When does your religion legally excuse you from doing part of your job?
Do you accept that a state can have an interest in things like promoting children, or marriage, or lgbt acceptance, or any number of other such issues? This is pretty widely accepted, I don't think we need to google specific cases.
Sure. But those claims are not considered in an undue hardship claim.
If an action would significantly impinge on the states ability to promote their interests, is this not considered undue hardship? Admittedly, legal terms often have ridiculous precise terms far from the colloquial ones, so if this isn't the exact correct phrase to use (I just copied yours) so be it. But in cases like this, not being able to give out marriage licences because of the clerk certainly is impinging on a state interest to give out marriage licences....so use whatever words are correct for this is hardship isn't the right one.
But in cases like this, not being able to give out marriage licences because of the clerk certainly is impinging on a state interest to give out marriage licences....so use whatever words are correct for this is hardship isn't the right one.
There's an actual function of government that is being impeded (the giving out marriage licenses). And that can be considered as part of a hardship argument. She is requesting a literal change to the forms, which has tangible operational consequences. (I believe this is a failed argument because proxy, but that's irrelevant to the claim that this is a consideration.)
If it were the case (and it's not) that she was only withholding licenses from gay couples, it would be a discrimination issue, and still not a hardship issue.
But neither of these can be framed as anything pertaining to "an interest in promoting X."
Is this semantic difference supposed to be important? I characterized giving out marriage licences as a state interest, you are calling it a function of government. I don't whether calling that an interest or a function is important, the point is that the state is impeded from being able to do that.
Is this semantic difference supposed to be important? I characterized giving out marriage licences as a state interest, you are calling it a function of government. I don't whether calling that an interest or a function is important, the point is that the state is impeded from being able to do that.
Originally Posted by you
Promoting tolerance of LGBT can be an interest of the government, however, and that interest can be too significantly harmed by the accommodation. So you are right in the object of the harm, but it can stil be understand in this way.
Originally Posted by you
The general idea is that when an action harms the ability to enact a state interest that is a harm. One way that harm can manifest is financial costs, but making the state less effective at its interest is certainly accepted too.
Originally Posted by you
It's an undue hardship arguement, namely that the state suffers a hardship on its ability to promote a state interest
As soon as you start talking about the *FUNCTION* of governmental entities, and not things like "state interest in (idea) X" but "state ability to do (behavior) Y", you start to get into the realm of undue hardship considerations for various forms of accommodation.
I said "ability to enact a state interest" and you told me that was wrong. You use the phrase "state ability to do Y". I don't see what you think the difference between the these are. In the case of marriage licences, they both seem to say "prevents the state from being able to give out marriage licences" (the state interest in the first, Y in the second).
I said "ability to enact a state interest" and you told me that was wrong. You use the phrase "state ability to do Y". I don't see what you think the difference between the these are. In the case of marriage licences, they both seem to say "prevents the state from being able to give out marriage licences" (the state interest in the first, Y in the second).
Conflating the ideas of a "state interest" and "institutional behaviors" is very problematic from a legal perspective. It does not matter *WHY* the state would or would not want to issue marriage licenses. Maybe it's *BAD* for government to issue them. But the law indicates that it needs to do this for bureaucratic reasons written into the law. It just doesn't matter because those state interests have no bearing on the behaviors that lead to the issuance of marriage licenses.
Kim Davis' objection only matters insofar as her behaviors disrupt the process of issuing licenses, not because it is somehow in conflict with any reason why the state wants to issue licenses.
The "state interest" in marriage licenses is the reason for issuing them. That's distinct from the behavior of actually issuing them. This is the same as the distinction between the state interest in drivers licenses (such as, ensuring the general competency of drivers and promoting safety) and the actual issuance of licenses (which is the exchange of money and paperwork and some form of testing).
Conflating the ideas of a "state interest" and "institutional behaviors" is very problematic from a legal perspective. It does not matter *WHY* the state would or would not want to issue marriage licenses. Maybe it's *BAD* for government to issue them. But the law indicates that it needs to do this for bureaucratic reasons written into the law. It just doesn't matter because those state interests have no bearing on the behaviors that lead to the issuance of marriage licenses.
Kim Davis' objection only matters insofar as her behaviors disrupt the process of issuing licenses, not because it is somehow in conflict with any reason why the state wants to issue licenses.
