The problem here is that the epistemology of knowledge is not there. It's not simply "I don't know" but rather it's "I don't know, but whatever is true must conform to my desired standard of proof." In the Christian sense, the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge. To the scientific materialist, it's repeatable verifiability is the beginning of knowledge. In both cases, there is an assertion of the nature of knowledge, neither of which can be tested (for if it could be tested, then the test itself would become the assertion of the nature of knowledge).

You're shifting gears and changing the context. In the context of the atheist position, "I don't know" is a stopping point. Atheists do not proceed to then search for a resolution to their atheism. They choose to stay in their atheism.

"I don't know" is not actually the start of anything. It's really an end. It's the end of one's knowledge. Progress happens when "I don't know" is followed by "I want to find out." This is the scientific inquiry that you describe above.

Framing their discoveries in terms of "faith" is also a red herring, and completely out of context with the rest of the conversation.

Sounds nice, but it's an empty platitude because you're establishing a self-defeating system of knowledge. You can never "truly explain" something unless you first know it. But according to your definition, you must reject that you know it in order to explain it.

This is the scientific materialist epistemology again. The "evidence" you are seeking is a repeatable measurable quantity of something. The "evidence" for a unique event will never be convincing. And I don't really think it's a nicer solution than saying "I don't know." For me, saying "I know" is more consistent with my experience of life than "I don't know." Things that I have seen and experienced are enough to convince me that God is, and it really doesn't matter whether the evidence is enough to convince you.

Let me explain it this way: If meaning is all proximate (ie, dependent upon me), then there is no compelling reason to care about people. I can value people because I want to value them, or I can not value them because I don't want to value them. Either way, it doesn't matter. Since I am the one making the definitions, I can do it however I want and be completely justified in my decision.

But if it's not my job to give meaning, and that meaning is given from somewhere else, my decision is entirely different. Do I conform my own sense of meaning to the meaning that has been given from "somewhere else" or do I deny the meaning given from "somewhere else" and replace it with my own meaningless meaning (because it's not my job to give meaning)?

Moreover, there is both an internal sense, and a nearly universal cultural sense that we should somehow be valuing others. And this is why universal meaning is more valuable than personal meaning. Personal meaning leaves me to be completely arbitrary about how I do things -- making it meaningless -- but this is not consistent with an internal sense that I really should be caring about others. It makes far more sense that people are to be valued, not because I say so, but because something else out there has defined them to have value.

Christ did what Muhammad did not. While we were still sinners, Christ died for us.

Secular science doesn't do any explaining. It merely describes. Explaining is all of this stuff regarding value and meaning that secular science does not touch. So God aids the explaining of things by telling me what to value and gives meaning to me by establishing specific purposes for me.

It all comes down to what you fundamentally believe about the universe. If the universe is ultimately derived from physical laws, then there is no meaning to it because physical laws lack the capacity of assigning meaning. It simply tells things what to do and where to go, and that's the end of it.

If you do think that there is meaning or value, then you have to ask where it comes from. Can physical laws ascribe meaning? I don't see how it can, but maybe you can find a way. I have a hard time accepting that meaning can come from us under this perspective since we're nothing but a product of physical laws. This implies that all the things we think are really just the physical laws doing their thing, and there's no reason for our sense of meaning or value to be anything more than mere consequences of physical laws.

Thanks. Perhaps ironically, my take on Christianity is counter-cultural to what most of contemporary Christianity looks like. But if I believe that my ultimate justification is found in Christ, then I don't care that I don't fit in with most other Christians in terms of how I view the world.

As far as the leap to Christianity goes... well... that's always the tough one to explain. I'll just say that when God makes an appearance in your life, it's not easy to ignore.

I agree. The conversation has become quite broad. Fortunately, I get a sense of this winding down as there doesn't seem to be much more back and forth left to be had on most of these topics. Hopefully, I've given you a better sense of where I'm coming from (regardless of whether you agree or disagree with it). This has been a good conversation.

But obviously the scientific method is the one that provides us with useful predictions about the future, such as what drugs will cure illnesses, how to land a man on the moon, when a solar eclipse will occur and so on. Whether or not you consider this to be "knowledge" in your narrow definition doesn't really interest me, but the fact of the matter is that science has actual utility in the real world and is supported by evidence whereas religion is not.

You've misunderstood me. No one is saying "I don't know if I'm an atheist." I know I'm an atheist just as you know you're a theist (presumably). I'm saying "I don't know how or why the universe exists," and that is certainly followed by "I want to find out," as I'm sure it is by many atheists. My point about Newton and Darwin stands; if they had faithfully assumed that the religious explanations in their fields of study were correct, then they would have never discovered anything and we would still be living in the dark ages.

