I dont know what I would have supported in a time in which I do not exist.

I don't want truth-laden oughts because I value freedom above rules, whether the rules happen to be ethical or non-ethical.

Okay.

Here you are stating moral skepticism arguments as a problem for naturalistic morality. I agree, they are a problem. I don't have any great answer to the italicized question. I don't think there is one, natural or supernatural. But that is fundamentally a question of knowledge. How do we know that this view is right? We don't. As I said before, I bottom out at the idea that happiness and flourishing are good things that we as humans should value. Moral choices and how we should live our lives are forced upon us and since we don't know what moral theory is correct, at the end of the day, we either just go along with our general cultural values or we decide to accept something as our values. I think this is true for all moral theories, natural or supernatural.

I'm mostly agnostic about this.

I'm talking about values and goals and it is a fact about the world that they can come into conflict with each other. You are yourself claiming this when you use your serial killer who takes pleasure in killing example.

Answering these questions are not trivial, but we can settle them. For instance, I think we've mostly settled that chattel slavery doesn't lead to happiness and flourishing. You seem to suggesting happiness and flourishing are random outcomes unrelated to our choices or place in life. Surely that isn't your actual view.

Then give me a definition that reflects this.
If you are willing to grant me abstract objects as natural objects then this conversation is trivial. Of course the naturalist can believe in an objective morality, truth, etc to the full degree. She just has to become a Platonist about morality.

It's not a question of knowledge, it's a question of reality. Do they exist or not? You seem skeptical about it, but mostly because you've been conflating subjective and objective morality for 5 posts. The italicized question is the moral question.

Precisely, so your subjective moral claim about human flourishing is merely that---an uninformed opinion. In order to establish moral oughts, we need to establish moral truth, and that, if it exists, exists independent of subjective opinions.

That's not bottoming out, you haven't even started yet. You're still asserting that chocolate is the best flavor.

Yes, all of these things are arbitrary unless moral values exist objectively. You are getting closer to being a consistent atheist.

It wouldn't be true for a set of objective moral values that actually exist.



Then all your moral claims are subjective and thus, void of meaning.

Yes, no subjective view of morality is anymore right than another if subjective moral value is all there is. If there is an objective set of moral values that is true, then people can be right and wrong to varying degrees about morality.



We haven't even agreed that happiness and flourishing are something we ought to accomplish! Why should we?




Here's a set of oughts

1. You ought to eat two ice cream sundaes every Sunday
2. You ought to floss your teeth with sweetgrass
3. You ought to kill every person older than 80, except your kin, and every cat you see if there is a reasonable chance you won't get caught
4. You ought to donate to the church of scientology

It's arbitrary. Some people might agree with some or all of them and some people will disagree with all of them. Those are subjective opinions about this set of oughts. Now how do we establish that this set of oughts is true? Unless we have access to the set of actual oughts, we have no way of knowing if any of them are true. Without having access to the actual set of oughts, we may as well claim the sky is green. Moral claims are absurd unless you first accept there is some moral standard by which to judge them.

Here's another one:

1. We should act in such a way that leads to human flourishing and happiness
2. We should act in such a way that limits human pain and suffering.

Well? Why? You can believe this all you want, you're still believing something that isn't necessarily true. Only when you have access to the real set of oughts can you decide if either or both of these is true. Either there is a real set of oughts or there isn't. If there is, then it either exists empirically and is accessible by logic or it is instantiated by an authority. That subject might be God or something else. If there is no God or other authority which instantiates moral value, then morality is an illusion.

Then believing in God is just as logical as not believing in one.

I'm hopeful it doesn't exist independent of subjective opinion. I have a strong distaste for Kant, Mills, and any other authoritarian trying to tell me what to do. Give me virtue ethics instead.

A set of moral rules that hold true eternally would take all the fun out. Moreover, if discovered, it may imply some higher power, which would turn all of this into a real shhiitt-show. A rule-master, judgement, and all that jazz.

No thanks.

That's what objective means.

Also, whether or not you want it to be true has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not it is.

I'm not interested in your desired view of the world.

Thanks anyway.

Sure, I think I agree with this. As I've stated, the moral standard that I'm using here is that we should act to improve human flourishing and happiness, so I would evaluate these oughts on the basis of that rule.