Conflating the ideas of a "state interest" and "institutional behaviors" is very problematic from a legal perspective. It does not matter *WHY* the state would or would not want to issue marriage licenses. Maybe it's *BAD* for government to issue them. But the law indicates that it needs to do this for bureaucratic reasons written into the law. It just doesn't matter because those state interests have no bearing on the behaviors that lead to the issuance of marriage licenses.
Kim Davis' objection only matters insofar as her behaviors disrupt the process of issuing licenses, not because it is somehow in conflict with any reason why the state wants to issue licenses.
To claim otherwise is clearly unreasonable and would essentially require the judicial persona that is the state to have the collective intelligence of a box of toothpicks. Though of course in this case it is not only about documents or governmental service, the state also has an interest in stopping institutionalized discrimination.
And of course you know this. Nobody would ever say that any government official should be allowed to religiously object to any function simply because his workplace could reasonably afford it. This case is a question about where the line in the sand should be drawn and only that.
No, the court did not find for Mr. Reed. I never said it did, because I actually make a little effort in reading things before I reference them or link them.
The court find in this verdict that the first amendment (specifically the free-exercise clause) extends to non-religion, atheists or indeed even people who refuse to state the nature of their beliefs. It is a known verdict and precedent for this exact reason.
Which is the exact point I made, and why I quoted it.
If the state wants to give gay people the right to marry and marriage involves marriage licenses, the state obviously has an interest in the issuing of marriage licenses. Or to put it even simpler: The state of course has an interest in that the money it pays to provide people with legal documents they are entitled to, actually goes towards providing people with the legal documents they are entitled to.
To claim otherwise is clearly unreasonable and would essentially require the judicial persona that is the state to have the collective intelligence of a box of toothpicks. Though of course in this case it is not only about documents or governmental service, the state also has an interest in stopping institutionalized discrimination.
And of course you know this. Nobody would ever say that any government official should be allowed to religiously object to any function simply because his workplace could reasonably afford it.
Yes. Good legal scholar that you are should find all of this to be sane and sensible.
The court find in this verdict that the first amendment (specifically the free-exercise clause) extends to non-religion, atheists or indeed even people who refuse to state the nature of their beliefs. It is a known verdict and precedent for this exact reason.
Which is the exact point I made, and why I quoted it.
Which is the exact point I made, and why I quoted it.
Mr. "Reads the verdict as a whole" is holding to one half sentence in the judgment, that doesn't even mean what he thinks it means.
The manager must have been indifferent to Reed's religious views, because Reed never expressed them to the manager; to this day we do not know what his religion is, as he refused to say at his deposition. It is difficult to see how an employer can be charged with discrimination on the basis of an employee's religion when he doesn't know the employee's religion (or lack thereof, which, as we have noted, is in the eyes of the law a form of religion), though the employee can survive summary judgment if, while declining to specify his religious beliefs, he attests that they differ from his employer's and that that is why he was fired.
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 972 (7th Cir.1997) -- https://casetext.com/case/venters-v-city-of-delphi
Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Laboratory, 992 F.2d 1033, 1037 (10th Cir.1993) -- https://casetext.com/case/shapolia-v...nat-laboratory
These cases show that it doesn't matter what the claimant believe. The first shows that religious harassment can happen even if statements are not obviously religious in nature. (This is not that different from sexual harassment claims, where something doesn't need to be explicitly sexual but create an environment in which an individual feels uncomfortable due to gender or sexuality.)
The second one is a case where the individual claimed to be fired (basically) for not being a Mormon. Insofar as this is the claim, it doesn't matter what religion he is as long as he isn't Mormon.
So I don't see how you can say this ruling extends something to non-stated-religion. It's merely affirming exactly what has come before, and things that are completely and totally intuitive from the point of view of understanding the nature of the objection. The facts of the matter that are relevant may not include the individual's religious perspective, as it could be the offending party's religious perspective that is causing the violation.
But keep on trying, and keep on failing. I don't mind it one bit.
You didn't quote it. I'm not even sure I'd call it a citation. You referenced it.
Mr. "Reads the verdict as a whole" is holding to one half sentence in the judgment, that doesn't even mean what he thinks it means.
But this wasn't even the case that did that. At the end of the bolded is a citation:
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 972 (7th Cir.1997) -- https://casetext.com/case/venters-v-city-of-delphi
Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Laboratory, 992 F.2d 1033, 1037 (10th Cir.1993) -- https://casetext.com/case/shapolia-v...nat-laboratory
These cases show that it doesn't matter what the claimant believe. The first shows that religious harassment can happen even if statements are not obviously religious in nature. (This is not that different from sexual harassment claims, where something doesn't need to be explicitly sexual but create an environment in which an individual feels uncomfortable due to gender or sexuality.)