I think I'm missing your point here. I'm not suggesting we reject anything that we know. I'm saying we should be honest about what we know and what we don't.

I don't think I've ever argued against the "utility" of science. It certainly does function very well in make predictions regarding the physical world that religion does not make. But since religion should not be in the business of making those types of predictions, I don't think this matters at all. (Except when people do try to put religion to work in that business... but that's not where I'm at and I stand quite firmly against it.)

Yes it is, and no it isn't. Yes it is, in the sense that many atheists do want to find out. No it isn't, in the sense that most atheists take a specific worldview in which certain possibilities are inherently excluded. In particular (as described elsewhere in this thread) a mechanistic worldview by construction precludes "God" from the picture as "God" is not a mechanism. So if the atheist has a construction in which certain possibilities are excluded, then if those possibilities turn out to be reality, the atheist will never find that which they're seeking.

I think you're being overly dramatic, and I'm not quite sure if you're being historically accurate. The insight of Newton wasn't so much a rejection of the notion of "angels keeping the planets in orbit" as much as it was simply making the intellectual "leap of faith" that the same phenomenon that causes things to fall here also causes things to fall far away. I don't really think that his perspective was so much rejecting "angels" as a phenomenological explanation as it was simply abstracting his experience into a larger setting.

Similarly, I don't think Darwin (about whom I know significantly less) was influenced so much by young earth creationism, which is something that really came about as an American Evangelical phenomenon during the early-mid 1900s. From "Scandal of the Evangelical Mind" by Mark Noll:

I stand by my position that

In other words, it has very little to do with God and faith (indeed, most scientists pre-1900 were men of faith, and they laid some very good groundwork for us today). Rather it's just that insight happens when someone looks at what we already think we know differently. I'll once again point back to the SMP thread where I was simply trying to argue that it has not been conclusively shown that the current laws of physics are sufficient for explaining all the other sciences. If there's something more to chemistry than Schrodinger's law and the Pauli principle, no chemist today will ever know because they've already assumed that this is all that's needed.

When do you know that you really know for sure about anything?

I agree about "honesty" but being honest includes being aware of and willing to be explicit about specific worldview assumptions that are brought to the table. If you bring a purely mechanistic worldview to the table, then you must also admit that you've precluded your own ability to find God (as something other than another physical law) if he's out there. The requirement of replicable results also means that event that happens to be unique in the universe *MUST* be denied status as an actual event, REGARDLESS of what actually happened.

And if an atheist doesn't have that worldview?
You seem to use words in a unique way, in this case somehow confusing materialist with atheist. There is no need for an atheist to be a materialist. Heck, there is no need for an atheist to be an atheist.
You can ( as several on here have reported in the past) really, really, really want there to be a personal god ... at the present you just don't believe there is, so you report in as an atheist.
Reporting you are without shoes doesn't mean you have excluded shoes from your worldview.
Cultural conditioning does that to a person. When raised in a culture where atheists are very much spiritualist or dualist one is not likely to make this error.

Better? Yes.
Realer? No. I can think of a hundred things that could be better, but I don't make a habit of playing pretend all the time.

Women don't have the moral right to an abortion after their baby is born. They also don't have the right to throw their children into a live volcano a.k.a. lake of fire, for not cleaning their room. Parents don't have a right to torture their children for even 5 seconds, much less all eternity, even if it were possible.

The atheist in that position (wanting to believe) needs to be able to answer the question, "Why can't you believe?" Sometimes, there's an epistemological standard (I won't believe unless God does ...), sometimes it's due to social pressures, and sometimes it's because the atheist is holding a worldview assumption that precludes God, but the atheist hasn't explored his own belief system deeply enough to find out which one is in the way.

Most atheists on this board are scientific materialists. I'm writing in the context of a specific audience.

So meaningless suffering is better than suffering with meaning. Why?

Are women before the baby is born in a position to know as much as God can know?

That meaning is all in your head does not imply that meaning is meaningless. Not without additional unstated premises, or a definition of meaning that says in big red letters "must be absolute and apply to everyone in exactly the same way." And hell, if your head could be all of reality, then it still doesn't imply that. I believe my meaning is just as meaningful as your meaning. You keep using the assumption that if meaning "only" exists in a person's mind, that somehow makes it less meaningful than if it were a component of reality. If this is just one of your worldview assumptions, then it's one on which we differ so you won't get anywhere by applying it with me (us, I assume, as I know many atheists share my views here). If it is not, then I'd love to hear the justification. How is meaning less meaningful if it is in your head? Why do you think it's less meaningful? This just seems to come out of nowhere.

