Yes, I'm sure you have.

Reality is, regardless of whether we know it is. But you've established knowledge of reality as a prerequisite of reality. I don't see how this is coherent.

Theists do the same.

How is someone through their own personal knowledge who says a possible God is unknowable any different then a theists who says God is knowable through their personal knowledge. Same difference just a different side of the coin.

What does this have to do with the question of reality?

Theist make a claim on reality. Someone who says there could be a God but its unknowable makes a claim on reality.


Im probably missing the point though.

Yeah.

This is the structure of the sentence (amending the grammar):

Whatever the claim happens to be (regardless of whether it is knowable or unknowable), it cannot affect reality/unreality. That is, if turns out that the claim is "just fantasy" then the unknowability of it did not have any impact of its being "just fantasy."

That you think shouting "zybbzt" is a viable alternative to CPR on a traffic victim, because saying it is fantasy presupposes a claim on reality is fine and groovy.

I don't. Let's move on.

Not before pointing out that this is a absurd analogy. I can think of at least three reasons this doesn't make any sense in context ("viable alternative," "presupposes." and the nature of the claim).

What is absurd is that you think claiming something to be a "fantasy" requires "assumptions" or "knowledge" about "reality".

Saying that something is a fantasy is obviously based on the state of the evidence and soundness of claims, not the evidence's relative truth value compared to some imagined platonic hogwash.

That is ofcourse, for those of us who express themselves in English.

You hold the position that "truth" is irrelevant (or nonsensical... I can't remember which). It's not about the English langauge.

Yes, truth is irrelevant except as a tool in logic, programming, maths, speech and other forms of formal or informal language. Maybe since you have dedicated a large part of your life and work to maths, you find that hard to see.

Anyway, to return to the discussion at hand. You are claiming "reality is", which I find to be a silly claim. The only thing that can reliably said to "be" is experience. Cogito - but no ergo sum, so to speak.

So the only one here making any claims as to some mystical "reality" as an argumentative trump card is, as the evidence clearly shows, you.

You're welcome to create such a system, but I'm not even sure if this hyper-pragmatist(?) understanding of truth is even one that is well-grounded philosophically. Even pragmatists deal with the question of "truth."

It seems to be a rather narrow-minded approach to knowledge to close off entire swaths of it, but maybe it's because you haven't spent a large part of your life and work dedicated to things that concern themselves with truth content. (Ignorance is bliss.)

This is very ad hoc and nonsensical. By what standard are you determining that "experience" (whose experience?) is the "only thing" that can "reliably" said to be? I can accept the position that both of our claims are equally silly, but you've got to construct an argument if you want to say that mine is and yours is not.

My memory is that you don't subscribe to solipsism. From any non-solipsistic understanding, your claim doesn't seem particularly tenable. (And if you do subscribe to solipsism, you should stop arguing with yourself.)

A camera can't see the truth of a tumor except as a formal representation of information (language), and our brains haven't displayed any signs of being able to do better (merely differently).

Solipsism must assume the existence of a mind, which is far too bombastic. Experience on the other hand can't be denied (since the very act of denying it would be experience).

Empiricism is therefore superior to any other epistomological method.

Oh and obviously statements like the above which can be shown to be wrong and that can be argued will always be superior to statements meant to mislead, avoiding commitment and an apologetical approach to knowledge. "Not even wrong" is not a desirable value for outlooks on life.

Wait a minute. How is it absurd to categorize something as fantasy without at least some knowledge about reality? Assuming we know everything about reality, distinguishing between real and imaginary becomes as easy as distinguishing between numbers or colours.

And what do you suppose the basis is for determining the "soundness of claims"? It comes back to having some prerequisite knowledge about reality.

Is this experience "real" or can we not be sure that it's "real"?

Also, you have to keep something in mind, and that is that truth and reality are not independent from each other. Whatever is real is true. According to your view of truth being irrelevant, whatever reality ends up being you would treat as irrelevant?

That seems prima facie weird.

For now, let alone the ambitious leap of deductive logic in reaching your conclusion on empiricism; we may come to that later.

On one hand you claim that the truth is irrelevant, yet on the other you either ignore or don't realize that truth is the foundation of knowledge. Epistemology is the study of methods of obtaining knowledge, as well as its limits, so it's the study of the methods of obtaining truth. You cannot claim to have "knowledge" on some thing that is inherently false. You can have knowledge on the truth about its falsehood, but the thing itself remains to be false and thus not knowledge.

Again, it's very strange that you claim the irrelevancy of truth, yet make a conclusion on a superior method of obtaining truth.

A camera lacks the capacity to conceptualize a tumor.

This is odd. What does this position say with respect to any sort of personal experience with God?

Therefore? You mean you're trying to establish something using logic, which pertains to truth values of statements as an epistemological method, which is not addressed by empiricism?

I think you need to take a step back and rethink your position. It's getting worse.

"Cogito" is thinking, not experience. Descartes claimed that the veracity of our sense experience could be doubted in a way that thinking could not. This is why Descartes is the paradigmatic rationalist figure of modern philosophy. So saying just, "cogito" is rather opposite of what you mean, I think.

I think what is confusing is that "fantasy" is usually contrasted with "reality." Thus, when you say that God is just a fantasy, it seems like you are saying that God is not real (not part of reality). This is the same distinction that we use when we say that a statement is true. Thus, if you don't want to use the concepts of "truth" or "reality," then you probably can't really use the concept of "fantasy." You can say that talk about God has no empirical significance. However, you will then run into people (such as me) who say (a) Yes it does and (b) So what if it doesn't?

