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Further, any deviation at all will, as Plexiq says, be likely to require a pure response, but in any real game of poker this is obviously crazy
I agree and would like to explore the options we have:
strategy A: Nash equilibrium, or some multiway situation that has reduced to heads up play which requires a comaximally exploitive strategy, otherwise default strategy vs unknowns.
strategy B: best pure strategy available given a read of marginal deviation.
strategy C: minimally exploitive strategy(assumed to be mixed?) given a read of marginal deviation.
strategy D: a strategy that is mixed, but slightly more profitable than (C), and thus slightly more exploitable given a read of marginal deviation.
Profitability from best to worst would be: B,D,C,A vs a non adjusting opponent, but I think either D or C would be a prudent choice vs anyone playing for significant stakes today.
Exploitability of course would decrease as: B,D,C,A.
I don't currently have access to solutions, so I shoot for D when I have a read, but I doubt I get anywhere close to the ideal ev of D, which is potentially as profitable as the best pure response, or extremely close to it.