20th July plot and it's impact on the Western Front
I'm currently working my way through the excellent book 'Panzer Leader' by Heinz Guderian. He claims that German forces were unable to commit to a concentrated counter attack on the allied invasion force using all available strength as Rommel may have had political implications for not committing his reserves. This resulted in ineffective peacemeal use of force instead. The implication here is that Rommel required these loyal reserves for the possible outcome of the 20th July plot to assasinate Hitler. I should point out that this isn't referring to the delay in committing forces on D-Day, which have been well documented in numerous sources.
One wonders if the use of these reserves, as requested by General Von Geyr, could have resulted in a different outcome in this theatre?
I've got to admit, this is the first time I've heard of this issue.
One wonders if the use of these reserves, as requested by General Von Geyr, could have resulted in a different outcome in this theatre?
I've got to admit, this is the first time I've heard of this issue.
I'm currently working my way through the excellent book 'Panzer Leader' by Heinz Guderian. He claims that German forces were unable to commit to a concentrated counter attack on the allied invasion force using all available strength as Rommel may have had political implications for not committing his reserves. This resulted in ineffective peacemeal use of force instead. The implication here is that Rommel required these loyal reserves for the possible outcome of the 20th July plot to assasinate Hitler. I should point out that this isn't referring to the delay in committing forces on D-Day, which have been well documented in numerous sources.
One wonders if the use of these reserves, as requested by General Von Geyr, could have resulted in a different outcome in this theatre?
I've got to admit, this is the first time I've heard of this issue.
One wonders if the use of these reserves, as requested by General Von Geyr, could have resulted in a different outcome in this theatre?
I've got to admit, this is the first time I've heard of this issue.
I'm unaware of any Allied intelligence that would support the idea.
Guderian did visit the Western front on a couple of occasions to look at the defences for the expected invasion and also discussed with Rommel his plan for it (something he disagreed with Rommel about).
The implicatiion wasn't so much that Rommel was involved in the plot but more the fact that he was aware of it and wanted to keep a 'reliable' division available for any possible emergency that may arise from it.
The implicatiion wasn't so much that Rommel was involved in the plot but more the fact that he was aware of it and wanted to keep a 'reliable' division available for any possible emergency that may arise from it.
When Rommel's Army Group B was put in charge of the Atlantic Wall defences under CinC West Gerd von Rundstedt, there existed a grouping of ten panzer divisions, called Panzergruppe West, under command of GdP Geyr von Schweppenburg. It was deployed in Central France, with the idea of being a reaction force to respond to any invasion of France, no matter the location. Unlike von Runstedt, Geyr von Schweppenburg, or Guderian, Rommel had actual experience trying to move armoured formations in areas where the western allies had air superiority. Consequently he believed that the usual German approach of centrally keeping a mobile armoured reserve for a counterattack would result in the armoured units being unable to make a strategic march without suffering enormous casualties. (As it turned out he was correct.) He proposed instead to sacrifice the illusion of strategic mobility and the reality of concentrated force by deploying armoured forces scattered right along the coast in the most likely landing areas of Pas de Calais and Normandy (under Rommel's command, of course) and then relying on tactical mobility alone. Having had east front experience of moving armoured formations under Soviet airspace, the other generals were disinclined to abandon doctrine. Unable to reach agreement, the Generals referred the matter to Hitler who decided to "compromise" by giving three of the ten divisions over to Rommel, three to Army Group G in the south of France and leaving four under Geyr von Schweppenburg. However deployment and movement of all ten divisions would be under Hitler's personal control. They could only go where and when he said they could go. Once the invasion actually occurred, Hitler and OKW did not immediately release all the panzer divisions. They were released in small groups over a matter of weeks, not hours.
