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my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium

12-28-2017 , 03:40 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Kingkong352
Yes this is true. I think people get confused because there is a difference between gto vs exploitive play for a hand & gto vs exploitive strategy.

For example vs 1 pot size bet on the river, the gto strategy generally say to defend 50% of his range, while the exploitive play would call 100% Or 0%.
(Because if opponent bluff 1%too much you have a 100% call, while 1% not enough result in 100% fold)

But for sure all of their 50% call would be included in your 100% call too. So they say 'but see we have same strategy!!' But they just happenned to play a hand the same way.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Kingkong352
For example if a fish limp QQ & call 3 streets he could say that he outplayed me. Or he just happened to have QQ... depends how you see things
It's not really clear to me what the difference between an exploitive play and exploitive strategy based on the examples you have provided.

I am also not sure what the difference has to do with the idea that a play that appears in a GTO solution/Nash equilibrium/or the solution we receive from a solver can be very similar or identical to a play a person would make exploitive (i.e. the idea that GTO play and practical play interact by chance, circumstance, or concious decision because it's the most profitable play).
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
12-28-2017 , 06:34 PM
I think the term for a play which satisfies all of the conditions of the original post, which qualifies such a play as all of these strategies:

Minimax

Nash equilibrium

Gto

Comaxexploitive

Max exploitive

———————————

Is a dominating strategy. Could we say that any non dominant strategy is a dominated strategy? I think no, but it’s close to what I’m trying to say.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
12-28-2017 , 07:32 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by just_grindin
I think you would be better off coming up with a different term to refer to your comaximally exploitive strategy to avoid confusion.

I think GTO has already been introduced as short hand for "Nash Equilibrium" for some time in poker circles.
Yeah i feel like there was a forum somewhere in poker theory about definitions and those 2 things got used interchangeably but were obviously different.

Edit: Lol yeah it's the first thread in this sub-forum

Anyways potato potatoe or w/e the fk, game theory optimal has optimal in it's name.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
12-29-2017 , 06:37 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob148
For example:

If I knew the nash equilibrium preflop range, but included some hands that were not in that range in my preflop raising range and plugged them into a solver, the solver would produce a minimax strategy that is not strategically symmetrical with that of the nash equilibrium.

Thus while nash equilibrium strategy is the strategy that maximally exploits the opposing nash equilibrium strategy, it is not necessarily the gto strategy, which maximally exploits the maximally exploitive counter strategy, given any set of previous information, including preflop errors.
There is really no need to introduce new terminology for this imo, solvers simply try to find Nash equilibrium strategies. If you make assumptions about the Preflop ranges, then you are essentially telling the solver to find the Nash equilibrium for an abstract game that has your manually defined starting conditions. Your abstract game may start on the flop with some manually defined hand weights, and that state may not be part of the NE in the full game, but the solvers simply find a NE for the game you define.

But i guess this has been mentioned already, Rusty's post pretty much covers it.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
12-29-2017 , 07:06 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Evoxgsr96
Yeah i feel like there was a forum somewhere in poker theory about definitions and those 2 things got used interchangeably but were obviously different.

Edit: Lol yeah it's the first thread in this sub-forum

Anyways potato potatoe or w/e the fk, game theory optimal has optimal in it's name.
You do realise that GTO is never the optimal play you can make right? The people who named it are just mental. They did apologise.

JustGrinding - He did explain exploitative and GTO pretty well, I got what he was saying, but you wont understand it when we explain it in perfect detail and so there is no point getting into it.
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12-29-2017 , 12:17 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Yadoula8
You do realise that GTO is never the optimal play you can make right? The people who named it are just mental. They did apologise.
This is false even by your own admission (i.e. re-consider the use of never).

Quote:
Originally Posted by Yadoula8
JustGrinding - He did explain exploitative and GTO pretty well, I got what he was saying, but you wont understand it when we explain it in perfect detail and so there is no point getting into it.
I asked what the difference was between an exploitive play and an exploitive strategy was and I said that I don't see how his examples illustrated that. I am perfectly fine with what the difference is between GTO, exploitive, etc.

I also don't understand how differentiating between a "exploitive strategy" and an "exploitive play" has relevance in the discussion of the topic "GTO strategies and exploitive strategies can and often do intersect".
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12-29-2017 , 04:03 PM
GTO is never optimal. If the opponent is using GTO, the optimal decision is to abstain from making any decision.
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12-29-2017 , 04:07 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Yadoula8
GTO is never optimal. If the opponent is using GTO, the optimal decision is to abstain from making any decision.
Technically absent rake it makes no difference if you abstain or play so it's just as optimal to play as it is not to play.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
12-29-2017 , 04:35 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by just_grindin
Technically absent rake it makes no difference if you abstain or play so it's just as optimal to play as it is not to play.
Then again, technically it does have opportunity cost so it wouldn't be the same and you should abstain.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
12-29-2017 , 05:15 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by just_grindin
Then again, technically it does have opportunity cost so it wouldn't be the same and you should abstain.
What's opportunity cost? The cost of possibly still losing?? I just think that time is money.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
12-29-2017 , 05:19 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Yadoula8
What's opportunity cost? The cost of possibly still losing?? I just think that time is money.
Time is money is the idea that opportunity costs encapsulates. Basically if you're doing something now that nets you less money than something else you could be doing during that time.
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12-29-2017 , 05:28 PM
Yadoula, you're right that the maximally exploitive line isn't always the same as the gto line, the Nash equilibrium line etc. We've established that for some time now. However, I think that it's important to study equilibrium strategy to better understand exploitive strategy. Perhaps we will always disagree on this point. We're simply coming at the problem from different angles.

