I'm currently working my way through the excellent book 'Panzer Leader' by Heinz Guderian. He claims that German forces were unable to commit to a concentrated counter attack on the allied invasion force using all available strength as Rommel may have had political implications for not committing his reserves. This resulted in ineffective peacemeal use of force instead. The implication here is that Rommel required these loyal reserves for the possible outcome of the 20th July plot to assasinate Hitler. I should point out that this isn't referring to the delay in committing forces on D-Day, which have been well documented in numerous sources.

One wonders if the use of these reserves, as requested by General Von Geyr, could have resulted in a different outcome in this theatre?

I've got to admit, this is the first time I've heard of this issue.

Sounds like unfounded speculation on the part of the Generaloberst (which doesn't necessarily mean he's wrong). He wasn't one of the plotters, and wasn't involved with the western front until after Rommel ceased to be in control, so he had no direct knowledge about the matter.

I'm unaware of any Allied intelligence that would support the idea.

Guderian did visit the Western front on a couple of occasions to look at the defences for the expected invasion and also discussed with Rommel his plan for it (something he disagreed with Rommel about).

The implicatiion wasn't so much that Rommel was involved in the plot but more the fact that he was aware of it and wanted to keep a 'reliable' division available for any possible emergency that may arise from it.

I'm not sure why you consider it an "excellent book". It is very self-serving and inaccurate. Entertaining perhaps, but not reliable history.

This is somewhat amusing in the context of the dispute about the employment of armoured troops between Rommel on the one hand and General der Panzertruppe Leo Dietrich Franz Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg*, in which Guderian meddled (without jurisdiction) on Geyr von Schweppenburg's side.

When Rommel's Army Group B was put in charge of the Atlantic Wall defences under CinC West Gerd von Rundstedt, there existed a grouping of ten panzer divisions, called Panzergruppe West, under command of GdP Geyr von Schweppenburg. It was deployed in Central France, with the idea of being a reaction force to respond to any invasion of France, no matter the location. Unlike von Runstedt, Geyr von Schweppenburg, or Guderian, Rommel had actual experience trying to move armoured formations in areas where the western allies had air superiority. Consequently he believed that the usual German approach of centrally keeping a mobile armoured reserve for a counterattack would result in the armoured units being unable to make a strategic march without suffering enormous casualties. (As it turned out he was correct.) He proposed instead to sacrifice the illusion of strategic mobility and the reality of concentrated force by deploying armoured forces scattered right along the coast in the most likely landing areas of Pas de Calais and Normandy (under Rommel's command, of course) and then relying on tactical mobility alone. Having had east front experience of moving armoured formations under Soviet airspace, the other generals were disinclined to abandon doctrine. Unable to reach agreement, the Generals referred the matter to Hitler who decided to "compromise" by giving three of the ten divisions over to Rommel, three to Army Group G in the south of France and leaving four under Geyr von Schweppenburg. However deployment and movement of all ten divisions would be under Hitler's personal control. They could only go where and when he said they could go. Once the invasion actually occurred, Hitler and OKW did not immediately release all the panzer divisions. They were released in small groups over a matter of weeks, not hours.

So Rommel was advocating that all reserves be released to him before the invasion, and once the invasion started he again tried to get any or all reserves released to him. It was Guderian who had argued that reserves not be released at all in advance, and not piecemeal afterwards. And it was Hitler who was responsible for the piecemeal allocation and release of the armoured reserves. So any claim by Guderian that Rommel failed to release reserves has it entirely backward. Rommel was to have reserves released to him, not by him. The delay in releasing reserves (not just on D-Day but until their eventual release in some cases weeks later) is due to Hitler and his OKW staff. For Guderian's fantasy to have any substance, one would have to show that a specific panzer division had been unconditionally released to Rommel and that Rommel had then ordered it to remain in place.

OK, so can Guderian or you point to which specific panzer division was under Rommel's complete control but which he ordered to stay out of action?

If Geyr von Schweppenburg's concept had been followed, then 21 PzD would never have been in position to make its thrust to the sea late on June 6, thereby preventing the early capture of Caen. To see what would have happened to his planned massive counter stroke, look what happened to Panzer Lehr Division, the most powerful formation in the German Army, when it attempted to make a strategic approach march. It lost most of its strength to air attacks before it even entered battle.

That's because it is a fantasy scenario, not history.

My point was Guderian wasn't in the chain of command and was occupied out of theatre at the time of the alleged withholding of reserves, so had no direct way of knowing who was withholding what.

