Quote:
Originally Posted by jglman91
Hi all, I have a game theory 101 question of a GTO concept I don't fully understand.
Basic question: If a GTO wager on the river is constructed in a way where the bettor is indifferent if the caller calls or folds, how does a GTO player ever make any money off someone playing non-GTO? Obviously if a GTO bet is made, and called by a GTO player at the correct frequency, both players break even in the long run. When the caller deviates from GTO, he should be losing money.
There is a fundamental concept of GTO that I don't really understand, I'm hoping someone can clarify. When I'm faced with a bet on the river by a bot playing GTO, it's supposed to be constructed in a way that makes me indifferent to calling or folding.
For simplicity, let's say I'm faced with a bet that GTO says I should call with 50% frequency. If I fold to this bet every time, I should be losing as much money as if I call this bet every time. However, if the bettor is balanced, don't we break even by calling 100%? [I know this is where my error is,
but why don't we call GTO bets 100% of the time, if the bettor is indifferent?] Something's gotta give, and I'm a little confused where my logical error is.
Not true for a few reasons:
#1) Some of your calls will beat "value betting" hands in your opponents range, so they're +EV calls. It's very rare for your river range to include only "bluff catchers" unless you're facing an overbet from a very polarized range.
#2) If your range was literally all "bluff catchers" (potential calls that never beat value hands), there would still likely be a removal effect component that made some calls better than others.
But your general point remains true. If you have a "bluff catcher" on the river and your opponent is betting a polarized range, you're pretty much screwed no matter what you do.