Sure it does.

Not "whatever it is you believe." I'm cool with Buddhism, some paganism, much mysticism, much New Age, most liberal theology, and so on. I consider evangelical Christianity, however, to be on the level of Scientology, Islamism, and Mormonism. It's not knee-jerk disagreement. It is a very specific issue with your very specific set of beliefs. I put them toward the absolute bottom of the stack in terms of credibility, and I think they are also violent and dangerous. This is, again, a specific position I take on your specific beliefs. It's not, "God obviously doesn't exist." I think God probably does exist. It's more, "the likelihood of the Christian God is on the level of the likelihood of Xenu." You are overgeneralizing, perhaps because you see Christianity as a universal. To me it's basically a cult.

Try to close your eyes and imagine that you see Christianity in the same light that you see Scientology. See whether the atheist posts make more sense in that light. I think much of what you consider unreasonable in these debates, you might consider more reasonable if it were directed at a worldview you personally find just as onerous as I find Christianity.

Imagine a Scientologist who openly states that his highest value is Scientology, and imagine he is nominated for the head of NIMH. Do you need to do further research on this person in order to reach a conclusion? Hell, even if you think it would be necessary for you to do more research before forming a purely personal opinion on the subject, would you maybe not react with disgust at the initial thought of a Scientologist heading NIMH? Would you be horribly unreasonable for having this reaction?

Naturally, you hardly put your beliefs on the level of Scientology. On the contrary, you consider your viewpoints to be the very most credible viewpoints (we may all do that). And that clearly colors your perceptions of our responses to those beliefs. But what I see when I look at Christianity is something extremely different from what you see when you look at Christianity.

No, it's "I don't know, and in order for me to believe something, it must conform to my fundamental standard of evidence." I don't expect to ever know the "truth," assuming it even exists. What is true need not conform to my standard of belief at all - why should it? What does the truth (in the "deep sense") have to do with my beliefs?

The reason that a revealed religion must conform to my standard of belief is simple. I think my standard of belief is reasonable. If God were to stake my eternal soul on my belief, and if God were just, then God could not indict me based on conclusions arrived at from a reasonable standard of belief. So if my standard of belief is reasonable, if God exists and is just (according to my definition), and if God will make my fate dependent on my belief in his existence, then God must provide evidence that meets my standard of belief. The absence of such evidence is proof against the existence of such a God (or proof against the reasonableness of my beliefs).

Atheism is not a brick wall. It is a world as rich and full as theism. Atheists do not "stop" at "I don't know." Atheists never stop. But no, we don't leave atheism - if you happen to view atheism as narrow, then I can see why you consider it a dead end. But as there is so much to explore in my atheist world, I don't see myself stopping any time soon.

No; this hasn't been true since Popper. Science never "finds out" anything, it only provides predictive models. Many (perhaps most) scientists do not try to equate these models with epistemic "truth."

I don't know about "truly," but you can certainly explain something without knowing it. I don't know a single thing, but I can explain plenty. To explain is to "predict and account for." To know the thing in itself is not necessary for that. Are you claiming it is?

Try presenting this formally. See how many extra hidden premises you need to bring out in order to do so. There are a massive number of hidden assumptions necessary to support this chain of inference. You simply cannot logically establish that proximate meaning is any more arbitrary (or less conducive to valuing others) than absolute meaning.

Just pushes it back a level. Now you're saying that life has meaning just because God said so. Or could it be that the meaning God provides represents more than an arbitrary fiat in your worldview? Well, the meaning I provide represents more than an arbitrary fiat in my worldview. There is logically no more reason to characterize my self-derived meaning as fiat and arbitrary than there is to characterize your God-derived meaning as fiat and arbitrary.

I don't accept the premise that meaning must derive from what the universe derives from. The fact that the universe derives from physical laws doesn't imply that meaning derives from physical laws. Listen to this - my worldview is not a linear hierarchy. I also don't accept the premise that physical laws lack the capacity of assigning meaning.

I do not accept the premise that everything has to "come from" somewhere.

I think few of the atheists here are scientific materialists. I believe you significantly underestimate the complexity of the philosophies you are encountering. You don't need to be a materialist to apply materialist reasoning. You seem to see atheists here applying materialist reasoning and then to assume that we are materialists on that basis. This is not a justifiable assumption.