He may well have wanted to do so, but where is the evidence that he ever had the opportunity to do so and took the opportunity? The piecemeal commitment of reserves is well-explained without this unfounded speculation. The idea of Rommel holding a panzer division back goes against everything Rommel ever actually tried to do with armoured forces which was get them to the coast as fast as possible.

* A note on the name General der Panzertruppe Leo Dietrich Franz Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg

General der Panzertruppe: his miltary rank. Generals ranking above Generalleutnant and below Generaloberst were called General of <branch name>. The rank stands somewhere between the British and American ranks of Lieutenant General and General. Linguistically it equates to General. In terms of grade, being the third grade of general officer (counting from the bottom) it equates to an American Lieutenant General or a British General. However, British Lieutenant Generals are considered to be equivalent to American Lieutenant Generals. The whole area gets fuzzy because the Americans have a rank between Colonel and Major General, called Brigadier General, which they consider to be a general officer. The British have a rank in the same spot, called Brigadier, which they don't consider to be a general officer, and the Germans had no rank between Oberst (Colonel) and Generalmajor. Functionally, as a commander of a grouping of corps, his position equated with that traditionally held by a General.

Leo Dietrich Franz: his given names

Freiherr: His rank of nobilty. Translates as "Free Lord". A rank of nobility in the Holy Roman Empire, equivalent to Baron.

Geyr: Family name. Some of his ancestors were styled von Geyr.

von Schweppenburg: his ancestral baronial estate. "Von" means "of". Schweppenburg is an estate c/w castle in the Ahr valley near Bonn.

A branch of the noble Geyr family from Köln (Cologne) bought the von Schweppenburg estate in the 18th century. This branch became known as Geyr of Schweppenburg to distinguish it from other branches of the family, e.g. Geyr von Roden

Most Freiherren will not have a family name given before the estate name. The original Barons of Schweppenburg would have been called <first name> Freiherr von Schweppenburg. If you will, the estate from which they got their noble title was their only family name. When Germany abolished the nobility after WWI, the rank of nobility and the estate name(s) to which it was attached became part of the legal family name. So while historically Leo's family name was Geyr, legally it was Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg.

When I say excellent I mean a really good read. I've always had an interest in history and have a decent knowledge of WW2 but this comes nowhere near close to someone who is a historian and has studied the war, or specific theatres etc, in detail. Hence my interests when reading about periods I have a certain knowledge of tend to veer towards the personal stories of those involved. Obviously with that comes an acceptance that there will be a certain amount of self-serving, and possible score settling, involved.

Guderian does acknowledge that when he visited the Western front prior to the invasion he realised how great allied air supremacy was. This was Rommels main objection to Guderian's plans for defence and was based on his experiences in Africa and Italy. Guderian thought that the troops and equipment could be moved at night to get around this but Rommel disagreed, again based on his experiences.

I'm obviously aware of the issue with reserves not being released without Hitler's permission but, as I pointed out above, I'm no historian so I don't have my own knowledge of the particular units involved. Guderian himself discusses the units that were committed rather than those that weren't and to be honest he only actually includes one sentence on the possibility that I discussed in the OP. On reading the footnotes though there are the following quotes from others:

Hans Speidel - Also political considerations made it seem desirable to the Field-Marshal that reliable armoured units remain readily available against future events

Freiherr von Geyr- The 2nd panzer division was held back by Rommel for some time, because in expectation of the plot to assassinate Hitler he wished to have a reliable army division available for any emergency. Although the situation obliged him to commit the 2nd panzers on the Western sector of the battlefield, where it opposed the US 1st Division, Rommel did manage to keep the 116th Panzer Dvision in reserve until the middle of July

So looking back it may have been others making the claim moreso than Guderian.

Also, I should point out, I'm not defending any position or point of view here. I don't have a horse in this one and was just looking for some discussion around it.

Hmm, I thought everybody agreed that panzers could move at night, but Rommel thought that this would inevitably result in panzers being spotted in their temporary daytime stops, due to insufficient time to camouflage the vehicles and cover the signs of their passage. Alternatively, if appropriate camouflage steps were taken it would reduce travel time to two or three hours per day, when the deployment area advocated by Geyr von Schweppenburg was on the order of 20 hours actual travel time from the Normandy beachhead. Strategic movements that would take a week, or result in > 50% losses were not acceptable to Rommel.

As it turned out, most strategic movement by Panzers in France was done by night or during inclement weather. Despite this, movement rates were slow, due to damage to infrastructre caused by airforce bombers and partisans, and aerial reconnaisance often found panzer divisions stopped during the day, if they tried to go too far in one night. No doubt Ultra intercepts helped, too. When 116 PzD eventually moved, it took 4 days to cover a distance about 2/3 of what Geyr von Schweppenburg's concept would have required, despite being aided by no-fly weather.

