Since my central point is that it’s futile or not even wrong to use empirical evidence to ascribe a probability to necessary truths, I thought I could get away with not using a [reductio] tag.

Is it a necessary truth that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens? If so, what non-empirical evidence do you use to determine this? If not, please explain to me how it is possible for something to not be identical with itself.

Real life (legal) Bayles theorem :

https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011...em-miscarriage

The advocates state that the results will be clearer or better but what does that mean ? More convictions , Less convictions ?

Bayles is a mechanistic mantra which like mathematics in the modern, in general, always has to be corrected, in the "real" because of its inherent limitations of time and space.

The Pythagorean idea of "number" underlying the universe is not the "number" to which the modern mathematician adheres and until the "mathematics of quality" is brought forth the lines and spaces of euclidean geometry (Copernicus et al) and its children "randomness" fall short and to allow this type of reasoning to enter the decision making process is a lugubrious , shallow and unknowing approach to healthy thinking which includes knowledge.

Someone, anyone; please explain "creation" , I keep looking in hope that someone drinks the water of "creation".

Why do you believe this?

You should explore the word "necessary" a bit more carefully. If "P implies Q", then you seem to be claiming that it is necessary that "P implies Q." But what of the initial assumption that "P implies Q"?

You seem to have set yourself up for circular logic.

Not as stated. If Samuel Clemens is the given name of the same person that Mark Twain is the pen name of, then it’s a necessary truth that Samuel Clemons is Mark Twain. (IF a = x and b = x, necessarily a = b). Big IF.

I don’t have a short answer for that. Is there a pivotal point with this?

There's a big difference between "necessary that P implies Q" and "P necessarily implies Q."

If God exists, that’s not some fact in existence like extra-terrestrial life; it’s a fact about the essence of existence/reality itself. From which, if God exists, everything in existence (Bible, evil, a banana, intelligent life, DNA, etc.) is evidence for God. So when we factor in evidence we believe lowers the probability of God, all we’re doing is factoring in our own ignorance of why those things are evidence for God. Likewise if God doesn’t exist.

So if Samuel Clemens is the given name of the same person that Mark Twain is the pen name of, then it is a necessary truth that Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.

Now, as a matter of fact, Samuel Clemens is the given name of the same person that Mark Twain is the pen name of, which means (according to you) that it is a necessary truth that Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.

You say you don't see how empirical evidence can affect the probability of necessary truths. So tell me the non-empirical way you come to know the necessary truth that Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain?

Pivotal in the sense that this is what your entire position hinges upon? Yes.

Pivotal in the sense that I have some reason to believe that you are willing to engage in the required level of philosophical self-reflection to understand why you're erecting both an intellectually and theologically flawed perspective on God, and through that reflection you will develop a much more robust understanding of the universe and that which created it? No.

All-or-nothing fallacy.

If I flip a coin and get a head, it's hard to count that as evidence in favor of God's existence, even if we take God's existence to be a GIVEN. At best, it's just a neutral fact of reality.

Ironically, what you're declaring is that we should be *MORE* ignorant of information in order to sustain the belief structure that you've erected. One must willfully choose not to engage in particular analytical thought patterns, lest they allow their perspective to allow the possibility of error.

By way of the big IF. It’s possible the person x was never born (no-x); it’s possible his parents named him Robert (a ≠ x); it’s possible he chose a different pen name (b ≠ x); etc. So in any of those possible worlds, a ≠ b necessarily.

Assume God doesn’t exist and an advanced race sends a time-traveler back to the 15th Century who claims to be Jesus and performs seeming miracles. Based on the empirical evidence available, the probability that God exists nears 1 for those people. Contrast that with the widespread occurrence of people flipping coins and coming up heads 100 times in a row. If that were to happen, we’re not questioning the truth of our probability theorems based on the empirical evidence. Or like I said initially, even if everyone else in the world said that 2+2=4 is false, we can still confidently assert that everyone else in the world is wrong.

I hope you realize how little sense this makes and how poorly it addresses the issues that have been raised. Because that would mean that you're thinking about what you're saying and not just rambling.

All you're claiming here is that humans can be wrong in their conclusions. That does nothing to advance any argument you've made previously.