So Rommel was advocating that all reserves be released to him before the invasion, and once the invasion started he again tried to get any or all reserves released to him. It was Guderian who had argued that reserves not be released at all in advance, and not piecemeal afterwards. And it was Hitler who was responsible for the piecemeal allocation and release of the armoured reserves. So any claim by Guderian that Rommel failed to release reserves has it entirely backward. Rommel was to have reserves released to him, not by him. The delay in releasing reserves (not just on D-Day but until their eventual release in some cases weeks later) is due to Hitler and his OKW staff. For Guderian's fantasy to have any substance, one would have to show that a specific panzer division had been unconditionally released to Rommel and that Rommel had then ordered it to remain in place.
This resulted in ineffective peacemeal use of force instead. The implication here is that Rommel required these loyal reserves for the possible outcome of the 20th July plot to assasinate Hitler. I should point out that this isn't referring to the delay in committing forces on D-Day, which have been well documented in numerous sources.
That's because it is a fantasy scenario, not history.
* A note on the name General der Panzertruppe Leo Dietrich Franz Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg
General der Panzertruppe: his miltary rank. Generals ranking above Generalleutnant and below Generaloberst were called General of <branch name>. The rank stands somewhere between the British and American ranks of Lieutenant General and General. Linguistically it equates to General. In terms of grade, being the third grade of general officer (counting from the bottom) it equates to an American Lieutenant General or a British General. However, British Lieutenant Generals are considered to be equivalent to American Lieutenant Generals. The whole area gets fuzzy because the Americans have a rank between Colonel and Major General, called Brigadier General, which they consider to be a general officer. The British have a rank in the same spot, called Brigadier, which they don't consider to be a general officer, and the Germans had no rank between Oberst (Colonel) and Generalmajor. Functionally, as a commander of a grouping of corps, his position equated with that traditionally held by a General.
Leo Dietrich Franz: his given names
Freiherr: His rank of nobilty. Translates as "Free Lord". A rank of nobility in the Holy Roman Empire, equivalent to Baron.
Geyr: Family name. Some of his ancestors were styled von Geyr.
von Schweppenburg: his ancestral baronial estate. "Von" means "of". Schweppenburg is an estate c/w castle in the Ahr valley near Bonn.
A branch of the noble Geyr family from Köln (Cologne) bought the von Schweppenburg estate in the 18th century. This branch became known as Geyr of Schweppenburg to distinguish it from other branches of the family, e.g. Geyr von Roden
Most Freiherren will not have a family name given before the estate name. The original Barons of Schweppenburg would have been called <first name> Freiherr von Schweppenburg. If you will, the estate from which they got their noble title was their only family name. When Germany abolished the nobility after WWI, the rank of nobility and the estate name(s) to which it was attached became part of the legal family name. So while historically Leo's family name was Geyr, legally it was Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg.
This is somewhat amusing in the context of the dispute about the employment of armoured troops between Rommel on the one hand and General der Panzertruppe Leo Dietrich Franz Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg*, in which Guderian meddled (without jurisdiction) on Geyr von Schweppenburg's side.
When Rommel's Army Group B was put in charge of the Atlantic Wall defences under CinC West Gerd von Rundstedt, there existed a grouping of ten panzer divisions, called Panzergruppe West, under command of GdP Geyr von Schweppenburg. It was deployed in Central France, with the idea of being a reaction force to respond to any invasion of France, no matter the location. Unlike von Runstedt, Geyr von Schweppenburg, or Guderian, Rommel had actual experience trying to move armoured formations in areas where the western allies had air superiority. Consequently he believed that the usual German approach of centrally keeping a mobile armoured reserve for a counterattack would result in the armoured units being unable to make a strategic march without suffering enormous casualties. (As it turned out he was correct.) He proposed instead to sacrifice the illusion of strategic mobility and the reality of concentrated force by deploying armoured forces scattered right along the coast in the most likely landing areas of Pas de Calais and Normandy (under Rommel's command, of course) and then relying on tactical mobility alone. Having had east front experience of moving armoured formations under Soviet airspace, the other generals were disinclined to abandon doctrine. Unable to reach agreement, the Generals referred the matter to Hitler who decided to "compromise" by giving three of the ten divisions over to Rommel, three to Army Group G in the south of France and leaving four under Geyr von Schweppenburg. However deployment and movement of all ten divisions would be under Hitler's personal control. They could only go where and when he said they could go. Once the invasion actually occurred, Hitler and OKW did not immediately release all the panzer divisions. They were released in small groups over a matter of weeks, not hours.