Speidel is an interesting case. He was Rommel's chief of staff, and a member of the inner circle in the plot to assassinate Hitler - the only one who survived. As part of the conspiracy, he was tasked with recruiting Rommel. Historians differ about how deeply Rommel was involved. He certainly knew about the plot, but most evidence seems to indicate he only decided to act personally about June 29, three weeks after it was decided to move 2PzD, the first of the two divisions Rommel is accused of delaying. It was in Speidel's interest after the war to promote the view that Rommel was an eager and full participant. He certainly carried out a multi-year campaign to bring Rommel's widow and son around to the view. For some years after the war they believed that Rommel had been betrayed by Speidel, perhaps because Rommel had not cooperated sufficiently with the plotters. The key defenders of Speidel from arrest for his role in the plot included Guderian and von Runstedt - those who had sided against Rommel in the Panzer deployment controversy.

It is further ironic that Speidel should suggest that it was Rommel that held divisions back. As Army Group chief of staff, Speidel was in position to assess unit readyness and advise the commander about reserve deployment. In the aftermath of the invasion there was much fingerpointing regarding the delay of deployment of reserves. Pro-Nazi supporters, eager to defend Hitler and OKW, have singled out Speidel as having misdirected 12 SSPzD, and having delayed employment of 2 PzD and 116PzD. AFAICT, there is no more foundation for this than for the idea that Rommel deliberately withheld formations from the fighting because of the plot. But it would have served Speidel's purposes to suggest that Rommel did. Speidel went on to become the first German commander of NATO land forces.

It seems to be the consensus view of historians that 2PzD was held in northeast France for two days because of the success of Operation Fortitude, the allied deception operation that notionally had General Patton in charge of an Army Group preparing to invade at the Pas de Calais. 2 PzD was the only mobile formation available to respond to such an invasion if one were to occur.

LOL! 2PzD was delayed for two days, but not by Rommel alone. I know of no senior officer who was prepared to move the only mobile reserve away when the Normandy invasion might still turn out to be a diversion from a primary attack at the Pas de Calais.

Remember that Rommel only had three armoured divisions under command. He deployed one to each of the two likely invasion areas. 21 PzD, which had fought for him in North Africa, was deployed behind Caen to cover the Normandy area, which Rommel thought was the most likely invasion area. 2 PzD was deployed near Amiens. 2 PzD was farther from the coast than 21 PzD, partly because Rommel thought it more likely he would have to move it to Normandy, and also to keep it farther from RAF bases, which were closer to Calais than to Normandy.

116 PzD was notionally the Army Group's strategic mobile reserve, and occupied a deployment area NE of Rouen, about midway between the other two divisions. Once 2 PzD was moved to Normandy, it was the only mobile reserve Rommel had. You don't commit your last mobile reserve unless things are very dire. However the 116th was a reserve on paper only. The 116th was only formed in March, and only received its Panther tanks as the invasion was happening. Throughout June it was understrength and undergoing training at the lowest levels (first phase training). By the time it was ordered deployed to Normandy around July 20th, it still hadn't received its AA weapons and was understrength in operational trucks. The division didn't receive a readyness status of "Kampfwert I" - ready for all operations - until July 30, about a week after it arrived at its deployment area in Normandy. The notion that Rommel was holding back the division because of the political situation is ludicrous. It was held back because it wasn't anywhere close to ready, and deployed before it was fully ready for combat

Furthermore Geyr von Schweppenburg was in no position to know the reasons the 116th didn't move earlier. He was sacked about three weeks before the 116th was moved, and the 116th had only been in his chain of command for a couple of weeks, months before, when it was first formed. He might not have known that it's first Panther battalion had been diverted to the Eastern Front, or that the trucks it received in May and June were far below the authorised compliment and in poor working order.

BTW this is the second time you have referred to the Freiherr as "von Geyr", which is, ofc, technically incorrect. Is that how he is cited by Guderian? Perhaps he was colloquially known by this name among colleagues for ease of reference.

Yeah, but just as part of the embarrassed fingerpointing of proud men who didn't want to admit to having been deceived by the Allies, or that their own actions would have or did cause greater delays, or the revisionism of others who want to protect their ill-chosen heroes. When one looks at the actual history of the three panzer divisions that Rommel was ever in a position to hold back, it becomes clear that none were held back for political reasons. Only such allegations themselves were made for political reasons.

I'm sorry if I associated you with the claim. I hope I have shown that it is without merit.