Quote:
Originally Posted by vixticator
Ok when you asked "Wouldnt you say we will be able to explain these things once we've got a better understanding of neuroscience? (ie that they are 'just' constructs of our physically explicable minds)" earlier I was confused. So, maybe, yes, this is what I believe, if you could explain what it a bit more. Logic is a construct of mind and study of mind could conceivably explain it. Or something.
If I understand you correctly, I think this is a pretty common physicalist/formalist view. Namely, the belief that mental phenomena are completely described by some (as yet unknown) physical theory coupled with the belief that maths and logic are not discoveries we make about the universe but are concepts which result from playing a mental "game" we've invented (a game which, conveniently, is very useful in making predictions about the world). 2+2=4 will eventually be understandable as the necessary byproduct of some particular physical state of a brain (or perhaps as an emergent property of any suitably configured complex system).
Concepts like truth, proof, axioms, valid, contradictory etcetera are all "just" linguistic consequences of the meta-rules we've invented and decided to call logic. The theorems of maths are superficially similar to statements we make about real world objects, however the similarity is a linguisitic coincidence and not anything more.
The sentence "5 is a prime number" doesnt refer to any
actual entity 5 which exists in a mind-independant way, despite looking similar to the sentence "Washington is a capital city", which
does refer to a concrete, mind-independant object and purports to describe some of its properties. Rather, the sentence "5 is a prime number" is an abstract object we utilise in the game of maths, the rules of which dictate that we assign a value of "true".
If all of that is a rough account of what maths and logic are, then I dont think we should label maths and logic 'supernatural' and nor do I think they are scientifically inaccessible. I'm not clear how one could consistently hold that 'the only form of existence is physical' without also believing something broadly similar to the above.