When Rommel's Army Group B was put in charge of the Atlantic Wall defences under CinC West Gerd von Rundstedt, there existed a grouping of ten panzer divisions, called Panzergruppe West, under command of GdP Geyr von Schweppenburg. It was deployed in Central France, with the idea of being a reaction force to respond to any invasion of France, no matter the location. Unlike von Runstedt, Geyr von Schweppenburg, or Guderian, Rommel had actual experience trying to move armoured formations in areas where the western allies had air superiority. Consequently he believed that the usual German approach of centrally keeping a mobile armoured reserve for a counterattack would result in the armoured units being unable to make a strategic march without suffering enormous casualties. (As it turned out he was correct.) He proposed instead to sacrifice the illusion of strategic mobility and the reality of concentrated force by deploying armoured forces scattered right along the coast in the most likely landing areas of Pas de Calais and Normandy (under Rommel's command, of course) and then relying on tactical mobility alone. Having had east front experience of moving armoured formations under Soviet airspace, the other generals were disinclined to abandon doctrine. Unable to reach agreement, the Generals referred the matter to Hitler who decided to "compromise" by giving three of the ten divisions over to Rommel, three to Army Group G in the south of France and leaving four under Geyr von Schweppenburg. However deployment and movement of all ten divisions would be under Hitler's personal control. They could only go where and when he said they could go. Once the invasion actually occurred, Hitler and OKW did not immediately release all the panzer divisions. They were released in small groups over a matter of weeks, not hours.
So Rommel was advocating that all reserves be released to him before the invasion, and once the invasion started he again tried to get any or all reserves released to him. It was Guderian who had argued that reserves not be released at all in advance, and not piecemeal afterwards. And it was Hitler who was responsible for the piecemeal allocation and release of the armoured reserves. So any claim by Guderian that Rommel failed to release reserves has it entirely backward. Rommel was to have reserves released to him, not by him. The delay in releasing reserves (not just on D-Day but until their eventual release in some cases weeks later) is due to Hitler and his OKW staff. For Guderian's fantasy to have any substance, one would have to show that a specific panzer division had been unconditionally released to Rommel and that Rommel had then ordered it to remain in place.
OK, so can Guderian or you point to which specific panzer division was under Rommel's complete control but which he ordered to stay out of action?
OK, so can Guderian or you point to which specific panzer division was under Rommel's complete control but which he ordered to stay out of action?
Hans Speidel - Also political considerations made it seem desirable to the Field-Marshal that reliable armoured units remain readily available against future events
Freiherr von Geyr- The 2nd panzer division was held back by Rommel for some time, because in expectation of the plot to assassinate Hitler he wished to have a reliable army division available for any emergency. Although the situation obliged him to commit the 2nd panzers on the Western sector of the battlefield, where it opposed the US 1st Division, Rommel did manage to keep the 116th Panzer Dvision in reserve until the middle of July
So looking back it may have been others making the claim moreso than Guderian.
Also, I should point out, I'm not defending any position or point of view here. I don't have a horse in this one and was just looking for some discussion around it.
As it turned out, most strategic movement by Panzers in France was done by night or during inclement weather. Despite this, movement rates were slow, due to damage to infrastructre caused by airforce bombers and partisans, and aerial reconnaisance often found panzer divisions stopped during the day, if they tried to go too far in one night. No doubt Ultra intercepts helped, too. When 116 PzD eventually moved, it took 4 days to cover a distance about 2/3 of what Geyr von Schweppenburg's concept would have required, despite being aided by no-fly weather.