-Aaron:

Can you clarify the subjective difference between 'proximate' meaning and 'absolute' meaning? I know you're already in about fifty conversations ITT, but I've talked to you about 'proximate' v. 'ultimate' meaning before and the discussion was never resolved satisfactorily.

Uh oh... I don't even remember that conversation. The way that it's framed, I don't know if there is a "subjective" difference, but I'd have to go back and see the context of what we were talking about to make sense of it.

Madnak -- that's a lot of typing. It will take time to get to it.

I appreciate it. Given our past exchanges, I thought there was a good chance you were ignoring me by now.

Believing that you're giving Collins a completely unfair shake, and that you've grounded your "hard-line" perspective on a caricature rather than taking the time to investigate the information that's available is both lazy and a poor reflection of your character. But none of this is an "ignorable" offense in my mind.

Besides, I think I probably like to argue too much to start ignoring people I strongly disagree with.

It's probably down there with some assumptions and definitions. I don't know if this will make any sense if you believe the universe is all in your head. Also, I draw a line between "meaningful" and "meaningful to ...".

If something is "meaningful" then it carries some sort of content or purpose on its own.

But when you start talking about "your meaning" and "my meaning" you run into conflicts regarding the "content" which is why we have to use modifiers like "meaningful to you" and "meaningful to me." This sort of personal meaning is probably what you're thinking of when you say meaning. The problem is that if it's only "meaningful to me" then none of the content that I assign to that object actually ever reaches the object (ie, it's not actually contained in the object).

This is why my assigning of meaning to objects is meaningless. I say it carries content, but it doesn't actually contain content. It's all an illusion inside of my head. No meaning was ever actually endowed on the object.

I'm not saying that the meaning we assign to objects is non-functional in how we operate in our lives. I'm simply pointing out that we must recognize that it is an illusion we put in front of ourselves, and that there's no "real" meaning in any of the "meaningful" stuff that we have. It is "meaningful to us" but without inherent meaning.

Now if meaning is an inherent property of objects, then you lose the ability to redefine the meaning to whatever you want it to be. In other words, it tells you what its meaning is, not the other way around. In a sense, there is an authoritative structure that is endowing things with meaning. For example (and sorry for the weak analogy), consider a military setting. The sergeant says "don't touch that." This is meaningful. Everyone below him must respect "don't touch that." Furthermore, violation of "don't touch that" comes with consequences from the one who endowed the object with "don't touch that." Even if you didn't know that the object contained "don't touch that," touching opens the door for consequence.

That is the difference between "meaningful" and "meaningful to ..."

If I were to be upset, it would not be with the one who was nominated, but the one who did the nominating. I think this comes down to a completely different view of authority and authoritative structures than anything else.

See above regarding authoritative structures. If God is in the position to endow "this is how it is" on the universe, then your disagreement with God is impotent. Just as if the segeant says "don't touch that," what recourse do you have if you touch it? "I didn't know" or "I wasn't convinced that you said 'Don't touch that'" have zero traction.

Atheism is not a brick wall. It is a world as rich and full as theism. Atheists do not "stop" at "I don't know." Atheists never stop. But no, we don't leave atheism - if you happen to view atheism as narrow, then I can see why you consider it a dead end. But as there is so much to explore in my atheist world, I don't see myself stopping any time soon.

I'm of mixed feelings of whether scientists do think that way, but most non-scientists view what scientists say in that way. But I don't really want to chase this down the rabbit hole.

If you believe that universe derives from physical laws, but you also think that meaning is not derived from the universe, then meaning is not a part of the universe. So if it's not a part of the universe, then where is it?

I think there are two core assumptions of scientific materialism:

1) "Scientific" = The scientific method is the only source of reliable knowledge
2) "Materialism" = The fundamental reality of the universe is matter and energy

When I say that someone is a scientific materialist, I'm simply saying that they hold these two assumptions somewhere among all of their other assumptions. I'm aware that there is some other baggage that people have put onto this term, but this is much like how people have put on extra baggage to "Christianity." (I'd use a different phrase, but I don't know of any other succinct phrase that carries precise this content... so I'm stuck with it.)

Aaron W. would you support an outspoken qualified atheists for this position?

We have something in common, then.

Okay. That's not how I define meaningful, but let's work with that definition.