The second one is a case where the individual claimed to be fired (basically) for not being a Mormon. Insofar as this is the claim, it doesn't matter what religion he is as long as he isn't Mormon.
So I don't see how you can say this ruling extends something to non-stated-religion. It's merely affirming exactly what has come before, and things that are completely and totally intuitive from the point of view of understanding the nature of the objection. The facts of the matter that are relevant may not include the individual's religious perspective, as it could be the offending party's religious perspective that is causing the violation.
But keep on trying, and keep on failing. I don't mind it one bit.
Mr. "Reads the verdict as a whole" is holding to one half sentence in the judgment, that doesn't even mean what he thinks it means.
But this wasn't even the case that did that. At the end of the bolded is a citation:
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 972 (7th Cir.1997) -- https://casetext.com/case/venters-v-city-of-delphi
Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Laboratory, 992 F.2d 1033, 1037 (10th Cir.1993) -- https://casetext.com/case/shapolia-v...nat-laboratory
These cases show that it doesn't matter what the claimant believe. The first shows that religious harassment can happen even if statements are not obviously religious in nature. (This is not that different from sexual harassment claims, where something doesn't need to be explicitly sexual but create an environment in which an individual feels uncomfortable due to gender or sexuality.)
The second one is a case where the individual claimed to be fired (basically) for not being a Mormon. Insofar as this is the claim, it doesn't matter what religion he is as long as he isn't Mormon.
So I don't see how you can say this ruling extends something to non-stated-religion. It's merely affirming exactly what has come before, and things that are completely and totally intuitive from the point of view of understanding the nature of the objection. The facts of the matter that are relevant may not include the individual's religious perspective, as it could be the offending party's religious perspective that is causing the violation.
But keep on trying, and keep on failing. I don't mind it one bit.
Your response here is a strange combination of arrogant and sad. You have for reasons known only to you waded in insult after insult in this thread, and even when it is clearly shown how childish "durrs" and lols" are completely unjustified, you still trudge on with the same old insults one after the other without even a second of reflection.
With such an attitude I don't think you can really understand legal jurisprudence, which is all but based on weighing viewpoints in a fair a manner as possible.
I'm sure you are itching to write some snide reply to prove my point, so I won't stand in your way for that. Law is a subject where I have absolutely no interest in engaging in some interweb pooflinging contest, so you can continue that path alone.
Not that I think nitting it up on "hurts a state interest to provide marriage liscences" vs "hurts the states ability to provide marriage liscences" is anything but vintage aaron semantic games, but you have seemed to have entirely missed that I even had a phrase about as close to your phrase as it is possible to imagine. This has to be one of your more ridiculous attempts to force some semantic quibble.
Read it carefully: "ability to enact a state interest". You used the almost identical phrasing "state ability to do Y". Both phrases have state, ability and enact/do. What on earth do you think the difference is? It seems blindly ****ing obvious that in both phrases we are talking about the actual behaviour - the ability to enact /the ability to do - whatever it is the state has an interest in. In this case, the actual issuing of marriage licences.
Not that I think nitting it up on "hurts a state interest to provide marriage liscences" vs "hurts the states ability to provide marriage liscences" is anything but vintage aaron semantic games, but you have seemed to have entirely missed that I even had a phrase about as close to your phrase as it is possible to imagine. This has to be one of your more ridiculous attempts to force some semantic quibble.
Not that I think nitting it up on "hurts a state interest to provide marriage liscences" vs "hurts the states ability to provide marriage liscences" is anything but vintage aaron semantic games, but you have seemed to have entirely missed that I even had a phrase about as close to your phrase as it is possible to imagine. This has to be one of your more ridiculous attempts to force some semantic quibble.
Anyone reading many of the verdicts referenced in this thread will see many great legal minds at work (and some minor ones I guess), who although they are not perfect or free of bias, are still taking very great efforts to be fairminded and reflective. They are not meant for quote-mining, but to be understood in the context of law in general and the courts' tasks in the state.
Your response here is a strange combination of arrogant and sad. You have for reasons known only to you waded in insult after insult in this thread, and even when it is clearly shown how childish "durrs" and lols" are completely unjustified, you still trudge on with the same old insults one after the other without even a second of reflection.
With such an attitude I don't think you can really understand legal jurisprudence, which is all but based on weighing viewpoints in a fair a manner as possible.