Descartes had no knowledge of how neurons communicate to form representation, if he did then he would have realized that his distinction was horribly misguided.

Ofcourse I want to use the concept of truth, I have already said it is an important tool in formal and informal language...to the extent that is impossible to have a functioning language without it. The sounds and writing methods we use are also extremely useful, but I'm not going to run around thinking that some imagined "reality" can reasonably be said to be "aaaa" compared to a mountain.

AaronW says it all here, but seems to not realize it:

It's easy to just assert things, isn't it? Do you have *ANY* basis upon which to make this claim?

More assertions! Do computers require a concept of truth in order for its language to be "functional"? I don't even know what you're claiming here about "functionality" of language...



Are you saying that the brain also lacks the capacity to conceptualize a tumor? You keep drawing up these analogies, but they don't go anywhere or make any sense.

To me, this conversation sounds like you've backed yourself into a corner early on, and instead of starting over, you've just kept on going.

Can you explain this further (I'm being sincere)? How is the sense experience/reason distinction shown to be false by modern neuroscience?
I would say that the function of "truth" in modeling is to connect the model to the world, i.e. reality. So you are correct that it is important in formal and informal languages, but it is important because it connects the model or language to reality. If you want to claim that there is no such thing as reality, or that there is no point in talking about it, then it seems to me that you are saying that this is an unnecessary aspect of language.

I suspect that you are equivocating between empiricism as a methodology (we can only learn knowledge through sense experience), and empiricism as an ontology (only sense experience is "real"), but you really want to accept both. If so, that's not an unreasonable thing to do. I would say then that AaronW and I are defending the Lockean view that what goes on in the mind are representations of an external reality, and you are defending the Berkeleyan view that all that exists is what goes on in the mind.

Then I can only suggest reading.

Since sensory information is represented by neuron signal maps in the brain just like cognitive functions also are, it is a mistake to treat one as more dependable than the other. Ofcourse the sensory processing regions of the brain is different from the regions where thinking takes place, but the rules of the game still apply. It's also relatively easy to show how both are very suspectible to various forms of sensory and cognitive errors, and how their interdependence will even make such errors cross over.

Then I am in disagreement. I would say the function of truth is as a tool in modelling what we experience and in communication.

We can't "start" with assuming reality, we have to start with what we experience and realize that knowledge is instrumental.


We can obviously learn through informal or informal language systems (as long as there is experience) and saying sensory experience is "real" is misunderstanding the point. Sensory experience is only that, you can represent it - but digging for some "reality" will just send you in an endless loop of representations upon representations.

It seems to me here that you actually are distinguishing between the category of sense experience and cognitive functions. I thought you were saying that Descartes' use of this distinction (which isn't original with him; Plato also makes this distinction), was what led him into error.

Anyway, I mainly wanted to point out the inappriopriateness of using Descartes' cogito as an illustration of your point, not make a general point about empiricist vs. rationalist epistemology, which seems like a side-issue.
I'm not sure I understand what an error is on your construal. Since you think there is only sensory experience, but this sensory experience is not a representation of an objective reality, how could it be in error? It just is whatever it is.

As for the relative dependability of sensory and cognitive functions in the brain, I'm not as interested in your epistemological claim, but your ontological one.

A tool for doing what? What is its function? As I said, I view it as a tool as well, but a tool noting the accuracy of our representations of reality. If we aren't representing anything, then what is its purpose?

Sensory experience itself is a representation though, no? I mean, our senses might be presented with a "blooming, buzzing confusion," but at the level of experience, this has been organized into a relatively ordered presentation of objects, events, and so on. So if you want to start at this level, experience, and not appeal to the external causes of experience (what I would call "reality"), that would be a case of representations of representations all the way down.

Yep.

Yep, his distinction is erroneous.

If I had meant it as early 1600s terminology, I would surely have been horribly mistaken.

Sure, hit your thumb with a hammer and if it doesn't hurt come back to me and repeat this argument.

I have never said sensory experience isn't a representation of reality, I have said that claiming sensory experience is a representation of reality as an argument for or against anything is bogus.

Maybe it's a representation of 8hskjknj. Who knows.

Yes, that's the point.

Thanks, that's helpful.

I could tell that you didn't mean to use seventeenth-century terminology when you quoted a seventeenth-century philosopher.

Okay. I hit my thumb and it hurts. Now what? Is this like a weird hazing ritual you make people go through before answering their questions? Does that mean you'll answer mine now?

You seem to think that the claim that our sense experience represents reality is meaningless. Seems like a denial to me. But I'm not really clear on what you are asserting here, so maybe I'm wrong.

Also, still waiting to hear what you think the purpose of truth is (what is it a tool for?)...

Actually - I didn't quote Descartes. I twisted his expression humorously, because Descartian philosophy has done enormous damage to the field of psychology.

If you didn't assume my knowledge of European philosophy was at the level of a highschool freshman, this particular side "debate" would not be needed.

I didn't really take your queston very seriously, because our posting history together has shown that your questions rarely are questions.

But if you want a serious reply then now you have two states and when you have more states you can start using truth as tool (formal or informal) to separate them and to separate other states or actions that lead to them.

I'm asserting that saying X models objective reality as an argument for or against X is meaningless.

I don't think it is very deep claim...it's actually fairly basic, and both you and Aaron seem like intelligent enough people to understand it just fine...so I would wish for you two to move on and disagree with it and explain why.

Purpose like some deeper objective intention or purpose as in what it is used for?