That's a big if.

To steal shamelessly from Nicholas Everett in The Non-Existence of God, in his critique of various ontological arguments, and in this case the idea that existence belongs to the nature of God, "We might well feel that this cannot be a proof of the existence of God because if it were, we could establish the existence of anything simply by making existence part of the nature or essence or definition of anything. " He then defines a unicorn as a hoofed quadruped with a horn, and further defines into existence a shunicorn, which is a hoofed quadruped with a horn that also (by definition) exists.

Then, quoting Gassendi: "For surely that which does not exist has no perfections or imperfections, and what does exist and has several perfections does not have existence as one of its individual perfections; rather, its existence is that in virtue of which both the thing itself and its perfections are existent... if a thing lacks existence, we do not say it is imperfect, or deprived of a perfection, but say instead that it is nothing at all."

Everett concludes, "What Gassendi is saying is that assertions (and denials) of existence should not be thought of as ascribing (or denying) a property to something."


It seems to me that OrP was differentiating between something existing in the mind vs existing in reality, while you're conflating the two concepts. I can conceive of a necessary being that necessarily has four hooves and a necessary horn on its forehead. That being exists in my mind, and I call it a nunicorn (necessary unicorn) but you can call it whatever you want. That doesn't mean it exists in reality.

The entire ontological argument hinges on the premise that you can't imagine anything greater than God. If God was not greater than the pizza, then God would not be that than which none greater could be conceived, so the entire ontological argument doesn't make any sense, since "than than which..." would not have to necessarily exist because you can think of something greater, thus avoiding the initial contradiction of something existing in the mind being greater than something existing in reality.

That's why choosing the greatest conceivable thing from an infinite number of categories (food, locations) doesn't make sense by definition, or how the term "greatest" is being used here. There is only one possible thing than which none greater can be conceived, and that one thing must necessarily exist in reality, as per the argument.

I don't know, I've pretty much shot my philosophy load, but it seems the argument hinges more on existence as a property and/or existence in reality being "greater" than existence in the mind. God is defined as greater so he can then be connected with the "greater" of real existence.

Framing the argument with a perfect island or pizza is just a way to show that the logic of the argument leads to absudities.

Respectfully, you guys have misunderstood a few points in Anselm's argument. His original argument is more adequate, but the one on wiki is broken down into points which I'll post. Read the original as it is far more poetic and convincing imo.


point 4 says that if God only exists in our minds, (a being which none greater can be conceived) then when we think of that being as existing in reality, suddenly that which none greater can be conceived is that than which a greater CAN be conceived. This contradiction cannot be true - That something be greater than the greatest.

Point 1 sets up point 4. "God", or "Excellence", or "Perfection" as it has been called are the necessary conditions for this being, or else there is no contradiction in point 4. You can't substitute anything except the greatest being, because as long as you can conceive of something greater, there is no contradiction, so there is no need for resolution, so it is not necessary for it to exist (Point 6.)

We don't get far enough using this paradigm to even point out the problems with imagining other "perfect" objects to begin with, because they simply do not fit for the argument to remain sound.

OP, sorry I mildly hijacked this thread, this takes me back some years. I'll leave this alone.

I'll admit that this is a subtle point, but it is an absolutely standard response to the ontological argument. I would submit that you don't recognize it because you don't understand modern logic.

So this is a contradiction:

1) (∃x)(Bx & ~Ex)* - i.e. [the x: x is a being with existence as essence] not (x exists).

This is not a contradiction:

2) ~(∃x)(Bx & Ex) - i.e not ([the x: x is a being with existence as essence] x exists).

This shows that it is possible to talk about and use the concept of a being whose essence is existence, but yet still deny that such a being actually exists.

*Where B stands for "essence is existence" and E stands for "exists."

Respectfully, you really don't get the "greatest possible pizza" parody arguments.

1. Our understanding of Schmizza is of a pizza than which no greater pizza can be conceived.
2. The idea of Schmizza exists in the mind.
3. A pizza which exists both in the mind and in reality is greater than a pizza that exists only in the mind.
4. If Schmizza only exists in the mind, then we can conceive of a greater pizza--one which exists in reality.
5. Therefore, Schmizza exists.

The argument form is identical to your version of Anselm's argument. We aren't ranging over greatest beings, but only greatest pizzas, so your objection that God would end up as the greatest in this argument fails (unless you think God is a pizza). So if you think Anselm's argument works, then why doesn't this one as well.

