(somewhat shifting the topic here)
How do we know "hard rationalism" is the correct approach?
It seems some people require an airtight argument or proof that God exists.

What airtight argument is there that "hard rationalism" is the correct way to approach the topic of God?

IMO we need to allow for the possibility that IF God exists He is revealing Himself more discreetly through nature and other means. IMO God is providing clues to His existence and character while intentionally withholding outright evidence/proof.

Note: above concepts were mainly gleaned from Tim Keller's book Reason for God

clearly it isn't. depending on what you are trying to achieve.

Well its good you and I agree.

I guess I am more speaking to the crowd that demands blatant proof of God's existence/character before they believe in any type of God.

I know of no one who doesn't believe God exists who thinks it is more likely than not that God exists. Thus it seems strange to complain that atheists are looking for an airtight proof. They don't need one--all they would need to show is that it is likely god doesn't exist.

The kind of complaint you are raising here is really based on an underlying disagreement about the kind of things that count as evidence for the existence of God. When atheists reject the kind of discreet natural revelation you are talking about here, it is not because they are looking for an "airtight argument or proof that God exists," but because they don't think that kind of natural revelation is evidence (or at least not very meaningful evidence) that God exists.

Given that you've lifted these concepts from a book I think it would be productive to clarify some things:

Can you define "hard rationalism"

This doesn't describe me, but I'm sure it does describe some people.

Still would like to know what exactly is meant by "hard rationalism", but also what other methods are being proposed that would be better and if there is argument or evidence () that those methods have any history of success.

Firstly, I am not so interested in what is 'possible' but in what is 'likely'. But in any case, many theists disagree with your proposal; from the unsophisticated ("Consciousness is evidence that God exists") to the sophisticated (e.g. Plantinga's 'Properly Basic Belief'). Why are they wrong? And how do you tell the difference between an entity that contrives to hide evidence of his existence and a non-existent entity?

Or lies to you about itself.

Orp, Was not my intent to complain. I question the line of reasoning that demands overt and obvious proof of God before believing in God. This likely doesn't apply to you. Refer to the threads in the vain of "what would it take to change your mind". Often people will make posts in the spirit of, "God would have to show up and do a bunch of miracles and also open himself up to scientific analysis for a min. of 1 yr.

My problem is not with the conclusion that God doesn't exist, but rather the methodology one uses to arrive at that conclusion.

Note: Maybe there is a term in more common usage rather than "hard rationality". By hard rationality I mean only believing things for which there is overt and obvious proof.

Zumby,

I think I answered some of your other queries in my above post. As I mentioned there may be a better term that "hard rationality" to communicate what I am trying to say.

Firstly, I am not so interested in what is 'possible' but in what is 'likely'. But in any case, many theists disagree with your proposal; from the unsophisticated ("Consciousness is evidence that God exists") to the sophisticated (e.g. Plantinga's 'Properly Basic Belief'). Why are they wrong? And how do you tell the difference between an entity that contrives to hide evidence of his existence and a non-existent entity?

If I understand Plantinga's argument correctly he is basically saying believing in God is a built in axiom for humans. I think it is splitting hairs to say I believe becasue I saw a beautiful sunset and I believe because I have a built in axiom to believe in God.

In fact it is impossible to believe in God in a vacuum. We only believe in God because of what is revealed in the physical realm (and the spiritual, but this is clearly less obvious).

And how do you tell the difference between an entity that contrives to hide evidence of his existence and a non-existent entity?

Well this is the million dollar question. Do we find the clues God has given us compelling? Or is it easier/more logical to explain away these clues by other means.

Sidenote: I always find the philisophical side of evolutionary theory so hard to believe. I find it harder to believe than God existing and virgin birth etc. Granted I am coming from a very Christian and biased perspective, but I try to be open minded about what is likely.

If your complaint is only directed at the sort of atheists who are, whether overtly or just 'in effect', saying that there is no evidence that would change their minds, then I agree that it is a irrational position for them to hold.

Look around and see what opinion reality holds.

Objection; begging the million dollar question.

When you dig a little deeper, I think you will find that these people end up saying that they don't know what it would take to believe in God. I think I can state it from my perspective rather simply: to consider it, it would take something for which "God did it" is a better explanation than anything else (including "we don't know"), and for me at least, there are very few things for which "God did it" is even a decent explanation, and certainly not a better one.

I don't think I am being unfair here, but contrast this with theist's personal reasons for belief, which almost always ends up with assigning special meaning to events that happen to them. You mention "the methodology one uses to arrive at that conclusion", perhaps the most important part of any method employed is to make sure you don't start with the conclusion.

100% agree with all of this, and it's why I find inference-to-best-explanation has value. For god hypotheses that are testable they (always?) turn out to be false, but there are many god hypotheses - especially more recently - where 1) we are all in agreement on the empirical evidence, 2) there is not a practical way to get additional empirical evidence at present and 3) we disagree on whether or not the god hypothesis is the best explanation.

For a case like bunny's license plate example (which, imo, is just a straight up inductive argument as the observation and the hypothesis are essentially the same thing) we can of course, just look at some more license plates. But if we want to narrow down the field of hypotheses, or where additional empirical evidence isn't possible, abductive arguments are useful.

I think abductive arguments are useful in selecting hypotheses too (we have to start somewhere) - they just don't lend any support to the proposition being true.

If there's ever a situation where additional empirical evidence isn't possible (I can't think of a meaningful one) we're not in a position to talk about knowledge (you can't know whether you're a brain in a vat, whether the world was created five minutes ago, etcetera).

It seems nonsensical to say that "hypothesis X is a better explanation than hypothesis Y" and simultaneously hold that "hypothesis X is no more likely to be true than hypothesis Y", so I don't think you can be saying that. But I'm not sure what else you could be saying.

Sure you can. A really common and important example is when a juror has to decide whether to vote guilty or not guilty.

We may adopt a hypothesis for all kinds of reasons other than because we think it's true - we flew to the moon assuming the universe operated under Newtonian mechanics.

We may (and should) 'abductively prefer' a hypothesis with greater predictive power but there's no non-inductive reason to think the universe must be predictable, hence no reason to think this predictive hypothesis is more likely to be true.

Any argument that the "better hypothesis" (according to the criteria you provided above) is more likely to be true rests on induction or deduction from assumed axioms. That's kind of my point.

I've always said abductive reasoning is useful in selecting hypotheses - if we want to develop confidence in the veracity of those (or if we are waving in the general direction of abductive arguments and saying "therefore...God") we use deduction or induction. The extent to which an abductive argument is persuasive, is the extent to which it includes empiricism or deduction.
I mean where it isnt possible in principle - we're speaking about arguments in support of a hypothesis, not artificial constraints imposed by the legal system.

"I dont have time to look for any further evidence*, so I'm going to pick one of these two hypotheses based on what I know now" doesnt mean additional empirical evidence isnt possible.

*Or I have time, but the court system is demanding I make my decision based on the presented evidence alone.

Once again I'm losing the thrust of what your issue with abduction actually is. The post you made that started this discussion was:

I don't seem to have changed your mind at all, but I think I've done all I can to defend abductive reasoning against those charges and provided links for interested parties to do further reading, so I'm calling it a day on this topic.

Okay. Although that may have been the first comment (and was pretty dismissive) I think a more relevant summary of my view was:

"It has something meaningful to say, but not anything particularly useful when it comes to testing beliefs (which is what I was speaking about)."