tanks (well, really a tankette and a light tank) that were used at the same time as the Pz III, but the German organizational charts put them in the light category.

There you go, making incorrect, unfounded assumptions again.

All of which tended to increase over time within a given class. So the weight of a tank classified as a heavy tank early in the war might be less than the weight of a medium tank late in the war.

You've left out other factors that affect the classification of tanks. Not only gun calibre but gun type. A tank with a short, low velocity large calibre howitzer is not generally in the same class as a tank with a long high-velocity gun of the same calibre. This relates to intended role as another factor affecting classification.

That you mention this just shows that your apparent assumption that weight alone is sufficient to classify a tank is incorrect. The Panther is widely categorized as a medium tank and the IS-1 as a heavy (or by some a super-heavy) tank. These classifications are driven by intended role as much as by actual weight.

Well, by that token a Panther would be classified as a medium because it was specifically intended to compete against the T-34. The IS's size and weight were primarily driven by the Soviet's decision to standardize on three existing chassis: T70, T34 and KV, being respectively, light, medium and heavy.

That depends on which tanks you compare to which. When you compare by consensus classification, the T70 was lighter than the contemporary versions of Pz II, the T-24 was lighter than the Pz III, the T34 was much lighter than the Panther and only slightly heavier than the Pz IV. The KV and IS series were lighter than the Tiger and Tiger II.

The KwK75/L24 in the Pz III N was an infantry support howitzer, not an anti-tank gun. Do I need to explain to you the difference between a gun and a howitzer? Perhaps I should have said "high velocity, low-trajectory gun intended primarily for engaging other tanks" to make things clearer for you. The Pz III Ausf N replaced the Pz IV Ausf A-F in the infantry support role while the Pz IV Ausf G-J replaced the PZ III Ausf A-M in the lighter MBT role.

That's really quite funny. I'm using the classifications used by the leading tank and WWII museums in the English speaking world. What are you using?

Well, more false statements by you based on no more than assumptions, fuelled by a lack of knowledge in the field. Looks like you picked a good time to leave.

Found this link interesting

http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt

It was a wargame played out at Sandhurst (the Military Academy) in 1974 between British and German officers using the plans for Operation Sealion.

Interesting... A few random comments:

The results show how fatal not having local air and naval superiority was (something I remarked upon in my recent reply to Mason's question regarding the feasibility of Sealion).

The exercise was conducted just about the time the existence of Ultra was declassified. The outline of the exercise appears to indicate that Ultra decrypts are not assumed to have played a role. It is unlikely that there would have been a way for the exercise to have included the assumption of advanced warning of the invasion. If an invasion had actually been attempted in September 1940, it is probable that the British reaction would have been a bit different from, and a bit more effective than the one depicted in the exercise. In particular, the RN would have had more naval forces deployed in the Channel than what was modelled (though modelling that would probably have negated the point of the exercise). I'll point out, in case there is anybody else as pedantic as I reading this, that "Ultra" was not used as a code for the SigInt high level decrypts until about a year later than the date of the modelled action, but Bletchley Park was most definitely decrypting Enigma messages at this time.

I find it interesting that the Germans chose to land from the sea small elements of nine divisions in the initial wave, rather than larger portions of fewer formations. I suppose this is what happened in the exercise becaeu t is what was called for in Sealion planning. In contrast, the allies landed larger portions of fewer divisions from the sea on D-Day in 1944, overa asmller front. I do have to wonder about the quantity of the German transport vessels that must have been assumed in the exercise. It seems to exceed what had actually been assembled at that date.

The German use of a parachute division to capture an airport which is then used to bring in an air landing division is entirely in keeping with German doctrine.

The list of formations named in the text is interesting both in what is included and what is omitted. There is references to "an Australian division" and "the New Zealand Div". In history, there were no Australian or New Zealand divisions in Britain in September 1940. There was the Australian 18th Infantry Brigade (smaller than a division), and a second Australian Brigade (the 26th) being formed but the division to which they were later to belong was not formed until a month later and the 26th was not combat-ready at the time. Furthermore, these Australian formations were not stationed close to the scene of the invasion. There was a New Zealand Infantry Brigade (the 5th), and it was the smallest of three formations in VII Corps. This Corps was tasked as the mobile reserve intended to counter-attack an invasion in southeast England, so it is no surprise to see mention of New Zealand forces being involved early, just not at the Division level. The other two components of VII corps were 1st Armoured Division and 1st Canadian Infantry Division. I would have expected to hear mention of these two formations, as they would have played the critical role in stopping the enlargement of the beachhead.

The text mentions that the first British counter attack is made by the 42nd Division, instead of one of the divisions of VII Corps. The 42nd was based in Gloucestershire at the time. Since this is in the western half of England , this division is more likely to have been one of the forces diverted to counter the Germans massing in the Cotentin. The 42nd was one of the Divisions evacuated at Dunkirk, and was at this point still in the process of absorbing new recruits to replace its battle losses. The text also mentions a counter-attack by the 45th Division, another formation I'd have expected to be found somewhere in western England, not in eastern Kent. As one of the second line Territorial Divisions, this division is more likely to have been guarding a stretch of coast than forming part of a mobile reserve.

The umpires of the exercise were retired military officers who had served in WWII, but, with the exception of the German naval and air umpires, not as general officers with operational experience at that time. The German umpire for land operations had actually been a Luftwaffe officer. The British naval umpire served as beachmaster on Gold Beach in Normandy on D-Day in 1944, at the rank of naval Lieutenant. (He started D-Day as assistant deputy beachmaster but his two superiors were killed early on D-Day.) I wish I could find out more about who controlled the various forces in the exercise.

I'm not sure what to make of an exercise that used non-existent forces and used existing forces in ways other than how they were tasked at the time. I don't know enough about naval or air operations to detect whether the unreality of the land portion of the exercise spilled over into the air and naval parts, but it was those parts that decided the outcome of the exercise. I did find an online mention of the exercise that claimed that a participant in the exercise said the historical RN forces in the Channel area were scaled back to allow an initial landing to succeed, so that a land portion of the exercise could be run.