So, I have been doing a fair amount of reading and what not on the Emptiness teachings of Buddhism, specifically the Gelugpa tradition (there are even more divisions if you want, but that is good enough). I thought I would run by the traditional reasoning used in Buddhism for justifying the statement of that all phenomena lack inherent existence - that is the reasoning behind the Emptiness teachings). I found this to be a pretty decent resource -
Chandrakirti-The Sevenfold Reasoning.
I guess what initially should be cleared up that when it is said that phenomena lack inherent existence (or are empty), it is not existence per se that is being refuted. It is just that phenomena lack some inherent, independent existent (The first part of the mediation on emptiness is actually developing the valid cognition of the object).
Also, according to the Heart Sutra, it is all phenomena that have this quality of emptiness (in comments on Emptiness, it is described as "own-being", e.g., the own-being of water is wet). Since "selflessness" is tossed around a bit, I thought might be suitable. (But all means all - enlightenment, samsara, dharma, mind, consciousness - whatever else - all phenomena)
Anyhow, the argument is:
A. If the inherent existence of the self were established, then this inherent existence could be found.
B. The inherent existence of the self can not found in any of the seven ways (I suppose you can equate "parts" as "Body/Mind"):
1) The self is not inherently the same as its parts. (If so, then the self would be equal to each body part or each thought. There would be as many selves as the parts.)
2) The self is not inherently different from its parts. (If this was true, you would be able to eliminate the parts of the body/mind until none are left, but still be able to point to the self. You would also be able to distinguish this partless self from someone else's self.)
3) The self is not inherently dependent upon its parts. (This is somewhat related to 2) above, however, what is the link between the self in question and this particular set of parts such that this self is dependent upon
the parts?)
4) The self is not inherently the substratum upon which its parts depend. (I have some difficulty with this one, but it seems to relate to 2 & 3)
5) The self is not inherently the possessor of its parts. (It would seem this would relate to some possessor/possessed relationship - in that I think it would be argued that the possessor can not logical also be the possessed, also I think there is another implication of 2 here)
6) The self is not inherently the mere collection of its parts. (I think this one is a bit tougher, but I think it relates to some redundancy, why self if its just body/mind? So why discuss it?)
7) The self is not inherently the shape of its parts. (Here the self would be a physical thing, the Buddhist would say mental states are not equivalent to brain states, but also, this is no shape to thoughts or mental states - which implies some physical thing. Also, what happens when the self changes shape in the future?)
C. Therefore the inherent existence of the the self is not established, i.e., the self has no independent existence from its own side, the self is empty.
Sure, there is more commentary that is provided on the 7 reasons - but just I though I would just get this out and see if were any initial criticisms. I can do my best to explain the 7 reasons more specifically - and maybe there could be some help - but, I just want to see if there are any immediate objections.
I think the 6th reason is where most may find the easiest criticism. Thoughts, questions or concerns?