So, I have been doing a fair amount of reading and what not on the Emptiness teachings of Buddhism, specifically the Gelugpa tradition (there are even more divisions if you want, but that is good enough). I thought I would run by the traditional reasoning used in Buddhism for justifying the statement of that all phenomena lack inherent existence - that is the reasoning behind the Emptiness teachings). I found this to be a pretty decent resource - Chandrakirti-The Sevenfold Reasoning.

I guess what initially should be cleared up that when it is said that phenomena lack inherent existence (or are empty), it is not existence per se that is being refuted. It is just that phenomena lack some inherent, independent existent (The first part of the mediation on emptiness is actually developing the valid cognition of the object).

Also, according to the Heart Sutra, it is all phenomena that have this quality of emptiness (in comments on Emptiness, it is described as "own-being", e.g., the own-being of water is wet). Since "selflessness" is tossed around a bit, I thought might be suitable. (But all means all - enlightenment, samsara, dharma, mind, consciousness - whatever else - all phenomena)

Anyhow, the argument is:

A. If the inherent existence of the self were established, then this inherent existence could be found.


B. The inherent existence of the self can not found in any of the seven ways (I suppose you can equate "parts" as "Body/Mind"):

1) The self is not inherently the same as its parts. (If so, then the self would be equal to each body part or each thought. There would be as many selves as the parts.)

2) The self is not inherently different from its parts. (If this was true, you would be able to eliminate the parts of the body/mind until none are left, but still be able to point to the self. You would also be able to distinguish this partless self from someone else's self.)

3) The self is not inherently dependent upon its parts. (This is somewhat related to 2) above, however, what is the link between the self in question and this particular set of parts such that this self is dependent upon
the parts?)

4) The self is not inherently the substratum upon which its parts depend. (I have some difficulty with this one, but it seems to relate to 2 & 3)

5) The self is not inherently the possessor of its parts. (It would seem this would relate to some possessor/possessed relationship - in that I think it would be argued that the possessor can not logical also be the possessed, also I think there is another implication of 2 here)

6) The self is not inherently the mere collection of its parts. (I think this one is a bit tougher, but I think it relates to some redundancy, why self if its just body/mind? So why discuss it?)

7) The self is not inherently the shape of its parts. (Here the self would be a physical thing, the Buddhist would say mental states are not equivalent to brain states, but also, this is no shape to thoughts or mental states - which implies some physical thing. Also, what happens when the self changes shape in the future?)


C. Therefore the inherent existence of the the self is not established, i.e., the self has no independent existence from its own side, the self is empty.

Sure, there is more commentary that is provided on the 7 reasons - but just I though I would just get this out and see if were any initial criticisms. I can do my best to explain the 7 reasons more specifically - and maybe there could be some help - but, I just want to see if there are any immediate objections.

I think the 6th reason is where most may find the easiest criticism. Thoughts, questions or concerns?

Two questions: when you "phenomena," do you mean it in sense it is meant in the Western philosophical tradition, as referring to our experience of the world?

Can you expand more on (6)?

I've posted this in the Buddha thread as this lecture speaks to King Milinda as questioned by the sage Nagasena and in at least one aspect relates the consideration of "parts to whole". It doesn't call for any especial Anthroposophical considerations nor is it an advocacy but more a characterization which will strike the hearts of many; Buddha and Christ.

http://wn.rsarchive.org/Lectures/Met...091202p02.html

I'd like more detail on the difference between "existence per se" and "inherent existence".

Also (and relatedly) can we just replace the word "self" in the syllogism with "car" or "table"?

Well, I suppose first things first - the wife just asked if I am going to do anything today, or be on the computer? I resisted my first impulse - "Well, I am doing something, babe." But I asked what something really meant and apparently something actually means put together the stroller. "OK, babe."

However, quickly, I would say yes - when "phenomena" is mentioned they mean it in the same sense as "things experienced." This could be a cup, a table, mind, any state of mind, nirvana, samsara, buddha-nature, dahrma, everything - even Emptiness. What it is not referring to are things that do not exist, the traditional example is "hair of a turtle." The idea I guess is to show that some inherent existence is like the "hair of a turtle," it is non-existent.

So, I have been thinking about (6). I think this relates to a step that I sort of skipped. So, generally the Buddhist powers that be would say that the 7fold reasoning is mainly a meditation - not calm abiding mediation, they call method an analytical mediation (however, it would seem apparent that the reasoning should be able to used in some philosophical debate).

Anyhow, the absolute first step is to have a valid cognition of the "object to be refuted." That is a strong sense of an object existing independently. I think in this sense (6) gets a little clearer. That is, I think a Gelukpa monk (trained in the the Consequentialist school) would say, that a cognition of "self" would be impossible if the cognition of the "self" was merely the collection of the parts. Conventionally, we say - "My body, My mind." So it would seem that there is some distinction there between cognizing "self" as opposed to "body" or "mind". Possibly circular? At least this is where I need to go a little deeper.

You can substitute anything into the syllogism - car and table are two that are used quite often. This would also include things not considered physical such as, mind, any state of awareness, emotions, dharma, etc ...

I was using "existence per se" as synonymous with some pragmatic existence, or in the nomenclature of the Emptiness teachings "conventional existence." That is, Emptiness does not refute existence - the cup is on the table. The problem is that we seem to perceive or interpret things to exist outside of some framework of relations or causes and conditions - that there is something out there that exists inherently, i.e., outside the conventions of language and cognition.

So, in the end, the Emptiness teachings are not saying that these things do not exist - but rather things exist only in relation to something else, or its existence is dependent upon a set of causes and conditions. There is no inherently existing cup - I guess you could say there is no cup as a thing in it self. You could also say that "selflessness" is empty and even the "emptiness" is empty, since both only exist in a relationship or only within some conceptual framework.


OK, I am now getting a stern look, time to assemble a bunch of parts into something.

Thanks! I will give this a read - looked over it briefly, seems interesting.

Not sure if you are just being condensed when you suggest parts refers to body/mind, but I think it's wildly out of context if thats our only consideration.

Also I wonder if you see 7 as purposeful number in this text.

Are you familiar with Chadrakirti's reasoning/meditation? Are you familiar with analytical meditations on Emptiness teachings and the purpose for finding the "object to be refuted"?

I am not really interested in labeling any significance onto "7" - really just looking at the logic involved in the syllogism, and not some esoteric rumination.

No. I could look into it if we feel it is discussion worthy though.

I loosely remember that there were 7 Rsis that brought the vedic knowledge to man. Did the author of this text really just randomly come up with 7 points?

Anyways you asked me to post about my understanding of non duality, I'm still curious about your comments on it and whether we have shown that non duality is K's thesis.

I am sorry dude - but your lack of skill at reading comprehension is astounding.

its weird that i crushed any academic testing up to a 3rd year university level

Yes

Sounds fine to me, as far as I can make out anyway - will see where the thread goes. Have you read Every Thing Must Go by Ladyman & Ross?

Cool.

What do you think of (6) being somewhat circular? The reasoning in support of (6) seems to be that since we can perceive an object, "cup," this idea of cup is more than just an assembly of parts. On the surface these seems somewhat circular - that is our idea of cup starts out as something more than just parts, so obviously the cup has to be more than just the assembly of parts.

I guess you could point to a wide variety of cup "styles." There are so many different kinds of "cup" it can't be just a mere assembly of parts? I dunno ....

I haven't, but it is now in the Kindle queue. Thanks!

Would the idea of structural realism have anything in common with the structuralism of Levi-Strauss? I have read through some resources on Ontic Structural Realism - didn't see any mention of Levi-Strauss, I assumed I would given the "structural" tag ...