I don't believe Anselm's argument works, I just don't believe this is the proper way to refute it.

If I did have to see this logic though, I would argue that you can't conceive of a perfect pizza to begin with, because I can always conceive of a better one. This process goes on to infinity, or to where the pizza has the properties of God. Also, there is an implication here that objects can be objectively perfect, which may not be true.

What stops me from conceiving of the pizza you describe, but instead, it never spoils? That would be more "perfect", as would a pizza that gives me wisdom while I eat it. An even more perfect pizza would grant me wishes, and since I con conceive of this, that pizza is even greater. This process will go on and on until the pizza is God-like, since perfection is not the requirement, but only that it be the greatest conceivable thing, which happens to contain perfection. The pizza on the other hand, may never be perfect by this standard, or would turn out to be God-like and thus the greatest conceivable thing.

So the pizza would turn out to be the greatest conceivable thing, or could never be conceived as being perfect to begin with.

His argument fails with anything else except the greatest conceivable thing, by that I mean, would not be sound. That's not to say his argument is valid, he has some other fallacies hidden in there, I just don't believe this is one of them.

I think the "which none greater can be conceived" version relies on existing being even greater than not existing.
If I can imagine FSM existing, and that nothing be greater than it, why doesn't the Ontological argument support that? It can be used to prove anything exists. As OrP shows in the post above yours.

@naked, you keep reinjecting the word 'thing' into this. he's not talking about 'things', he's talking about pizzas.

Yeah Kant was on to something, I think other philosophers did an even better job than he did, but the whole existence/predicated thing is solid. I think a counter argument was that by that logic you're saying that 100$ in front of you in not greater than 100$ in your mind, but there is still something to it.

Essentially what you're saying is that the FSM is God, because there is nothing greater, and thus would have the qualities of God.

You're right, although for my last post, it's strange to think of a pizza with God-like qualities as a pizza. If the pizza is the greatest conceivable pizza it would still turn out to be God, or could not be conceived as being the greatest to begin with.

It depends. The greatest conceivable pizza would be the one that tasted the most awesome, no? Is tasting the most awesome also one of gods qualities?

If that was the case, then the perfect pizza does exist, so there is no contradiction. The pizza you find the most awesome is the greatest pizza.

I think this fails for more than one reason, but the first is that you can't conceive of such a pizza, because it can always be a little better, or it will end up with ridiculous powers to fit the "nothing greater" requirement.

no, because there as you point out, there are more than 1 qualities to the greatest ever pizza. I am not sure that qualities we assign to pizza as nothing greater, would be the same qualities that we assign to god as nothing greater?

Although I am getting confused now and should probably just stop

Yeah, I kinda regret bringing up this whole pizza thing, really derailed this thread.

no, its not strange to think of any kind of pizza as a pizza. that's what pizzas are, pizzas.

only if god is a pizza.

I don’t understand what he’s getting at. All we can really say in regard to an (essential) necessary being is that the concept is conceivable without contradiction. I don’t think it’s even possible to imagine what one would be like, other than saying that since it’s essentially pure existence, it’s wholly immaterial. So it’s not the case that “we could establish the existence of 'anything' simply by making existence part of the nature or essence or definition of 'anything'." Maybe we could get away with defining a Platonic Form in such a way, but certainly not a unicorn or any ‘thing’ that is essentially something other than pure existence. From what you quoted, I just don’t think he has any idea what his opponents are talking about, because on my read what he’s saying is in effect: reality (all that is) is a hoofed quadruped with a horn.

That’s a very popular view, but it’s just a view that’s not uncontested.

If we can’t conceive of something as existing, then we’re warranted in saying that it doesn’t exist. Likewise, if we can’t conceive of something as not existing, then we’re warranted in saying that it does exist. I don’t think we should say that it doesn’t or does, as an uncontestable fact, because there’s always the chance that what is currently inconceivable may become conceivable, or vice versa. And I think we need to hedge that a bit because what may conceivable or inconceivable (as necessarily or impossibly existing) to someone may not be to another. But at the end of the day I think conceivability serves as ample justification for beliefs anyway.

What you’re negating doesn’t make sense to me:
(∃x)(Bx & Ex) - There exists an x such that x is a being whose essence is existence and x exists.

That’s like saying: something exists that is both a being whose essence is existence and a something that exists.

I don't get the redundancy with E. (2) seems reducible to:
~(∃x)Bx - Beings whose essence is existence do not exist.

This should be enough. You've claimed that ~(∃x)Bx is a contradiction. So prove it.