I'm sure you are itching to write some snide reply to prove my point, so I won't stand in your way for that. Law is a subject where I have absolutely no interest in engaging in some interweb pooflinging contest, so you can continue that path alone.
With such an attitude I don't think you can really understand legal jurisprudence, which is all but based on weighing viewpoints in a fair a manner as possible.
I'm sure you are itching to write some snide reply to prove my point, so I won't stand in your way for that. Law is a subject where I have absolutely no interest in engaging in some interweb pooflinging contest, so you can continue that path alone.
It's literal conflation. It's not a "state interest" that is being enacted. It's a process or a procedure. And pretending like the focus has been on "enacting" is silly.
"Promoting tolerance of LGBT can be an interest of the government, however, and that interest can be too significantly harmed by the accommodation."
-- Harming the "promotion" of government interest X.
"The general idea is that when an action harms the ability to enact a state interest that is a harm. One way that harm can manifest is financial costs, but making the state less effective at its interest is certainly accepted too."
-- Non-financial consideration of hardship and your *ONLY* usage of "ability to enact."
"It's an undue hardship arguement, namely that the state suffers a hardship on its ability to promote a state interest"
-- Promote a state interest
Straight from the e-mouth of the government.
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html
This is the only consideration as it pertains to undue hardship. That's the definition. The burden has nothing to do with the state interests. At all. It has nothing to do with promoting state interests. At all. It has nothing to do with any of the things you've been emphasizing. Holding to the one time you backed yourself into the word "enact" as your only defense shows that you're wrong.
And if you're going to point to "burden" and start talking about burdening of state interest in promoting X again, I'm just going to laugh at you.
"Promoting tolerance of LGBT can be an interest of the government, however, and that interest can be too significantly harmed by the accommodation."
-- Harming the "promotion" of government interest X.
"The general idea is that when an action harms the ability to enact a state interest that is a harm. One way that harm can manifest is financial costs, but making the state less effective at its interest is certainly accepted too."
-- Non-financial consideration of hardship and your *ONLY* usage of "ability to enact."
"It's an undue hardship arguement, namely that the state suffers a hardship on its ability to promote a state interest"
-- Promote a state interest
Straight from the e-mouth of the government.
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html
Title VII requires an employer, once on notice that a religious accommodation is needed, to reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. Under Title VII, the undue hardship defense to providing religious accommodation requires a showing that the proposed accommodation in a particular case poses a “more than de minimis” cost or burden. Note that this is a lower standard for an employer to meet than undue hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which is defined in that statute as “significant difficulty or expense.”
And if you're going to point to "burden" and start talking about burdening of state interest in promoting X again, I'm just going to laugh at you.
Yes. My question to you is why you think it matters.
Are you going to hold that this case in which the judge said half of a sentence that says "he could maybe have had a chance..." is equivalent in some legal sense to
??
The LOL was totally justified. The guy was an idiot, and the judge called him out on it. It was funny that the judge went so far as to question the guy's psychological status IN THE CASE LAW!
(Did you even read the thing I quoted? I bet you didn't!)
Are you going to hold that this case in which the judge said half of a sentence that says "he could maybe have had a chance..." is equivalent in some legal sense to
Originally Posted by you
The court find in this verdict that the first amendment (specifically the free-exercise clause) extends to non-religion, atheists or indeed even people who refuse to state the nature of their beliefs.
Your response here is a strange combination of arrogant and sad. You have for reasons known only to you waded in insult after insult in this thread, and even when it is clearly shown how childish "durrs" and lols" are completely unjustified, you still trudge on with the same old insults one after the other without even a second of reflection.
(Did you even read the thing I quoted? I bet you didn't!)
Same point (the point being that tame_deuces is wrong), different argument:
Given that the case was between private individuals, it is literally impossible for a first amendment ruling to be made because first amendment rulings only pertain to the government. Title VII is not a first amendment issue unless it's being raised against the government.
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html
Originally Posted by TD
The court find in this verdict that the first amendment (specifically the free-exercise clause) extends to non-religion, atheists or indeed even people who refuse to state the nature of their beliefs.