-------

Plexiq,

Quote:
There is really no need to introduce new terminology for this imo, solvers simply try to find Nash equilibrium strategies. If you make assumptions about the Preflop ranges, then you are essentially telling the solver to find the Nash equilibrium for an abstract game
I agree that there isn't a need, but this is more in the spirit of convenience. Like in geometry where the space (x) and (x^i) are related, yet different. I think that coming up with new vocabulary is easier to grasp than adding a qualifier to the existing language.
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12-29-2017 , 08:06 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob148
Yadoula, you're right that the maximally exploitive line isn't always the same as the gto line, the Nash equilibrium line etc. We've established that for some time now. However, I think that it's important to study equilibrium strategy to better understand exploitive strategy. Perhaps we will always disagree on this point. We're simply coming at the problem from different angles.
The thing is mate, I understand exactly where you're coming from, I know how to find leaks etc, but you dont have a clue where I'm coming from.

Whether or not GTO is useful to an exploitative player is a good conversation that I would like to have with you someday, but, before you can argue that GTO helps us exploit, you have to understand how to exploit properly. Finding leaks is only Level Two. It all changes every time you move up a Level.
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12-31-2017 , 10:58 AM
Quote:
Whether or not GTO is useful to an exploitative player is a good conversation that I would like to have with you someday, but, before you can argue that GTO helps us exploit, you have to understand how to exploit properly.
I'm a firm believer that there should be a difference between these ideas:

a) exploitive strategy

b) exploitive strike

Now, with your "preadjusting" stuff that you like to talk about, it seems that you're advocating a maximally exploitive preflop strategy. I think this is quite exploitable. Perhaps you can get away with it vs bad players; if so then good for you; I ain't mad at ya; do your thing. However, as a poker theorist, you must accept this:

As you go for more and more exploitive value, you in turn become more and more exploitable.

This is the only objection I have to your proposals and theories. Do you address this in your book?
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12-31-2017 , 12:08 PM
That's an impressive post Bob. You seem to be noticing the difference between what Sun Tzu calls -

a) A direct attack
b) An indirect attack

He says that these are the only two types of attack possible. In my book I do applaud him for this logic and use the same terminology myself. I describe this as the difference between a Level Two offensive play, and a Level Three offensive play. Level Two is all about reacting to an 'imbalance' in the opponents strategy with a direct offensive, and Level Three is all about inducing the opponents mistakes with a deceptive offensive. Level Two is all about the past, we are reacting to the opponents mistakes. Finding leaks, that sort of thing. Level Three is all about the future, luring the opponent into making mistakes. Pre-adjusting etc.

Once you understand that logic you can see how the mind has evolved over the millennia. In the early days of decision making, the beings were all making their decisions based on past experience. For billions of years the only way they could make decisions was by using memories past down in the form of instincts. They use these memories to show them how to react to whatever nature can throws at them. This is how all Level Two decisions are made. We learn something about an opponent, and then we make our plays in reaction to the information.

Level Three beings have one additional ability. They are able to imagine Level Two situations, without having had experienced it. Using this skill they are able to imagine what they look like from the opponents Level Two perspective. And thus they acquire empathy. They are able to imagine what they look like from the outside and so acquire self-awareness. They are also able to imagine future scenarios which enables them to plan their offensive.

(Level Two without Level Three is purely defensive. But once we add Level Three logic to Level Two, we become capable of making direct offensives)

I find all of this is all fascinating. It really is amazing what you can learn from a simple mind game. Surely there is some Darwin type characters out there who would love to learn about this stuff, but, with the entire learned portion of the poker world going mental at me it's extremely difficult to have any of my logic appraised.

You say that exploitation leaves you exploitable. I do not say these exact words in my book because they are just another GTO trick, twisting everything around to encourage everyone to use GTO. I do explain in my book that GTO is the only strategy that cannot be beaten, and so this means exactly the same thing. The reason I dont say that exploitation is exploitable is because it implies that their is a large risk of losing when using this strategy and that is silliness. We only exploit so far as is profitable. If we didn't find profit in an exploitative line we will naturally use the equilibrium strategy. GTO players say that it is a risk to use exploitation, but all of the profit in poker comes from one player being better than another. If two players are both using GTO the better GTO player wins. If they are both using exploitation the better exploiter wins. The profit margins are smaller when you use GTO, and that sounds better but its not. To make a living from poker you need to play against people that you are better than. And if we are the better player, we want our margins to be bigger! If you sit me with a micro stakes player they will take years to match my exploitative ability. It isn't like they are going to be able to exploit me just because I am exploitable. I will rinse them until they can match me.

