This is similar to the concept called the prisoner's dilemma. It's a similar kind of situation in which two players could theoretically make a higher EV strategy if they communicated and worked together. It has been solved, though, and the solution is for the players to not work together.
You can imagine a HU match between two equal GTO bots. They would both be losing money due to rake. However, if they worked together and decided to play Strategy X - folding any two cards on the button, their EV would actually increase to 0.
The problem with this strategy, however, is that the game has to end at some point. Nothing is infinite. Therefore, once the last hand is being played, it becomes +EV for the player on the button to not play Strategy X and play GTO instead to make some profit. Then, if we look at the second to last hand, the player on the button will now assume that the opponent won't play Strategy X in the last hand and will therefore have no reason to follow Strategy X himself. This goes on and on untill every hand is being played GTO.
This is why GTO doesn't consider future hands. It always picks the option that has the highest EV in the moment.
I also just can't agree with your opinion, that a strategy is in an equilibrium when one player is always making the -EV call, just because that situation happens at a 0% frequency.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Duncelanas
Actually at a hu cash table with 100% rake, it wouldn't matter because regardless of the action the pot would be 0 chips
There wouldn't be rake preflop in my example.
Quote:
Originally Posted by moremore
In!