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_religion.html
17. How might First Amendment constitutional issues arise in Title VII religion cases?
The First Amendment religion and speech clauses (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech”) protect individuals against restrictions imposed by the government, not by private entities, and therefore do not apply to rules imposed on private sector employees by their employers. The First Amendment, however, does protect private sector employers from government interference with their free exercise and speech rights. Moreover, government employees’ religious expression is protected by both the First Amendment and Title VII. See Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace (Aug. 14, 1997) (available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19970819-3275.html). For example, a government employer may contend that granting a requested religious accommodation would pose an undue hardship because it would constitute government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The First Amendment religion and speech clauses (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech”) protect individuals against restrictions imposed by the government, not by private entities, and therefore do not apply to rules imposed on private sector employees by their employers. The First Amendment, however, does protect private sector employers from government interference with their free exercise and speech rights. Moreover, government employees’ religious expression is protected by both the First Amendment and Title VII. See Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace (Aug. 14, 1997) (available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19970819-3275.html). For example, a government employer may contend that granting a requested religious accommodation would pose an undue hardship because it would constitute government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Jesus Christ, you are just going to interpret that nearly-identical-to-your phrase as completely different no matter what, aren't you? What on earth do you think enact means if not have procedures and policies? We are literally talking about the exact same thing, using more or less the exact same words, and you are having a flip out. And while I would have thought this semantic distinction was completely ****ing obvious, you hilarious start droning on about how I only used that nearly-identical-to-your phrase once and thus somehow my opinion is...uh.....worse? I don't even know how to start on the incoherent mess confusing the order of interest and promote and everything else......and really....is it going anywhere except some other bizarre semantic quibble you will insist you won on? So sad.
Do you not think being unable to give out marriage licences would be a "burden" on a government that has an interest in marriage licences? Or "has a procedure to give out licences" if you absolutely insist on the gross error of using the standard legal term of a state interest?
Do you not think being unable to give out marriage licences would be a "burden" on a government that has an interest in marriage licences? Or "has a procedure to give out licences" if you absolutely insist on the gross error of using the standard legal term of a state interest?
We are literally talking about the exact same thing, using more or less the exact same words, and you are having a flip out.
Promoting tolerance of LGBT can be an interest of the government, however, and that interest can be too significantly harmed by the accommodation. So you are right in the object of the harm, but it can stil be understand in this way. Although I'm with you on the "she should get an accommodation" side.
I don't think this is correct. Simply having "an interest in promoting X" does not enter into the question of "hardship." All questions of hardship come down to financial or operations viability. Is it too expensive for the employer to accommodate? Does it disrupt the operations too significantly?
Do you not think being unable to give out marriage licences would be a "burden" on a government that has an interest in marriage licences? Or "has a procedure to give out licences" if you absolutely insist on the gross error of using the standard legal term of a state interest?
If it were, then the government would be playing the role of thought police, and if you disagreed with what the government thought was good, you would be burdening the government.
Another post, absolutely zero explanation of what on God's green earth it is you think the difference between "ability to enact a state interest" and "state ability to do Y" is, because they sound more or less identical to me. But oh no, one is completely wrong! And one is completely right!
Vintage. ****ing. Aaron. You really are the king of semantic nittery. "OMG you didn't make the distinction between an interest and procedures that enact that interest completely explicit....except the time you did and it matched me completely but let's ignore that". Pathetic.
Vintage. ****ing. Aaron. You really are the king of semantic nittery. "OMG you didn't make the distinction between an interest and procedures that enact that interest completely explicit....except the time you did and it matched me completely but let's ignore that". Pathetic.
I asked a Priest today to see if things changed since i was in Church...he disagreed. Just saying dont want argue it.
"No, but..." is not "No."
Another post, absolutely zero explanation of what on God's green earth it is you think the difference between "ability to enact a state interest" and "state ability to do Y" is, because they sound more or less identical to me. But oh no, one is completely wrong! And one is completely right!
The underlying fact of the matter is that the question of undue hardship for the government with regards to religious accommodations has NOTHING to do with whether the government wants to promote tolerance of LGBT.
Originally Posted by you
Promoting tolerance of LGBT can be an interest of the government, however, and that interest can be too significantly harmed by the accommodation. So you are right in the object of the harm, but it can stil be understand in this way.
The difference is simple. The ease or difficulty of enacting a state interest when considering a religious accommodation is NOT a consideration for undue hardship. A religious accommodation cannot be denied because the state wants to promote tolerance for LGBT and this person's religion is getting in the way. (See First Amendment.) That is not an allowable reason under the law. A different reason must be presented, and it comes back to operations. This is not complicated.
But please, continue to pretend that backing into the word "enact" one time is an accurate representation of your position, despite the evidence to the contrary. It makes you look smart.
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