Okay then, using your definition of meaning I will try to explain how it works if the universe exists inside my mind. First and foremost, you exist within the universe, so "your meaning" is a description of the universe in a functional way. "My meaning" is different. But I wouldn't say that any object has meaning based on the definition you're using, except one - I have intrinsic meaning. Other objects reflect that meaning. I suppose with spiritual experiences, meditation and the like, I can "directly" experience the meaning inherent to reality (and I'm defining "reality" here as "my mind"). That's like turning my eye inward to look at itself - it's a strange experience that is hard to describe. Most of the time my mind's eye is directly outward - not necessarily into "external" reality, as I don't really view the universe as any more external than my own thoughts, but to something other than my own awareness (whether that be my sensations, my perceptions, my thoughts, my emotions, or some other contents of reality).

The only way I can see the meaning (that is an intrinsic part of reality - an intrinsic part of me) if my mind's eye is directed outward is to observe something that reflects that meaning. The clearest example of this is another human being - another human acts like a "mirror" to me. You can call this an illusion if you like - other humans may be philosophical zombies, in fact they are necessarily philosophical zombies in the universe as it is. But they appear to resemble me, and so they appear to share the meaning that is intrinsic to me. Because it is difficult to view "myself," to view reality "in itself," (though people who meditate constantly show signs of extreme happiness and contentment, so maybe it would be wiser for me to take that path - regardless) it is necessary for me to experience "my" meaning in these things that resemble the inexplicable aspect of myself that you might call my "awareness" (though I think that misses the point, I'd have to get mystical to describe it otherwise).

Of course, it's not just that objects in the universe reflect meaning. The truth is that there is only one object at all, and that object does intrinsically have meaning. Again, I won't elaborate because it would get into mysticism. But I am not arbitrarily assigning meaning. When I experience meaning in an object, that implies that some reflection of underlying reality is communicated by that object. Illusion or not, the underlying meaning is intrinsic to reality, regardless of whether it is "really" associated with the object in question.

This does not establish intrinsic meaning. You can assume that God has the power to simply declare intrinsic meaning, but this is as much a basic low-level premise as the assumption that the individual is the source of intrinsic meaning.

I'm upset with plenty that Obama does, for the record. But I don't view any linear hierarchy as legitimate, and I could go on but again that would be a derail. I think you're right that our views of authority and authoritative structures is an issue here.

Again, this assumes that God can actually imbue objects with inherent meaning, which is not at all obvious to me given most definitions of omnipotence. I could see a justification of meaning as a "reflection of God," similar to how I view meaning as a "reflection of myself," but if objects inherently have the property of meaning, then an assumption is required that God can imbue them with that property in order for the view to be supported. In other words, I don't think this conclusion follows from my premises or presents any contradictions for me. And the view doesn't seem to follow from your premises so much as to be defined within them. This doesn't refute any view of meaning as subjective (and there are many such views, not just my own solipsist perspective).

Well, I think the universe is contained within myself. You believe that your self is contained within the universe. Of course, I could still justify meaning in the universe in functional/behavioral terms, and while such meaning would not be an intrinsic property of anything, that would indicate nothing about its value. It takes an additional premise to say that intrinsic meaning is "more valuable" - logically, intrinsic meaning is not more valuabe than relative meaning any more than the color green is more valuable than the color red, it is only within a set of premises establishing a framework of value that these determinations can be made. But to describe my own view, it's part of me, and I am larger than the universe.

Or to clarify further, there are two "universes" I talk about. The first is the "little universe" that I discuss 99% of the time. This is the universe that works according to physical laws, it is a model that I have constructed in order to make sense of my perceptions. It is my conceptual model that allows me to say "this is an apple" instead of "this is a region of red in my sensory apparatus." But my only knowledge of the apple, the sole source of my inference that "there is an apple," is my sensations (and the perceptions derived from those sensations). If I had never sensed anything like an apple in any way, had never seen an apple with my eyes or heard one described with my ears, then I would have no concept of an apple. What an apple is to me is the result of sensory information I have achieved and processed. That is, inputs coming from sensory "places." This applies to everything I know about the universe. Thus, my universe is necessarily derived from my senses. It seems contradictory to describe my sensations as being contained within something derived from my sensations, so my capacity for sensation must be "outside" the little universe.

Within my little universe is my "little self," the me that was born, grew up through the human stages of development, is now a grown adult, and has thoughts and feelings based on a brain. This "little self" bears some striking resemblances to my "big self," which is my ultimate reality. The thoughts that I can infer my "little self" is having, I can also directly experience in my "big self." But the "little self" is still just a model. My "big self" contains things that my little self does not appear to contain (such as what we can refer to as qualitative experiences or qualia). My big self also contains the universe, whereas my little self is contained by the universe.

