I realize I never got to the crux of the issue. The immediate reason MacArthur was relieved of command was that he had issued letters to the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives that were critical of Truman's conduct of the war and his limited warfare policy. When these letters were made public, MacArthur was (justifiably) viewed as insubordinate by Truman (and Dean Acheson).

Truman's popularity was hurt much more by MacArthur's firing than MacArthur himself. As a historian, I've found this interesting. As a citizen, I've always found this troubling, and a reminder that we ought not get too wrapped up in our military "heroes."

Cool thread.

Washington pretty much has to be number one on the list, imo. he doesn't get nearly enough credit for things like his masterful retreats.

There are a lot of contenders for number two. Grant is my sentimental number two, but Patton is a strong candidate for number two.

Sherman I don't think rates; it is my understanding that the he was simply implementing Grant's strategy (but I haven't read about this in a long time and would welcome being corrected if I'm wrong about that).

Speaking of fighting on the wrong side and being underrated, Longstreet should be on a top 10 list for sure.

This is a list of guys ranked based on their mastery of strategy and the operational art. A list of battlefield commanders would look somewhat different, i think, although Washington would still be on it, and probably number one.

I'm sure most of you have seen it, but if anyone has the time I'm sure a lot of use would appreciate if you could give details on some of the stuff you're describing here, in this thread.

A lot of adjectives are being used to describe some of the greatest generals, but hopefully someone can give some detailed examples of them putting their described talents into play.

Speaking of fighting on the wrong side and being underrated, Longstreet should be on a top 10 list for sure

If you add longstreet to the lis shouldn't you add jackson to this ?
A lot of southern commanders and generals were great ex. Hill,kirby smith , jeb stewart,joe johnston

No qualms with Jackson being on a top 10 list, but he certainly isn't underrated.

I find tough to compare admirals to generals. The subject is damn different. However is admirals are included, Nimitz would probably have to be there.

Its an fair list, although i think Stonewall Jackson deserves cred. The valley campaign is truly an amazing work of strategical and tactical display.

Benedict Arnold was a superb commander during the Revolution. He is now persona non grata, so his reputation in the public's eye will be forever ruined.

Anthony McAuliffe

As far as Civil War generals go, many historians give the honor to Nathan Bedford Forrest.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nathan_...thumous_legacy

General Adnan Al-Kaissie ftw

It should be noted that Grant's reputation as a President has been on the rise among many recent historians. As much as anything this has been due to the re-evaluation of Reconstruction and his role in supporting it.

I'll also note that his Memoirs are very much worth reading, both for their literary and historical value.

For all others mentioned in this thread they had at least an established force to command in battle. Washington, on the other hand, did it with civilians that until the end of the war were still a pretty ragtag bunch. US Rev war history in insane to read when you consider the overwhelming odds facing Washington and company.

It's my opinion that Joe Johnston may be the most underrated General in our history. If you look at his campaign through Northern Georgia where he was facing Sherman, an argument can be made that he was actually winning even though he had the smaller army. When they reached the outskirts of Atlanta, Sherman's losses, by some accounts, were six times what Johnston's were, he was at the end of a long supply line, and Bedford Forrest was loose in his rear.

Mason

I don't think the casualty ratio you suggest is accurate. By most accounts, Johnston indeed inflicted more casualties than sustained during that campaign and he did quite well defending in the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. Even still, the casualty rate is a bit misleading because Johnston was overly cautious (and that is certainly a defensible approach given the circumstances) and he failed (or perhaps refused) to exploit potential aggressive moves.

I suggest that such is akin to a poker player who is proud in the fact that he has never been caught bluffing. As you have pointed out, that most likely means that player is not bluffing enough.

Anyhow, I will agree with you that Johnston was/is underrated but a lot of that falls to him. He was not very adept at handling the politics of the role and he was constantly at odds with Davis. Other generals (most notably Bragg) took advantage of this dynamic and seemed to undercut him on the field. Furthermore, some of his tactics were too advanced for his subordinate commanders leading to a break down in execution (most notably in the Battle of Seven Pines where by all means his plan should have resulted in rolling up half of McClellan's invasion force).

He's arguably in the top ten for the Civil War (especially if you include his prior exploits) but no way in U.S. history.

I don't believe that Johnston was as cautious as most historians state. At Seven Pines, as you point out below, his battle plan should have worked, and at Bentonville, he certainly attacked a much stronger army even if it was only one-third of Sherman's force.

But the real answer to this question is what would Johnston had done at Atlanta? Would he had defended the city as he claimed? or would his campaign of maneuver and strategic retreat had continued?