So you're denying reality now? (Maybe you should clarify whether you believe there is only one possible world...)

I'm still not sure what John is saying. Going back to unsolved number theory conjectures. Is he saying that it is nonsensical to say something along the lines of "there is a 15% chance that there exists an even number that is not the sum of two primes"?

Suppose that I know nothing of number theory but I do know that Melvin Schwartz says that he is sure that no such number exists. And I also know that he has made many such pronouncements, 100 of which have been subsequently proved or disproved. And he was right 85 of those times. If I knew nothing else about math, mathematicians, or the frequency of conjectures turning out right, it is not wrong to assign to myself that 15% probability (as long as no one else offers to bet me or even speaks to me about the problem). The fact that the conjecture is either definitely true or definitely false doesn't matter. Any more than it would matter if the question was "what are the chances Caesar could bench press 300 pounds?

Nah, you probably have me in checkmate. I’m running into an issue figuring out how my conception of God could exist anywhere outside of my mind. Just can’t quite articulate it.

this is incorrect. The existence of things tells you nothing about the existence of god, even if he does actually exist. You are reasoning from your desired conclusion backwards.

no proof

This is a welcomed positive statement.

I don't think you've explicitly stated your religious perspective, but both your position and your screen name suggest that you're a Christian. Many Christians, especially those that have had apologetics training somewhere in the 80s or 90s (and it might also have had legs earlier than that as well), recite the type of "necessary being" theological perspective. And it is one that has a long history in Christian thought.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-necessary-being/

But in my own experiences as a Christian, I've also found that this approach is sorely lacking in terms of theologically weight (as in, this doesn't actually move anything). Not to say that there is no merit to the idea at all, but that it isn't where the rubber meets the road. It establishes too narrow of a foundation to build on and denies too much common ground where progress can be made.

Anyway, good luck as you continue to think about your beliefs and pursuit of truth.

1) IF God exists, then God exists necessarily.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore, God exists necessarily.

4) IF Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain, then Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain necessarily (law of identity).
5) Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.
6) Therefore, Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain necessarily.

In both arguments, (1) and (4) make a hypothetical claim about what is sufficient for a necessary claim to be true. In both arguments (2) and (5) claim this antecedent has been met, thus showing that (3) and (6) are true. However, (5) is an empirical claim about the world, subject to the same probabilistic rules of evidence as other empirical claims about the world. We do not learn that Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain through pure reason, but through an investigation of the world, an investigation that is inherently uncertain.

You have claimed that if we accept (1), we can only accept (2) if we also accept (3). I agree. However, that does not imply as you are assuming that therefore (2) must be a non-empirical claim. (2), just like (5), can still be an empirical claim subject to the ordinary rules of evidence we use for other empirical claims, even if its truth implies some other claim is necessarily true.

Also, you are a bit confused here. It doesn't matter if Samuel Clemens's mother had given him a different name. (5) is not saying that the name "Samuel Clemens" is identical to the name "Mark Twain." That is obviously false. Rather, it is saying that the person referred to as "Mark Twain" is the same as the person that is referred to as "Samuel Clemens." If truth, that is true regardless of what names we use to refer to him.

What is the scope of evidence used to establish materialism is true? I’d say everything. Same with Idealism. Why should it be any different with theism since it’s a worldview as well.

Thanks for aiding and abetting.

Okay, but what about a possible world where Samuel Clemens never came to be? Philosophers in that world would accept (4), but how could they assert (5)? I guess they’d agree it’s possibly necessary, whatever that means. What I think they would say is "Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain necessarily, only if the person named Samuel Clemens is necessary."

I don't see how this helps your case. You are only adding another empirical claim necessary for (6) to be true (your suggested revision doesn't work as it makes the argument invalid).

1) IF God exists, then God exists necessarily.
2) God exists.
3) Therefore, God exists necessarily.

4) IF Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens exists, then Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain necessarily (law of identity).
5) Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain.
6) Samuel Clemens exists.
7) Therefore, Samuel Clemens is Mark Twain necessarily.

(7) is still a necessarily true statement discoverable through empirical means (does Samuel Clemens exists and was he Mark Twain?).