See it looks to me like I'm just saying that there isn't an x whose essence is existence. I think you see me as saying there is an x whose essence is existence and this x doesn't exist.

The redundancy is because you view existence as a predicate (Ex) rather than as a quantifier (∃x). I view the claim that there is no being with the essence of existence as a change in the quantifier, so we're still referring to the same predicate, no problems. You view existence as a predicate and so think that when I claim there is no such being I am changing the predicate into something incoherent like the existing non-existing being.

Somewhere I know I don't belong here but I catch glimmers of the great Scholastic debates of the 14th century related to Nominalism versus Realism.

In one mind, words are merely tags to which we relate reality to ourselves and others but have no intrinsic woose, or stuff or essence or being,etc...., Nominalism, in cliff notes.

To the other, the Realists, words or concepts or thoughts have in essential and being a reality which are not dependent upon our sense bound perceptions; Realists .

The question of sense free thinking comes about through this route (maybe others too); that is the question is : is sense free thinking a reality and to some, who do not agree but still see something, it then becomes a possibility. there are the others who say "no".

A being whose essence is existence exists by necessity, if it exists. So I don’t directly have a problem with the conclusion “beings whose essence is existence do not exist’ as long as it follows from “… they’re impossible." That’s the dichotomy: such a being must exist or can’t exist. So if you want to grab the latter horn and conclude they don’t exist, I’m okay with that. Obviously, if you're trying to circumvent the argument, I'm not.

It follows from: there is no such being. What you are assuming here is that anything that possibly necessarily exists, necessarily exists. Therefore, if there is no such being, then it must be because it is impossible that there is no such being. I reject that inference (I reject S5 modal logic).

However, the main point I was making is that it doesn't follow from your definition of God alone that God actually does exist. So I can talk about your definition of God, and assert of it that it doesn't exist, without contradicting myself (note I also think we can talk of there being no round squares). I'm not that bothered by what you think follows from the claim that there is no God.

Two points: in my Schmizza argument, it isn't greatness simpliciter that we're interested in, it is pizza greatness. What makes a pizza great is different from what makes a baseball player great. For instance, a great baseball player doesn't need to have tasty cheese on it, but a great pizza does. Thus, we shouldn't assume that greatest conceivable pizza will have the same characteristics as the greatest conceivable being. Pizzas are a subset of beings, and it is unlikely that the pinnacle of great pizzas is also the pinnacle of all possible beings.

Second, your objection that greatest conceivable pizza isn't coherent is fine--just note that there are similar worries about whether greatest conceivable being is coherent as well.

This is a much more suitable argument I think. Can we really conceive of this greatest being to begin with? Although do we really need to conceive it, or does the fact that we assign the title "greatest" to something enough? I.e. picture the greatest thing, however that looks. Nothing can be greater than it. Not sure to be honest.

The problem with the pizza on the other hand is that taste is not a quantity to be measured but a quality which is subjective. The pizza you deem as the greatest is not necessarily great at all, it's just subjectively the best.
If you want to personally make the greatest conceivable pizza, you could theoretically choose your favourite ingredients and overtime achieve this feat of the greatest tasting pizza to your preference. It's very possible.

I think one of Anselm's problems is that his argument points to infinity. Infinity must exist in all facets for this theory to work. Replacing the pizza for anything quantitative works better. I can concede that there is some logic behind this argument, just not that ones that I've seen. Greatest conceivable space for example, or greatest conceivable weight. That would mean that infinity must exist, or that "God" must have these qualities.

A more poignant example in this area of criticisms, (which I think is not the best way to refute this argument) is something like, "largest diamond." Which would mean that an infinitely large diamond must exist. The only problem here is that this doesn't disprove the theory, because we can't prove for sure that there isn't an infinite number of infinitely large objects somewhere.

I think Kant's objection to Anselm, which MB mentioned earlier, is much more cohesive than Gaunilo's. After all, the very best this argument can result in is that more "greatest" things must exist in addition to God, if it even works at all.

But it matters if one says such a being ‘does not exist’ for those who do accept S5. That you reject it just means you’re not engaging the argument or circumventing it. However, for those that do accept it, (and those are the only people I’m arguing against), saying such a being doesn’t exist entails impossibility:

If x can exist, then x must exist.
If x must exist, then x does exist.
x does not exist.
Therefore, x cannot exist.

That’s all I’m after. So unless you want to shill for those my argument is targeting, I’m not sure what you’re attempting to accomplish with all this.