You should never place a bet in holdem that is only value, and never a bluff.



Then you are not value betting nearly often enough. It is OK, to actually lose a showdown after you value bet. In GTO, it would happen 50 percent of the time you are called.

I never said otherwise. I meant that ever single combo that you choose to call on the river should be 0ev at a minimum.
I consider 50% to be often.

This is only true if you never raise.

I’m not requesting you to actually do this, but as a useful exercise to any poker theorist, the following scenario should be at least interesting:


Let’s say the pot is 100, and both players have stacks of 100.

Pick a holdem board, on the river. Pick any board, so long as both players are allowed to have the nuts in range.

Player 1 checks full range, Player 2 can checkback, but instead decides to bet 100, so Bet=Stacks=100.

Now, assign the ranges. Both players know both players ranges in this spot. Both players openly discuss strategy, just never reveal their actual holdings.

Scenario (i) Both players agree that Player 2 will only bet for value.

Scenario (ii) Both players agree that Player 2 is betting both bluffs and value.

Locate the threshold calling combo for Player 1 in each scenario.

Measure the distance, as in portion of range, that the call combo moves down in range in scenario (ii) vs (i).

Compare this to the portion of range that Player 1 bluffs in scenario (ii), vs only value-bets in (i).

Does scenario (i) favor either player, or is it breakeven?

Does scenario (ii) favor either player? If so which and by how much EV?

Player 2 should only bet the nuts and Player 1 should only call the nuts. Thus it's breakeven.

It increases the bettor's share to a value closer to (bet + pot) and it decreases the callers share closer to 0ev(gets his call back).

Player 2 has value with her 50.1% combo, especially if Player 1 is only calling with the nuts.



If the callers share is zero EV, then where is the profit to Player 2? Surely she gets some +EV here. This is zero sum.

The stipulation was that player 2 will not bluff. betting the 50.1% combo would be a bluff in this case. Unless you meant to originally state that the value range is the same in both scenarios, but still then the bottom of the bettor's range isn't getting called by worse, thus it's not a value bet unless it's the nuts.

I said that the callers share is a value approaching zero ev, not that it is zero ev.

Depending on how you stack the ranges against each other, the caller's share will be a value between 0ev(gets the call back as in nuts+bluffs vs pure bluffcatchers) and some value less than 50% pot.

At this point I will just disagree. I am not sidestepping from your counterpoints. It is clear we will not agree going forward.

Ok, seems like you're taking symmetric distribution ideas and are applying them to asymmetric distribution stuff, which I don't think works that way.

If you disagree with this then yeah we're just going to have to disagree.

No hard feelings here though. Thanks for the contributions.

Did you mean Player 1(the caller), and not Player 2(the bettor)? If yes:

The bold is exactly what I've maintained since last night. I'm not even sure what exactly we're disagreeing on at this point.

No, the bettor gets the +EV. We are in disagreement.

(0,1) game with removal

pot = 1, stacks = 1 pot each, 2 players

player 1 bets pot with this range: (0, 0.9, 1)

player 2 holds this range: (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.95, 1)

player 2 calls 50% according to mdf: (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.95, 1)

player 2 folds (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5)

player 2 ev:

(0.6, 0.7, 0.8) = 0ev call

(0.95) = +1 pot +ev call

(1) = +2 pots +ev call

Seems to me that (0.95) is quite profitable as a call because it wins 2/3 of the time at showdown.

Player 2 average ev facing the pot sized bet is 0.6 pots/hand. Note that pot = 2 after player 1 bets. (3/10 = 30% * 2 = 0.6)

Under the assumption that this model is, or could be understood as, a river situation extending from a hand of poker that features a turn bet of some kind, followed by the pot sized river bet:

Depending on how much the river has rearranged these ranges, (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8) would be stronger bluffcatchers on the turn(not as close to 0ev considering river checkdown value), or a draw to a stronger bluffcatcher on the turn(closer to 0ev), or a strong turn hand(very profitable call) that has regressed due to a dangerous river card.

(0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4) would be profitable draws on the turn(little showdown value thus not really a consideration of the original post), or weaker bluffcatchers that missed the river(near 0ev turn call), or medium bluffcatchers(not near 0ev on the turn)that regressed due to a dangerous river card.

The bold are the hands that I think don't need to consider future action calculation.

These hands in particular are extremely vulnerable to poor turn play, which is why I chose to make this thread, not because of some math agenda. I don't really care either way, just looking to advance my understanding of how the marginal turn hands behave. I think that I've shown why future action calculations are unnecessary for the marginal hands. Now I'd like to talk about what really happens in game play against non perfect opponents, let's assume a standard preflop raising range for the button(about 35% to 45% imo) and a decent flop strategy, leaving us with a turn decision with a marginal hand facing a bet with one street to play:

How do you feel about marginal bluffcatcher/draw hands vs these opponents?:

player a) doesn't bluff quite enough on the turn and is thus slightly value heavy. has good river strategy despite the lack of marginal semibluffs.

player b) doesn't bluff quite enough on the turn and is thus slightly value heavy. prefers bet flop and turn then checkback river to bet flop check turn bet river with good value hands.

player c) value bets slightly loose and has many turn semibluffs to work with. has strong river strategy despite turn looseness.

player d) value bets slightly loose and has many turn semibluffs to work with. prefers bet flop and turn then check river line to the bet flop check turn bet river line.

player e) value bets slightly tight and semibluffs at a good rate considering this tightness. prefers the bet flop check turn bet river line unimproved with good but not triple barrel worthy hands.

player f) value bets slightly tight and semibluffs at a good rate considering this tightness. prefers the bet flop and turn then check river line unimproved with good but not triple barrel worthy hands.

I think each player deserves special attention, but if you just want to talk about one type of opponent, I think we should talk about player (f) as this is the modern tag at work that I usually face.