Here's my basic disagreement with you. Like most humans, I want to live a happy life. I also want to be fully self-actualized, to achieve my goals, to help other people also live good lives, and so on. These desires are not arbitrary - I assume that many of them are the result of basic human drives and desires developed through evolution, both natural and cultural. The outcomes of evolution are not arbitrary (they are based on natural selection), but they are contingent. That is, if evolution had taken different paths, then I could have different desires, etc. Nonetheless, evolution took the path it took, and so I have the desires and preferences I have. This is true for other humans as well.

Given those facts about the world, it doesn't seem to me at all obvious how I should live my life. Will I be happier if I get divorced or not? Should I cheat on my taxes? How much time and effort should I put into caring for my children? Will society provide more opportunity for self-fulfillment if policy x is adopted? These are questions that morality (as I view it) are trying to answer. Given the facts about human psychology and society, how can we best achieve our goals and desires.

Now, you are asking more fundamental questions. You are saying, hey, since the outcomes of evolution are contingent, including my desires, psychology, and so on, why should I view fulfilling my own or other people's desires as worth pursuing at all? After all, if evolution had taken a different path, then maybe we wouldn't view them as worth pursuing. Since natural selection doesn't have any particular moral valence, how could what is right or wrong to do depend on it? In other words, suppose I lived what I'm describing above as a "good life" - happy, long, self-actualized, with people I love and so on. There is no reason to think that I should view this as a goal worth pursuing just because I desire it. My desires themselves are just another contingency and so have no moral force.

It's true that I don't have much of an answer to this question. There are a few proposals that attempt to answer this, eg Kantianism, Platonism, various theistic proposals, etc. None of these proposals rise above interesting hypotheses in my estimation. So I'm left with no certain answer as to what is morally right to do regardless of the contingencies of human evolution. This is what you are talking about as "objective morality."

However, we don't need to answer this question to live a "good" life. The good life I described above is based on the contingent features of who we are, our actual desires, our character and social status, etc. All those questions that presuppose a contingent human nature can still be answered and, if answered well, can lead to a good life for me and other people. Maybe you aren't satisfied to call this "morality." Fine, whatever, I'm not that bothered. But it does the thing I started out wanting, which was to figure out what to do, how to live a good life. If it turns out that I have no universal basis for wanting to be happy or to have a flourishing life, oh well. In that case, I'd still want to do what I was doing, fulfilling my own and other people's desire for happiness and so on.

You claimed it is absurd for an atheist to believe in objective morality. Platonic views of morality are objective views of morality and are compatible with atheism. Thus, it is not absurd for the atheist to believe in objective morality. What does this have to do with how logical it is to believe in a God?

No. That is and has always been the fundamental question. I'm glad you're getting it now.

There ya go.

It doesn't matter what our desires are or what evolution would have or could have done. There is no good reason to follow any particular path AT ALL, including those we naturally desire, unless there is absolute moral authority that acts a certain way and you wish by your actions to follow its lead. Your 'good life' is subjective, and your subjectivity is irrelevant to the question of how human beings ought to behave. Thus, if there is no moral authority, there is no morality--only nihilism. The same goes for questions of meaning, purpose, etc. You can pretend ala Victor Frankl that your subjective will to purpose is real and meaningful and you can do it well---it supposedly got him through forced labour camps during the holocaust---but it doesn't transcend your subjective view to do so. In order to transcend the subjective, there must be something to transcend TO.

This is flat out nonsense.

Even worse. Arrogant nonsense. Authoritarian nonsense. Amongst the worst kind of nonsense.

Why is it nonsense? I'd like a fuller explanation.

I think that I should include a disclaimer: I'm not familiar w/ the thread of varying philosophical viewpoints so if anyone tosses a particular philosopher at me I'll be at a disadvantage but my question is this: How is it possible to decide what is moral in a mechanistic universe that has simply arranged the atoms in a brain as it has happened to work out? An individual has zero free will in such an event. I watched a Sam Harris vid wherein he explains the acts of a vicious criminal in terms of bad genes and an unfortunate upbringing.

How is anyone to make a judgement that that criminal acted immorally if all of his actions are explained in that way?

I don't recall him telling us his desired view of the world.

In the future, please do us all a favor and wait until you're sober before posting. Thanking you in advance.