So the question can be raised - is there a "big universe" out there, that resembles the little universe in the same way that my big self resembles my little self? And my answer is simple - my sensory inputs do not justify any conclusion about an "outside" universe. I would need to arbitrarily assume the existence of such a universe. And I'm not willing to do that. But the idea is certainly comfortable, and is intuitively plausible. Of course, if there were a big universe, it would probably differ from the little universe (just as my big self differs from my little self). The big universe, even if it bore a superficial resemblance to my little universe (and I'm not sure it would), might not work according to physical laws (as the little universe does). But my mind is far, far too limited to reach any conclusions about a big universe. Understanding the little universe is tough, understanding my big self is almost impossible, it is clear to me that the big universe is beyond me. (Especially based on the reasoning of the idealists, etc, about the impossibility of understanding the "thing in itself" which I believe is a necessary condition for understanding the big universe.)

Thus, while there may be a "big universe" out there, I am not in direct contact with that universe. I am only in contact with my self and my perceptions. And thus, reality is my self and my perceptions. There is no "big universe" to speak of, because in order to speak of the big universe I would need to make assumptions about it. Still, there are times (such as now) when I do speak of the "big universe" as an intuition pump.

Okay, but I represent one example of where this is a questionable definition. I don't think the scientific method is the only source of reliable knowledge, for example. I think it is the only source of reliable knowledge about the little universe. I make no claims about the "big universe," and when speaking with others I assume it does not exist (not because I believe it does not exist, but because the others with whom I am speaking are part of my little universe and it is easier to use little-universe terminology with them than to try and express the layers of my metaphysics). But I don't fit the scientific materialist box, as some of my actions are based not on the little universe but on my big self.

I would have no inherent issues with an "outspoken qualified atheist" in the same sense I wouldn't have any problems with an "outspoken qualified Muslim." The operative word here is "qualified."

Ok just checking. I think most Christians would have a problem based on all the polls i have seen on atheists in positions of power.

I guess this is no different from madnak having a problem of Christians in positions of power.

Christians and politics in the US is a combination that has caused great damage due to the last 50-100 years of increasingly misguided leadership. Their focus got distracted by power and influence, which turned them away from the ministry of reconciliation that was given to them. It's going to take at least 1-2 generations, if not more (if it ever happens), for that mess to be cleaned up.

I cant speak for madnak. But for me until Christians take off all the laws that are on the books (even if they aren't enforced) denying atheists the right to run for office. Im pretty much opposed to all Christians being put into positions of power.

To be fair, you would have to object to all theists holding positions of power. There's nothing explicitly "Christian" about those laws.

I would disagree that any other theist besides Christians had anything to due with establishing those laws. The US was and is a predominantly Christian nation and i hold them more accountable for those discriminatory laws. Its not like a bunch of Hindu or Muslims put those laws in place or have the power to remove them. But i would not support any other theists that are in favor of them remaining.

I'm pretty sure there were a good number of enlightenment deists out there in the 18th century. (Plus post-enlightenment 19th centruy deists.)

I have not read your entire exchange with madnak, so this statement may be completely accurate. I would like to at least clarify that the reasons for my trepidation about the appointment (and the reasons for that of others that I know) is not that he is a Christian, and I certainly don't believe that he is unqualified.

It is that he has made very public statements through books and other media that take a concrete position on the inevitable outcome of several avenues of research that most of the scientific community would say is premature and unsupported. This makes me worry that he may allow those positions to negatively affect research in those areas. As long as he doesn't I don't think there will be any major problems.

The other problem of his stance on stem cells isn't really a huge deal since we can make them in other ways now, but as a precedent it could be an issue in the unlikely event that a similar dilemma presents itself during his tenure.

This is a fair concern. And it is true that he may face decisions in which he is responsible for attempting to see into the future and decide which avenues of research get funds and which ones don't (because the money is finite and he can't fund everything). His professional judgment of the future results and benefits of those projects will certainly play a role in those decisions.

But this is also not a problem that would be unique to Collins, and it would be a fair concern to have regardless of who was nominated.

The other source of knowledge that I can rely on is " .... ".

The only other sources I can think of requires an acceptance that you, or Pletho, have special knowledge or that I have special knowledge. Iow, it's not demonstrably reliable, even to myself ( if I could demonstrate to myself I could demonstrate it to you).

The others come down to "it is reliable because I believe it is reliable".