Quote:
Originally Posted by Bluegrassplayer
Instead of not using the Maginot Line at all, French forces follow De Gaulle's defensive plan by placing several of France's armies in reserve instead of on the Line itself. When Germany invades France through Belgium, these reserve armies are sent to stop the German blitzkrieg effectively stopping World War 2 in 1940.
I don't think this would have made a difference.*
The main element at work was the surprising speed in which the German mechanized troops could exploit a breakthrough. Until it happened, most of the German brass were highly skeptical that the initial attack would lead to anything beyond a stalemate.
However, Guderain understood French military doctrine quite well and he was banking on the fact that the French would not move positions until they had perfect information. Indeed, the French held to the philosophy that they would maintain a continuous line and insist that the attack came to them. Eventually, once the offensive wore itself out, they would consider a counter attack. However, the French would only advance 1500 meters at a time, allow their supporting artillery to resight and then move again. After 3 or 4 such movements, the guns had to be brought up.
Everything was slow, slow, slow. Preparations for a battlefield exercise that was to run two days, took eight to set up. The French simply had no concept of what the Germans were capable of (especially since most of the Germans were not such aware, either) and could not fathom the speed of attack and minute-by-minute changes to the battle field conditions.
Guderian saw beyond all of this and realized that before the French would even react properly, the Germans would be all the way to the coast. Of course, he was correct - but so much so that it scared the German brass who tried to restrain his progress (fearing a trap, counter-attack, or other movement that would breach the flanks).
Indeed, the most compelling decision regarding the Invasion of France was the German decision to move from Halder's "Case Yellow" invasion plan which essentially would operate into a planned stalemate with enough ground gained to allow air operations against the British Isles, to von Manstein's plan which produced the first proper use of the Blitzkrieg.
Unless the French decided to completely rewrite their military doctrine, what they did, or didn't do, is irrelevant.
* The French, still weary from WWI also did not want the "next one" to be fought on French soil. Accordingly, whether De Gaulle's plan was better (if not sound) he could have not overcome the popular sentiment to keep the war in Germany or at least near the border.