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Originally Posted by Mason Malmuth
I don't believe that Johnston was as cautious as most historians state. At Seven Pines, as you point out below, his battle plan should have worked, and at Bentonville, he certainly attacked a much stronger army even if it was only one-third of Sherman's force.
I was not using "cautious" to infer that he chose an inferior strategy, I was using that term to put the casualty ratio in context. Otherwise, the casualty ratio does not really tell us anything (especially since defending armies typically inflicted casualties at a rate of at least 2 to 1 during the Civil War).
I think Johnston's biggest asset is that he adopted a realistic outlook regarding his army's possibilities much sooner than other Generals. Obviously, this created conflict with Davis who was still trumpeting his belief that the Confederates could achieve a military victory (as opposed to hanging on for a political resolution).
I find Johnston's approach much more defensible than that of Lee in the closing months of the war. A few years back on these boards, I posed the question of whether Lee should have been tried for war crimes for unnecessarily prolonging the inevitable which directly led to tens of thousands of needless casulaties and millions of dollars of property loss (as you might guess, it went over like a fart in church).
Johnston should have prevailed at Seven Pines, but his intricate tactics were not properly explained to or understood by his subordinate commanders. That is a problem (one that was not all that uncommon) and it falls to Johnston. Is he unlucky in that respect? Sure, even with these problems, fate could have been kinder.
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But the real answer to this question is what would Johnston had done at Atlanta? Would he had defended the city as he claimed? or would his campaign of maneuver and strategic retreat had continued?
I don't care if Johnston would have defended Atlanta, or not. I think he exercised sound judgment as to what was necessary and appropriate for the circumstances at hand. If he ultimately made the decision that human capital was more important than saving Atlanta, that choice is more than justified.
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I don't know if this is a fair analogy. Johnston's armies always seemed to have the ability to disappear and not be where his opponent thought they would be. That can give you a great advantage, while never being caught bluffing shows you are clearly playing at a disadvantage.
Yes, the comment had more to do with my discussion of the casualty ratio. I do not question his choice of tactics, etc. To reiterate (and I know you are not writing a book on the subject, so you offered a conclusory statement and used the casualty ratio as evidence - so, your point is well taken, but still is appropriate for discussion) the casualty ratio is a number without context because he was employing a strategic retreat during this time.
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I agree with all of this. An interesting side note about him is that while he didn't get along with Davis, his troops were thrilled to have him as their commander. Perhaps this had something to do with the fact that they were less likely to be shot under his command than under other Southern generals.
Indeed. This also was a factor in the tension between him and Davis.
Last edited by Oski; 04-06-2011 at 01:53 PM.