... Guderian himself discusses the units that were committed rather than those that weren't and to be honest he only actually includes one sentence on the possibility that I discussed in the OP. On reading the footnotes though there are the following quotes from others:
Hans Speidel - Also political considerations made it seem desirable to the Field-Marshal that reliable armoured units remain readily available against future events
Hans Speidel - Also political considerations made it seem desirable to the Field-Marshal that reliable armoured units remain readily available against future events
It is further ironic that Speidel should suggest that it was Rommel that held divisions back. As Army Group chief of staff, Speidel was in position to assess unit readyness and advise the commander about reserve deployment. In the aftermath of the invasion there was much fingerpointing regarding the delay of deployment of reserves. Pro-Nazi supporters, eager to defend Hitler and OKW, have singled out Speidel as having misdirected 12 SSPzD, and having delayed employment of 2 PzD and 116PzD. AFAICT, there is no more foundation for this than for the idea that Rommel deliberately withheld formations from the fighting because of the plot. But it would have served Speidel's purposes to suggest that Rommel did. Speidel went on to become the first German commander of NATO land forces.
It seems to be the consensus view of historians that 2PzD was held in northeast France for two days because of the success of Operation Fortitude, the allied deception operation that notionally had General Patton in charge of an Army Group preparing to invade at the Pas de Calais. 2 PzD was the only mobile formation available to respond to such an invasion if one were to occur.
Freiherr von Geyr- The 2nd panzer division was held back by Rommel for some time, because in expectation of the plot to assassinate Hitler he wished to have a reliable army division available for any emergency. Although the situation obliged him to commit the 2nd panzers on the Western sector of the battlefield, where it opposed the US 1st Division, Rommel did manage to keep the 116th Panzer Dvision in reserve until the middle of July
Remember that Rommel only had three armoured divisions under command. He deployed one to each of the two likely invasion areas. 21 PzD, which had fought for him in North Africa, was deployed behind Caen to cover the Normandy area, which Rommel thought was the most likely invasion area. 2 PzD was deployed near Amiens. 2 PzD was farther from the coast than 21 PzD, partly because Rommel thought it more likely he would have to move it to Normandy, and also to keep it farther from RAF bases, which were closer to Calais than to Normandy.
116 PzD was notionally the Army Group's strategic mobile reserve, and occupied a deployment area NE of Rouen, about midway between the other two divisions. Once 2 PzD was moved to Normandy, it was the only mobile reserve Rommel had. You don't commit your last mobile reserve unless things are very dire. However the 116th was a reserve on paper only. The 116th was only formed in March, and only received its Panther tanks as the invasion was happening. Throughout June it was understrength and undergoing training at the lowest levels (first phase training). By the time it was ordered deployed to Normandy around July 20th, it still hadn't received its AA weapons and was understrength in operational trucks. The division didn't receive a readyness status of "Kampfwert I" - ready for all operations - until July 30, about a week after it arrived at its deployment area in Normandy. The notion that Rommel was holding back the division because of the political situation is ludicrous. It was held back because it wasn't anywhere close to ready, and deployed before it was fully ready for combat
Furthermore Geyr von Schweppenburg was in no position to know the reasons the 116th didn't move earlier. He was sacked about three weeks before the 116th was moved, and the 116th had only been in his chain of command for a couple of weeks, months before, when it was first formed. He might not have known that it's first Panther battalion had been diverted to the Eastern Front, or that the trucks it received in May and June were far below the authorised compliment and in poor working order.
BTW this is the second time you have referred to the Freiherr as "von Geyr", which is, ofc, technically incorrect. Is that how he is cited by Guderian? Perhaps he was colloquially known by this name among colleagues for ease of reference.
I'm sorry if I associated you with the claim. I hope I have shown that it is without merit.
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