Have to go, but the world isn't mechanism and this thought of machines and what is birthed from it, is nonsense. there comes a point in the mechanistic viewpoint that matters become immeasurable or incongruous either if one goes out to the ends of the universe or to the beginnings of the fetus of human birth.

In some respect we can go through the pictures of the fetus in reverse is some idea of a geometric mathematics but there will be a point where we can go no further and the mathematics fails. This is entry into the unknown.

Likewise consider the movements of the planets , sun, moon, and earth and this incommensurability again arises, for arithmetic or algebraic certainty is lost. This is entry into the unknown.

If the cosmos were mechanistic then it would immediately "freeze" into a death clysis .

All the above can be ascertained just by studying the researches and thoughts of modern scientists and that's why we have "theorem" and "hypothesis"(which is more to the point).

The mathematical certainty desired by Kant becomes mechanistic but only in our approach to the cosmos as carried within. In no way does this imply that because I carry the thought that the sun sits still in the heavens does it do so for , of course, modern astrophysicists are sure that the sun moves in its own pattern.

In one look at the hero of science Galileo was a pest who told the others that the sun sits still but they believed what they saw was movement of the sun and denied him. Neither spoke the perfect truth as the movement perceived through the senses was only half the answer whereas Galileo was in the same circumstance, only in reverse.

What we have throughout the human, at present, is easy fanciful thoughts and thinking and this is science.

Sam Harris is a soft determinist (most materialists are) although it's possible to be a non-determinist, though the idea is a lot fuzzier. Soft determinism allows us freedom of thought and action but that we are compelled in various ways towards certain ends. Determinism is more coherent with unguided materialism. He's also a utilitarian based on his Moral Landscape book (maximize the greatest possible good). Personally I think the very fact the world is here is bizarre. The fact that there are conscious, self-aware beings upon it is even more bizarre and materialism seems to be self-evidently false. I don't believe it's possible to get life from non-life, consciousness from non-consciousness, morality from amorality, and free will from pure determinism.

First of all, from a pragmatic point of view, moral atheists clearly exist. 99.99% of us do not murder or kick puppies. As I've argued, these moral standards come from history, including evolutionary biology.

The conversation we are having is actually over the definition of morality. If we determine that someone is moral by measuring what they do, then most atheists are ethical. If the test is what we say, then again, atheists profess principles, just like you.

You are basically arguing that although atheists stigmatize punching old ladies, it isn't "really" morality because it did not come from a deity.

You are arguing from definition. You have defined morality as coming from God, so you have already won the argument. But this is a word game, you have not proven anything.

Example: For many reasons, we must not stab our neighbors' kids. To wit, humans have a positive biological reaction to young things and do not want to hear them scream in horror. We have learned that murder goes against our interest because it provokes retaliation and grief. We build elaborate edifices to prevent it. Enforcer types have learned that they can make a living as cops by offering to protect us from violence and chaos. They become another constituency for laws and order. We read stories to our own offspring and train them to be nice. Humans like social contact, and we will be ostracized if we shoot Dennis the Menace. And so on. For a great variety of reasons, we have internalized the value that we should not kill neighborhood kids.

I believe you are going to say that all those reasons are pragmatic self-interest, not morality. I'm saying, what I described is morality. That is where it comes from, history and biology, which eventually get translated into edicts.

Now religious belief can be powerful, but the great list of historical factors I barely started to list are, on balance, more powerful than the reason that God said not to kill. And note that even God's morality that you are talking about has little effect on behavior if the community is not enforcing it.

Good.

This is like saying that because the gravitational constant is contingent and empirical that we have no good reason to use it when building or guiding rockets. In general, your problem has been an inability to understand what it would be like to live in a world without a transcendent moral law or authority. It's true that in such a world there is no transcendent moral law/authority justifying our actions or goals (duh). I've also agreed that ultimately in such a world our values and goals are freely chosen by us - not because of some universal principle but on the basis of our own contingent desires and character. In this sense, there is no further justification for these values or goals. Their meaning, value, and justification comes from us as humans, not a God or transcendent law.

However, that leaves us with the practical problem of how to achieve these goals and further these values. On my account, this is what morality is about, figuring out principles that make it possible for us to live with other people so that we can achieve these goals/values. In this sense, morality is not justified on the basis of a transcendent law/authority, but on the basis of its effectiveness in achieving these goals. I'll call this morality*.

