Quote:
Originally Posted by luciano27
I disagree. Germany essentially ended its chance to win the war by deciding to attack Leningrad as part of Operation Barbarossa. The Germans vastly underestimated the Soviet troop numbers and ability to raise reserves of troops and materiel.
Had the plan to form Army Group North been scrapped and instead a plan limiting the attack to two invasion points with two Armies been adopted, Germany would have likely rolled right to Moscow and overpowered the Ukraine. At that point, Leningrad would have been effectively cut off and ripe for a later operation.
So, the war first turned on that decision to go forward with Barbarossa in June 1941 with 3 Armies attacking 3 regions.
Nevertheless, the Germans still had an opportunity to salvage its operations in Russia as the Army Group Center approached Moscow in August/September. Bock and Guderian were adamant that they could take Moscow from there. At that point, the Army Group Center was well positioned to take Moscow. Of course, if Army Group North was diverted at that point to join the attack on Moscow, all the better.
However, Hitler went over everyone's head and directly ordered the armored divisions from Army Group Center to divert and support Army Group North and Army Group South. That decision ruined the Germans chance to take Moscow and ruined any chance they had to redeem the original failure manifested at the beginning of the Operation.
Each opportunity served to the Germans after this crucial point merely offered low odds at complete victory, but good odds at stalemate or negotiated resolution. For example prior to attacking Stalingrad, the Germans had a prime opportunity to attack right through to the Caucasus oilfields. Cutting off the Russian oil supply and establishing an endless supply of oil would have been a major leverage point for Germany.
Instead, Hitler demanded the attack on Stalingrad. That decision was a major blunder no matter what that outcome may have been.
Further down the line, Hitler kept insisting his generals not concede any ground, thus it forced the Germans to conduct battles in tight places. The primary advantage Germany enjoyed was its speed and it needed to operate in the open. However, Hilter insisted on a strategy that guaranteed that the German war machine would be ground up piece by piece by an army that had (by comparison) an endless supply of assets to throw into the grinder.
Kursk was a big battle, for sure, but it had no bearing on the outcome. At best, it was a consolidation of the inevitable: Germany was going to lose all of its men and materiel committed to that front - Kursk just provided the convenience of allowing it all to happen at once.
Last edited by Oski; 06-27-2011 at 02:33 PM.