Unfortunatly Bob, I suspect that this is not the only problem you have with my logic. Everyone goes so far until they start suffering from CogD. Some people can't understand Level Two logic, and when you explain to them that they need to give the villain a range they will struggle to grasp it, go mental at you, etc etc. Many, many people cant understand Level Three logic, and when you explain to them that they should consider a range for themselves from the opponents perspective they struggle to grasp it, go mental at you, etc etc. Sklansky went further than anyone else I ever saw, he actually made it past poker logic before he started going mental. I haven't had much of a chance to speak with him, as he avoids me like the plague, but I suspect that he misses a good few other details too. Everyone has their own limit. Everyone except beginners. I can teach everything to a beginner in minutes, and that is why I have targeted my book at them.

Last edited by Yadoula8; 12-31-2017 at 12:27 PM.
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01-02-2018 , 12:30 PM
I agree with Bob in his clarification of GTO versus NashE. The problem is when we try to introduce past data regarding villains, player pool, venue, etc., then by game theory it is not GTO and no one will listen. Comaximally exploitive is maximin and game theory is minimax, right?

The more I try to show exploiters the mathematics of insanely profitable exploit poker, the more they resist.

Exploiters just want to win, they are generally disinterested in the math of said winnings.

Without a GTO balance point there is no way to calculate the profit of any single hand of exploit poker.
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01-02-2018 , 01:59 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by robert_utk
I agree with Bob in his clarification of GTO versus NashE. The problem is when we try to introduce past data regarding villains, player pool, venue, etc., then by game theory it is not GTO and no one will listen. Comaximally exploitive is maximin and game theory is minimax, right?

The more I try to show exploiters the mathematics of insanely profitable exploit poker, the more they resist.

Exploiters just want to win, they are generally disinterested in the math of said winnings.

Without a GTO balance point there is no way to calculate the profit of any single hand of exploit poker.
Maybe I misunderstand you here, but of course there is a way to calculate profit without any understanding of GTO. Exploitation came before GTO. We guess our profit, rather than know it certainly, if that's what you mean. But essentially any GTO profit estimations are exactly that too. Estimations.
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01-02-2018 , 03:03 PM
Does pokersnowie closer to GTO or NE in this theoretical framework since it limited in 4 bet size?
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01-02-2018 , 03:07 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by jasonhau
Does pokersnowie closer to GTO or NE in this theoretical framework since it limited in 4 bet size?
Since Nash equilibrium preflop ranges are still unknown, I classify solvers as gto strategy producers.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
01-07-2018 , 11:11 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob148
Since Nash equilibrium preflop ranges are still unknown, I classify solvers as gto strategy producers.
You sure about this? Multiple people in high stakes limit forum claim to have essentially solved pre flop for LHE with solvers.
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01-07-2018 , 11:44 PM
Snowie is a no limit bot.
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01-08-2018 , 01:54 AM
I have an expression for GTO that I think encapsulates this thread, that I apply at least to live poker.

GTO is stupid, but knowing it is critical

I recently started playing 1/2 live again at Borgata and Parx. For me, easy to say GTO is stupid. However, if my goal was to make the absolute highest hourly possible, than knowing GTO would be critical in that goal. It would be very stupid for me to have a balanced 3 barrel bluff range, but knowing the deviation from GTO relative to how often specific opponents fold would yield the highest possible return.

The goal of a poker player should never be to play GTO. That would be stupid. It should always be to play perfectly exploitive. In order to know the actual frequencies of perfectly exploitive play, it's critical to know GTO.

This more applies to most live poker players. I argue players who all play GTO against each other should find better games. However, I am pretty sure at super high stakes, you sometimes have 5 GTO pros and 1 or 2 super rich whales. I can see how there is a huge risk from deviation against your other opponents competing for the whales money.
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01-08-2018 , 03:30 AM
One thing I notice with many players who preach gto is they always fold to big polarized bet pretending exploitive reasons.
my loose theory; the difference between gto and Nash equilibrium Quote
01-08-2018 , 12:15 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by phunkphish
You sure about this? Multiple people in high stakes limit forum claim to have essentially solved pre flop for LHE with solvers.
I thought University of Alberta released a full preflop strategy for Limit Hold Em which was only exploitable for fractional amounts of milli big bets a couple of years ago. Maybe it wasn't them but another university.

Edit: Admittedly that's limit holdem and Bob may be referring to no limit.
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01-08-2018 , 12:48 PM
I may be missing something, but I thought that the only game that has been completely solved to date is Heads-Up Limit Hold Em (done by supercomputer and stored in tons of memory).

Meaning that any Limit Hold Em game with 3 or more players has not yet been solved.

And any No Limit Hold Em game with 2 or more players has not yet been solved.

Finally, it does not make sense to me to "solve" pre-flop in the absence of solving the complete game tree. Since early decisions (pre-flop) surely depend upon how later streets (flop, turn, river) will be played out.
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