Now, it is true that this leaves open the possibility that some people can have goals/values that are diametrically opposed to morality*. Their goals are such that they can't really be made compatible with other people also achieving their goals/values. For such people, such as your serial killer, moral* considerations have no force. We can't persuade them to stop doing what they are doing through reason, we can only try to stop them - either through force or incentives. But that doesn't mean that morality* doesn't apply to them. After all, the existence of such people and the mediation of different values is exactly why we need morality* in the first place. It just means that they have chosen to not live by such considerations. I, and others, can still live by morality* considerations. After all, by definition, we benefit from doing so.

I understand that you think that morality* is not a true morality (rather something like a hypothetical instead of categorical imperative). That's fine. I'm not trying to do a conceptual analysis here. Rather, I'm presenting a picture of how, even in a world with no transcendent basis for morality, something very close to it might exist and be justified even so. I don't need to justify my liking chocolate ice cream on transcendent moral principles. I also don't need to justify my wanting to live a happy and flourishing life on transcendent moral principles. It's true that I can't reason other people into adopting this desire if they don't already have it. But so what? As a matter of fact, most people do have these desires, and the furtherance or hindrance of these desires is affected by their own and other people's actions. Developing principles such as, don't steal, are useful heuristics to guide our behavior towards others so that we all benefit.

Never said they didn't. But why is it wrong to murder and kick puppies? What is that moral ought not based upon?

Again, just because the majority of humans have inbound desires it does not follow that satiation of these desires and feelings are what we ought to accomplish. You cannot derive an ought from an is.

Morality is already defined. It's how we ought to behave.

No, I'm saying you cannot derive how we ought to behave from how most of us behave. Understand?

What I have actually said is that atheism logically leads to nihilism.

Just the fact that most of us are repulsed by the thought of murdering kids doesn't mean we shouldn't murder kids. Psychopaths get pleasure from inflicting pain. Why are they wrong? Because most of us don't feel that way? Most Nazis hated Jews; were they right because they were the majority?

No it's not morality. How most of us behave does not determine how we should behave.

Adding a father figure into the mix doesn't resolve anything.

Admitting only a single reason as a "good reason" for doing what you do (following some path) is nonsense. This standard is based on circular reasoning, whereby we must first assume the existence of a moral authority in order to have the standard, which in-turn demands a moral authority.

Someone who does not believe or wish to be believe in a moral authority, will admit more than one reason as a "good reason" because in reality more than one reason can lead to moral outcomes and moral behaviour. There are three main systems of ethics based on this:

1. Deontological (categorical imperative/intention-based)
2. Consequential (utilitarianism/outcome-based)
3. Virtue ethics (Moral behaviours as skills you get better at).

All of these systems admit more than a single reason.

What's clear is that you do not understand what arguing from definition is and totally miss the point and just keep repeating yourself. You are claiming that only your definition of morality can be used, therefore your conclusions are correct. And no, of course the meaning is not fixed, except in the minds of pedantic church ladies.

You like to think you proceed from a firm morality while atheists do not. But yours suffers all the same weaknesses. Unless you are Moses, you did not receive a moral code direct from the lord. You access it through reading, discussion, participation in community, the way you were raised. You like to think your morality is authentic, but a quick glance shows a bewildering variety of interpretation, because it all comes through human eyes, ears, and tongues -- it's representation, not God. Except for you, who thinks you are Moses. Claiming only you have the true word is just a used car con, and you call it theology.

5. God says, "Ted Bundy, you ought not murder people."

Ted Bundy asks God, "Why should I care about your oughts?"

God says, "Because I am delivering to you the absolute, universal, objective super-duper moral truth."

Ted asks God, "Why should I care?"

Why should Ted care any more about 5 than he cares about 1? If he has decided that the only thing important to him is the enjoyment he gets from murdering people, what can you say to him?

I'd like to know how what is no more than a fizz of elementary particles can decide anything.

I'd like to know how you came to conclude that we're "no more than a fizz..."

'Flesh Robot in the service of a molecule.' Better?

Cuz we say we can.

A little bit, but why do you seem to have no problem accepting that elementary particles can form molecules?

Is there something about elementary particles that make emergent behavior impossible in principle? Do you doubt all emergence, or only some? If the latter, how do you decide?