I don't know if this is a fair analogy. Johnston's armies always seemed to have the ability to disappear and not be where his opponent thought they would be. That can give you a great advantage, while never being caught bluffing shows you are clearly playing at a disadvantage.

I agree with all of this. An interesting side note about him is that while he didn't get along with Davis, his troops were thrilled to have him as their commander. Perhaps this had something to do with the fact that they were less likely to be shot under his command than under other Southern generals.

Based on what he actually accomplished, I agree, and for those who don't know he was wounded early in the war, and once recovered, he was more of a department head than a real commander for a while. However, if you looked at his performance when he had an army, it actually tells a different story. He played a significant role at First Bull Run, should have beat, as you say, McClellan at Seven Pines, may have actually been beating Sherman in Northern Georgia even though I do agree that the casualty figures I cited above are somewhat suspect, and he also understood that Vicksburg was a deathtrap for the Southern Army under Pemberton but was not able to communicate this to Pemberton fast enough.

Best wishes,
mason

I was not using "cautious" to infer that he chose an inferior strategy, I was using that term to put the casualty ratio in context. Otherwise, the casualty ratio does not really tell us anything (especially since defending armies typically inflicted casualties at a rate of at least 2 to 1 during the Civil War).

I think Johnston's biggest asset is that he adopted a realistic outlook regarding his army's possibilities much sooner than other Generals. Obviously, this created conflict with Davis who was still trumpeting his belief that the Confederates could achieve a military victory (as opposed to hanging on for a political resolution).

I find Johnston's approach much more defensible than that of Lee in the closing months of the war. A few years back on these boards, I posed the question of whether Lee should have been tried for war crimes for unnecessarily prolonging the inevitable which directly led to tens of thousands of needless casulaties and millions of dollars of property loss (as you might guess, it went over like a fart in church).

Johnston should have prevailed at Seven Pines, but his intricate tactics were not properly explained to or understood by his subordinate commanders. That is a problem (one that was not all that uncommon) and it falls to Johnston. Is he unlucky in that respect? Sure, even with these problems, fate could have been kinder.

I don't care if Johnston would have defended Atlanta, or not. I think he exercised sound judgment as to what was necessary and appropriate for the circumstances at hand. If he ultimately made the decision that human capital was more important than saving Atlanta, that choice is more than justified.

Yes, the comment had more to do with my discussion of the casualty ratio. I do not question his choice of tactics, etc. To reiterate (and I know you are not writing a book on the subject, so you offered a conclusory statement and used the casualty ratio as evidence - so, your point is well taken, but still is appropriate for discussion) the casualty ratio is a number without context because he was employing a strategic retreat during this time.


Indeed. This also was a factor in the tension between him and Davis.

This may be one of the pitfalls of history. I haven't studied MacArthur much but I have older family members now dead that served in WWII and one of them didn't like MacArthur very much. He claim he abandoned his men to die in the Philippines.

Now Nimitz and Halsey they thoroughly approved of and thought Nimitz was the much brighter of the two.

But that's just a single war veteran's opinion on MacArthur I am quoting. There could be more extenuating circumstances. It's possible they didn't know all the details of the times they were living through or that MacArthur got some bad press.

MacArthur didn't get bad press. Why? Because he was a media whore. Vain and political, MacArthur always made sure to do big things when people were watching, and he tried his best to cover up his mistakes. Even his "Island Hopping" campaign was lifted from Halsey.

After the sucessful operation in Buna, New Guinea:

Donald Miller, The Story of WWII, pg. 159.

Also this:

Ibid. p. 102

Also the troops in Bataan felt he abondoned them not only physically, but in spirit. During the seige, MacArthur only visited his troops for one day, even though his base in Corrigador was only 3 miles away by water. He was derisively called "Dougout Doug"

Etc., etc. Roosevelt hated him as a man, Eisenhower and others in high command thought MacArthur should have been stripped of his command, but MacArthur was a master of spin and the reality was that there was nobody else that could have been plugged into the job at that point.

Ty for this post. I suspected MacArthur was a media hound.

I had no idea he was at Pearl Harbor but I think he managed to miss the Death March of Bataan also.

Also officers are called to respect to their Commanders-in-Chief whether they like him or agree with him or not. They don't defy them. That's most likely a Code of Conduct violation.

He wasn't in Pearl Harbor. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was clear the war was going to escalate in the South Pacific. MacArthur was on full alert, but as the historical accounts relate, he was dilitory in getting things going and was caught with his proverbial pants around his ankles.